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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of EU Regional Policy is to intervene effectively in regions that “lag behind” in 
economic terms and to finance development programmes through the allocation of 
Structural Funds which operate in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity, 
additionality and partnership. This policy should allow regions to converge with EU 
averages in terms of income and employment. Italy and Spain provide very good 
examples within the EU as a whole, of significant economic disparities between regions 
that still appear to be present. We argue and provide substantial evidence of the fact that 
the persistence of such disparities is mainly due to inefficient administrative and 
institutional capacity at the regional level. Although some regions have brought 
themselves towards the average, in Italy and Spain, there is evidence that certain 
administrative, institutional and implementation problems have tended to appear, 
hampering the opportunities of regions to converge in the required way. Because of this, 
regional economic convergence and thereby socio-economic cohesion are still beyond 
reach. Two decades after the 1988 Reform of the Structural Funds, EU Regional Policy 
has only partially succeeded in reducing regional economic divergence within Italy and 
Spain, where regional economic inequalities still exist. Although we demonstrate that 
some regions have been able to move forward in the requisite way, it is questionable 
whether all of the support for these regions can actually be eliminated completely in the 
near future with the challenges that the EU faces, particularly in relation to the latest 
round of Enlargement.    
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
       
1.1-AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
       The main aim of this thesis is to critically examine the impact of the European 
Union (EU) Regional “Cohesion” Policy1 on Italy and Spain in order to increase our 
understanding of the reasons behind an economic divergence amongst the NUTS 
(Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques2) 2 regions of these two countries 
which is still present. It also attempts to explore whether EU Regional Policy, according 
to its four fundamental principles of subsidiarity, additionality, partnership, and 
programming, has contributed positively to regional economic convergence, towards the 
cohesion target. The analysis relies on three performance indicators: employment rates, 
unemployment rates and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. In very simplified 
terms, the argument underpinning this thesis can be synthesised in the following flow-
chart.  
 
       Institutional capacity is the basis for regional economic convergence to take place 
and the comparative element in the examination of the Italian and Spanish case studies 
                                                 
1 The meaning of “Regional” Policy is the same as that of “Cohesion” Policy. The main aim of EU 
Regional Policy is the establishment of economic cohesion amongst its Member States, so throughout the 
thesis, the EU Regional Policy is sometimes referred as “Cohesion” one. 
2 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. In our thesis, NUTS 2 regions include EU regions with 
a population between 800,000 and 3 million inhabitants (Europa, 2008a). 
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will be strengthened by a framework focused on institutional capacity building. 
Institutional capacity includes all the actions, programmes and projects needed in order 
for an institution to function properly and according to the specific needs for which it 
has been established. In the case of the thesis, this term is applied to regional institutions. 
Institutional capacity building means the establishment of regional administrations 
capable of putting the regional policy into practice and, hence, satisfactory regional 
institutional capacity building involves making the regional institutions that comprise 
the regional administrations competent to a) identify the regional problems and needs, b) 
become familiarised with the EU Regional Policy framework and basic principles, c) 
cooperate efficiently with the EU institutions for EU Regional Policy [European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), Cohesion Fund, 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)] and d) find solutions to those regional 
problems that hamper development. 
       Institutional capacity is closely linked with administrative capacity. Regional 
administrative capacity includes all the actions and management conducted by the 
regional governments in order for regional development to take place. Such actions 
include not only the management of the Structural Funds (SFs), but also the entire range 
of responsibility of the regional governments. The responsibilities of the Italian NUTS 2 
regions include a) community and social services, b) planning, c) economic 
development, d) health and e) police. The responsibilities of the Spanish NUTS 2 
regions include a) urban planning, b) regional development, c) housing, d) public works, 
e) environment, f) social services, g) culture, h) tourism, i) agriculture and j) 
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communications (Russell Barter, 2000). Administrative capacity is linked to the 
efficient absorption of the SFs and thus it is linked with the term “spending capacity”.  
       Spending capacity is the ability of regions to absorb the SFs (allocated to them by 
the EU in the context of EU Regional Policy) in the best possible way in order for 
regional development to take place. Spending capacity is the ability of regions to invest 
the SFs in certain sectors and areas which have potential for future economic growth 
and development. Spending capacity can be measured as a percentage of the funds 
already “spent” compared to those initially allocated. In the context of the SFs 
expenditures, there is a two-step procedure. The first step includes the initial allocation 
of SFs, where it is necessary for SFs to be committed to specific expenditures in terms 
of individual programmes-projects, or a set of projects. This first step requires the need 
to exactly identify where the allocated SFs can be spent (invested) in order for regional 
development to take place. The second step includes the expenditures that have to take 
place in order to pay for the actual realisation of the programmes, or projects. Spending 
capacity is expressed by the percentage of the executed payments over the committed 
ones (Glusman, 2010; Leonardi, 2003 and 2005; Milio, 2007 and 2010; Mota and 
Noferini, 2010).  
       Regional economic convergence in general means the elimination of economic 
disparities that exist between regions. Convergence is here intended in economic terms 
and it is measured in terms of per capita GDP (relative to the EU average). Convergence 
is understood as a process of regional growth that permits low performing regions to 
experience increasing GDP per capita, which ultimately tends to converge to the EU-27 
average. For Convergence Regions this means aspiring to reach a GDP per capita above 
75% of the EU-27 average, thereby exiting the Convergence Objective. 
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       Measuring the process of convergence is complex, and calls for the combination of 
two factors: a) it is necessary to refer to a temporal framework, as convergence implies 
an action of approximation, and this requires development to be measured over a period 
of time, b) it is necessary to compare the evolution of the region’s economy with that of 
its immediate areas of reference (interview with officials at the General Direction of 
European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). For example, we can compare the 
convergence of the regions with that of the countries of which they are part, or the EU 
as a whole.   
       The concept of convergence is closely related to the concept of cohesion. Cohesion 
is the related political objective. It is a political science term meaning the harmonisation 
of socio-economic disparities, in order for a region to function more appropriately 
towards progress, socio-economic stability and development. Income convergence is the 
means by which in part economic cohesion is achieved (Leonardi, 2005). This close 
relation between cohesion and convergence is indicative of the close relation of the 
fields of economics and political science in this thesis. If economic convergence does 
not take place, then the political objective of socio-economic cohesion cannot take place 
either. Cohesion is the outcome of convergence. 
       Regional economic divergence is the exact opposite of convergence and means the 
continuous existence of economic disparities between regions. Regional economic 
disparities are the economic differences between regions in the context of specific 
economic variables, such as GDP, income, employment and unemployment.        
       The Convergence Objective “aims to help the least developed Member States and 
regions that are lagging behind to close the gap more quickly in relation to the EU 
average by improving conditions for growth and development” (Regional Policy 
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Inforegio/Convergence Objective, 2010:1) and its main areas of action include 
infrastructure, employment, information and communication technologies and 
administrative efficiency in public services and administration (Regional Policy 
Inforegio/Convergence Objective, 2010). Overall, the Convergence Objective aims to 
create growth-enhancing factors and conditions, which can deliver real convergence for 
the least-favoured EU regions (Regional Policy Inforegio/Key Objectives, 2009). The 
sources of funding are the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund, although the latter 
does not apply to Italy.     
       The key question we aim to address is whether EU Regional Policy, through the 
allocation of the SFs, has indeed resulted in a reduction in unemployment and an 
increase in GDP per capita and employment in the four Italian (Campania, Calabria, 
Puglia and Basilicata) and four Spanish (Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, 
Andalucía and Extremadura) case studies of the thesis 3 . We would argue that 
satisfactory institutional capacity building depends on the efficiency of the structural 
adjustments that should take place within the regional administrations, in order for the 
Community Support Framework (CSF) to be put in practice in a more adequate way. 
This would lead to a better utilisation of EU funds, which would then be likely to have a 
more visible impact on regional economic development. In order for a satisfactory 
regional economic performance to take place to work towards the target of economic 
convergence, spending capacity must be successfully associated with adequate 
institutional capacity. In the EU context, the mark of a satisfactory regional economic 
performance for a region would be its exclusion of a region from the Convergence 
Objective, as its GDP per head had grown above the 75% threshold.        
                                                 
3 Note: All NUTS 2 regions referred in this thesis are cited exactly as they are referred at the official 
documents by Eurostat. 
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       So far, we can argue that in the cases of Sardegna, Basilicata, Castilla y León and 
Comunidad Valenciana, the results of the combination of spending and institutional 
capacity have been encouraging, with the result that these four regions have been able to 
be excluded from the Convergence Objective. In the remaining four regions selected in 
the thesis, despite the fact that the allocation of the EU SFs was more than generous, the 
results are less than encouraging, as these regions are still included in the Convergence 
Objective for the current CSF Cycle (2007-13). Regional economic development has 
indeed taken place in these regions as well, but to a lesser extent. We would argue that 
one of the main reasons for this is their institutional problems. The following sections 
clarify the methodology on which this thesis is based, as well as the design of the 
structure.   
    
1.2-METHODOLOGY 
       The methodology of the thesis is based on the collection of primary and secondary 
data. Primary data are collected through conducting interviews with regional and 
national policy-makers for the eight case study regions chosen for the analysis, as well 
as representatives of the EU Commission. The interviewees at the regional, national and 
EU level were carefully chosen according to their knowledge, experience and the 
specific positions they hold. The interviewees at the regional level were regional 
ministers, regional presidents, directors, managers, administrative members and 
university professors involved with EU Regional Policy. The interviewees at the 
national level were general directors, sub-directors, economic analysts and members of 
evaluation units at the Italian and Spanish Ministries in charge of regional policies. The 
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interviewees at the EU level were programme managers in charge of EU Regional 
Policy in Italy and Spain, working for the European Commission in Brussels. 
       Secondary data have been gathered from a critical survey of the current relevant 
literature, as well as statistical data, reports and statistics databases mainly provided by 
Eurostat and the Spanish and Italian national and regional statistical institutes in charge 
of regional policies.        
       The chapters on “Regionalism, Structuralism and Regional Development” and 
“European Union Regional Policy and Policy Evaluation” tend to include mainly 
secondary data and information, whereas those detailing the “Profile of Regional Policy 
in Italy and Spain”, the “Analysis of the four Italian regions” and the “Analysis of the 
four Spanish regions” include a combination of primary and secondary data. All 
primary data are included and presented in Appendix 2, where a summary of the 
transcript of the interviews can be found. 
       The reason for following such a methodological approach is the fact that primary 
directly reported data can offer more direct opinions and comments regarding the 
specific research questions of the thesis and can interact with the main arguments of the 
thesis more efficiently. Primary data are complementary to secondary ones and establish 
a more coherent evaluation of the regional divergence patterns that have taken place in 
both Spain and Italy. The methodology used is further explained in the following 
paragraphs, where the structure of the thesis is briefly presented. 
 
1.3-STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
       The thesis includes six chapters and three appendices. Chapter 2 is on “Regionalism, 
Structuralism and Regional Development” and presents the conceptual theoretical 
 7
framework encasing the research; this is essential for a better understanding of the 
thesis’ arguments. We draw on the following theories: a) region-regionalism, b) 
structuralism-dependency theory and c) theories of regional development (“top-down” 
and “bottom-up” approaches). The first section of the first part of the chapter concerns 
the clarification of the term “region”. It is essential to analyse the characteristics and 
limitations of this term thanks to a critical and comparative literature scrutiny that 
mainly draws on the contributions of Tavares (2004), Evans, (2002), Schmitt-Egner 
(2002) and Downs (2002). 
       An analysis of the term “regionalism” follows in order to define the “regional scale” 
at which this study is based. We then link regionalism with region for a better 
understanding of the foundations of EU Regional Policy. Indeed, regionalism is the 
main theoretical and methodological tool on which EU Regional Policy is based, and it 
is important for analysing the regional policy of Italy and Spain. We also present the 
clash between the intergovernmentalist and supranationalist approaches at the EU level 
and adapt it in the context of the implementation of the SFs by the regions. This section 
of the chapter is mainly based on the work of Allen (2000), Katzenstein (1996), 
Acharya (1999), Ghica (2008), Lerro and Schiuma (2009), Leonardi (2005), Wyatt-
Walter (1995), Tavares (2004), Strecker (1994), Wallis (2002), Hurrell (1995), Bache 
(1999), Bache and Flinders (2004), Bailey and De Propris (2006) Mansfield and Milner 
(1999) and Cable (1994). 
       The second part of this theoretical chapter presents an analysis of “dependency 
theory”, an introduction to the terms “core”, “periphery” and “semi-periphery” and an 
examination of the theory of “structuralism”, as a predecessor of dependency theory. It 
is essential to examine dependency theory, since it can be efficiently linked to regional 
 8
policy. It is related to Marxist theory, and highlights the uneven development that takes 
place in the two countries of our study and sets the criteria according to which adequate 
structural development can become a reality. This part is mainly based on the work of 
Callinicos (1983), Seers (1983), Levitas (1974), Austin (1990), Bailey and Driffield 
(2002), Hymer (Hymer, 1975 in Bailey and Driffield, 2002), Kurzwell (1996), Rice and 
Waugh (1992), Brookfield (1975), Palma (1981) and Frank (Frank, 1967 in Palma, 
1981). 
       In the third part, we look at the theory of “regional development” (mainly based on 
the work of Bergman, Maier and Todtling (1991), Harrop (2000), Martin and Sunley 
(1996), Krugman (1991 and 1994), Krugman and Obstfeld (1997), Krugman and 
Venables (1995), Friedmann (1991), Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996), Stohr and Taylor 
(1981), Hirshman (1958), Myrdal (1957), Pedersen (1991), Comtois (1986), Mittelman 
(1996), Hansen (1981), Williamson (Williamson, 1965 in Hansen, 1981), Darwent 
(1969), Perroux (Perroux, 1950 in Darwent, 1969), Buck (2006) and Illeris (Illeris, 1993 
in Buck, 2006), which argues that regional convergence and regional divergence are 
fundamental processes not only for identifying the problems of regional development4, 
but more broadly also for measuring the extent of a country’s uneven development. The 
last part reviews the “top-down/centre down” and “bottom-up” approaches. We 
critically compare them and use such concepts to trace how policy has changed over 
time in both Spain and Italy.  
       Chapter 3 is on “EU Regional Policy and Policy Evaluation” and discusses how EU 
Regional Policy has been conducted from the establishment of the EEC up to the 
current CSF Cycle (2007-13), with an emphasis on the most important debates and 
                                                 
4 Such as those in Italy and Spain. 
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decisions concerning the impact of EU Regional Policy on Italy and Spain. This chapter 
not only concentrates on the 1988 Regional Policy reforms and the following CSF 
Cycles, but also provides a background to the regional policy of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) since its establishment. In this chapter, we also refer to 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as well as to EU Enlargement, as these are 
factors that have clearly had a serious impact (mainly budgetary) on EU Regional 
Policy. This section is mainly based on the work of Leonardi (2005), Allen (2000), 
Dinan (1999), Gillingham (2003), Armstrong (2004), Bache (1998) and Barry and Begg 
(2003).  
       It further presents a critical survey of the literature on policy evaluation with an 
emphasis on issues such as the ex-ante, intermediate and ex-post evaluations and the 
monitoring procedures. In the final section, an evaluation framework is established in 
order to attempt to estimate the impact of EU Regional Policy in the context of regional 
economic development in Italy and Spain, towards the target of regional economic 
convergence. The evaluation sections are mainly based on the work of Bachtler and 
Mendez (2010a and 2010b), Bachtler, Mendez and Wishlade (2009 and 2010), Bachtler 
and Gorzelak (2007), Polverari and Bachtler (2004), Mirwaldt, McMaster and Bachtler 
(2009), Milio (2007 and 2010), Kearney (1997), Nicita (2008), Feinstein and Zapico-
Goni (2010) and on EU evaluation reports.            
      In the “Profile of Regional Policy in Italy and Spain” chapter, an analytical and 
comparative profile of regional policy and regions in the two EU Member States of the 
thesis is presented. The aim of this chapter is to offer a coherent view of the regional 
economic situation in Italy and Spain, through the use of GDP per capita, employment 
and unemployment rates. A wealth of data is relied upon in order to ascertain whether 
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EU Regional Policy has had a positive impact on these countries and their regions in 
particular. The tables and figures included in this chapter are intended to offer a 
quantitative view of the economic situation, whereas the further analysis based on the 
literature review offers a more qualitative view.  
       In the “Analysis of the four Italian regions” chapter, there is an attempt to critically 
present the four Italian case studies in order to understand why some Italian NUTS 2 
regions have experienced a high degree of regional economic development, whilst some 
others have not. The case studies examined in this chapter are four regions - Basilicata, 
Calabria, Puglia and Campania - which were eligible for Objective 1 funding during the 
third CSF Cycle (2000-2006). The reason for choosing them is that Basilicata has exited 
the Convergence Objective, even as a “Phasing-Out” Region, which means it has exited 
because of the EU Enlargement, while the other three, despite the fact that they also 
received significant amounts of funds, have not significantly reduced divergence and are 
still included in the Convergence Objective, mainly due to problems regarding their 
institutional capacity. We compare the economic performance of these four regions to 
find out the reasons for this outcome with a special emphasis on the management of the 
funds. Regions such as Sardegna and Sicilia are excluded from further study since their 
economy is mainly based on tourism and the inputs and outputs are not clearly 
presented in official statistics.  
       The main variables considered are the GDP per capita and the unemployment and 
employment rates, in addition to a critical observation of regional spending, 
administrative capacity and implementation problems. In this chapter, the analysis of 
secondary data is integrated with primary data extracted from the interviews we 
conducted with key regional authorities. 
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       In the “Analysis of the four Spanish regions” chapter, we present the four Spanish 
case studies – Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía and Extremadura - in 
order to understand the effects of EU Regional Policy on the regions and to measure 
their degree of convergence. These regions have been chosen due to the fact that during 
the third CSF Cycle (2000-2006) they were all included in Objective 1, but during the 
current CSF Cycle (2007-2013) Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana have been 
excluded from the Convergence Objective (both as “Phasing-In” Regions, which means 
they have exited the Convergence Objective due to their significant regional economic 
development), while the other two regions are still included in the Convergence 
Objective despite the fact that they have all received significant SFs.  
       Our analysis critically compares the management of funds and the institutional 
capacity amongst the regions and sheds light on whether EU Regional Policy, through 
the SFs, has indeed helped such regions reach the target of achieving regional 
development and thereby decreasing their extent of their economic divergence. Again 
here a combination of primary and secondary data is essential. Primary data are 
extracted from the interviews we conducted with key regional authorities. 
       Finally, the “Concluding remarks and policy recommendations” chapter 
summarises the main findings of our analysis, offering an evaluation of the convergence 
level reached within the two countries. The main conclusions are three: a) the evident 
regional divergence (clear distinction between core and periphery) that exists in Italy 
and Spain can be effectively analysed and explained by the use of dependency theory, 
which emerges from structuralism, b) the terms new and soft regionalism, as well as 
MLG can be effectively adapted to the case of EU Regional Policy and c) the less-
centralised, “bottom-up” approach seems to be more effective than the “top-down” one, 
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in order for regional development to take place. The currently existing regional 
economic divergence in our eight EU regions used as case studies has its roots in the 
high degree of centralisation of the national regional policies, the inadequate 
cooperation between EU, national and regional authorities, and the lack of respect for 
the principles of additionality, subsidiarity and partnership. 
       Also, in this chapter there is a critical discussion about EU Enlargement and the 
challenges it poses to EU Regional Policy, with the main emphasis given to budgetary 
constraints and more specifically to whether or not (after 2013) the EU can actually 
afford to fund underperforming regions, which have not shown significant traces of 
regional economic convergence and development for the last 20 years. This issue is 
closely related to the question of whether the EU should continue using the bottom-up 
approach after 2013. We feel that this study helps estimate and evaluate the impact of 
regional policy not only in the eight Italian and Spanish case studies, but more generally 
in the cases of the new EU Member States of the currently significantly enlarged EU.  
       The academic contribution of this thesis is mainly applied. The novelty lies in the 
collection of the secondary data and the results that can be drawn from them in the 
context of EU Regional Policy and the adaptation of the aforementioned theoretical 
models to the cases of Italy and Spain. It should be mentioned that the aim of this thesis 
is not to produce a new theory, but to adapt existing theoretical models to the case 
studies in a slightly different way to the studies existing in the current bibliography. The 
combination of primary and secondary data and their analytical presentation in order to 
measure the impact of EU Regional Policy on Italy and Spain are the main contributions 
of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REGIONALISM, STRUCTURALISM AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
       In this section the theoretical framework of the thesis will be presented. It will 
clarify the definition of terms extensively used throughout the thesis and it will critically 
discuss the relevant academic and policy-related contributions. Firstly, it is important to 
clearly define and explain the exact meaning of the term “region”. This survey is about 
regions, so it is necessary to stress clearly what is meant by them. Secondly and related 
to the above, we introduce the term “regionalism” as the main theoretical and 
methodological tool, on which EU Regional Policy is based.  
       Thirdly, we critically analyse “dependency theory” (which highlights the uneven 
development that takes place within Italy and Spain), introducing terms such as “core”, 
“periphery” and “semi-periphery” and examining the theory of “structuralism”, which 
preceded dependency theory. Finally, we analyse the theories of “regional 
development”, which will be the main theoretical instrument used throughout my study. 
The reason for choosing this theory is the fact that its basic elements, which are 
“regional convergence” and  “regional divergence”, are fundamental, not only in order 
to identify the problems of regional development in Italy and Spain, but also in order to 
measure this uneven development and come up with adequate explanations for its 
existence. Related to this, the concepts of “top-down/centre down” and “bottom-up” 
policy approaches will be introduced and compared with relevance to the specific 
characteristics and problems of Italy and Spain.  
       The main concern of EU Regional Policy is the regional economic divergence that 
exists within the EU. Regional disparities and inequalities may result in a real threat to 
the solidarity and the targets of the EU and may have a negative impact on the Single 
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Market and the EMU. The question that needs to be addressed is whether EU Regional 
Policy has had a positive impact in the EU Member States. This section attempts to 
present and critically discuss the main academic work that has been done on EU 
Regional Policy in general, from the beginning of the EEC in the late 1950s up until the 
current decade. It is well accepted that inequalities create economic gaps that may lead 
not only to economic instability, but also to socio-political tensions, overall threatening 
the European vision. Hence, an effective Regional “Cohesion” Policy is undoubtedly 
one of the main concerns of the EU. 
      There are four main bodies of literature that deal with EU Regional Policy. The first 
is economics literature, mainly focused on how public policy can affect growth, job 
creation and unemployment reduction (Krugman, 1991 and 1994; Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 1997; Krugman and Venables, 1995). This body of literature mainly 
concentrates on the economic outcomes of EU Regional Policy (Combes and Overman, 
2004) and tries to estimate how EU Regional Policy will make the peripheral5 Member 
States more competitive in terms of the Single Market and the EMU (Leonardi, 2005). 
      The second body of literature is that of regional science (Milio, 2007 and 2010; 
Evans, 2002; Schmitt-Egner, 2002; Downs, 2002), mainly focused on the policy 
process6. The main question this body attempts to answer is how EU Cohesion Policy 
influences a) the efficiency of development efforts and b) the distribution of well-being 
throughout the national territory (Leonardi, 2005). This literature is more interested in 
the outcomes of the policy, than in the decision-making process. 
      The third stream of literature is concerned with political science, and in particular 
the field of Europeanisation studies, mainly interested in how EU Regional Policy can 
                                                 
5 In terms of income GDP per capita, employment and unemployment. 
6 Outputs and outcomes. 
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affect a) domestic administration and b) internal politics at both a national and regional 
level-context. Unlike regional science, the political science is interested in both the 
decision-making and the implementation process. This body concentrates on how 
institutional interactions7 affect a) the implementation of the Regional Policy guidelines 
and b) the stakeholders who must be the main beneficiaries of policy outputs (Allen, 
2000), (Armstrong, 2004). One of the main characteristics of the political science 
analysis is the Multi-Level Governance (MLG) pattern (Milio, 2010), as it is based on a 
critical comparison and evaluation between the regional, the national and (up to a 
certain extent, especially in the field of Europeanisation Studies) the EU level (Leonardi, 
2005). 
      The fourth body of literature is international relations (IR), mainly focused on how 
policies emerge and function, as well as on the role of actors (Allen, 2000; Harrop, 1996 
and 2000; Gillingham, 2003). This body is not particularly interested either in economic 
outcomes, or decision-making processes, since their main interest is whether the EU fits 
into the model of an international regime. Some IR scientists argue that the EU looks 
like a supranational confederation, others like a loose federation and others like an 
intergovernmental union. We would argue that given the scope of this study, this 
literature is probably the least relevant.  
       The methodological approach of this study is a combination of the first three bodies 
of literature: -economics, regional science and political science-. Studies in economics 
are important because this study is based on the analysis of economic variables, and the 
issues of growth, job creation and unemployment reduction are of main importance. The 
regional science research is also important because one of the most significant attempts 
                                                 
7 Dealing with Regional Policy. 
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of this study is to evaluate the efficiency of development efforts throughout the national 
territory of the Member States examined, namely Italy and Spain. The political science 
research is important since this study is heavily based on MLG patterns and on the 
simultaneous comparison of the regional, national and the EU levels. This body of work 
is focused on the decision making process, which is very important in understanding the 
nature, meaning and implementation of national as well as EU decisions in relation to 
EU Regional Policy. 
       In an attempt to link the main theories used in this thesis (regionalism, structuralism, 
dependency theory and theories of regional development) with the aforementioned 
bodies of literature, we can argue that regionalism is linked with the body of regional 
science research. Structuralism and dependency theory are both mainly linked with the 
body of economic research, because, as we will see after examining these theories, the 
regions are divided in core, semi-periphery and periphery categories according to their 
economic development, which includes income level, investments, employment and 
unemployment. The theories of regional development are linked with both economics 
and political science research, as they deal not only with the economic interactions 
between the developed and less developed regions, but also with the kind of policy that 
should be used in order for regional economic development to take place within the less 
developed regions. As we will see, the top-down and bottom-up approaches are linked 
with the policy-making process (in order to decide which is more efficient for regional 
development), whilst the issue of convergence is clearly associated with economics.               
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2.1-REGION AND REGIONALISM AND THE LINK BETWEEN THEM 
   
2.1.1-REGION: A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
  
       The issues of region and regionalism are linked with the body of literature in 
regional science and the reason for analysing the term “region” is simply the fact that 
this study is about EU Regional Policy, where regions play the most important part 
(Evans, 2002) (Schmitt-Egner, 2002) (Downs, 2002). In practice, it is very difficult to 
find an exact definition of the word “region”, especially due to the broadness and 
complexity of the area of regional studies (Evans, 2002). Thus, it is important to define 
what a region is, not only in a political and economic sense, but also in a linguistic and 
historical one. 
       The word “region” originates from the Latin word “regio” which means a 
geographical, or administrative area “distinguished by similar features” (Tavares, 
2004:4). To be more precise in linguistic terms (Schmitt-Egner, 2002), it is essential to 
mention that the word “regio” derives from the verb “regere” which means “to direct, to 
rule”.  
      The word “region” has more meanings than just a geographical one. It is associated 
with politics, economics, sociology and anthropology. According to Russet (Russet, 
1967 in Tavares, 2004), a region is defined by historical and cultural characteristics, the 
operation of political institutions and economic interdependence. Lagenhove 
(Lagenhove 2003 in Tavares, 2004) argues that in order to clarify the word region it is 
important to make a distinction between “regions” and “non-regions”. According to 
Lagenhove (Lagenhove, 2003 in Tavares, 2004), this distinction becomes possible if we 
consider the region as a) a system of international actions in both a national and an 
international context (Evans, 2002; Schmitt-Egner, 2002; Downs, 2002), b) a system 
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characterised by statehood properties, c) a reciprocal achievement and d) a producer of a 
specific identity (Tavares, 2004). 
      At this point a distinction will be made between the terms “state” and “region”. A 
state is a set of institutions that possess the authority (Evans, 2002; Schmitt-Egner, 2002; 
Downs, 2002) to make the rules that govern the people in one or more societies and 
have sovereignty over a certain territory. The state includes institutions like the armed 
forces, civil service, state bureaucracy, courts and police. On the other hand, a region 
can be any considerable and connected part of a space, or surface. It may also be an 
administrative sub-division of a city (Evans, 2002; Schmitt-Egner, 2002; Downs, 2002), 
a territory, or an EU Member State. The difference between a state and a region depends 
on the existing degree of sovereignty. 
      In relation to regions and regionalism, it is important to analyse the meaning of the 
“regional scale” and to clarify whether we are using the term regionalism on the sub-
national, or the EU level. Regionalism in general can be used when examining the 
emergence of sub-national regionalist movements and economies8, as well as when 
examining broader trends of regional integration9. 
      A first level of regionalism refers to countries that are part of a political, or 
economic regional project 10 . In such a context, countries like the USA-Canada-
Mexico11, Spain-Italy12 and China-Japan-Australia13 can be characterised as regions. A 
second level of regionalism refers to independent states within countries14. A third level 
                                                 
8 Such as Scotland, Cataluña and País Vasco. 
9 Such as the EU. 
10 Such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). 
11 In the case of NAFTA. 
12 In the case of the EU. 
13 In the case of APEC. 
14 Such as England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which can be characterised as  regions within 
the UK. 
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of regionalism refers to states that have a high degree of independence and sovereignty 
(without being totally independent)15. A fourth level refers to regions with a lower 
independence and degree of sovereignty16. In this study, the level of regionalism that 
will be used will be the fourth one. 
      In the cases of Italy and Spain, we define regions as administrative areas having 
boundaries assigned according to sub-national and international agreements, 
characterised by a certain independence and degree of sovereignty. In both Italy and 
Spain regional administrations have a high degree of independence and sovereignty. In 
particular, this study concentrates on the Objective 1 and Convergence Objective 
Regions, according to the EU NUTS classification. In every EU Member State, a three-
level hierarchy of regions in terms of administrative boundaries has been encouraged. 
Geographical NUTS 1 level units are large sub-national units, such as North-West, 
North-East and Centre in both Spain and Italy. NUTS 2 regions correspond for instance 
with “Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas” in Spain and “Regioni” in Italy. The NUTS 
2 regions consist of a number of NUTS 3 regions17. Objective 1/Convergence Objective 
applies to NUTS 2 regions.  
 
2.2-REGIONAL SCALE AND REGIONALISATION: THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK TO STUDY “REGIONS” 
 
       Regionalism is the most important theoretical concept in the area of regional studies 
and particularly in the case of the EU. It is closely related to the word “regionalisation” 
and that is why it is important to make a distinction between them (Katzenstein, 1996). 
Regionalism is “the set of ideas and principles that highlight the enmeshing of units in a 
                                                 
15 Such as California, Michigan and Ohio in the USA. 
16 Such as Molise in Italy and Principado de Asturias in Spain. 
17 Such as the Greek “Nomoi”, the Spanish “Provincias” and the Italian “Provincie”. 
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regional context” (Tavares, 2004:6). Regionalisation on the other hand is the regional 
interaction process (Tavares, 2004). 
      According to Wyatt-Walter (1995), regionalisation refers to the undirected process 
of economic and social interaction within a certain region and often takes the name “soft 
regionalism”, which is likely to result in high economic interdependence within that 
particular area, rather than between that area and the rest of the world. According to 
Strecker (1994), regional development could become a reality only under the condition 
that there is adequate consultation with the regional and local authorities and an 
effective “understanding of the intrinsic value of specific localities and habitats” 
(Strecker, 1994:2).  
       Soft regionalism (Acharya, 1999; Hurrell, 1995; Ghica, 2008) was an answer to the 
approach of “internationalism” dominating many European countries, especially in the 
1970s 18 . The reason for this was the argument that in order for effective regional 
development to take place it was important “to have one’s own individual place with its 
distinctive features and ways of living” (Strecker, 1994:1).  
       Another reason for rejecting internationalism was the fact that shortly after World 
War 2, people were more than eager to invite all kinds of international entrepreneurs 
into their regions, hoping that they would contribute to the desirable regional 
development. Nevertheless, after all those development plans were put into practice, the 
majority of the regions’ inhabitants discovered that not only did these plans not lead to 
development, but that they also resulted in environmental pollution, noise and traffic. 
Hence, they rejected all these “modernist” plans and started supporting more regional 
                                                 
18 Particularly in Germany, when the need for efficient regional development became more intense, 
people started rejecting the idea of “internationalism” and “narrow provincialism”. 
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approaches. That is why soft regionalism also became known as “post-modernism” 
(Strecker, 1994).     
      Soft regionalism is the main type of regionalism (Ghica, 2008; Hurrell, 1995) on 
which the EU is based. It is mostly driven by markets, private trade, investment flows 
and the policies of companies, rather than state policies. It is totally different from “hard 
regionalism”. Hard regionalism is linked with Communism and could be found in the 
former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. It is based on the argument that, 
despite the fact that different regions within those two countries19 wanted to be on their 
own and have higher degrees of independence, the central government wanted them to 
remain part of the whole (Strecker, 1994).  
       The fundamental difference between the two concepts is that, whilst in the case of 
hard regionalism, central governments are reluctant to offer much power and authority 
to their regions, in the case of soft regionalism, central governments are indeed willing 
to offer power and authority to their regions (Ghica, 2008). Hard regionalism is an 
inadequate theory for regional development, as it is totally contrary to the fundamental 
principle of subsidiarity. Soft regionalism is exactly the opposite.   
      Soft regionalism is embraced in advanced industrialised states/countries/regions, 
whereas hard regionalism can be found in highly centralised countries, characterised by 
an imperial conquest history. It is the response to internationalism and modernism 
(Strecker, 1994). This study is based on soft regionalism (Acharya, 1999; Ghica, 2008) 
and not hard since it is the approach EU Regional Policy is based on and it clarifies why 
consultancy with regional-local partners, local acceptance and understanding of the 
                                                 
19 Such as Croatia and Slovenia in former Yugoslavia and Ukraine and Byelorussia in the former USSR. 
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value of specific localities and habitats are necessary for successful regional 
development. 
      Soft regionalism is important for one more reason. As a concept, it is critical of the 
idea of “modernist functionalism” (Strecker, 1994), which supported the idea that the 
world was moving towards a global community, where everybody would be able to 
converse with everybody else, learn an artificial language (Esperanto) and abolish all 
their specific traditions, languages, dialects and special regional characteristics. Soft 
regionalism, on the other hand, favours the view that each and every region is different 
from every other and that effective regional development can become a reality only if 
those in charge understand and estimate its specific economic and socio-political needs 
(Strecker, 1994). 
      The term “new regionalism” is also important for this study, as in the following 
paragraphs it will be linked with the bottom-up approach of regional development. New 
regionalism is a form of regionalism, created due to the contemporary globalisation of 
the economy. One of the main targets of the EU establishment was the decrease of 
economic competitiveness on a country-by-country basis and the increase of 
competitiveness on a region-by-region basis (Wallis, 2002). According to new 
regionalism, regional competitiveness is a fundamental factor in order to analyse and 
assess regional economic development (Lerro and Schiuma, 2009). What is more, new 
regionalism emerged in order to achieve and maintain sustainable development.  
      Wallis (2002) argues that in order for economic growth to be balanced with 
environmental protection and social equity, regional action is necessary. The reason for 
using the term new regionalism in this study is the fact that it highlights the importance 
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of the regions, and as a consequence the importance and necessity of regional 
development (Wallis, 2002). 
       New regionalism concentrates mostly on process and not on structure. Whilst old 
regionalism was searching for structural alternatives, such as city/county consolidations 
and the creation of special purpose and multi-purpose authorities, new regionalism 
establishes a structural alternative as a strategy, but its main concern is the processes, 
such as strategic planning, visioning, consensus building and the resolution of conflicts 
(Wallis, 2002).  
      The new regionalism is a more active and perhaps a more systematic approach 
towards regional development, since it focuses mainly on what has to be done within 
the region in order for regional convergence to be a reality. The new regionalism uses 
process, not as the trail through structure, but as an instrument to form structure (Wyatt-
Walter, 1995).  
       Since the EU Regional Policy target is regional cohesion, Leonardi (2005) argues 
that the main question is how Cohesion Policy can influence the competitiveness and 
growth of the peripheral regions in the context of the Single Market. 
       At this point a conceptual clarification of the MLG will be made and this will be 
more coherent if a brief historical background is provided. Ever since the official 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), there has been a debate 
between the realists-intergovernmentalists and the pluralists-neofunctionalists. 
Intergovernmentalists argued that the national governments were mainly in charge of 
the nature of integration and their major responsibility was to be the gatekeepers 
between supranational developments and their domestic systems. Intergovernmental co-
 24
operation at an EU context did not have important differences from that in other 
international regimes (Bache, 1999).  
      On the other hand, neofunctionalists supported the fact that EU governments would 
not be able to resist the pressures for further EU integration (Bache, 1999). The 
disagreement between them was on the degree of independence of the Commission 
when moving towards further integration.  
      The concept of MLG was initially introduced by the pluralists-neofunctionalists 
shortly after the creation of the Single Market. Marks, Hooghe and Blank (Marks et al, 
1996 in Bache, 1999), when referring to MLG stressed the fact that European 
integration is a procedure of policy-creation, where policy-making decisions are shared 
across supranational, national and sub-national levels. Allen (2000) argues that the 
MLG started being used as an analytical tool when the SFs were introduced, mainly in 
order to explain their implementation by the EU Member States. On the other hand, 
realists-intergovernmentalists, continued to argue that national governments were of the 
main importance when decisions on European integration were to be taken.         
       The reason for mentioning these two different approaches is the fact that they will 
then be linked to EU Regional Policy. Ever since 1961, there have been disagreements 
between the Commission and member states on how far the Commission should go 
independently. In the 1970s, EEC Regional Policy was mainly controlled by the 
national governments of the Member States. With the establishment of the ERDF, the 
principle of additionality was introduced. The Commission encouraged Member States 
not to reduce their spending for regional development, but to increase it 20 . As a 
                                                 
20 Increased governmental spending meant that these Member States would receive more funds from the 
EU. 
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consequence, the principle of additionality was supposed to lead to a supranational 
regional policy, but it didn’t, at least not until 1988.  
      The reason for mentioning additionality and putting it in a supranational context is 
because of its false interpretation by many Member States, and particularly Italy and 
Spain21. The Commission did not succeed in putting the principle of additionality into 
practice the correct way, and perhaps this was caused by national governments’ 
resistance to doing so. 
       After the 1988 SFs reform, there was a lively debate on the increased role the 
Commission was going to play in relation with Regional Policy22. Discussions revolved 
also around the new role sub-national players were due to play, especially during 
implementation, as the principle of partnership was introduced. The latter meant that 
regional policy had to involve partnership and cooperation between national 
governments, subnational authorities and the Commission, in order for policies to be 
successfully implemented. However, according to Bache (1999), and Bache and 
Flinders (2004), in the context of regional partnerships, which were created for an 
efficient SF administration after 1988, the EU national governments23 were in position 
to dominate implementation networks in order to influence important policy decisions 
and outcomes (Bache, 1999).  
      Governments had an authority in the stage of implementation but did not use it in 
the correct way and this means that they did not put into practice the principles of 
additionality and partnership adequately, and this is often claimed to have contributed to 
regional divergence (Bache and Flinders, 2004).  
                                                 
21 In some Italian and Spanish NUTS 2 regions EU funds not only were not additional, but also they were 
much higher than the national ones. 
22 At the EU level if we want to define the regional scale. 
23 Which were mainly in charge of implementation. 
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       When the principle of subsidiarity was introduced in combination with partnership, 
this should have offered regions the chance to clearly express their local problems and 
needs and to promote a more decentralised, “bottom-up”, policy making strategy 
(Bailey and De Propris, 2006). However, neither was properly implemented in Italy and 
Spain and this had an impact on their ability to reap the benefits of the Reform. To some 
extent, the problem with the implementation of EU Regional Policy has not been with 
the tension between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism within the EU, but 
rather that the principles of additionality, subsidiarity and partnership have been 
violated. The blame is held mainly by the national governments. In purely theoretical 
terms, the contemporary theoretical background concerning EU Regional Policy is a 
combination of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism-supranationalism. It is a 
combination of realism and pluralism.    
      Hurrell (1995) argues that regionalist activity involves the creation of interstate 
agreements, or regimes which should help the members of the region respond to 
external challenges and promote common values, offer solutions to common problems 
and establish a regional balance of power.  
       Throughout this study, the EU-level scale will be mostly referred to even if 
sometimes there will also be considerations at the sub-national scale. The main regional 
scale this thesis is based on is the EU scale. The reason for this choice is the fact that 
this study is focused on regional policy and it is obvious that the categorisation of the 
EU Objectives is based on the contemporary economic situation of each region at an EU 
level and not a subnational one. If a region is considered to be developed in the sub-
national level of Italy for example, it does not necessarily mean that it is regarded as 
developed at the EU scale.  
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       Overall, the EU has been experiencing a process of deepening integration. Deep 
integration exists when the member countries of a “regional structure” reach formal 
agreements that concern not only low politics (such as economics), but also high 
politics (such as security). EU Regional Policy is somewhere in the middle of the scale 
between low and high politics. However, at a regional project-structure with a shallow 
integration (only low politics), an efficient regional policy is impossible. 
      The EU has an “open” regional arrangement. This means that there is no 
protectionism in its policies, with the possible exception of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). In fact, the EU Regional Policy is not protectionist and can be linked 
with the “new regionalism” approach and the openness and flexibility of boundaries. 
The importance of such distinctive EU features is the fact that they reveal the EU’s 
identity and how it operates at a supranational level  
      EU institutions and particularly the Commission are in a position firstly to identify 
the problems the EU regions face and secondly to provide them with adequate funding 
so as to improve their infrastructure and resolve problems such as unemployment, 
industrial decline and low standards of living (Mansfield and Milner, 1999) Funds such 
as the ERDF, the ESF, the EAGGF, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG), and the Cohesion Fund are managed by the DG REGIO and are responsible for 
this attempt at improvement. 
      In conclusion, we argue that the concepts of soft regionalism and new regionalism 
contribute to define a framework for examining EU regional development, with MLG 
being an important component of understanding the relations between the different 
levels of government. The EU also embraces an open regionalism. 
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2.3. DEPENDENCY THEORY AND STRUCTURALISM: CORE VS. PERIPHERY 
  
      Structuralism and dependency theory are mainly linked with the body of literature 
within the area of economics, because, as we can observe in the following paragraphs, 
regions are categorised according to economic variables and characteristics. The reason 
for using both theories in this study is the fact that they can offer a satisfactory 
theoretical background for the contemporary regional disparities that exist within 
several EU Member States24, at both a sub-national and an EU level.   
      Dependency theory originates in Marxist theory (Callinicos, 1983) and assumes that 
underdevelopment or limited development can be attributed to exogenous reasons 
(Economy Point, 2006), such as the way countries, or regions are integrated into the 
overall economic system, either global, or EU-wide. According to the dependency 
theory, the countries of the world can be divided into three main categories: the most 
powerful and advanced industrialised states are the so-called “core” countries; middle-
income states are the “semi-peripheral”, and low income states are the “peripheral” ones 
(Levitas, 1974; Seers, 1983). Drawing upon this classification, we adapt it to describe 
EU regions. In order for peripheral, or semi-peripheral regions to achieve economic 
development, it is necessary for them to reduce their connectedness with the core. This 
sounds difficult and perhaps a little counter-intuitive, especially given the efforts of the 
EU to complete the Internal Market with the free movement of people, goods, services 
and capital (European Commission, 2010). The argument here is that peripheral 
development can only be achieved through a reduction of imports, the development of 
domestic industry and the careful selection of inward foreign investment.  
                                                 
24 And in this thesis Italy and Spain. 
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       Such a line of argument within the EU is practically impossible, and we believe, 
also undesirable. We would argue that economic isolation would not necessarily trigger 
faster and more effective economic development and deliver narrower regional 
economic disparities. On the contrary, at times of intensified globalisation, if a 
periphery region was to close its boundaries, this would reduce the chances of regional 
development even further.  
       The argument of this thesis is that the core-periphery structures should not (and 
practically cannot) be eliminated, as they are an expression of a regional division of 
labour, but that in order for regional development to take place within the peripheral 
regions it is necessary for the core regions to design a policy that will actually create 
wealth within the peripheral regions, but this wealth will remain in the regions and will 
not return back to the core.  
       Practically, this means that if foreign investments are established and if they are 
profitable, then a certain amount of the profit should remain in the peripheral regions 
and be invested within them, in order for development to continue. For example, if the 
owners of an industry created at a core region, such as  Piemonte deciding to establish a 
plant in a peripheral region of Italy, some business profits should return to the central 
industry in Piemonte (which means that the central industry will be economically 
benefited), but a certain amount should remain within the peripheral region, to be used 
for business expansion within the region (establishment of more industry plants, 
updating of technology, education of labour force and in general any investment that 
can intensify regional economic development). Core-periphery structures cannot be 
eliminated, but an efficient synergy between core and peripheral regions can result in 
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economic growth within the periphery, which will also have a positive impact on the 
core.        
       Within the EU, we can observe a wealthy core of regions characterised by high 
GDP per capita and are close to one another and a less wealthy and advanced set of 
peripheral and semi-peripheral regions, which are located away from the core (Combes 
and Overman, 2004). Despite the fact that at an EU level the core-periphery pattern has 
slightly decreased since the mid-1980s (mainly due to the income convergence of the 
EU Member States), within the EU Member States it has remained stable (ibid). This is 
the case with Italy and Spain. In Italy, the peripheral regions (Campania, Calabria, 
Puglia and Sicilia) are all concentrated in the South and are indeed very far away from 
the core regions, such as Lombardia, Piemonte, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna. In Spain, 
peripheral regions (Castilla-la Mancha, Extremadura, Andalucía and Galicia) are 
located in the Central and Southern areas25 and are also located far away from the core. 
They are all far from Cataluña and País Vasco, although Castilla-la Mancha and 
Extremadura are not far from Comunidad de Madrid.  
       The income level is not the only criterion relied upon to conclude whether a region 
belongs to the core, the periphery, or the semi-periphery. Instead, other economic 
indicators are also looked at such as the level of investment, the quality of the 
infrastructure, and unemployment (Austin, 1990). Hymer (Hymer, 1975 in Bailey and 
Driffield, 2002) put forward the argument that transnational corporations can be a 
reason for the existence of uneven development across countries, because they search 
for low costs and market access in certain countries and regions, as the need for skilled 
workers is evident. Top management, in charge of the goal determination and planning 
                                                 
25 With the exception of Galicia. 
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is concentrated in capital cities, which tend to be the core of the core. Such cities turn to 
be the most important centres in terms of strategic planning. This means that the 
majority of the cities located in peripheral or semi-peripheral regions 26  “would be 
organized on a hierarchical basis ranging from bases for regional head-quarters down 
to sites dealing with merely day-to-day operations” (Bailey and Driffield, 2002:57).  
      The result would be that “income, status, authority, and consumption patterns would 
radiate out from these centers along a declining curve, and the existing pattern of 
inequality and dependency would be perpetuated” (Bailey and Driffield, 2002:57). This 
is how transnationals’ activities exacerbate inequalities. Hymer (Hymer, 1975 in Bailey 
and Driffield, 2002) analyses the resulting “trickle down” system, where select groups 
in the capital or the most important cities in the core regions become familiarised with 
innovations long before the inhabitants of the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. 
Then, through an “international demonstration effect” and the transnationals’ control 
over the media and marketing channels, such innovations are introduced to peripheral 
regions. However, this is not beneficial to peripheral regions, as it “has the effect of 
reinforcing patterns of authority and control by creating the illusion of upward mobility 
for workers outside the core even though their relative status remains unchanged” 
(Bailey and Driffield, 2002:57).  
       Examples of core regions in pure economic terms would be Lombardia in Italy and 
Cataluña in Spain due to the fact that a) they are far less dependent on agriculture than 
the others, b) they are far more industrialised than the others and their industries are 
characterised by higher technology, and c) they are characterised by a skilled labour 
force, a higher level of income, GDP per capita and employment, accompanied by a 
                                                 
26 Taking always into account the GDP per capita and employment. 
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lower level of unemployment, compared to the others. The semi-peripheral regions are 
Cantabria in Spain and Abruzzo in Italy, due to the fact that they have already managed 
to exit the Convergence Objective. Examples of peripheral regions are Extremadura in 
Spain and Sicilia in Italy, as, despite the fact that they have been receiving SFs for more 
than 20 years, they still have not managed to reach 75% of the EU-27 GDP in order to 
exit the Convergence Objective. Furthermore, their unemployment rates are particularly 
high, whilst their employment rates are low compared to the core and semi-peripheral 
regions. Finally, these regions are characterised as peripheral because of their distance 
from the core regions and the lack of competitiveness of their companies.  
       Dependency theory also has its roots in the theory of structuralism. Structuralism 
does not examine isolated material elements (Kurzwell, 1996) and in the context of this 
thesis it means that it does not examine the development of countries, or regions in 
absolute terms. Every element of the system is important only if it plays a significant 
part in a set of structural connections (Rice and Waugh, 1992). In the context of this 
thesis, it means that the development of the NUTS 2 regions plays an important part in 
terms of the entire EU Regional Policy and the outcomes of the development in one 
region have a certain impact on the EU as a whole. Structuralism, most importantly 
through the work of Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault (Kurzwell, 1996) and Derrida 
(Callinicos, 1983) examines the inter-relationships between elements on which mental, 
linguistic, social and cultural structures are based.       
       We can argue that structuralists tried to adapt structuralism to a regional context, 
arguing that developed, advanced industrialised core states27 were mainly responsible 
for the economic problems and the poor development of the peripheral ones. This 
                                                 
27 When speaking about states they mean both countries and regions. 
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underdevelopment of the peripheral regions has led to new forms of dependency (not 
only economic, but also political) and this is one of the reasons for the transformation of 
structuralism into dependency theory. Dependency theory can be applied to all 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries and regions (Brookfield, 1975), including Italy 
and Spain. 
       According to Frank’s model of underdevelopment, the majority of the countries 
with capitalist economies have established a “metropolis-satellite” chain (Brookfield, 
1975), (Palma, 1981) and in these countries we can include Italy and Spain. Frank 
(Frank, 1967 in Palma, 1981) argues that if the main reason for underdevelopment is a 
region’s satellite status, then regional development might become a reality through a 
weaker degree of metropolis-satellite relationships between the core and the periphery 
(Palma, 1981).  
       The satellite economies/regions are the peripheral and semi-peripheral ones and if 
they establish a lower degree of metropolis-satellite relations, then this may result in a 
certain degree of regional and local development (Palma, 1981). If the core regions 
offer more power and responsibilities to the peripheral ones, according also to the EU 
Regional Policy principle of subsidiarity28, then the latter will be able to identify more 
clearly their particular problems and needs, as regional authorities have a deeper 
knowledge of the exact problems of their region and are better aware of the specific 
sectors29 which may have the potential to lead to regional economic development30, in 
order for development to start inside the peripheral region. The metropolis-satellite 
relationship can be linked with the “bottom-up” regional development approach, which 
is critically presented in the following section.       
                                                 
28 Which is one of the main concerns of this thesis. 
29 Within the particular region. 
30 If they are efficiently managed. 
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2.4-THEORY OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: REGIONAL CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE  
       
       The theory of regional development (Bergman et al, 1991) is linked with the bodies 
of literature in both economics and political science. As we can observe in the following 
paragraphs, the models of economic geography presented, as well as the terms 
“convergence” and “divergence” are linked with economics. The bottom-up and top-
down approaches are linked not only with economics (as they draw conclusions about 
regional economic development), but also with political science, as they cover issues of 
decision-making on the level of centralisation of the regional policies. These two 
approaches are clearly linked with MLG, as they reveal the level and type of 
cooperation and coordination between the national and the regional level in the context 
of EU Regional Policy. 
       The theory of regional development is essential for the study of EU Regional Policy 
as it provides us with the most appropriate theoretical background, in order to 
understand why some EU NUTS 2 regions are lagging behind, always in terms of GDP 
per capita and employment. The main element of this theory is the tension between 
regional convergence and divergence (Harrop, 2000).  
      In terms of regional development, the study of the capitalist economy is traditionally 
dominated by two opposing views. The first is an outcome of neoclassical equilibrium 
economics and supports the fact that if there are no important barriers to the operation 
of market processes in terms of an integrated national spaced economy, there are 
pressures towards the general convergence of regional incomes over time. Regional 
inequalities can only be short-run incidents, especially due to the fact that such 
inequalities are highly likely to put into practice self-correcting movements in prices, 
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wages, capital and labour, which will push towards the desirable regional convergence 
(Martin and Sunley, 1996). 
      The second view is in favour of the fact that there are no necessary reasons why 
regional growth and incomes must converge and states that regional divergence is the 
most probable result. In the 1970s and 1980s, Marxist theories advocated uneven 
regional development. In the 1990s, the interest shifted in favour of the “new industrial 
spaces” and, as a consequence, Marxist approaches were substituted by neo-Marshallian 
and transaction cost theories of regional economic growth (Martin and Sunley, 1996). 
      Krugman (1991) considers the interregional migration of workers in order to make 
sense of regional convergence and divergence. His economic geography model shows 
how core-periphery structures can be created through externalities among economic 
agents. Krugman (1991) links regional integration with increased or decreased 
inequalities.  
       There are two economic models based on economic geography and they both come 
up with interesting results about whether or not economic integration leads to uneven 
development. The first model is that of Krugman (1991) and the second that of 
Krugman and Venables (1995). 
      According to the first model, labour is mobile and it is necessary for an industrial 
firm to have a unit of worker in order to produce a satisfactory output. When the firm 
moves to a place/region, in that place the labour demand is increased and this leads to a 
raise in the wage rate. This increased wage is highly likely to attract workers to that 
area/region (Krugman, 1991). This means that a lot of skilled workers will move to that 
area and it is highly likely that development will take place in that area. As a result, the 
regions from where those (skilled) workers will leave are going to suffer a decline in 
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development, due to the fact that the workers that will remain there will either be 
unskilled, or old. The regions with the skilled workers will be the core ones, whereas 
the others will be the peripheral and semi-peripheral ones.  
      However, in the second model, labour is assumed to be immobile, which means that 
the firm, besides being a final good supplier to consumers, also becomes an 
intermediate demander and supplier of goods. Thus, when such a firm moves to another 
place/region, there is an increase in demand for the intermediate goods in that region. 
As a result, there is a rise in price. This higher price (of the goods) is likely to attract 
more intermediate firms to move to that area (Krugman and Venables, 1995). For that 
reason, that area or region will experience greater development, whereas the regions 
from which such firms have departed will suffer a decline (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
1997). The regions with the intermediate firms will be the core ones, whereas the others 
will again be the peripheral and semi-peripheral ones. Moving becomes easier with 
integration. The conclusion from both models is that increased economic integration 
leads to regional divergence and creates core-periphery economic structures.         
      Armstrong (Armstrong, 1995 in Martin and Sunley, 1996) after examining regional 
convergence firstly within 62 and afterwards within 169 European regions between 
1975 and 1993, concluded that the absolute convergence rate of the NUTS 2 regions 
was 0.4% per year and argued that the speed of regional convergence varied along the 
economic cycle and was faster in periods of economic booms than during recession. On 
the contrary, the research (on UK counties) carried out by Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996) 
reaches the opposite result; convergence is more evident during slow national growth 
periods (Martin and Sunley, 1996). 
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       Later, “endogenous growth theory”31 identified as endogenous all the factors that 
the neoclassical growth model identified as exogenous (Krugman, 1994). According to 
this theory, economic growth can become a reality within a country, or region through 
internal processes, including an efficient management of human capital and the 
establishment of updated forms of technology and production. On the contrary, the 
neoclassical theory argues that growth can take place mainly due to external factors, 
such as trade. The aim of this theory is to argue in favour of regional convergence, even 
taking into account the fact that it has certain limitations when applied to a regional 
context.  
       The classical development theory includes the top-down/bottom-up development 
theory, mainly used to analyse regional policy. Its main argument is that few 
investments can be made in certain sectors of the economy or in specific geographical 
areas-regions without the benefits being felt by other areas as well (Stohr, 1981).  
      According to the classical “top-down/centre-down” theory, also known as the 
centre-down development paradigm, development begins in a few dynamic sectors and 
can hopefully be extended to the entire spatial system (Hansen, 1981). There are four 
main characteristics of the top-down approach: a) capital flows from the core to the 
periphery and resources flow back to the core (e.g. investments in oil field flow from 
the city to a region and oil flows to the city for power production), b) development starts 
in a few dynamic sectors or geographical areas and spreads to others, c) there is an 
emphasis on urban industrial, capital-intensive development, the highest level available 
of technology and the maximum use of external and scale economies and d) 
development involves large scale investment projects, increases of functional/territorial 
                                                 
31 Which was an evolution of the conventional neoclassical theory. 
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integration, increasing scale of private and public organisations to transmit development 
through these integrated units, large redistribution mechanisms and a decrease of 
economic, social, cultural and institutional barriers that may obstruct transmission 
effects with/between these units (Buck, 2006).  
      Examples of this theory include resource development projects in petroleum, 
mineral, or forestry resources, infrastructure projects32, office and retail development in 
urban areas and investments in science.  
       A top-down approach would on the other hand imply that decisions are normally 
taken by governments without consultation with local people and partners and this is 
totally contrary to the principle of subsidiarity, which is fundamental for an effective 
regional policy. According to Hirschman (1958), the top-down approach can sometimes 
result into “polarisation” and “trickle down”. High centralisation of national-domestic 
regional policies increased the core-periphery division and led to higher economic 
divergence.  
       Hirschman (Hirschman, 1958, in Hansen, 1981) also argues that development 
strategies must concentrate on a few sectors33 and argues that growth begins at the main 
(leading) economic sectors and is transferred to the others through firms (Hansen, 1981).       
According to Hansen (1981), “the actual effects of the growth points on the hinterlands 
depend on the balance between favourable effects that trickle down to the hinterlands 
from the progress of the growth points and the unfavourable, or polarization, effects on 
the hinterlands as a consequence of the attractiveness of the growth poles” (Hansen, 
1981:17). Trickling down effects occur due to investments placed in the hinterlands by 
the growth points. Polarisation occurs because competition from the growth points may 
                                                 
32 Such as roads, airports and public transport. 
33 Rather than on widely dispersed projects. 
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depress manufacturing and export activities in the hinterlands. The growth points might 
create a brain drain from the hinterlands, instead of creating opportunities for their 
disguised unemployment (Hansen, 1981).               
       A significant problem is the risk of the “back-wash” and “spread” effects, which 
may appear when capital and resources invested eventually flow from the periphery34 
back to the core (Stohr and Taylor, 1981). This is completely opposite to the targets of a 
regional development programme. Myrdal (Myrdal 1957 and Myrdal in Hansen, 1981) 
argues that they look like the polarisation and trickling-down effects of Hirschman.        
       Hansen (1981) argues that the dominant industries have the capacity of turning the 
towns or cities in which they are located into the main poles of development of their 
regions. Regional inequalities and national levels of development are strongly related. 
Williamson (Williamson, 1965 in Hansen, 1981) argues that high disparities in terms of 
regional income can be identified in the early development stages, whilst regional 
economic convergence can take place in the latest stages of national growth and 
economic development. Regional convergence can take place when national economic 
growth appears. Elimination of regional disparities and effective regional development 
can lead to regional cohesion. 
       Having studied the Italian regional policy of the 1960s, Stohr (Stohr, 1981 in Buck, 
2006) reached the conclusion that the national government invested enormous financial 
resources in a centralised top-down regional policy. However, top-down strategies 
resulted in an increase of disparities (Buck, 2006). Stohr (1981) concludes that a 
decentralised approach must be the basis for an efficient government policy (Buck, 
2006).        
                                                 
34 Or semi-periphery. 
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       The alternative decentralised regional development approach is called the “bottom-
up” approach and is based on the argument that “decisions and power should be as 
close to the bottom as possible with coming from a region rather than being imposed 
from outside. Self-directed and self-generated economic growth and development will 
occur with greater success than a potentially risky project imposed from above” (Buck, 
2006:3).  
       In general, the bottom-up approach is based on the assumption that decisions 
regarding regional policy should be taken through cooperation between national and 
regional authorities, due to the fact that regional authorities are in general more aware of 
the specific needs and problems of their region. This approach is linked with MLG, as it 
requires efficient coordination between the national and the regional level. In order for 
the bottom-up approach to be successful, there is a need for a) controlling the back-
wash effects created by the top-down approach and b) establishing dynamic impulses 
within the underdeveloped areas. Back-wash effects can be eliminated with interaction 
changes between regions/countries and the dynamic impulses can be created by 
identifying the endogenous factors that will lead to regional development (Stohr, 1981). 
According to Ghica (2008), the bottom-up approach is closely linked with soft 
regionalism, as both approaches aim to produce development “within” the region.  
      Stohr (1981) is in favour of the bottom-up approach because of four reasons: a) 
regional disparities in living standards hamper regional development and a population 
distribution according to the long-term resource potential of individual regions must 
take place; b) the specific cultural/institutional conditions35 should not be ignored; c) 
decisions on the development objectives and tools must come from within the 
                                                 
35 Within the natural and social environment of different communities. 
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respective communities36 and d) a higher degree of both regional and national self-
determination regarding the desirable territorial interaction should take place. Also, 
there is a need for selective spatial closure (Stohr, 1981), which means the reduction of 
transfers to and from regions/countries which decrease their potential for self-reliant 
development.  
       According to Mittelman (1996), the reason for introducing the bottom-up approach 
is to better understand the new regionalism, which is more advanced than other versions 
of integration theory (such as functionalism, neofunctionalism, institutionalism and 
neoinstitutionalism), as it emphasises more on power relations, production and 
structural transformations. 
       Between new and old regionalism there are issues in understanding power versus 
empowerment, as well as using these terms to link them with the new regionalism and 
the bottom-up approach. The old regionalism was traditionally focused on “drawing its 
powers from units of the government above and below it. Power was viewed as a zero-
sum game, so the power to govern had to be taken from somewhere. Local jurisdictions 
often felt threatened that their powers would be diminished” (Wallis, 2002:3). This is 
contrary to the efficient development of a peripheral/semi-peripheral region and 
opposed to the fundamental principle of subsidiarity.  
      Instead, new regionalism is mainly based on “empowerment”, the aim of which is 
which is to include communities and neighbourhoods in local and regional decision-
making processes (Wallis, 2002). Empowerment includes nonprofits and for-profits in 
the decisions and actions of the central government and does not consider these actions 
to be a zero-sum game, contrary to old regionalism. Empowerment is based on the 
                                                 
36 Regional communities must gain more power/responsibility, which is the target of EU Cohesion Policy. 
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argument that new interests result in new authority and energy, leading to policies in the 
context of a regional agenda (Wallis, 2002). That is why we can link the new 
regionalism with the bottom-up approach, as it supports the fact that in order for 
regional development to take place, all actions must start within the region and not 
outside it.        
       The structural composition of the economy of each region plays a very important 
role to its development. The possibilities for a region to enter the road of progress and 
gain advantages depend on local conditions, such as the actions of political institutions, 
regional policy assistance, infrastructure, labour supply, social qualifications, factor 
prices and population density (Illeris, 1993 in Buck, 2006). However, growth factors are 
also important for efficient regional development. Such factors include geographical 
location, accessibility, the endowment of the region with labour and capital, 
agglomerations and infrastructure.   
       Illeris (Illeris, 1993 in Buck, 2006) makes a distinction between the top-down and 
the bottom-up approaches and argues that the bottom-up approach is more likely to 
result in regional development. He states that “regional development patterns in western 
Europe in recent decades exhibit a mosaic like pattern of dynamic and declining 
regions with no uniform core/periphery polarization. This has replaced the former 
uniform concentration of economic growth in the national core areas. The lack of a 
regional development pattern exhibiting the core-periphery pattern is used to cast 
doubts on the success of the traditional models and a reason put forward to support the 
need for a bottom-up approach” (Illeris, 1993 in Buck, 2006:3). 
       Friedmann (1991) also supports the bottom-up approach and argues that the cultural, 
the political, the physical, the economic and the institutional environment of the regions 
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determine whether the establishment of new forms of production, based on updated 
technology, will result in regional development. Illeris (Illeris 1993, in Buck, 2006) 
argues that regions which are most likely to perform well are those that have economies 
with expanding sectors (oil production, high tech industries, producer services, 
international organisations) whereas regions unlikely to perform well are those where 
declining industries dominate the economy (agriculture, coal mining, steel, shipyards 
and port functions).  
      In the case of Italy and Spain, those regions whose economy is based on services, 
high tech industries and tourism are indeed on a growth path, which means low 
unemployment, higher GDP per capita and less interregional migration37. There are 
examples in Italy (Sardegna) and Spain (Canarias), where peripheral regions have 
gained significant profit due to their tourist sector. On the other hand, regions based on 
agriculture are in steady decline (Calabria and Puglia in Italy/Galicia and Extremadura 
in Spain). 
 
2.5-CONCLUSIONS 
 
      In order to create an adequate theoretical background for the thesis, our conclusion 
is that the most appropriate theory to explain the regional divergence that exists within 
the EU and in the context of this thesis within Italy and Spain is dependency theory and 
particularly the terms “core”, “semi-periphery” and “periphery”. The regional scale used 
in this thesis is mainly the EU scale, but in some cases, the use of the sub-national scale 
will be necessary. We can argue that the terms new and soft regionalism can efficiently 
be adapted to the case of the EU. In the context of EU Regional Policy, there is a clash 
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, particularly in terms of the 
                                                 
37 Less departure of the region’s skilled workers to other regions. 
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allocation and implementation of the SFs. This issue is both supranationalist, as the EU 
as a whole decides about critical issues regarding the regional policy and its principles, 
and intergovernmentalism, because there are certain differences in the adaptation of the 
CSF by the several national governments of the EU Member States.        
       Another important issue raised in this chapter is whether the top-down, or the 
bottom-up approach of regional development is more appropriate when moving towards 
the target of regional convergence. In our view, the bottom-up approach is more 
adequate, due to the fact that it takes into consideration the knowledge and opinions of 
regional and local authorities. This way, it is easier to identify the exact problems and 
needs of each region. In the top-down context, there is limited, or no consulting with 
regional authorities and development starts outside the region rather than inside. 
However, as we will see in the following chapters, it is difficult to find pure bottom-up 
approaches and the prevailing formula is a more decentralised combination of both.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EUROPEAN UNION REGIONAL POLICY AND POLICY EVALUATION  
 
       This chapter discusses how EU Regional Policy has developed from its 
establishment in 1988 to the current CSF Cycle (2007-13) and then establishes an 
evaluation framework in order to attempt to estimate the impact of EU Regional Policy 
in the context of regional economic development in Italy and Spain, towards the target 
of regional economic convergence. 
 
3.1-REGIONAL POLICY BEFORE 1988 
      Since the establishment of the EEC, there has been a need for an efficient regional 
policy. According to the preamble of the Treaty of Rome (1957), Member States were 
certain that in order for the EEC to achieve economic progress, solidarity and socio-
political stability, it was necessary to eliminate regional economic disparities. The 
“common market” target made that need more evident, despite the fact that “most of the 
relevant activity involved the negative process of removing barriers to the free 
operation of the market, provision was also made for positive intervention” (Allen, 
2000:247). There was a plan for the establishment of ESF (established in 1960) (Milio, 
2010) and a European Investment Bank (EIB), but there was absolutely no provision for 
a cohesion policy, or fund, even though the Commission was always in favour of such 
an action. The EAGGF started financing the common agricultural policy of the EEC in 
1962 (Milio, 2010). 
      The main reasons for the lack of policy instruments in the hands of the European 
Commission for the conduct of an efficient EEC Regional Policy during these first 
decades were two: a) national governments and not the EEC were in charge of regional 
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development policies and b) regional policy rested on the incorrect assumption that the 
Common Market would eliminate regional economic disparities (Leonardi, 2005).  
       The target of the EU Regional Policy has always been cohesion 38 . Economic 
cohesion is fundamental for the EU as it is the most important cornerstone for the 
achievement of European integration and the spillover from low (such as economics) to 
high politics (such as security and political integration). Cohesion is related not only to 
economic progress, but also to issues such as political integration, democratisation and 
security.  
       The concepts of cohesion and convergence are related to the concept of integration. 
Integration is a process parallel to cohesion and is based on the establishment of 
supranational (or intergovernmental) institutions which will deal with decision-making, 
implementation processes and compliance with EU regulations (Armstrong, 2004). In 
terms of the EU, it is impossible to achieve convergence and cohesion without the 
effective operation of the EU-level institutions. Cohesion is possible if supranational 
institutions come up with the appropriate decisions to make it possible. Also, cohesion 
can act as a stimulus for the necessary political decisions in order for convergence and 
integration to take place. Nevertheless, according to Leonardi (2005), if the policy could 
return to the national level, it would not result in cohesion and political integration for 
the wider EU (Leonardi, 2005). The recipe for an efficient regional convergence would 
be a successful cooperation between institutions at the EU, national and regional levels.    
      In 1975, the ERDF was established (Milio, 2010) and its target was for the 
Commission to start eliminating regional disparities (Allen, 2000). Nevertheless, the 
main reason for the ERDF’s establishment was to facilitate Member States achieve a 
                                                 
38 Which is related to the concept of convergence. 
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deal on a much broader set of objectives. This deal was the outcome of the 1969 Hague 
Summit, where Member States agreed on two important long term targets: EU 
Enlargement and a move towards EMU (Allen, 2000). In this context, a regional policy 
would not only result in the economic progress of individual member states, but would 
enable all EU Member States to benefit from the establishment of a Single Market and 
the gradual removal of all trade barriers.  
      The main characteristics of the EEC Regional Policy that started in 1975 were a) the 
predominance of sectorial objectives and programmes in close coordination with those 
established by national-domestic policies, b) the focus on the entire national territory 
with expectations that there would be positive spillovers for the less developed 
(peripheral) regions, c) the formulation of programmes and projects with single 
objectives, d) the articulation of interventions over the span of a single year, e) the 
definition of policies by using an inter-governmental process linking national 
governments and f) the EEC’s responsibility for compensating national governments for 
what they achieve in terms of regional policy (Leonardi, 2005).  
      During that period, there was a minimal involvement of the Commission in the 
implementation of EEC Regional Policy. National governments were mainly in charge 
of regional policy (Armstrong, 2004), a system of quotas was imposed in the Member 
States’ bargaining process and there was an annual allocation of EEC resources, seen as 
reimbursements, according to Member States’ quotas (Leonardi, 2005).  
       According to Allen (2000), between 1975 and 1999 there was a close relation 
between the decrease in agricultural market expenditure through the Guarantee Section 
of the EAGGF and the increase in SFs expenditure. Together they amounted to 
approximately 80% of the EU budget. This shift mirrored the growing priority that was 
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given to socio-economic cohesion. As the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was 
thought to increase regional economic disparities, by offering funds to the EU core areas, 
the EU Regional Policy was thought to be the exact opposite and therefore between 
1988 and 1999 there was an increase in SFs, accompanied by a decrease of CAP 
expenditure (Allen, 2000). 
      Besides the ERDF establishment, the 1975 deal was important for two more reasons; 
a) 1.3 billion ECUs (European Currency Unit) were agreed for the period 1975-1978 
and b) national quotas were set out for the allocation of the fund. There was also an 
emphasis on the principle of additionality.  
      The Directorate General XVI, which was in charge of Regional Policy made several 
attempts to convince Member States that ERDF funds should not be substituted for 
national expenditure. ERDF funds were supposed to be additional to national-
governmental ones and should have been used for investment. The first problem 
appeared when national governments refused to limit their project applications’ value 
according to their agreed quotas (Allen, 2000). The financial information they were 
providing did not show if the EU SFs were additional to those allocated by the national 
governments.  
      A Regional Policy Committee was established to discuss and develop the notions 
that would then become the principles of additionality, partnership and concentration. In 
1979 and 1984, more reforms took place, but still “the Commission and most regional 
authorities found themselves marginalized in a policy process that rapidly became an 
instrument of national policy making” (Allen, 2000:248). In 1979, the Council agreed 
with the Commission’s proposal on a small non-quota section, whereas in 1984 these 
quotas were “relaxed into indicative ranges” (Allen, 2000:254), which offered the 
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Commission discretion over approximately 11% of the ERDF budget. In the same year, 
the Council declared that 20% of the ERDF would apply to programmes and not to 
individual projects. Some of these programmes would be carried out by Member States, 
others by the Commission. Measures were taken for better coordination between the 
ESF, the ERDF and the guidance sectors of the EAGGF (Allen, 2000).   
      The Commission attempted to conduct the Regional Policy at a supranational 
context, whereas Member States were more interested in an intergovernmental context. 
A significant obstacle in the Commission’s attempts to reform the ERDF rules was that 
it required the European Council’s unanimity. Moreover, the ERDF expenditure was a 
non-compulsory item in the EU budget, and for that reason it was subject to the 
European Parliament members’ endorsement. Any increase in the ERDF (if combined 
with greater Commission autonomy vis-à-vis member states) would result in more 
influence for the Parliament (Allen, 2000). During the 1970s and 1980s, Member States 
showed themselves to be more interested in pursuing their own interests39 , than in 
working together to reduce regional disparities. National and intergovernmental 
interests were first on the list, whereas EU supranational concerns fell last.  
      The Single European Act (SEA) (1986) and the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes (IMPs) gave a boost to attempts to put in place an efficient EU Regional 
Policy (Allen, 2000). According to the SEA, Member States on the periphery would 
have access to the financial resources necessary to deal with the economic shock the 
Single Market was expected to create. Armstrong (2004) believed that, unless the EU 
Cohesion Policy is capable of eliminating the current regional economic disparities in 
                                                 
39 Concerning influence and political power. 
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the Mediterranean Member States, the divergence may be higher and this may have a 
negative impact not only on these countries, but also on the EU as a whole.  
      Dinan (1999) argued that the accession of Greece (in 1981) and Spain and Portugal 
(both in 1986) emphasised the inability of the EC to effectively deal with regional 
disparities. The main question in the mid-1980s was whether or not the IMPs would be 
successfully put into practice, given the regional inequalities that existed in Italy and 
Spain. Dinan (1999) argued that the then newly nominated Commission President 
Jacques Delors stressed the importance of and necessity for a Regional Policy. Indeed, it 
was argued that the inclusion of Greece and Spain had “revealed a tension in Europe 
which is a tension between north and south. It stems not only from financial problems 
but from a lack of understanding, from a clash of culture, which seems to be promoting 
certain countries to turn their backs on the solidarity pact that should be one of the 
cornerstones of the Community” (Dinan, 1999:432). This was therefore evidence of a 
basic core/periphery problem within the EU.  
      Tondl (2004) also expressed some doubts on EU Cohesion Policy in the 1980s and 
questioned whether the EU was in a position to deal with the increased regional 
divergence, whereas Armstrong and Taylor (1985) argued that regional economic 
divergence, taking place mostly in the Mediterranean Member States, could put the 
solidarity of the EU in serious danger.  
      According to the Title V40, included in the Treaty of Rome by the SEA, there was a 
plan to reduce the disparities between core and periphery regions and to give special 
attention to the rural areas. According to Article 130b, economic cohesion was 
supposed to become a reality through EIB loans and common Community policies -with 
                                                 
40 Articles 130a-e, now 158-162. 
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an emphasis on SFs and the efficient coordination of the Member States’ economic 
policies. Article 130c was also of great importance since it was the first that finally 
provided a direct Treaty base for the ERDF, whereas the equally important Article 130d 
stressed the need for an effective implementation of the SFs. The target of the Delors-1 
package was for the SFs to be doubled so that by 1993 they would account for 
approximately 25% of the EU budget. 
 
3.2-CSF CYCLES 
3.2.1-FIRST CSF CYCLE (1989-93)  
      In terms of the 1988 reforms, the Commission established the principles of 
subsidiarity, additionality, partnership and programming. The principle of subsidiarity 
states that decisions regarding regional policy at the EU level “should not be taken 
unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional and local level” 
(Regional Policy Inforegio/Subsidiarity, 2010:1). This principle aims to encourage the 
functioning of the EU Regional Policy at a more decentralised context, under which, 
regions will have a greater degree of power and responsibility, always in terms of 
regional policy.  
       According to the principle of additionality, SFs must not replace “public or 
equivalent structural expenditure by a member state in the regions concerned by this 
principle” (Regional Policy Inforegio/Additionality, 2010:1). This means that SF 
allocations will not necessarily result in a decrease in national structural expenditure in 
the regions concerned. The principle of partnership requires cooperation between the 
EU and the Member States in terms of regional policy and SF allocation, from the 
preparatory stages to the implementation, evaluation and assessment of the outcomes 
(Regional Policy Inforegio/Partnership, 2010). The principle of programming includes 
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the administrative mechanism under which the Regional Policy is conducted and more 
specifically the multi annual Operational Programmes (OPs). The aim of this principle 
is to identify the main strategic priorities and manage financial allocations (Regional 
Policy Inforegio/Programming, 2010). 
       The Commission’s target was the establishment of a common policy and a more 
autonomous role for itself, being less dependent on the interests of the national 
governments, and acting at a more supranational level (Allen, 2000).  
       The need to redefine the EU Regional Policy came from the evaluation of economic 
risks that would appear with the launch of the Single Market and the 1988 EU Regional 
Policy reform took place in order to efficiently accompany the establishment of the 
Single Market (Armstrong, 2004). Either at an intergovernmental, or a supranational 
level, an effective regional policy was necessary to help Member States, and in 
particular regional economies, adjust to the open-market competition, to support their 
competitiveness so as to minimise the possibility of economic divergence and to reduce 
regional economic disparities, which would otherwise be evident between core and 
peripheral regions (Allen, 2000; Bache, 1998). 
       In March 1988, the European Council decided the allocation of 64 billion ECU to 
the SFs, which practically meant the doubling of annual resources for the first CSF 
Cycle (1989-93). On 24 June 1988, the Council adopted the first regulation according to 
which, SFs would be placed in the context of Cohesion Policy. This reform 
concentrated funds on the poorest regions, and introduced multi-annual programming, 
strategic orientation regarding investments and the active participation of regional and 
local partners (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). The involvement of regional and local 
partners means precisely a shift towards a bottom-up approach to regional development. 
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      The main characteristics of the new EU Regional Policy (from 1989 onwards) were 
a) the prevalence of multi-sectorial objectives and interventions for regions that are 
lagging behind in economic terms and for those that had experienced de-
industrialization as specified in every Member State’s Community Support Framework 
(CSF), b) the identification of the specific regions and localities where interventions 
should take place, c) the creation of a formal programme with an integrated approach to 
planning, simultaneously pursuing multiple development objectives, d) the articulation 
of programmes over a number of years based on a five, six, or seven year budgetary and 
programming cycle, e) definition of CSFs through the direct participation of 
representatives from regions, localities and civil society and f) the search for synergy in 
the funding projects outside the CSF (Leonardi, 2005). The shift from a sectoral to a 
territorial approach was a reality.  
       The concept of “territorial dimension” was important in a) finding the place where 
the policy was to be implemented, b) identifying the level of implementation and c) 
acknowledging the role of regional and local governments in regional projects. The 
identification of the territorial dimension offered the Commission a chance to shift the 
policy objectives from individual economic sectors to individual regions. The new 
ERDF Regulation meant that responsibilities for rule making and resource allocation 
were transferred to Brussels, but this did not mean that national policies would be 
eliminated. The target of the EU Regional Policy was to add an EU dimension to the 
existing national regional policies. 
       A significant budgetary shift took place. Annual payments increased from 
approximately 6.4 billion ECU in 1988 to 20.5 billion ECU in 1993, whilst their relative 
share increased from 16% to almost 31% of the entire EU budget. It can be argued that 
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the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF were favoured by this budgetary shift, as a re-
funding projects system was established. In the context of this system, the projects were 
chosen and presented by the EU Member States (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). 
       Five objectives were established in terms of the first CSF Cycle: a) Objective 1 for 
the structural development of regions lagging behind, b) Objective 2 for regions 
suffering industrial decline, c) Objective 3 to reduce long term unemployment, d) 
Objective 4 towards the occupational integration of young people (Inforegio Panorama, 
2008) and e) Objective 5 for the development of agricultural structures and rural areas. 
Under Objective 1, Spain was allocated 10.2 billion ECU, as 57.7% of its population 
was living in Objective 1 Regions. Italy was allocated 8.5 billion ECU, as 36.4% of its 
population was living in Objective 1 Regions. Spain and Italy were the major 
beneficiary Member States in the first CSF Cycle under Objective 1 (Inforegio 
Panorama, 2008).  
       The Treaty on European Union (TEU) (December 1991) and the Delors-2 package, 
known also as the “Maastricht bill”-an agreement reached in line with the Edinburgh 
European Council (December 1992)- also provided a stimulus for the EU Regional 
Policy.  
       According to Article B of title 1 (Common Provisions), one of the main EU targets 
would be socio-economic progress and development through the establishment of an 
area without internal frontiers, through socio-economic cohesion and the creation of 
EMU (Allen, 2000). Also, Article 3 stressed the importance of the creation of Trans-
European Networks (TENs), while Article 130d spoke about the objectives and 
implementation of the SFs, emphasizing the need for the establishment of a new 
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Cohesion Fund in order to a) provide funds for Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, and 
b) support the creation of TENs, as well as environmental projects. 
      The debate on the TEU was about whether national governments would agree on the 
financing and implementation of the objectives. Some of the governments required a 
Protocol on Economic and Social Cohesion 41 , in order for an interim agreement 
between them to become a reality. This Protocol included the alterations that were 
supposed to be agreed in Edinburgh (in December 1992) and stressed that: a) “the 
doubling of the Structural Funds between 1988 and 1993 implies large transfers, 
especially as a proportion of GDP of the less prosperous member states” and b) the EIB 
“was lending large and increasing amounts for the benefit of the poorer regions”. Also, 
there was “a desire for greater flexibility in the arrangements for allocations from the 
structural funds” (Allen, 2000:250).  
       The Protocol stressed that the Cohesion Fund would be supposed to help the 
Member States with a Gross National Product (GNP) per capita less than 90% of the EU 
average. Another target of the Fund would be to assist these countries in order to 
achieve the economic convergence criteria for the EMU. These targets clearly showed 
the close relation between the EU Cohesion Policy and the Single Market (Allen, 2000).  
       At the Edinburgh European Council (1992), there was an agreement, according to 
which, national governments were supposed to increase SFs from 18.6 billion ECU in 
1992 to 30 billion ECU in 1999 (1992 prices). Also, the European Council allocated 15 
billion ECU to the Cohesion Fund with an increase in annual spending from 1.5 billion 
ECU in 1993 to 2.6 billion ECU in 1999. Up to 1996, Spain would receive between 
52% and 58% (Allen, 2000). 
                                                 
41 Finally annexed to the TEU. 
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       Gillingham (2003) agrees with Dinan (1999) in stressing the social impact of EU 
Regional Policy, and by assessing the budgetary constraints concerning the EU 
Regional Policy and the importance of a functional redistribution. He mentioned that the 
purpose of the SFs was to ease accommodation to the Single Market and never 
substitute for it.     
       The reform of EU Regional Policy introduced in 1989 changed the way EU 
Regional Policy pursued regional economic development. Until then, Regional Policy 
focused mainly on the role and responsibilities of the national systems of administration, 
or specialised development agencies in the context of project implementation. The 
reform, on the other hand, introduced the active involvement of numerous 
administrative levels and socio-economic groups in policy establishment and 
implementation (Leonardi, 2005). 
        
3.2.2-SECOND CSF CYCLE (1994-1999) 
       In terms of the second CSF Cycle, a sixth Objective was added towards the 
assistance of regions with low population density. Again the funding under Objective 1 
was significant (94 billion ECU by the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF and 14.45 
billions by the Cohesion Fund, 68% of its total funds available), covering 24.6% of 
approximately 97.7 million EU inhabitants. In 1994, the FIFG was also established 
(Milio, 2010). Always under Objective 1, 41% of the investment was spent on 
enterprises, 29.8% on infrastructure (half on transport and a quarter on environment) 
and 24.5% on human resources. The total SF budget was 69 billion ECU, which 
equalled 25% of the EU budget and 0.3% of the entire EU GDP. 64% was destined for 
Objective 1 Regions. Spain received 14.2 billion ECU and Italy 11.4 billions. The entire 
SFs and Cohesion Funds budget was 168 billion ECU, which equalled one third of the 
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EU budget and 0.4% of the entire EU GDP. 68% was destined for Objective 1 Regions. 
Spain received 42.4 billion ECU and Italy 21.7 billions (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). 
       In 1993, the Commission proposed to simplify the implementation of the Regional 
Policy by reducing the number of Objectives from five to three, and by reducing the SF 
coverage from over 50% of the EU population to 35%-40%. As a result, the amount of 
resources devoted to the SFs between 2000 and 2006 would drop from 275 billion euros 
(1999 prices) to 258 billion euros. 
 
3.2.3-THIRD CSF CYCLE (2000-2006) 
       In the third CSF Cycle, the SFs Objectives were reduced to three and the 
Community Initiatives from 13 to four. Under Objective 1, funding by the ERDF, the 
ESF, the EAGGF, and the FIFG amounted to 149.2 billion euros. The Cohesion Fund 
funding amounted to 25.4 billion euros, covering 37% of the EU-25 population (169.4 
million inhabitants). Under Objective 1, 41% of the investment was spent on 
infrastructure42, 33.8% on enterprises and 24.5% on human resources. Spain received 
56.3 billion euros and Italy 29.6 billions. However, the main concern in terms of this 
Cycle was the EU Enlargement and on 1 May 2004, the EU officially included 25 
Member States. The total amount of SFs and Cohesion Funds was 213 billion euros for 
EU-15 during the third Cycle and 21.7 billion euros between 2004 and 2006 for the ten 
new Member States. The entire amount equalled approximately one third of the EU 
budget and 0.4% of the entire EU GDP. 71.6% of it was destined for Objective 1 
Regions (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). 
       The EU Enlargement, working towards the target of deeper integration, was based 
on the fact that any European country, which respected human rights, liberty and 
                                                 
42 Almost half on transport and a third on environment. 
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democracy could apply for an EU membership. This application was submitted to the 
European Council and the European Commission set a formal opinion regarding the 
applicant country. Then the Council had to unanimously agree the negotiating mandate, 
which was the first step for the negotiation procedure between the applicant country and 
the other EU Member States. The conditions for Enlargement were included in the 
“Copenhagen criteria” (December 1993), according to which, a candidate country was 
supposed to have institutions that could guarantee democracy, respect of the law, human 
rights and the protection of minorities, a well-functioning market economy and an 
ability to follow all membership obligations efficiently and to show adherence to the 
objectives of political, economic and monetary union (Europa, 2010d).  
       In 1995, the Madrid European Council emphasised the need for an adjustment of 
the administrative structures of every candidate country, in order for the country to be 
ready to put the EU guidelines, rules and procedures into effect successfully, moving 
towards a faster integration. Moreover, the EU had to make sure that both the 
institutional capacity and the decision-making processes in the candidate countries were 
effective enough in order for EU policy implementations to take place without problems 
(Europa, 2010d). 
       A pre-accession strategy was created for the candidate countries and included 
Europe Agreements, Association Agreements, Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements, Accession Partnerships, European Partnerships, Pre-Accession assistance 
(including co-financing from International Financing Institutions, participation in EU 
programmes, agencies and committees and national programmes) and Progress Reports. 
The role of this strategy was to prepare the candidate countries sufficiently in order for 
them not to have difficulties when adopting the EU framework (Europa, 2010b). 
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       At this point it should be mentioned that in the cases of Spain and Italy, no pre-
accession strategies took place to prepare them for the Reform of the SFs and thereby a 
move to a bottom-up regional policy before their inclusion in the EEC. This means that 
there were no satisfactory structural, or institutional adjustments within the national, or 
the regional context of those two countries in order for them to be able to implement EU 
rules and procedures more effectively towards a faster and more efficient integration. If 
such pre-accession criteria and mechanisms had taken place in Italy and Spain, it is 
highly likely that neither of the two countries would have faced implementation 
problems and perhaps all the Spanish and Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 regions would be 
nowadays excluded from the Convergence Objective. 
       The Enlargement posed a challenge to the EU budget, in terms of both the SFs and 
the CAP. All the regions of the new Central and Eastern European Member States were 
eligible for Objective 1 funding, which means they were to receive the highest rates of 
SFs assistance and, in terms of the CAP, a challenge was raised as the majority of these 
countries, in particular Poland and Hungary are significant agricultural producers and 
specialise in dairy products and cereals which are subject to high intervention levels by 
the EU (Armstrong, 2004). According to estimations in the early 1990s, it would be 
very difficult for the EU-15 to deal with such additional demands, and therefore, at the 
discussion on the 2000-2006 budget allocation that took place at the Berlin meeting of 
March 1999, it was decided that the candidate countries were to receive less money, 
allocated during a much longer period of time (Armstrong, 2004). 
       In terms of implementation, two new factors appeared during the third CSF Cycle. 
The first was the “n+2” rule (Bachtler and Mendez, 2010a), according to which, OPs 
received 7% of their budget out front by the EU and were obliged to spend it by the end 
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of the second year. Otherwise, the anticipated funding for the following year would be 
significantly decreased and the funding which was not spent would automatically return 
to the EU. The second factor was the “4% performance reserve”, according to which the 
EU withheld from Member States 4% of their overall SFs allocation for the 2000-2007 
period. In order for this reserve to be allocated to the Member States, the latter had to 
satisfy certain requirements, including the assessment of the results of programmes on a 
yearly basis, the monitoring of projects and the measurement of the amount of money 
spent after the third year. A mid-term evaluation report carried-out by outside evaluators 
would then inform the Commission about the economic progress of the regions in order 
to decide how the reserve should be allocated (Leonardi, 2005). 
       Another important issue was how EU Regional Policy would be affected by the 
establishment of the EMU. Ever since the EU Treaty of 1992, it was believed that the 
attempts of the EU Member States to meet the convergence criteria would increase 
regional divergence. In particular, the need to decrease the deficits of the public sector 
was supposed to affect the peripheral regions significantly in a negative way. Therefore, 
during the second CSF Cycle, it was decided by the EU to significantly increase the SFs, 
and the establishment of the Cohesion Fund in 1994 took place in order to provide 
assistance, particularly to the less advantaged EU regions towards the EMU. After the 
introduction of the euro in 2002, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was another 
factor putting significant pressure on EU Member States’ budgets, making it difficult 
for the Member States to spend more on their peripheral regions. The fact that the EU is 
not an optimum currency area and certainly lacks interstate mechanisms for fiscal 
transfers makes the future of EU Regional Policy uncertain (Armstrong, 2004). 
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       Barry and Begg (2003) also connect the launch of the EMU with EU regional 
cohesion. Their main argument is that regional convergence is necessary for a 
satisfactory functioning of the EMU and there are clear implications, particularly for the 
Mediterranean countries, where regional disparities are more evident. 
      Allen (2000), just like Gillingham (2003), admits that the principles of additionality 
and partnership were violated, especially by the Mediterranean Member States. 
According to Allen (2000), there were difficulties in monitoring the financial practices 
of some national governments effectively and therefore it was almost impossible for the 
EU to conclude if EU funds were actually additional to national funds.       
       In assessing the implementation of the partnership principle, partnership provided 
stimulus not only for regionalisation, but also for regionalism (Allen, 2000). Allen 
(2000) argued that it was natural for highly centralised EU Member States to have 
disagreements regarding the functioning of the partnership principle. Spain and Italy 
were highly centralised countries and for that reason partnership implementation was 
problematic.  
       The Berlin agreement left the EU member governments43 in a stronger position 
than before. Its most important outcomes are the renationalisation of the control of SFs 
expenditure and the weakening of the basic EU principles concerning Regional Policy44. 
According to Bache (1998), the Berlin agreement managed to take the policy process 
away from the MLG and close to a modified intergovernmentalism, known as 
“extended gatekeeping”. 
      Between 1989 and 2006, the most common concept associated with EU Regional 
Policy was “Europeanisation”. According to Radaelli (Radaelli, 2003 in Leonardi, 
                                                 
43 Particularly the core ones. 
44 Additionality, partnership, programming and concentration. 
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2005), Europeanisation is the process leading to the establishment and 
institutionalisation of rules, policy decisions and procedures, which are initially 
consolidated in the context of the EU policy procedures and then included in the context 
of national and sub-national public policies (Leonardi, 2005). The regional policy was 
firstly formulated at an EU level and then it was transferred to the national level for 
incorporation with all three levels (EU, national and regional) working in close 
cooperation. 
      The current EU Regional Policy does not fit into any national model, since it is in 
addition to existing national regional policies rather than a substitute for them. EU 
Regional Policy between 1989 and 2006 was a combination of inputs from the 
Commission, national governments and regional authorities. Before 1988, national 
governments were exclusively in charge of decision-making and the implementation of 
regional policy in their territory. However, after 1989, regions have been involved in 
policy-making processes. This cooperation explains the term Europeanisation in the 
sense that the Commission is the Member States’ agent. 
      From 1989 onwards, the management, control and evaluation functions have 
become more organised. The implementation policy has been much more efficient, 
mostly due to the effective organisation of the EU institutions. Agenda 2000 contained 
an organised outline of objectives and policies for the 2000-2006 period. This progress 
is also shown by the improvement in the regional economic performance of the 
peripheral regions, especially within Italy and Spain. 
       The 1989-2006 EU Regional Policy was concentrated on the allocation of resources 
from the European to the national and regional level through a planning programme, 
specific interventions, monitoring and reporting of expenditures, calculation of outputs 
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and evaluation of incomes (Leonardi, 2005). The concept of convergence emphasised 
the need for solidarity between the core and periphery in the EU. Also, EU Regional 
Policy after 1989 helped Member States which had problems financing their own 
regional policy. Before 1989, such Member States were forced to either increase their 
government spending, or decrease their domestic expenditures in order to finance their 
regional economic policies. Those budgetary constraints created many difficulties. The 
EU with its multi-level and multi-actor governance contributed to national regional 
policies with the first positive results at a regional level soon visible. 
        
3.2.4-FOURTH CSF CYCLE (2007-2013)     
      The Commission stated that after 2006, within the EU-25, Objective 1 Regions 
would be restricted to 25% of the population. The previous Objectives 2 and 3 are 
merged (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). During the current CSF Cycle (2007-2013), what 
was Objective 1 (including regions with GDP less than 75% of the Community average) 
is now re-labelled as the Convergence Objective. Also, the Commission stated that 
Member States with Gross National Income (GNI) below 90% of the EU average would 
benefit from the Cohesion Fund. Furthermore, a “Phasing-Out” system was approved to 
Member States which “would have been eligible for the Cohesion Fund if the threshold 
had stayed at 90% of the GNI average of the EU at 15 and not at 25. This only concerns 
Spain” (Europa, 2009c:1). 
       Besides the Convergence Objective, the other two Objectives are: a) the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment Objective and b) the European Territorial 
Cooperation Objective, based on the INTERREG initiative on transnational, cross-
border and interregional cooperation. The entire SFs and Cohesion Funds available are 
347 billion euros, equal to 35.7% of the EU budget and 0.38% of the entire EU GDP. 
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81.5% is available for Objective 1 Regions. Spain receives 35.2 billion euros and Italy 
28.8 billion (Inforegio Panorama, 2008).     
       During the current CSF Cycle, the EU will spend 308 billion euros45 more for 
regional convergence (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007:309) and “a phasing-out system is 
granted to those regions which would have been eligible for funding under the 
Convergence objective if the threshold of 75% of GDP had been calculated for the EU 
at 15 and not at 25” (Europa, 2009c:1) (Basilicata in Italy and Ciudad Autónoma de 
Ceuta, Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla, Principado de Asturias and Región de Murcia in 
Spain). 
 
3.3-THEORY ON POLICY EVALUATION 
       Since the beginning of the CSF Cycles, the evaluation process (Bachtler and 
Mendez, 2010b) has gained further importance due to the fact that it is linked to the 
crucial issues of the allocation of SFs and satisfactory implementation according to the 
basic EU Regional Policy principles. Evaluation is the process of “assessing and 
providing judgements and feedback on the design, delivery and impact of each 
programme” (Kearney, 1997:313). According to Milio (2007) evaluation is the means 
through which an assessment can be made, regarding whether the programme 
implementation has been conducted as initially anticipated. Evaluation is an integral 
process towards regional development, as it can critically assess, estimate and calculate 
the problems, difficulties, future potential and impact of a specific programme.  
       The main aims of evaluation include accountability, support in decision-making, 
mainly in the context of the allocation of resources, clear policy targets, recognition of 
policy needs, efficient assessment of impacts at project, programme and policy level, 
                                                 
45 In 2004 prices. 
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cost-effectiveness of policies and learning and lesson drawing, particularly in the 
context of procedures (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004). There is an emphasis on 
“qualitative research on processes; case studies of best practice; quantitative 
investigations of effectiveness (impacts), efficiency (cost per job), additionality, 
deadweight and displacement; and macroeconomic modelling” (Polverari and Bachtler, 
2004:6).  
       Diez (Diez, 2002 in Polverari and Bachtler, 2004) summarises the challenges for 
the evaluation of the EU Regional Policy of the past twenty years in five categories: a) 
adopting a holistic approach to contemporary regional policy, since contemporary 
regional policy tends to comprise a plurality of targets, b) the importance of using 
specific knowledge, skills and methods, c) a multiplicity of issues, meaning that the 
evaluation procedure has to assess a complex set of interactions in the context of 
regional policy, d) the involvement of a great number of actors, such as stakeholders, 
partners and beneficiaries and e) a bottom-up procedure through which policy is in close 
agreement with the principle of subsidiarity, where evaluation can be an instrument for 
both capacity building and learning. According to Bachtler, Mendez and Wishlade 
(2009), Cohesion Policy has not only been a simple redistributive mechanism, but also 
(and more importantly) an efficient “tool” in order for the combination of solidarity, 
competitiveness and sustainable development to become a reality amongst the EU 
Member States.  
       Evaluation is characterised by a multiplicity of targets, such as the promotion of 
socio-economic progress, high employment levels, sustainable development and the 
achievement of socio-economic cohesion (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article B, 1997 in 
Synthesis Report, 2010).   
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       The evaluation process is related to the monitoring process (Bachtler and Mendez, 
2010b), as they both aim to measure the efficiency of Regional Policy. However, these 
two processes, despite the fact that they work towards the same target, are not identical 
and it is important to make a distinction between them. Evaluation (Bachtler and 
Mendez, 2010b) is meant a) to estimate and assess the efficiency of policy, b) to support 
the implementation of policy instruments and programmes and c) to conduct the design 
of new policies (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004). The monitoring system “harnesses strict 
certification, control and correction mechanisms. Member States have to carry out 
checks and audits of projects that receive funding, and the Commission itself can make 
on-the-spot inspections” (Regional Policy Inforegio/Monitoring, 2010:1). Also, EU 
Member States are required to assess the implementation of the OPs through a) a 
certification body, b) an auditing body and c) a monitoring committee (Regional Policy 
Inforegio/Monitoring, 2010). Monitoring committees oversee programmes and, 
according to Kearney (1997), “in practice, monitoring has ranged from supplementing 
information on the actual expenditure of a programme with minimal information on the 
consequences of that expenditure to sophisticated systems which make later payments 
conditional on managers providing detailed information on the outputs which have 
actually been achieved from preceding payments” (Kearney, 1997:314).  
       We would therefore argue that the main difference between evaluation and 
monitoring is that while monitoring is used to be aware of the ongoing progress and 
status of the programme, evaluation measures the impact of the programme on the 
economy and society. Besides, the information gathered from the monitoring process 
can be used to change or update the programme in question, whereas the information 
gathered for the evaluation process can be used for future programmes.  
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       Quantitative evidence concerning the impact of EU Cohesion Policy is carried out 
by DG REGIO (the Directorate-General of the EU Commission in charge of EU 
Regional Policy), as part of a research project, using the HERMIN (Bachtler, Mendez 
and Wishlade, 2010) and QUEST econometric models (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). 
The QUEST model is the Commission’s own macroeconomic model. The HERMIN 
model46 concentrates less on GDP growth rates and more on the increase of the GDP 
level in the Objective 1 Regions and their countries. This model focuses on three 
expenditure types: physical infrastructure, human capital and support to enterprises. 
According to Bachtler and Gorzelak (2007), “in the short term, such (aforementioned) 
outlays tend to stimulate demand which, in Keynesian theory will lead to the emergence 
of multiplier effects. In the medium and long run, such outlays should generate supply 
effects owing to increased effectiveness of the production factors and will also foster the 
inflow of exogenous capital, attracted by better conditions for business. The intensity of 
such processes is determined by elasticities inserted into the model on the basis of 
external evaluation” (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007:322). 
       The evaluation process includes three stages: the ex-ante stage, an intermediate and 
the ex-post one. Ex-ante evaluation takes place when a programme, or project, are being 
designed and agreed. Prior appraisals and assesments regarding individual measures of 
every programme, or project, take place, in order to make the first estimations about the 
future outcomes of that programme and possibly to evaluate whether or not it will be 
successful. However, the technical difficulties of making correct and accurate prior 
appraisals result in a series of different estimations and approaches not only between 
EU Member States, but also amongst the different plans submitted by individual EU 
                                                 
46 Planned and actual expenditure data as part of ex-post evaluations. 
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Member States. In many cases, the main problem has been the lack of specification of 
baseline data, which was necessary in order to estimate and calculate the impact. In 
other words, ex-ante evaluation in general can be regarded as imperfect (Kearney, 1997). 
       Ex-ante evaluation can also be linked with SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-
Opportunities-Threats) analysis either for a specified sector, or a member state. It is also 
linked with knowledge about labour market trends, environmental situations, 
sustainable development issues and production development impacts (Ministero dello 
Sviluppo Economico-Dipartimento per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica, 2011).  
       The aim of intermediate evaluation, on the other hand, is to identify problems, or 
weaknesses in the context of the programme management information that might exist 
after the programme begins. It also aims at providing guidance and information for re-
programming actions, or decisions that may be necessary either because of alterations in 
policy design and priorities, or because of the fact that the programme is actually not 
evolving as planned. Intermediate evaluation is also very important as it creates a solid 
framework for the ex-post evaluation where the impact of the programme will be 
estimated and calculated. In the past, intermediate evaluation was regarded as a formal 
bureaucratic procedure with limited scope, but mainly since the beginning of the second 
CSF Cycle, it has been acknowledged as a basic element of efficient programme 
management (Kearney, 1997).  
       Ex-post evaluation is expected to notify not only the re-definition of programmes in 
certain programming periods, but also the entire reforming of structural policies. This 
can be performed by the provision of information regarding the actual effects of the 
current policies. Nevertheless, ex-post evaluation suffers from two important problems. 
The first is the fact that in most cases the latest available information corresponds to the 
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programme situation not as it is at that specific moment, but as it was two or three years 
ago. The only method that can solve this problem is the utilisation of customised 
surveys according to monitoring information. The second problem is, in some cases, a 
difficulty in actually identifying all of the factors that can influence a certain policy. If 
some factors are not taken into consideration, then this might lead to incorrect decisions 
regarding the future of that policy and might have a negative impact in the short, or long 
run. A possible solution to this problem can be to exploit and apply the entire range of 
existing evaluation methodologies, updating and developing them wherever possible. It 
should be mentioned that important contributions regarding evaluation methodology 
have been made by the Commission DGs, the Technical Working Group on Evaluation, 
including evaluation experts from both the Commission and EU Member States and the 
MEANS programme, the target of which was the discovery of best practices at all 
evaluation levels within the EU (Kearney, 1997).  
       It can be argued that, whilst in the mid-1980s, perhaps the only effective regional 
policy evaluation system was that of the United Kingdom (UK), nowadays there is 
practically no EU Member State where systematic evaluation of regional policies, 
programmes, projects and instruments does not take place in order to comply with EU 
guidelines and requirements. The third CSF Cycle marked the beginning of the 
complete evaluation procedure (ex-ante, intermediate and ex-post ones) in all EU-
funded regional development programmes and it is worth mentioning that between 2000 
and 2003, the complete cycle (ex-ante, intermediate, ex-post) took place in all of the 
aforementioned EU programmes (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004). 
       The evaluation of EU Regional (Cohesion) Policy is conducted in accordance with 
the partnership principle (Regional Policy Inforegio/Evaluation, 2010). The ex-ante 
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evaluation is conducted by the EU Member States, whereas the ex-post one is 
implemented by the Commission. EU Member States are mainly in charge of the 
ongoing evaluations, but the Commission is also entitled to intervene when necessary 
(when EU evaluations are considered to be more effective than those undertaken by 
Member States), always in partnership with the Member States (Regional Policy 
Inforegio/Evaluation, 2010). 
       Polverari and Bachtler (2004) argue that different evaluation cultures can be 
identified, drawing on national systems of law and administration. In particular, they 
divide the EU Member States into three categories, based on the use of evaluation in the 
context of regional policy. The first category includes countries where evaluation was 
regarded as a very important and integral part of process of policy-making; these 
include Germany, the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, and recently Ireland and Austria. In 
such countries, the domestic regional policy evaluation has been actually “embedded in 
the policy-making process, reflecting national evaluation cultures and the development 
of an evaluation practice which largely pre-dates the Structural Funds or that can be 
considered as mainly independent from Structural Funds rules” (Polverari and Bachtler, 
2004:14).        
       The second category includes countries where evaluation has taken place on an ad 
hoc, or intermittent basis, such as France, Luxemburg and Finland, whilst the third 
category includes the remaining Member States where evaluation of regional policies 
was not as common, and in fact was introduced and established because of the SF 
obligations. Italy, and to a lesser extent Spain, are included in this category. Historically, 
Italy in particular had a weak evaluation culture (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004) in the 
context of regional economic development and before the beginning of the first CSF 
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Cycle, evaluation was ex-ante and project-related (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004). Ex-
post and programme-wide (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004) evaluations mainly started 
taking place due to the SF principles and regulations.  
       In Italy, the National Evaluation System includes the Evaluation Unit of Public 
Investments (UVAL) of the Ministry of Economic Development, which acts as the 
general coordinator of the National Evaluation System and the evaluation of the 
National Strategic Reference Framework, of the Ministry for Agricultural and Rural 
Policies (INEA), the ESF Evaluation Unit at the Ministry of Labour (ISFOL) and the 
Managing Authorities’ Evaluation Units (Nicita, 2008). UVAL can be characterised as 
the most important agency for evaluation and its main responsibilities include the 
promotion of information, data and knowledge for public policies, support to 
administrators in order to innovate public action, programme evaluation and the ex-ante 
evaluation of projects (Nicita, 2008).   
       In Spain, the evaluation of EU co-funded projects and programmes is conducted 
and coordinated by various entities, according to the nature of the programmes and the 
policy sector. The evaluation of regional development programmes is carried-out by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEH) and mainly the Directorate General of 
European Community Funds (DGFC). We can argue that within the DGFC, the most 
important evaluation unit is the General Sub-Direction of Territorial Programming and 
Evaluation of the European Community Programmes. Social policy evaluation is 
conducted by the Labour Ministry (Feinstein and Zapico-Goni, 2010).        
       Evaluation has undoubtedly had an important influence on policy within the entire 
EU. Both administrators and policy-makers regard now evaluation as a crucial part of 
the policy-making process and there has been an emphasis on the development of the 
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capacity for evaluation through studies of evaluation and investment in evaluation skills 
and techniques. Evaluation studies are now conducted and assessed in a more 
systematic way through the establishment of specific evaluation units, guidance on best 
practice and the creation of evaluation handbooks (Polverari and Bachtler, 2004).    
 
3.4-RESULTS AND ADAPTATION TO ITALY AND SPAIN  
3.4.1-FIRST CSF CYCLE (1989-1993) 
       The results of the first CSF Cycle could be characterised as encouraging. EU 
Objective 1 Regions managed to reduce the GDP per head divergence with the EU 
average by 3%. Around 600,000 jobs were created through the SFs in Spain, Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal and the average GDP per head of these Member States was raised 
from 68.3% to 74.5% of the EU average. Also, 917,000 persons were trained by the 
ESF and 470,000 Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) received significant 
assistance in the EU Objective 2 Regions (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). 
 
3.4.2-SECOND CSF CYCLE (1994-1999) 
       The results of the second CSF Cycle were also encouraging. The effect of the 
intervention of SFs on GDP (real terms) resulted in the creation of an additional 4.7% in 
Portugal, 2.8% in Ireland, 2.2% in Greece and 1.4% in Spain. In Objective 1 Regions, 
700,000 net jobs were established, resulting in an employment addition of 
approximately 4% in Portugal, 2.5% in Greece and between 1% and 2% in Spain and 
the Italian Mezzogiorno. 800,000 SMEs (500,000 in Objective 1 Regions) received 
direct investment assistance, 4,104 km of motorway and 31,844 km of other roads were 
created, or modernised, rail infrastructure was updated and in Objective 2 Regions 
approximately 567,000 gross additional jobs were established, unemployment fell from 
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11.3% to 8.7% and 3.2 billion ERDF funding resulted in the creation of 115.1 million 
square metres of “new sites and premises” (Inforegio Panorama, 2008:17).  
       Bachtler and Gorzelak (2007) refer to quantitative evidence concerning the impact 
of the EU Cohesion Policy in the Mezzogiorno. This is the result of modelling research 
carried out by DG REGIO, using certain macroeconomic models. According to Beutel 
(Beutel 1993, 1995 and 2002 in Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007), the Funds increased the 
GDP growth rate by 2.4% within the Mezzogiorno by the end of the second CSF Cycle. 
Between 1994 and 2001, the Commission concluded that GDP growth in Spain had 
been 1% per year higher than the EU average, and employment rates had increased to a 
higher degree than the EU average. Furthermore, GDP per capita in the Objective 1 
Regions had grown faster than in the rest of the EU (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). 
According to Beutel (Beutel, 1993, 1995 and 2002 in Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007), the 
Funds increased the GDP growth rate by between 0.5% and 1% per year in Spain during 
the 1989-1999 period47 (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). In Spain, the additional GDP at 
the end of the 1994-1999 period, in per cent relative to a baseline scenario without 
regional programme was 4.3 according to the HERMIN model, 1.2 according to the 
QUEST model and 4.2 according to Beutel (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007).  
       According to the HERMIN model, during the second CSF Cycle, the effects of 
structural interventions were expected to lead to a 4%-9% higher GDP level in Spain. 
For the second CSF Cycle, the QUEST model estimated an increase in GDP of 1%-3% 
in Spain (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 The first and second CSF Cycles. 
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3.4.3-THIRD CSF CYCLE (2000-2006) 
       The results of the third CSF Cycle were exemplary. Objective 1 spending resulted 
in the establishment of approximately 570,000 net jobs, around 160,000 of which were 
in new Member States. In Spain, there was approximately four billion euros of SF 
investment in research, technology and innovation, for more than 13,000 research 
projects, involving almost 100,000 researchers and co-financing the majority of the 
present 64 Spanish technology parks. Also in Spain, investments in roads saved almost 
1.2 million hours of travel time per year. In all EU Objective 2 regions, approximately 
730,000 jobs were created (Inforegio Panorama, 2008). According to EU statistics, the 
Cohesion Policy produced an increase of 1.1% in the GDP of the Mezzogiorno (Europa, 
2009a).  
       According to Commission data, during the third CSF Cycle in Spain, for every euro 
contributed in terms of the EU Regional Policy, an extra 0.9 euro was generated on 
average in the Objective 1 Regions, reaching as high as three euros in the Objective 2 
Regions (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). According to Beutel (Beutel, 1993, 1995 and 
2002 in Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007), the Funds increased the GDP growth rate in 
Spain by between 0.03% and 0.4% during the third CSF Cycle (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 
2007). In Spain the additional GDP at the end of the 2000-2006 period, in per cent 
relative to a baseline scenario without regional programmes was 2.2 according to 
HERMIN and 0.9 according to QUEST (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). According to 
the HERMIN model, the effects of the third CSF Cycle were estimated to lead to 
increases of 1.8%-6.1% in Spain. The QUEST model estimated an increase in GDP of 
0.5%-2.4% in Spain (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). 
       According to the EU (2009), between 2000 and 2006, the EU Cohesion Policy had 
a very significant impact in both Italy and Spain. More specifically, in Italy, Cohesion 
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Policy supported 20,000 businesses, including 200 start-ups. Funding for industrial 
research projects was beneficial to 770 businesses and there was a significant rise in a) 
the number of businesses connected to the Internet from 25% to 70% and b) the number 
of families connected to the Internet from 11% to 32%. Furthermore, 690 km of new 
roads were constructed and 350 km of railways were significantly modernised. The 
railway line linking Rome and Naples was finally completed and this resulted in the 
reduction of the journey time by approximately 33 minutes. New airport terminals were 
created in Cagliari, Bari and Catania and there was a significant updating of air traffic 
control systems within the entire Mezzogiorno (Europa, 2009a).  
       Also, an additional number of approximately nine million people gained access to 
sorted household collection of waste and 63 new plants for waste treatment were 
introduced. 530 projects were established in order to improve the cultural heritage of the 
Mezzogiorno and this partially led to an increase in the number of foreign tourists to the 
Mezzogiorno by 20% (always between 2000 and 2006). Due to the Cohesion Policy, 
there was one computer for every ten students within the Mezzogiorno, up from one for 
every 33 students in 2001. This partially led to an increase in the number of young 
people attending compulsory education from 80% in 1999 to 93% in 2007. Lastly, 
15,000 SMEs in 14 Italian regions received a significant amount of EU aid. The impact 
of the Cohesion Policy, according always to the EU statistics, is more than evident 
(Europa, 2009a). 
       In the case of Spain, EU Cohesion Policy had an equally significant impact. 
Between 1995 and 2007, in terms of GDP, Spain increased its disparity with the rest of 
the EU-27 from 92% to 106.8% of the EU GDP per capita average and between 1995 
and 2006, the average growth in GDP per capita was 0.5 percentage points a year higher 
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than the EU average. Between 2000 and 2005, more than 377,000 people received 
support regarding issues such as self-employment, training, skills development, housing 
and childcare and approximately 2.5 million people received support in terms of 
continuous training. Also, between 1995 and 2004, more than 1,200 km of motorways 
and roads were co-financed by the Cohesion Policy. Between 2000 and 2006, the 
Spanish high-speed train network was updated and extended with new connections 
between Lleida-Tarragona-Barcelona, Cordoba-Malaga and Madrid-Valladolid 
(approximately 850 km in total). Furthermore, between 2000 and 2006, 2,000 km of 
water pipelines were upgraded and 600 km of new pipelines created, serving almost 6% 
of the Spanish population (2.6 million people) (Europa, 2009b). 
       Between 1999 and 2005, 57 plants for water treatment were constructed, upgraded, 
or enlarged. Between 2000 and 2006, the SFs invested approximately four billion euros 
into R&D, innovation and the information society and this led to the creation of more 
than 21,000 R&D and innovation projects with the participation of almost 10,000 
researchers. More than 500 research and technology centres were supported and the 
majority of the current 64 Spanish technology parks were co-financed. There was also 
significant support for technology activities in almost 100,000 SMEs and an investment 
of approximately one billion euros into the infrastructure of information and 
communications technologies (Europa, 2009b). 
       Also, very important national programmes have started, due to SF support. The 
most significant of these include the Programa AGUA (2004-2008) for water reserves 
management, the Plan AVANZ@ (2005-2010) for decreasing the digital divide between 
Spain and the EU and the Torres Quevedo for research and technology support for 
SMEs. It is also worth mentioning that Cohesion Policy funding resulted in the 
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attraction of foreign investment, which rose from 11% of total investment in 1998 to 
approximately 18% by the end of the third CSF Cycle. Multi-annual programming 
encouraged longer-term planning in Spain and the partnership requirement led a greater 
number and range of organisations to get involved in development projects (Synthesis 
Report, 2010). The impact of Cohesion Policy, according to the EU, has been evident 
both in Italy and in Spain. 
       According to the Synthesis Report (2010), EU-15 Objective 1 Regions that received 
SFs between 2000 and 2006 experienced a higher economic growth rate than those 
receiving no EU funds. This was true in the case of Spain, but not in the case of Italy, 
where the growth performance of its Objective 1 Regions was inferior to that of the 
non-assisted EU-15 regions (Synthesis Report, 2010).  
       Between 2000 and 2006, the employment rate in the Objective 1 Regions of Spain 
increased by 8.7 percentage points (from 52.5% in 2000 to 61.2% in 2006), whereas in 
Italy it increased by 4.4 percentage points (from 41.5% in 2000 to 45.9% in 2006). 
According to field research on more than 250 firms in Italy, more than 69% of projects 
were between a high and a medium-to-high tech nature (Synthesis Report, 2010), 
approximately 83% of research activities had their results commercialised (Synthesis 
Report, 2010), and 19% led to the establishment of patents (26% in the context of the 
SMEs). Around 92% of firms reported that the effect on jobs was positive (average 
increase of 15%) and 87% of the projects strengthened public-private collaboration with 
an emphasis on the link between universities, public research centres and businesses 
(Synthesis Report, 2010). 
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3.4.4-FOURTH CSF CYCLE (2007-2013)            
       The expected results for the fourth CSF Cycle are also positive. Cohesion Policy 
investment is likely to increase the GDP of the new Member States by around 6% on 
average and the GDP of Spain and the Mezzogiorno by approximately 1-1.5%. By 2015, 
SFs and Cohesion Funds are likely to have established around two million new jobs and 
the focus on research and innovation will possibly create 40,000 additional jobs. Also, 
EU Regional Policy will invest in 25,000 km of new, or reconstructed, roads and 7,700 
km of railways will be created (Inforegio, Panorama, 2008).  
       The main priority of EU Cohesion Policy in Italy between 2007 and 2013 is the 
creation of 473,000 new jobs in the four Convergence Objective Regions. The transport 
infrastructure will receive 4.1 billion euros from the EU. The EU will also invest 2.7 
billion euros into entrepreneurship promotion and support of SMEs and 1.6 billion euros 
into information and communication technologies (Europa, 2009a). In Spain, still 
between 2007 and 2013, 45.5% of the ESF funds (3.6 billion euros) will be invested in 
raising labour participation, whilst electronic services and applications for citizens (in 
the form of e-government, e-health, e-learning and e-inclusion) will be supported by the 
ERDF with approximately 741 million euros under the Information Society priority. 
10.6% of the entire ESF funding in Spain (860 million euros) will be invested in the 
adaptability of workers and enterprises, 218 million euros (by the ESF) will be invested 
in the integration of migrants and 6.65% of the ESF funds will finance issues such as 
poverty and social inclusion (Europa, 2009b).  
       It must be made clear that regional development is not only determined by EU 
Regional “Cohesion” Policy. Other factors, such as national governmental policies and 
regional authorities’ actions in terms of institutional capacity building, spending 
capacity and investments have to be taken into account and it is worth mentioning that 
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according to the EU Synthesis Report48, there are certain “difficulties of tracing a direct 
link between the expenditure supported and economic performance” (Synthesis Report, 
2010:15), and macroeconomic models such as QUEST and HERMIN (used in the 
evaluation process) “represent the only practical means of estimating the effects of 
cohesion policy” (Synthesis Report, 2010:15). Also, “these models attempt to represent 
the behaviour of economies as best as they can, but there, of course, remains 
uncertainty, and debate, about how economies work in practice” (Synthesis Report, 
2010:112) and “the estimates of the effect of cohesion policy produced by the two 
models are not necessarily an accurate reflection of reality. Indeed, both cannot be 
correct” (Synthesis Report, 2010:119).  
       In other words, the EU recognises that the combination of public expenditure 
financed by EU funding and economic performance can sometimes be problematic and 
thus satisfactory economic performance cannot always be linked to the SFs allocations. 
Regional economic performance and development are not always an outcome of EU 
Regional Policy.     
      
3.5-CONCLUSIONS  
      The conclusions that can be drawn after examining how the EU Regional Policy has 
been conducted from the establishment of the EEC up to the current CSF Cycle (2007-
13) are manifold. Ever since the establishment of the EEC, there has been a need for an 
effective regional policy in order to reduce such disparities, but the first major step was 
made in 1975 with the establishment of the ERDF. The 1988 Regional Policy reforms 
and the beginning of the CSF Cycles the following year were the cornerstones, on 
which a new, less-centralised EU Regional Policy would begin, in order for regional 
                                                 
48 Ex-post evaluation of the ERDF actions between 2000 and 2006. 
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economic divergence between the EU Member States to be narrowed. Since 1989, the 
EU Regional Policy has indeed been orientated towards cohesion, but for cohesion to 
become a reality, regional convergence is essential. Economic convergence strongly 
contributes to socio-economic cohesion and thereby a more harmonious integration. In 
this spirit, the regional economic disparities that are still present work to hamper 
cohesion. 
       During the four CSF Cycles, the EU faced several problems and difficulties when 
conducting its regional policy. These difficulties were linked with a) budget allocations, 
b) implementation problems and c) violation of fundamental regional policy principles, 
such as additionality, subsidiarity and partnership. Such difficulties were mainly evident 
in the Southern Member States, and in particular Spain and Italy. Despite the fact that it 
was difficult for the EU to allocate huge amounts of SFs to these two countries, mainly 
because of budgetary restraints due to the EMU, or the Enlargement, it can be argued 
that during all the CSF Cycles, both countries received respectable amounts of SFs. 
However, both Spain and the Italian Mezzogiorno, suffering an inefficient institutional 
capacity, were not adequately prepared to immediately adopt the CSF framework and 
the EU Regional Policy rules and procedures. Therefore, during the first two CSF 
Cycles the results were not particularly satisfactory, but during the last two CSF Cycles, 
the results, not only in Italy and Spain, but in the entire EU, have been more 
encouraging. 
       The evaluation framework required by the Commission shows that in both Italy and 
Spain, systematic evaluation became a reality only after the beginning of the CSF 
Cycles. Both countries were characterised by weak evaluation cultures, which, before 
the CSF were mainly ex-ante and more project-related than programme-wide. However, 
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particularly since the beginning of the third CSF Cycle, both Member States started 
undertaking the complete evaluation process, which includes ex-ante, intermediate and 
ex-post evaluations.  
       Although it is necessary to argue that a) regional economic development is not 
always an outcome of the EU Cohesion Policy and b) the EU econometric models offer 
estimations that do not necessarily reflect the reality, we cannot deny that the EU 
Cohesion Policy has undoubtedly had a positive impact on both Italy and Spain, 
especially from the third CSF Cycle onwards, and particularly on issues such as 
infrastructure, industrial development (particularly in the context of SMEs), training and 
skills development and investment in research and development. These, however, 
somehow do not reflect sustained regional growth.         
       The positive impact of the EU Cohesion Policy on Italy and Spain presented here 
suggests that there is room for optimism that further regional economic progress can 
take place and regional disparities can be eliminated, despite the fact that regional 
divergence still exists. The current CSF Cycle (2007-13) remains pivotal regarding the 
future of EU Regional Policy and its outcomes will reveal the degree of effectiveness of 
the EU Regional Policy in an already significantly enlarged EU. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE PROFILE OF REGIONAL POLICY IN ITALY AND SPAIN 
 
4.1-INTRODUCTION 
       The aim of this chapter is to offer a coherent view of the regional economic 
situation in Italy and Spain by means of key economic indicators49, but also relying on 
data and figures provided by the interviewees in the two countries. The data discussed 
will include national level data, as well as regional data for the Objective 1 Regions in 
both countries. The analysis will shed some light on whether EU Regional Policy has 
been having a positive impact on these countries. In chapter 5, we will focus only on 
Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia and Campania, whilst in chapter 6 we will focus only on 
Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía and Extremadura. Chapters 5 and 6 
integrate this focus with a more qualitative discussion drawing on the interviews carried 
out with key regional policy-makers. 
       In this chapter, the economic profiles of Italy and Spain will be presented with an 
emphasis on the regional dimension, in particular looking at those regions that were 
eligible for Objective 1 SFs50, during the third (2000-2006) CSF Cycle. The regions this 
study is based on are the Italian and Spanish NUTS 2 regions which were part of the 
Objective 1 between 2000 and 2006. The target of this survey is to provide statistical 
evidence as to whether there has been any progress in terms of regional economic 
convergence. Both Spain and Italy are characterised by the existence of core and 
periphery economic structures amongst their NUTS 2 regions, according to the 
dependency theory. This metropolis-satellite relation established between rich and poor 
                                                 
49 GDP per capita, employment and unemployment rates. 
50 Regions with a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU-15 average. 
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regions results in economic divergence, which has been narrowing down, but not 
eliminated.      
       Figure 4.1 below shows the dispersion of regional GDP per inhabitant51 in both 
Spain and Italy from 1995 to 2006. This dispersion is calculated at NUTS 3 level and is 
measured by the sum of the absolute differences between the national and the regional 
GDP per inhabitant, weighted with the population share. It is expressed in percentage of 
the national GDP per inhabitant (Eurostat, 2010a). It is indicative of the difference that 
exists between these two countries. The conclusion is that between 1995 and 2006, the 
dispersion of regional GDP per head across the Italian regions remained higher than that 
across the Spanish regions. However, from 2002 to 2006, both countries experienced a 
gradual decrease (with the exception of the period 2003-04 for Italy, when no decrease 
took place), so that both display in 2006 lower dispersion than in 1995.  
Figure 4.1 
Dispersion of regional GDP per inhabitant in Spain and Italy (in % of the national GDP per 
inhabitant 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010a. 
 
                                                 
51 In % of the national GDP per inhabitant. 
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4.2 THE CASE OF ITALY 
4.2.1-A BRIEF ECONOMIC PROFILE 
      Italy is made up of 20 NUTS 2 regions, of which the Objective 1 Regions52 included 
were Puglia, Calabria, Campania, Basilicata, Sicilia and Sardegna. In the 2007-2013 
CSF Cycle, Basilicata53  and Sardegna54exited the Convergence Objective. Calabria, 
Campania, Puglia and Sicilia are still included in the Convergence Objective. 
Dependency theory is useful to explain economic development in the case of Italy, 
where core, semi-periphery and periphery structures55 are evident. We argue that the 12 
northern regions56 are the core ones, due to the fact that a) they are far less dependent 
on agriculture than the others, b) they are far more industrialised than the others and 
their industries are characterised by higher technology, c) the labour force occupied in 
the northern regions is more skilled than in the others, d) in the northern regions there is 
a higher level of income, GDP per capita and employment, accompanied by a lower 
level of unemployment, compared to the others.  
                                                
       Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata and Sardegna are the semi-peripheral regions, due to 
the fact that they have already managed to exit the Convergence Objective. We also 
include Basilicata in the semi-periphery, despite the fact that it is a “Phasing-Out” 
Region, as in terms of GDP per capita, employment and unemployment, its performance 
is more successful compared to that of the Convergence Regions. The four Convergence 
 
52 During the third CSF Cycle. 
53 Basilicata is a “Phasing-Out” Region and a Phasing-Out system “is granted to those regions which 
would have been eligible for funding under the Convergence Objective if the threshold of 75% of GDP 
had been calculated for the EU at 15 and not at 25” (Europa, 2009c:1). 
54 Sardegna is a “Phasing-In” Region and a Phasing-In system “is granted until 2013 to NUTS 2 regions 
which were covered by the former Objective 1 but whose GDP exceed 75% of the average GDP of the 
EU-15” (Europa, 2009c:1).      
55 According to economic variables such as GDP per capita, employment and unemployment. 
56 Lombardia, Piemonte, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Val D’Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Liguria, 
Marche, Trentino-Alto Adige, Toscana and Umbria.  
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Regions57 form the periphery, as, despite the fact that they have been receiving SFs for 
more than 20 years, they still have not managed to reach the 75% of the EU-27 GDP in 
order to exit the Convergence Objective. Furthermore, the unemployment rates are 
particularly high, whilst their employment rates are low compared to the other Italian 
regions. Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicilia can be regarded as peripheral regions 
also because of their distance from the core regions and the lack of competitiveness of 
their companies. The thesis is based on this division between the developed industrial, 
core North, which is dominated by the dynamic manufacturing and service sectors, and 
the more agricultural and public sector dependent, peripheral Mezzogiorno58.  
      In the context of macro data, in 2009 (the latest year available), the Italian GDP (in 
Purchasing Power Parity-PPP) was $1.76 trillion (country comparison to the world: 11), 
the GDP real growth rate was -4.8% (country comparison to the world: 187) and the 
GDP per capita (PPP) $30,300 (country comparison to the world: 44). In 2009, the 
unemployment rate was 7.7% (country comparison to the world: 79) and the inflation 
rate 0.8% (country comparison to the world: 41). In 2009, the labour force was 24.97 
million (country comparison to the world: 23) (CIA Factbook/Italy, 2009a).  
       In the context of micro data, in 2009, the GDP composition per sector was such that 
agriculture59  accounted for 1.8%, industry60  for 25% and services for 73.1% (CIA 
Factbook/Italy, 2009a). In the beginning of the CSF Cycles (in 1989), all of the 
Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 regions61 were included in Objective 162. The semi-peripheral 
                                                 
57 Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicilia. 
58 Meaning the Italian South. 
59 Italy’s most important agricultural products are fruits, vegetables, grain, fish, dairy products, olives, 
potatoes, sugar beets and soybeans.  
60 Italy’s most important industries are tourism, machinery, chemicals, motor vehicles, iron and steel, 
food processing and clothing. 
61 Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata, Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia and Sardegna. 
62 It should be mentioned that the Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 regions were the only Italian NUTS 2 regions 
included in Objective 1. 
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Abruzzo managed to exit Objective 1 during the second CSF Cycle and the semi-
peripheral Molise during the third and this is a sign of regional economic development 
and convergence. 
 
4.2.2-ITALY AND SFs 
       According to Piazzi (2009), analysis of whether EU SFs63 have had positive results 
in terms of economic and social convergence in Italy shows that over the period 
considered the regions of the Mezzogiorno have gradually diverged64 . This is a feature 
common to the whole Italian economy. In fact, within this negative trend, the 
Mezzogiorno regions were able to perform better than the other Italian regions. The 
reason for this national level divergence has been the significant deterioration in 
productivity rates, particularly in the Northern and Central Italian regions. Even though 
the losses of productivity of the regions of the Mezzogiorno were less severe than of the 
Centre-North, the performance was worse than the EU-27 average. The trends observed 
in the labour market in the Mezzogiorno were fairly positive. In most cases, 
employment rates and unemployment rates improved compared to both the EU and the 
Italian average. Yet, they were not able to fully offset the bad performance in terms of 
productivity over the period 2000-2005.  
       The analysis also suggests that the role of the public sector in Italy in addressing 
internal disparities was rather weak. Over the period 2000-2006, both current and 
capital expenditure per head was persistently higher in the regions of the Centre-North. 
The objective of allocating 30% of the ordinary capital expenditure to the regions of the 
Mezzogiorno each year, enshrined in national Law, was not respected throughout the 
                                                 
63 Despite some initial implementation difficulties. 
64 In terms of GDP per capita compared to the EU-27 average. 
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reference period. Figures suggest that the distributive role of the public sector was more 
evident in Spain (interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
       Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below reveal the combination of national and EU contributions 
during the first and second CSF Cycles in Italy65. According to Table 4.3, the SFs 
distribution for Objective 1 Regions between 2000 and 2006 of Italy was 21,935 
MEUR66. 
Table 4.1 
Total allocations for 1989-1993 CSFs in terms of SF, EIB, private and national contributions 
(MECU in 2005 prices) 
Member 
state Total SFs 
SFs for 
Ob.1 
National 
contribution 
Private 
contribution EIB loans Total 
Annual 
impact 
on GDP 
Italy 11872 8504 11310 4243 10283 37708 0.87% 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, pp. 51 and 55. 
 
Table 4.2 
Total allocations for 1994-1999 CSFs in terms of SF, EIB, private and national contributions 
(MECU in 2005 prices) 
Member 
state Total SFs 
SFs for 
Ob.1 
National 
contribution 
Private 
contribution EIB loans Total 
Annual 
impact on 
GDP 
Italy 21651 14860 19240 17442 1732 60065 1.76% 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, pp. 57 and 59. 
 
Table 4.3 
Overall distribution of the SFs 2000-2006 (MEUR in 1999 prices) 
Member state Objective 1 Transition ex Obj. 1 Total 
Italy 21935 187 29656 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, p. 63. 
 
       According to the EU, implementation is “the operational process needed to produce 
expected outputs” (Milio, 2007:430), which can be divided into two main categories; 
quantitative67 and qualitative68 implementation.      
       During the third CSF Cycle, the CSF financial assistance had a budget of around 46 
billion euros and included six thematical areas69, as well as technical assistance. Seven 
National Operational Programmes (NOPs) and seven Regional Operational Programmes 
                                                 
65 As we can see the total SFs for the second CSF Cycle were practically doubled, compared to the first 
Cycle. 
66 In 1999 prices. 
67 Investing allocated resources within the “due time span”. 
68 Investing resources in projects that will possibly lead to regional economic development. 
69 Natural resources, cultural resources, human resources, local development systems, cities and services. 
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(ROPs) took place. Between 2000 and 2008, approximately 269,000 projects in Italy 
were identified as admissible for financing by the OPs. The CSF provided funds not 
only for infrastructural projects, but also for projects of a non-material nature70. Around 
50.9% of the resources for about 34,000 infrastructural projects were spent on natural 
resources and services. Finally, 19.3% was spent on transport infrastructure 71  and 
23.3% was spent on industrial investment72 (Rapporto DPS, 2008). For the current CSF 
Cycle (2007-2013), Italy will receive 28.8 billion euros from the EU as table 4.4 shows. 
Such 21.5 billion euros will be allocated to the Convergence Objective Regions (Europa, 
2009a). 
 Table 4.4 
Funds for Italy in billion euros 2007-201373 
OBJECTIVE FUND EU NATIONAL PUBLIC TOTAL 
Convergence ERDF 17.8 18 35.8 
Convergence ESF 3.7 3.9 7.6 
Total Convergence  21.5   
Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment 
ERDF 3.1 5 8.1 
Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment 
ESF 3.2 4.4 7.6 
Total Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment 
 6.3   
Total European 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
ERDF 1  1 
TOTAL  28.8 31.3 60.1 
Source: Europa, 2009a. 
Note: Figures have been rounded up. 
 
       In terms of the third CSF Cycle (2000-2006), Italian national policy makers decided 
to complement the EU performance reserve mechanism74 with an additional (separate) 
national performance reserve. This additional reserve amounted to 6% of the third CSF 
Cycle SFs for Objective 1 Regions and applied only to Objective 1 Regions’ OPs. All 
                                                 
70 Such as interventions in research areas, education-training and industrial services. 
71 Approximately 5,450 projects. 
72 Approximately 104,000 projects. 
73  Each Territorial Cooperation programme includes a minimum of 15% co-financing from each 
participating Member State. 
74 According to which, 4% of the committed SFs would be set aside and then distributed to programmes 
that met certain targets. 
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Italian NUTS 2 third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions would be benefited by this 
additional reserve, the distribution of which would take place according to their 
performance towards meeting specific targets associated with more effective public 
spending quality and improved public administration. The national performance reserve 
mechanism was a procedure introduced to ensure more efficient management of funds 
at a regional level and to assess the performance of the regions. It was based on 12 
indicators75, which were applied to NUTS 2 regions (Public Governance and Territorial 
Development Directorate, 2008). 
       A weighting system was used in order to determine the relative importance of each 
indicator in the measurement of the entire performance on which the financial reward 
depended. Institutional enhancement represented 58%, integration 25% and 
concentration 17% of the total. The target of the procedure was to find out which 
regions could actually achieve the target, which was to reach these indicators. The 
regions with the highest levels of success would receive a higher amount of funds. The 
main actors in this process were the Department for Development Policies (DPS) at the 
Ministry of Economy, the Evaluation Unit within the DPS (UVAL) and various regional 
Managing Authorities (Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, 
2008). 
       The administrations involved in the national performance reserve together achieved 
approximately 60% of total targets by September 2002, which was the first deadline. 
Basilicata received approximately 140% of its initial endowment, Campania, Sicilia and 
Puglia received between 79-98% of the reserve, whereas Sardegna and Calabria 
received approximately 40%. The important fact, though, is that all these regions 
                                                 
75 Divided into three categories: a) institutional enhancement, b) integration and c) concentration. 
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satisfied at least one indicator (see figure 4.2 below). The EU was informed of the 
process, but was involved only when the Italian authorities submitted documentation 
containing indicators and rules; when this was approved as a part of the CSF, the 
programme started in August 2000. This 6% national performance reserve represented 
2.6 billion euros for Objective 1 Regions (Public Governance and Territorial 
Development Directorate, 2008). 
Figure 4.2 
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NATIONAL PERFORMANCE RESERVE INDICATORS ACHIEVED BY
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       Table 4.5 below shows the distribution of the national performance reserve. In 2002, 
the OP for Sicilia received the highest amount of EU co-financing, compared to the OPs 
concerning the other third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions. The OP for local 
development was also the highest one compared to the OPs concerning the other 
categories. 
Table 4.5 
Distribution of the national performance reserve in 2002 (in EUR) 
OPERATIONAL 
PROGRAMME EU co-financing 
Percent resource total 
CSF (%) 
Maximum 6% 
performance reserve 
(EUR million) 
Actual performance 
reserve distributed 
(EUR million) 
Basilicata 742,778 3.46 45,480 69,887 
Calabria 1,994,246 9.49 122,106 79,357 
Campania 3,824,933 17.83 234,198 272,523 
Puglia 2,639,488 12.30 161,614 174,924 
Sardegna 1,946,229 9.07 119,166 79,884 
Sicilia 3,857,946 17.98 236,219 234,234 
Research 1,191,485 5.55 72,718 60,592 
School 472,558 2.20 28,841 30,426 
Security 573,108 2.67 34,978 29,076 
Local Development 1,978,939 9.22 120,778 170,350 
Transport 1,801,313 8.39 109,937 61,949 
Fishing 122,000 0.57 7,446 4,814 
Technical Assistance 312,428 1.46 19,068 44,533 
Total CSF 21,457,451 100.00 1,312,549 1,312,549 
Source: Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, 2008, p. 94. 
 
       The third CSF Cycle was very successful in terms of the promotion of a 
performance measurement in Italy, as very little was undertaken before the 
establishment of the performance reserve (1999/2000). Mechanisms such as the de-
commitment rule, the EU performance reserve and the mid-term evaluation process 
were fundamental for an efficient Regional Policy. Furthermore, Italy implemented 
context indicators and breakthrough variables. The objectives of the national 
performance reserve were not just about the successful implementation of the SFs, but 
aimed to improve administrative capacity significantly and promote important reforms 
and more complex projects (Public Governance and Territorial Development 
Directorate, 2008).  
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4.2.3-ABRUZZO AND MOLISE: COMPETITIVENESS AND EMPLOYMENT REGIONS. 
SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EXIT FROM OBJECTIVE 1 
 
      The economic performance of Abruzzo and Molise show significant regional 
economic development. In 1989, both regions were included in Objective 1. However, 
during the second CSF Cycle, Abruzzo became the first Italian and EU region to exit 
the Objective 1. During the third CSF Cycle, Molise also entered a “Phasing-Out” 
period (Leonardi, 2003:1). 
       In Abruzzo, the employment rate in 2008 was 45.2%76. In 1999, its employment 
rate was again the highest amongst the Italian Objective 1 Regions (40.4%) and close to 
the national average (42.6%). Between 1999 and 2008, the regional employment rate 
was increased by 4.8% (Eurostat, 2010d). The economy of Abruzzo has changed 
dramatically since the 1950s (Europa 2004b). In 1951, 60% of the population was 
employed in the agricultural sector, 22% in industry and only 17% in the service sector. 
By 1971, industry’s share was already bigger than that of agriculture, while in 1981, the 
service sector’s share grew bigger than that of industry. Industry was the main driving 
force that created economic development within the region. In 2001, 61% of 
employment was in the service sector77, 33% in industry78 and only 6% in agriculture79 
(Europa, 2004b). 
      The unemployment rate in 2008 was 6.6%80. In 1999, Abruzzo’s unemployment 
rate was 10.1%81 (Eurostat, 2010i). In the province of Teramo, the unemployment rate 
                                                 
76 This is by far the highest amongst NUTS 2 Italian Objective 1 Regions and it is almost in line with the 
national average (45.9%), but a bit lower than the average for the EU-27 (53.7%), the EU-25 (53.9%) and 
the EU-15 (54.3%), always for 2008. 
77 Slightly lower than the national average. 
78 Slightly higher than the national average. 
79 Slightly higher than the national average. 
80 By far the lowest amongst the other Italian Objective 1 Regions and lower than both the national (6.7%) 
and the EU-27 average (7%) for 2008. 
81 By far the lowest amongst the Italian Objective 1 Regions and lower than the national average (11.4%) 
for 1999. 
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was one of the lowest in Italy, reaching only 4.1% in 2001 (Europa, 2004b). In 2007, 
Abruzzo’s GDP per capita represented 85.3% of the EU-27 average82, by far the highest 
amongst the Italian Objective 1 Regions. In 1996, its GDP per capita was also the 
highest (103.4% of the EU-27 average) (Eurostat, 2010g). 
       The agriculture sector, which mainly consists of smallholdings, is modernised and 
now offers high-quality products83. Industry is also much developed. There are a few 
large businesses and many small and medium-sized ones. The increasing role of pure 
and applied research carried out in the region is significant, particularly in the fields of 
pharmaceutics, biomedicine, electronics, aerospace and nuclear physics; this is 
associated with these sectors anchoring themselves in the region. The most important 
industrial zones are Val Pescara, Val Sangro, Val Trigno, Val Vibrata and Conca del 
Fucino. Some major private, or state-controlled companies are located in these zones, 
although their head offices might be outside the region. A lot of important companies 
have located in these zones, such as SIV (glass) and Magneti Marelli (car batteries and 
starter motors) in Val Trigno; Honda (motorcycles) and Sevel (vans) in Val Sangro; 
Montefluos (chlorine), Italcementi (cement), Fater (pharmaceuticals) and Pirelli 
(transmission belts) in Val Pescara; Italtel (telephones) and Selenia (electronics and 
aerospace) in L’Aquila; Texas Instruments (digital circuits) in Avezzano and Fiat (car 
components) in Sulmona. Advanced services can be observed in Pescara. Tourism is 
also important for the region’s economic development. This successful industrialisation 
occurred in conjunction with a significant infrastructural development all over the 
region (Europa, 2004a).       
                                                 
82 PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average. 
83 The most important are wine, cereals, sugar beet, potatoes, olives, vegetables, fruit and dairy products. 
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       During the 1970s and 1980s, Abruzzo experienced significant regional 
development (Garofoli, 1994). L’Aquila experienced industrialisation from above 84 , 
whereas Teramo experienced industrialisation from below85 (Piattoni, 1997). In the late 
1960s, the Italian government decided that the best way for L’Aquila to embark on a 
development path was to use a top-down approach. The objective of that strategy was to 
“stimulate the emergence of local firms through the presence of outside companies” 
(Piattoni, 1997:323). 
       The problem was that it was almost impossible to find a productive connection 
between local industrial enterprises and public companies. This led to a shortage of the 
former and in the early 1980s, the deep economic crisis that took place in the public 
company Italtel uncovered the need for restructuring. The restructuring process was 
based on a complete alteration of the relations between the state company and 
subcontracting firms and on the firing of half of the work-force. This process indeed 
restored profitability (Garofoli, 1994), but only for a short time. Economic problems 
appeared again and with no actual development actually taking place. 
      The economic crisis of the 1980s had a negative impact on local enterprises in 
Abruzzo. Hence, local authorities decided to intervene so as to restructure the local 
economy and their main target was to attract investment from outside the region. Within 
L’Aquila, the restructuring of Italtel was the most difficult task. Firstly, they managed 
to convince SIP86 and Alenia87 to invest in the area. Secondly, they made sure that 
2,000 workers were hired back and only 500 were handed over to the employment 
redundancy fund. Thirdly, the Department of Engineering of the University of L’Aquila 
                                                 
84 Linked to the top-down approach. 
85 Linked to the bottom-up approach. 
86 A public telephone services company. 
87 A public company specialising in civic and military satellite communication systems. 
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created a specialised degree in Electronic Engineering to supply locally skilled 
engineers. Fourthly, scholarships for research in communications technology were 
created and joint research projects between the university and the companies were 
established. This led to the arrival of many new firms in the area. Lastly, a technology 
park was created in L’Aquila. Its aim was to combine the current public and private 
research facilities of Abruzzo, as well as to promote the development of local high-tech 
firms. It can be argued that the bottom-up approach achieved better results in terms of 
sustainable local development than the top-down one had done before (Piattoni, 1997). 
      On the other hand, in the area of Teramo, a bottom-up strategy, or an 
industrialisation from below was followed from the very beginning (early 1970s). In 
2001, the unemployment rate in Teramo was one of the lowest in Italy, 4.1%. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Teramo experienced huge growth in industrial production and firm 
creation and this helped in the establishment of industrial districts within the 
Mezzogiorno (Piattoni, 1997).  
      Teramo mainly owes its development and industrial growth to the decentralisation 
process, which took place because of the crisis in the early 1970s. In the 1980s, there 
was an autonomous evolution in the manufacturing activities based on local artisanal 
traditions, which made them enter national and international markets. What is more, 
foreign and northern firms established a “steady flow of subcontracting traffic which 
induced local entrepreneurs to start up new activities” (Piattoni, 1997:326).  
       These new enterprises were concentrated in traditional manufacturing sectors, such 
as clothes, leather goods and furniture. They succeeded mainly because of the low 
production costs that the client firms acquired by subcontracting part of the production 
to southern firms. During the late 1980s, most southern entrepreneurs moved to 
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independent production88, in order to face problems concerning the price of products, 
the skills of the labour force and the competition from developing countries (Piattoni, 
1997). Regional and local authorities were mainly in charge of regional economic 
development (Morgan, 1997). Abruzzo’s political class played a very important role by 
a) supporting the attempts of the local entrepreneurs to upgrade their production, b) 
simplifying the transition to a new industrial relations system and c) providing 
incentives for the regional economy’s expansion.           
      To sum-up, in Abruzzo, the bottom-up approach was successfully put into practice89 
(Morgan, 1997). The reasons for this include a) social institutions and governmental 
authorities operated in a clear and transparent way, with very few traces of corruption, b) 
less received investment was spent on consumption goods and c) there was a significant 
infrastructure development, which led to a rapid increase in manufacturing productivity. 
In 2006, Abruzzo was the only region within the Mezzogiorno with an unemployment 
rate lower than the national average.  
       In Molise, the employment rate in 2008 was 41%90. Between 1999 and 2008, the 
employment rate increased by 2.9% (Eurostat, 2010d). Despite its industrial 
development, agriculture is still important to Molise’s economy: in 2002, 10% of 
employment was in agriculture, against a national average of only 5%. The importance 
of this sector can also be observed by the fact that almost all of the 136 municipalities of 
the region are rural. However, between 1995 and 2002, the agricultural sector shed 
5,600 jobs91. In 2002, the share of employment in the industrial sector was 29.1%92, 
                                                 
88 Either individually, or through cooperation. 
89 Stohr (1981) is proved correct when arguing that bottom-up approaches and development from below 
result in regional economic development. 
90 Lower than the national (45.9%) average and the EU-27 (53.7%), the EU-25 (53.9%) and the EU-15 
(54.3%) figures in 2008. 
91 Which is more than one third of the total number of the existing jobs in 1995. 
 97
whereas the share in the service sector was 60.9%93. Molise has the highest share of 
regional employment in the public sector than any other Italian NUTS 2 region (Europa, 
2004j). 
      In 2008, the unemployment rate of Molise was 9.1%94, the lowest of all the third 
CSF Cycle Italian Objective 1 Regions. Between 1999 and 2008, the unemployment 
rate of Molise dropped by 7.1%, which is an evident sign of development (Eurostat, 
2010i). A great emphasis on training led to an increasing supply of skilled workers 
being able to meet the local demand. Several technical and vocational schools within the 
region were able to prepare young people to enter the local labour market95. A major 
problem was that academic education was, and still is, only available in a few centres. 
University education has only been available for a very short time in the faculties of 
agriculture, economics, law, mathematics, physical and natural science. However, there 
is a strong link between the university and the local industry and this has indeed been 
promoting the bottom-up strategy (Europa, 2004j).       
       In 2007, Molise’s GDP per capita was 77.9% of the EU-27 average96 (Eurostat, 
2010g). In 2001, the region produced 0.4% of Italy’s GVA. In the same year, the 
agricultural GVA share was 4.5%, the industrial share 24.9% and the service share 
70.6%. Molise’s industrial sector is mainly dominated by the building industry. There 
are many small and medium-sized firms within the region. There is also a large Fiat 
plant in Termoli, set up in 197397, and agro-food industry in the area of Campobasso-
Bojano. One of the biggest and most important Italian firms is involved in poultry 
                                                                                                                                               
92 3,100 jobs more than 1995 and national average at 31.8%. 
93 9,100 jobs more than 1995 and national average at 63.2%. 
94 Higher than both the national (6.7%) and the EU average (7%) in 2008. 
95 In 2002, Molise provided 177 vocational courses with 2,720 students. 
96 PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average. 
97 This firm carries out large investment in technological innovation and is in close cooperation with the 
regional chemical and engineering firms, leading to significant regional development.  
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production and processing in that area. Another important food sector is pasta 
manufacturing, the share of which is steadily increasing both in the domestic and 
international market. In the province of Isernia, a very profitable clothing industry has 
been set up over the last few years. The service sector includes small firms dealing with 
distribution, transport, banking and insurance. The shift from agriculture to 
technological innovation in industry is the main reason for the regional economic 
development of Molise (Europa, 2004i). The employment rate has increased and the 
unemployment rate has significantly decreased. The development of a diverse 
manufacturing sector with intense technological innovation is one of the main reasons 
that led Molise to exit the Objective 1 priority.  
       Abruzzo and Molise are examples supporting the argument that a bottom-up 
approach can lead to the “promotion” of a region from peripheral to semi-peripheral.  
 
4.2.4-ITALIAN OBJECTIVE 1 REGIONS OF THE THIRD CSF CYCLE (2000-2006) IN TERMS 
OF GDP, UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
       Table 4.6 below shows GDP expressed in euro per inhabitant in all the third CSF 
Cycle Italian Objective 1 Regions, plus Abruzzo and Molise. 
Table 4.6 
GDP at current market prices at NUTS level 2 (Euro per inhabitant) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 27 15400 16200 17000 17800 19100 19800 20500 20700 21700 22500 23600 24900 
Italy 17400 18500 19100 19800 20900 21900 22700 23200 23900 24400 25200 26000 
Campania 10700 11500 11900 12300 13000 13800 14600 14800 15300 15600 16100 16600 
Puglia 11400 11900 12400 13100 13800 14400 14900 15100 15500 15700 16400 16800 
Basilicata 11900 12800 13400 14400 15000 15400 15900 16200 16900 17100 18200 18900 
Calabria 10500 11300 11700 12300 12900 13700 14100 14600 15300 15700 16200 16600 
Sicilia 11100 11800 12100 12400 13100 13900 14300 14700 15000 15700 16300 16600 
Sardegna 12700 13800 14200 14800 15600 16600 16900 17500 18200 18500 19300 19700 
Abruzzo 15000 15700 16000 16500 17800 18800 19300 19300 19000 19900 20700 21400 
Molise 12600 13800 14200 14500 15300 16100 16500 16700 17300 17700 18800 19600 
Source: Eurostat, 2010e. 
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       A significant divergence between the EU-27 and the Italian GDP and that of the 
third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions can be observed. This means that the latter were 
underperforming with respect to the core Italian Objective 2 and 3 Regions. In 2007, 
semi-peripheral Sardegna produced the highest GDP per inhabitant amongst the third 
CSF Cycle Italian Objective 1 Regions, whereas peripheral Campania, Calabria and 
Sicilia the lowest. Table 4.6 shows that the four current Convergence Objective Regions 
have the lowest performance. Figure 4.3 below shows the regional per capita GDP in 
PPS, compared to the EU average.  
Figure 4.3  
Regional GDP (PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average), by NUTS 2 regions 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010g. 
 
       There is an evident drop in GDP over the period for all regions, except Basilicata 
and Molise after 2005 and Abruzzo after 2004, if we compare it to the EU-27 average. 
In 1996, 1997 and 2001, Abruzzo managed to achieve a higher percentage in terms of 
GDP compared to that of the EU-27 (in % of the EU-27 average). In 2007, Campania 
and Calabria (the Mezzogiorno periphery) had the lowest GDP per capita amongst the 
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third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions, whereas Sardegna and Basilicata had the highest. 
This GDP drop is in contrast to the Spanish Objective 1 Regions. It is clear from Figure 
4.3 that the four current Convergence Objective Regions have the lowest performance.  
       The most significant change in GDP per head between 2000 and 2005 took place in 
Abruzzo, whereas the least significant took place in Calabria and Campania. Between 
2000 and 2005, GDP per head in PPS in the Italian Objective 1 Regions diverged from 
the EU average about seven percentage points (from 75.8 to 68.9). This trend can be 
observed in all Southern Italian regions compared to the EU-27 average. The decline 
was more significant in the relatively more developed regions (Abruzzo, Molise and 
Basilicata) and lower (less than six percentage points) in regions such as Campania and 
Calabria (interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
       The negative trend observed in Italian Objective 1 Regions (and also in Abruzzo) 
reflected a general trend of the whole Italian economy. Indeed the Italian GDP average 
in PPS declined from 117.1% to 104.8% of the EU-27 average over the period 2000-
2005. Moreover, this downturn was markedly more important in Italian Non-Objective 
1 Regions which are located in the Centre-North (-15.8 percentage points) than in the 
Italian Objective 1 Regions of the Southern part of the country (-6.9 percentage points). 
Five out of eight regions of the Mezzogiorno enjoyed growth rates of GDP per head 
(PPS) higher than the Italian average (interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
       In both Italian Objective 1 and Non-Objective 1 Regions, the GDP per capita 
dropped between 2000 and 2005 with the drop in the Non-Objective 1 Regions being 
much more significant than in the Objective 1 ones. Between 2000 and 2005, there was 
a significant decrease in terms of the GDP per capita in Abruzzo. Nevertheless, the 
important feature, which truly reveals regional economic development, is the fact that in 
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Campania, Calabria and Sicilia, which are considered to be by far the worst performing 
Mezzogiorno regions, there was an evident increase in terms of GDP per capita 
(normalised for Italy equal to 100). This is a sign of significant progress and a proof that 
regional economic development has indeed taken place within the peripheral Italian 
Convergence Regions. 
       The comparison of the evolution of GDP per head in PPS of the regions of the 
Mezzogiorno with the Italian average (Italy=100) shows that overall these regions 
slightly converged with the national average over the period 2000-2005. Objective 1 
Regions evolved on average from 64.7% to 65.7% of the Italian average (Italy=100): 
Calabria (+2.2 percentage points), Sardegna (+2.0 percentage points) and Campania 
(+1.6 percentage points) stand out in terms of "catching-up" with the national average 
(Italy=100). Amongst the Objective 1 Regions, only Puglia (-0.6 percentage points) and 
Basilicata (-0.5 percentage points) diverged in respect to the Italian average (Italy=100). 
GDP per head plummeted in Abruzzo (-5.3 percentage points), the only region of the 
Mezzogiorno not eligible under Objective 1. Comparing the evolution of the Italian 
Objective 1 Regions with their equivalents in Spain shows that these regions 
significantly underperformed over the period: whereas Italian Objective 1 Regions lost 
almost seven percentage points in relation to the EU-27 average, Objective 1 Regions in 
Spain (from 80.6% to 87% of the EU-27 average) converged towards the EU average 
(interview with Piazzi, 2009).  
       Within Italy, in both Objective 1 and Non-Objective 1 Regions, the GDP per person 
employed dropped between 2000 and 2005 and, given that this is a measure of labour 
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productivity, this had a negative impact on regional economic development98 (interview 
with Piazzi, 2009).  
       In 2005, the GDP per person employed in the Mezzogiorno was slightly below the 
EU-27 average (98% of the EU-27 average) and more than 15 percentage points below 
the Italian one (114.6% of the EU-27 average). Over the period 2000-2005, the GDP per 
person employed decreased both in Italian Objective 1 Regions (from 101% to 98% of 
the EU-27 average) and in the whole of Italy (from 118.3% to 114.6% of the EU 
average). This decline was however (slightly) less significant in the Objective 1 Regions 
(-3 as against -4 percentage points). When looking at each region in the Mezzogiorno, 
the decline of productivity in relation to the EU average was particularly intense in 
Calabria (from 101.9% to 91.5%). The decrease in all the other regions of the 
Mezzogiorno remained below the Italian average except for Abruzzo (-4.5 percentage 
points) and Campania (-4.0 percentage points) (interview with Piazzi, 2009).  
       Once again, this underperformance of the regions of Mezzogiorno must be seen in 
the broader context of the unsatisfactory performance of the whole Italian economy over 
the period 2000-2005. Moreover, most of the Mezzogiorno regions99 experienced lower 
declines in their productivity rates than the Italian average. Trends in productivity 
observed in the Italian Objective 1 Regions compared to the equivalent regions in Spain 
worsened over the period. Spanish Objective 1 Regions enjoyed gains of productivity of 
over five percentage points. However, it is important to recall that productivity rates in 
the Italian Objective 1 Regions were still above those of their equivalents in Spain in 
2005 (interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
                                                 
98  Nevertheless, despite this negative feature, Italy currently has only four Convergence Objective 
Regions, as opposed to six in the previous CSF Cycle. 
 
99 Especially Puglia, Basilicata, Molise, Sardegna and Sicilia. 
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       Losses of productivity in the Italian Objective 1 Regions (-3 percentage points) 
were below the losses in the Italian economy (-3.7 percentage points) in relation to the 
EU-27 average. In Spain, gains of productivity of Objective 1 Regions (+5.5 percentage 
points) exceeded those of Non-Objective 1 ones, in relation to the EU-27 average.  
       It is worth looking at the trends observed at national level to assess whether or not 
there is a correlation with the performance of the Objective 1 Regions. In fact, this 
correlation exists. The performance of the whole Italian economy was overall 
significantly poorer than that of Spain. Moreover, the decline of Italian Objective 1 
Regions was not so significant compared to the whole Italian economy. Southern Italian 
regions were able to cushion to some extent the process of decline of the Italian 
economy compared to the EU-27 average. Objective 1 Regions in Spain also performed 
better than their respective national economies. In conclusion, there seems to be 
evidence that the underperformance of the Italian Objective 1 Regions must be 
interpreted within a context in which the national economy suffered from slow growth 
rates over the reference period and performed much worse than the EU-27 average 
(interview with Piazzi, 2009).  
       Labour cost is another important factor that can be linked with regional economic 
development, as it is closely related to the competitiveness of industries. In 2004, the 
hourly labour cost, excluding apprentices, in the Mezzogiorno100 accounted for 17 to 23 
euros per employee in full time units in industry and services. At the same time, in 
Spain, in the North-West, the Centre, the South, the East and the Canarias, where all the 
                                                 
100 South Italy and Islands where all the peripheral and semi-peripheral 2000-2006 Objective 1 Regions 
are located. 
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peripheral and semi-peripheral 2000-2006 Objective 1 Regions are located 101 , the 
labour costs accounted for 12 to 17 euros per employee102 in full time units in industry 
and services. This means that labour cost in the Italian Objective 1 Regions was 
significantly higher compared to the Spanish ones and this difference can partly explain 
the difficulties the companies located in the Mezzogiorno experienced when trying to 
become more competitive. It is worth noting that labour costs in the peripheral 
Mezzogiorno were similar to those of the core Spanish Comunidad de Madrid and North 
East, which includes the País Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, La Rioja and 
Aragón, which (in 2004) had a GDP per capita much higher than all the Mezzogiorno 
Objective 1 Regions and neither of them was included in Objective 1 (Eurostat, 2008). 
Busillo (2010) clearly argues that one of the main thorns hampering development in the 
Mezzogiorno is indeed the high labour cost per production unit that has increased in 
Italy by 24 percentage points between 1998 and 2008 (Busillo, 2010).  
       However, high labour costs are not the only reason for lack of competitiveness in 
the Objective 1 and Convergence Objective Regions of the Mezzogiorno. Organisational 
problems, industrial agglomeration problems and a lack of adequate infrastructure in 
order to support economic activity are also major reasons behind the lack of 
competitiveness of industries. Other important factors include the fact that the 
productive structure is mainly based on SMEs and this makes product introductions and 
innovation processes difficult, there is lack of development in terms of human capital, 
mainly involving education, and there are certain difficulties on the part of the Italian 
national government into keeping the public debt under control, which practically 
                                                 
101 Galicia and Principado de Asturias in the North-West, Castilla y León, Castilla-la Mancha and 
Extremadura in the Centre, Andalucía and Región de Murcia in the South, Comunidad Valenciana in the 
East. 
102 Data non available for Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta and Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla. 
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reduces the economic funds that the national government is able to allocate to the 
peripheral regions (Busillo, 2010).  
       Figures 4.4 and 4.5 below show the real growth rate of regional GDP in the 
Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 regions. 
Figure 4.4 
Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices at NUTS level 2- percentage  
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
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Figure 4.5 
Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices at NUTS level 2- percentage  
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
 
       In 2006 Basilicata experienced the highest growth rate in regional GDP (2.1%), 
which was higher than the national average (1.9%) and also higher than the average of 
Abruzzo and Molise. The performance of Basilicata and Sardegna also shows economic 
progress and development. On the contrary, Sicilia and Calabria experienced the lowest 
growth rate (1% and 1.1% respectively). Figures 4.6 and 4.7 below show the real 
growth of the regional gross value added (GVA) in the Mezzogiorno regions. The 
Italian and EU-27 rates are also included.  
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Figure 4.6 
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
 
Figure 4.7 
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
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       From 2003 to 2007 (with the exceptions of Calabria in 2004, Sicilia and Abruzzo in 
2005 and Basilicata in 2006), the real growth rate of GVA of all the Mezzogiorno 
regions and the national GVA growth rate of Italy were lower than the GVA growth rate 
of the EU-27. This is indeed another sign of regional economic divergence, not only 
amongst the Mezzogiorno regions, but also between Italy and the EU. Table 4.7 below 
shows the economically active population in the Mezzogiorno regions, in Italy and the 
EU-27. Both in 1999 and 2008, Campania had the highest number of economically 
active people in the Mezzogiorno, but between 1999 and 2008 this number slightly 
decreased.   
Table 4.7 
Economically active population at NUTS level 2 (1000)/Age: 15 years and over/Sex: Total 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 226375.1 228154.6 232038.5 234582 236615.6 239080.2 
Italy 23360.9 23574.7 23778.8 23989.9 24148.2 24364.8 24451.4 24661.6 24727.9 25096.6 
Abruzzo 484.9 485.1 497.9 503.1 505.5 520.5 534.1 533 535.4 554.3 
Molise 125.9 125.3 127.5 126.2 124 123.3 119 121.8 122.4 125.6 
Campania 2030.9 2043.8 2055.1 2084.4 2073.1 2087.6 2029.3 1986.6 1936.6 1922.5 
Puglia 1449.2 1462.3 1448.7 1463.5 1446.2 1461.5 1430.7 1439.8 1444.9 1455.3 
Basilicata 215.6 221.1 217.5 217.8 218 222.4 219.6 220.3 215.6 220.2 
Calabria 738.2 731.2 751.4 757.8 753.9 723.5 704.8 705.4 678.5 677.2 
Sicilia 1755.7 1776.5 1776.2 1760.7 1759.7 1738.7 1755.7 1737.3 1710 1716.9 
Sardegna 650.9 649.3 660 666.1 659.3 689.2 685.5 681.3 680.2 696 
Source: Eurostat, 2010c. 
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Figure 4.8 
Economic activity rates at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/Age: 15 years and over 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010b. 
 
       In 2008 Sardegna had the highest activity rate amongst the third CSF Cycle 
Objective 1 Regions, whereas Calabria had the lowest. The low performance of the four 
current Convergence regions is evident from Figure 4.8. On the contrary, Abruzzo 
experienced a gradual increase. Molise also experienced an increase, despite the 
decrease that took place between 2002 and 2005, whereas Basilicata did not experience 
any significant alterations. However, it is worth mentioning that the distance of all the 
regions presented on Figure 4.8 from the EU-27 average is indeed significant. Figure 
4.9 below presents the unemployment rates within the Mezzogiorno.  
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Figure 4.9 
Unemployment rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010i. 
 
       Figure 4.9 shows that all the third CSF Cycle Italian Objective 1 Regions suffer 
much higher unemployment if we compare them both to the national and the EU 
average. In 2008, Sicilia had the highest unemployment rate (13.8%) amongst the 
Convergence Regions, whereas Puglia had the lowest (11.6%). The national average, 
though, is lower than that of the EU and this again shows the huge economic disparities 
that exist in Italy and result in the appearance of core, semi-periphery and periphery 
structures according to dependency theory. 
       Between 2000 and 2005 unemployment rates fell dramatically from 21.9% to 
12.7% in the Italian Objective 1 Regions. The reduction was also significant in the 
whole of Italy, from 10.6% to 6.8% of the labour force. Therefore, the positive trends 
observed in employment rates took place in parallel with a gradual reduction of the 
unemployment rates: while more persons were incorporated to the labour market, the 
number of people who were effectively working soared as well. The reduction of the 
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unemployment rates in the Mezzogiorno regions evolved even better than the average of 
the EU-25103 over the reference period. Yet it is important to recall that those rates were 
particularly high in the Mezzogiorno regions and, therefore, there was more room for 
improvement (Piazzi, 2009, interview).   
       Comparing the trends observed in Objective 1 Regions in Italy with the Objective 1 
Regions in Spain shows that the results are encouraging in Italy. The Spanish regions 
also enjoyed a very substantial fall in their unemployment rates. The trends present once 
again very significant correlations with the evolution observed at national level. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn is that between 2000 and 2006, the fall in 
unemployment within Italian Objective 1 Regions was more significant than that within 
the Non-Objective 1 ones (interview with Piazzi, 2009). Table 4.8 below shows the 
drop in long-term unemployment across the regions of the Mezzogiorno between 1999 
and 2008.  
Table 4.8 
Share of long-term unemployment (12 months and more), by NUTS 2 regions (Percentage of total 
unemployment) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Abruzzo 6.31 4.85 2.92 3.27 2.99 3.44 3.57 3 2.89 2.85 
Molise 10.7 9.23 8.89 7.62 7.75 5.88 5.22 5.4 3.97 4.65 
Campania 17.67 17.67 17.26 15.49 14.92 8.17 8.61 7.36 6.02 7.07 
Puglia 12.08 10.59 9.3 9.15 8.62 8.9 7.85 7.15 5.81 5.81 
Basilicata 9.74 9.81 10.48 9.16 9.41 7.09 6.58 5.85 5.17 6.02 
Calabria 18.23 17.41 16.98 15.18 13.57 7.99 8.46 7.10 6.18 6.11 
Sicilia 16.48 16.65 15.1 13.85 13.4 10.03 9.41 7.77 7.55 7.69 
Sardegna 13.06 13.31 11.67 10.69 9.42 6.94 6.93 5.56 4.57 5.94 
Source: Eurostat, 2010h. 
       In 2008, Sicilia suffered the highest share of long-term unemployment amongst the 
current Convergence Regions, whereas Puglia had the lowest. Between 2000 and 2006, 
there was an evident fall in unemployment rates a) in all the Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 
regions, b) in both Italian Objective 1 and Non-Objective 1 Regions and c) in the 
                                                 
103 Data at EU-27 for 2000 are not available. 
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Spanish Objective 1 Regions. Figure 4.10 below, shows the regional employment rate 
within the Mezzogiorno regions. 
Figure 4.10 
Employment  rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over   
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010d.  
       The employment rate of the Italian Objective 1 Regions was lower, compared with 
both the Italian and the EU average. In 2008, the Convergence Regions with the lowest 
employment rate were Calabria and Campania (34.9%) and that with the highest, Puglia 
(37.3%). The fact that all the third CSF Cycle Italian Objective 1 Regions had a 
significantly lower employment rate than the national average shows again the regional 
divergence that exists in Italy. Besides Abruzzo, all the other Mezzogiorno regions have 
had employment rates below 42.1% up until 2005. Between the core North and the 
periphery South, there was a 20% gap in employment rates (Leonardi, 2005). 
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       Between 2000 and 2005, Sardegna and Calabria experienced the most significant 
increase in employment rates 104  , whereas Molise 105  and Puglia experienced the 
opposite results. 
       Between 2000 and 2005, both Italy and Spain experienced increases in terms of 
employment. This proves again that Italy and to a greater degree Spain experienced 
significant regional economic progress and development, particularly within their 
Objective 1 Regions. The average employment rate in the Italian Objective 1 Regions 
was 45.2% of the total working age population in 2005. This rate is 63.4% of the EU-27 
average and 71.3% of the Italian average. In any case, there was a relatively significant 
progress of the employment rates in Italy (+4.4 percentage points) both in Non-
Objective 1 and Objective 1 Regions in relation to the EU-27 average employment 
growth rate. This improvement was slightly more important in Italian Objective 1 
Regions (+4.5 percentage points) than in the rest of the country (+4.2 percentage points) 
(interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
       At regional level, between 2000 and 2005, all the regions in the Mezzogiorno, 
except Molise, enjoyed positive trends in terms of employment rates compared to the 
EU-27 average. In particular, they significantly rose in Sardegna (+9.9 percentage 
points) and Calabria (+6.4 percentage points) in relation to the EU-27 average. In 
general, the Mezzogiorno regions performed better than the Italian average. Only Puglia, 
Molise, and Basilicata to a much lesser extent, witnessed worse results than the Italian 
average (interview with Piazzi, 2009).  
       Between 2000 and 2005, Italian Objective 1 Regions were able to reduce by almost 
four percentage points the gap compared to the EU-27 average. Conversely, the process 
                                                 
104 Relative to both the Italian and EU-27 average. 
105  Despite the fact that it was experiencing better economic progress in terms of GDP per capita, 
employment and unemployment, compared to Sardegna and Calabria.  
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of convergence in terms of employment rates was faster in Spanish Objective 1 Regions 
(interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
 
4.2.5-CONCLUSION 
      The overall conclusion that can be drawn after examining the case of Italy is that 
since the beginning of the CSF Cycles, its economic divergence has been narrowed and 
regional economic development has indeed taken place and the proof is that four 
regions (Abruzzo, Molise, Sardegna and Basilicata106) managed to exit Objective 1 and 
the Convergence Objective. Dependency theory helps understand Italy’s regional 
economic development, as the core-periphery structures and the metropolis-satellite 
relations are evident, not only if we compare the Mezzogiorno with the North, but also if 
we compare the Mezzogiorno regions amongst themselves107. If we compare Italy with 
Spain, Italy is the only country where a steady decline108 in terms of GDP per capita in 
its third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions can be observed. In all its third CSF Cycle 
Objective 1 Regions the unemployment rate was much higher than both the national and 
the EU average. Another less encouraging feature is that between 2003 and 2007109, the 
real growth rate of GVA of all the Mezzogiorno regions and the national GVA growth 
rate of Italy were lower than the GVA growth rate of the EU-27. This is indeed another 
sign of regional economic divergence, not only amongst the Mezzogiorno regions, but 
also between Italy and the EU.   
                                                 
106 Basilicata has exited Objective 1 as a “Phasing-Out” Region, which means it has actually exited 
because of the EU Enlargement and not due to its significant regional economic development. 
107 For example Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata and Sardegna are much more developed than Calabria, 
Campania, Puglia and Basilicata. This means that the four former regions form the core of the 
Mezzogiorno, whilst the four latter (Convergence Regions) form the periphery. 
108 Relative to the EU average. 
109 With very few exceptions. 
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       The encouraging feature in the case of Italy is the fact that, in almost all its third 
CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions110, from 1999 to 2004, there was a steady increase in 
employment rates, relative to the EU average, although from 2004 to 2005, a slight 
decrease was observed. Nevertheless, a drop in unemployment can lead to regional 
economic convergence only if it is accompanied by an evident GDP per capita increase. 
The Mezzogiorno so far has failed to display this.  
      Limited economic activity, a certain lack of investment and low GDP per capita 
rates explain the current regional economic disparities between the Mezzogiorno and the 
rest of the country. Despite evidence of regional economic development, a metropolis-
satellite relationship between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy still exists. 
 
4.3 THE CASE OF SPAIN 
4.3.1-A BRIEF ECONOMIC PROFILE 
      Spain consists of 17 NUTS 2 regions and two autonomous cities. Nine111of these 
regions and the two autonomous cities112 were included in Objective 1 during the third 
CSF Cycle. We argue that in Spain, the seven regions113 which have never been part of 
Objective 1 form the core of Spain, according to dependency theory. As in the case of 
the 12 core northern Italian regions, these seven Spanish ones a) are far less dependent 
on agriculture than the others, b) they are far more industrialised than the others and 
their industries are characterised by higher technology, c) the labour force occupied in 
these seven regions is more skilled than in the others, d) in these seven regions there is a 
higher level of income, GDP per capita and employment, accompanied by a lower level 
                                                 
110 With the exception of Puglia. 
111  Andalucía, Principado de Asturias, Castilla-la Mancha, Castilla y León, Extremadura, Galicia, 
Canarias, Región de Murcia and Comunidad Valenciana. 
112 Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta and Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla. 
113 Aragón, País Vasco, Illes Balears, Cataluña, La Rioja, Comunidad Foral de Navarra and Comunidad 
de Madrid. 
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of unemployment, compared to the others. Cantabria, Principado de Asturias, Castilla y 
León, Canarias, Región de Murcia, Comunidad Valenciana, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 
and Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla are the semi-peripheral regions, due to the fact that 
they have already managed to exit the Convergence Objective.  
       Andalucía, Extremadura, Galicia and Castilla-la Mancha form the periphery, as, 
despite the fact that they have been receiving SFs for more than 20 years, they still have 
not managed to reach the 75% of the EU-27 GDP in order to exit the Convergence 
Objective. Furthermore, unemployment rates are particularly high, whilst their 
employment rates are low compared to the other Spanish regions. Andalucía, 
Extremadura, Galicia and Castilla-la Mancha can be regarded as peripheral regions also 
because of their distance from the core regions and the lack of competitiveness of their 
companies.  
       In the macro data context, Spain’s GDP (in PPP) in 2009 (the latest year available) 
was $1.368 trillion (country comparison to the world: 13) with a real growth rate of -
3.6% (country comparison to the world: 173). In 2009 the unemployment rate was 18% 
(country comparison to the world: 162) and the inflation rate (consumer prices) -0.8% 
(country comparison to the world: 10) (CIA Factbook/Spain, 2010a).  
       In the micro data context, in 2009, the GDP composition by sector was such that 
agriculture114 accounted for 3.3%, industry115 for 26.8% and services for 70%. Spain’s 
labour force for 2009 was 23.04 million (country comparison to the world: 27) (CIA 
Factbook/Spain, 2010a).  
        
                                                 
114 The most important agricultural products of Spain are grain, fish, dairy products, vegetables, olives, 
pork, beef, citrus and wine grapes. 
115  The most important industries of Spain are those of textiles and apparel, food and beverages, 
automobiles, metals, chemicals, shipbuilding, machine tools, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. 
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4.3.2-SPAIN AND SFs 
      Between 1994 and 1999, Spain was the first EU Member State in terms of structural 
contribution for the Objective 1 Regions (26,300 millions of ECU at 1994 price) 
(Bianchi, 1998:151). From 1990 to 1992, Spain received (in millions of ECU) 2990.4 
from the EAGGF Guarantee, 450.4 from the EAGGF Guidance, 867.8 from the ESF, 
216.8 from the ERDF and 10.5 from the R&D DG XII. The total amount received was 
4535.9 million ECU, which put Spain 4th in the list of the EU Member States (Bianchi, 
1998:154). Spain was also a Cohesion country, whereas Italy was not. 
      The evolution of Spanish regional policy has indeed been influenced by the 
development of EU Regional Policy. The Spanish regions gradually became more 
decentralised, but the main problem was the identification of the regional endogenous 
potentials not being aligned with the ERDF pre-requisites. The ERDF’s target was the 
establishment of a business environment that could help the creation of new SMEs and 
support their growth and economic performance. Another problem was that Spain has 
failed to fit EU SFs into its existing governmental intervention for regional policy, 
indeed the ERDF has been supposed to top up domestic regional funding and not to 
substitute it. 
       Regional economic development is not only a matter of EU SFs and governmental 
funds, but also of efficient management. During the first three CSF Cycles, the EU 
spent approximately 550 billion euros to support regional economic development, 
particularly in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. In terms of the current CSF Cycle116, 
the EU will spend 308 billion euros more117 (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007:309). Tables 
4.9 and 4.10 below reveal the combination of national and EU contributions during the 
                                                 
116 2007-2013. 
117 In 2004 prices. 
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first and second CSF Cycles in Spain. Figures show that the SFs for the second CSF 
Cycle practically tripled compared to those for the first one. In terms of the third CSF 
Cycle, the SFs distribution for the Spanish Objective 1 Regions was 37,744 MEUR118, 
according to Table 4.11. 
Table 4.9  
Total allocations for 1989-1993 CSFs in terms of SF, EIB, private and national contributions (MECU in 2005 
prices) 
Member 
state 
Total SFs SFs for 
Ob.1  
National 
contribution 
Private 
contribution 
EIB loans Total Annual 
impact 
on GDP 
Spain 15086 10171 11317 5275 10510 42188 2.09% 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, pp. 53 and 55. 
  
Table 4.10 
Total allocations for 1994-1999 CSFs in terms of SF, EIB, private and national contributions (MECU in 2005 
prices) 
Member 
state 
Total SFs SFs for 
Ob.1 
National 
contribution 
Private 
contribution 
EIB loans Total Annual 
impact on 
GDP 
Spain 42400 26300 21504 18576 9000 91480 4.14% 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, pp. 57 and 59. 
 
Table 4.11 
Overall distribution of the SFs 2000-2006 (MEUR in 1999 prices) 
Member state Objective 1 Transition ex Obj. 1 Total 
Spain 37744 352 56205 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, p. 63. 
 
       In terms of the current CSF Cycle (2007-2013), Spain will receive 36 billion euros 
from the EU, 26 billion of which will be allocated to the Convergence Objective 
Regions (Europa, 2009b), as Table 4.12 below shows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 In 1999 prices. 
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Table 4.12 
Funds for Spain in billion euros 2007-2013119 
OBJECTIVE FUND EU NATIONAL PUBLIC TOTAL 
Convergence CF 4 1 5 
Convergence ERDF 17 7 24 
Convergence ESF 5 1 6 
Total Convergence  26   
Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment 
ERDF 6 4 10 
Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment 
ESF 3 2 5 
Total Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment 
 9   
Total European 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
ERDF 1  1 
TOTAL  36 15 51 
Source: Europa, 2009b. 
Note: Figures have been rounded up. 
 
       During the current CSF Cycle, the ERDF is providing funding for a) the 
Convergence Objective Regions, b) the “Phasing-Out” and “Phasing-In” Regions, c) the 
Competitiveness Regions, d) the Cross-border Regions and e) the Cohesion-ERDF 
Programme (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 2009d).        
       The objective of the ESF is to prevent unemployment, to develop human resources 
and to promote labour market integration. For the current CSF Cycle, its main priorities 
are: a) “Promote employability, social inclusion and equality” (51% of the total funds to 
be spent) and b) “Promote the spirit of business enterprise and adaptability in workers, 
companies and business people” (49% of the total funds to be spent) (Ministerio de 
Economía y Hacienda, 2009e).  
       The European Territorial Cooperation Objective is very important for the economic 
development of Spain. This objective is based on the INTERREG initiative (Mirwaldt, 
McMaster and Bachtler, 2009) and Spain has received approximately 559 million euros, 
249 million of which are allocated to Transborder Cooperation Programmes, 149 
                                                 
119 Each Territorial Cooperation programme includes a minimum of 15% co-financing from each 
participating Member State. 
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million to Transnational Cooperation Programmes and 111 million to European 
Neighbourhood Programmes. The corresponding funding for the Interregional 
Cooperation and Networks Programme is not distributed by individual countries. The 
Transborder Cooperation Programmes include a) Spain-Portugal and b) Spain-France-
Andorra. The Transnational Cooperational Programmes include a) The Atlantic Space, 
b) Southeast Europe, c) the Mediterranean and d) Madeira-Azores-Canarias. The 
Interregional Cooperation and Networks scheme is based on just one programme for the 
entire EU (INTERREG IV C) and three Networks (ESPON, URBACT and INTERACT 
II). The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument includes the Programmes: 
a) Spain-External Borders and b) Mediterranean Basin Transborder Cooperation 
Programme (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 2009f). 
       In terms of the third CSF Cycle, the Cohesion Fund offered 12,146 million euros to 
Spain. In terms of the current CSF Cycle, Spain will receive 3,543 million euros. 
During the current CSF Cycle, the Spanish Competitiveness and Employment Regions 
will receive 3,126 million euros in the form of SFs (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 
2010b). For its “Phasing-In” Regions, Spain will receive 3,856 million euros between 
2007 and 2013, which represents 37.1% of the total amount of the Objective 120 . 
Furthermore, Spain will receive 44% of the Ultra-Peripheral Regions (UPR) Fund in 
order to invest it in the development of the Canarias. This funding is offered for 
extremely decentralised regions. 981 million euros are destined for them, and the 
Canarias will receive 436 million euros (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 2010g).  
       Between 2007 and 2013, Spain will also receive 1,419 million euros for its 
“Phasing-Out” Regions, which equals 11.3% of the total amount for the Objective, and 
                                                 
120 Always in terms of the fourth (2007-2013) CSF Cycle. 
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18,752 million euros for its Convergence Regions, which equals 10.7% of the total 
amount assigned to the Convergence Objective (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 
2010c).  
       The Convergence Objective Regions still underperform and have a GDP per capita 
below 58% of the EU average, whilst the performance of the regions receiving 
transitional assistance are continuously approaching the EU average. Between 2000 and 
2005, both categories decreased their difference with the EU average by approximately 
5%. Employment rates in Galicia, Castilla-la Mancha, Andalucía and Extremadura did 
not reach 58%, whereas the rates of the regions included in the Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective reached 68% (interview with Peroulakis, 2009). 
       The transitional regions perform better, even if their employment rate is 
significantly lower than that of the Competitiveness Regions (approximately 63%). The 
unemployment rates in the Convergence Regions are 4% higher, compared to those of 
the transitional regions, despite the fact that the difference was twice higher in 2000. 
This again shows significant regional development, but at the same time reveals that 
there is quite a distance between the transitional period and the Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective (interview with Peroulakis, 2009). 
 
4.3.3-CANTABRIA: COMPETITIVENESS AND EMPLOYMENT REGION. SUCCESSFUL 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EXIT FROM OBJECTIVE 1 
 
      Cantabria has experienced significant regional economic development during the 
last decade and this has led to its exit from Objective 1. It is now a Competitiveness and 
Employment Region. During the third CSF Cycle, Cantabria was in a “Phasing-Out” 
stage, just like Molise in Italy. The reasons for this economic progress include a) a high 
level of education, b) a large increase in the employment rate, c) a significant drop in 
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the unemployment rate, d) an important increase in wages and e) a successful 
restructuring of the industrial sector. 
       The primary sector is mainly based on fishing and livestock-raising. It can be said 
that the 2008 recession negatively affected the industrial, construction and services’ 
sectors. 80% of enterprises in Cantabria employ fewer than six workers and 
approximately 1.5% more than 50 and “sole trader and limited liability companies are 
the most common legal forms of enterprises” (EURES/Cantabria, 2009:1). The most 
important economic activities in Cantabria include construction, trade, company 
services, hotels and restaurants and land transport. These activities represent 
approximately 53% of all companies and 47% of jobs. According to the Active 
Population Survey of the National Statistics Office of Spain, during the fourth quarter of 
2008, the activity rate of Cantabria was 56.9% and the unemployment rate 8.9%. 16% 
of the working population is employed in industry, 12% in construction, 4% in 
agriculture and approximately two thirds in the services’ sector. Also, “geographical 
mobility in hiring continues to be negative, with more contracts going out than coming 
in” (EURES/Cantabria, 2009:2).  
       In 2008, the regional employment rate was 52.4%121. Between 1999 and 2008, the 
employment rate increased by 13.3% and this shows significant economic progress 
(Eurostat, 2010d). Between 1999 and 2008, the unemployment rate dropped by 8.2% 
and this was indeed a clear sign of economic development. In 2008, Cantabria’s 
unemployment rate was 7.2%122 (Eurostat, 2010i). During the last few years there has 
                                                 
121 Similar to the national (52.4%) average and a little lower than the EU 27 (53.7%), the EU 25 (53.9%) 
and the EU 15 (54.3%) ones for 2008. 
122 Lower than all the third CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 Regions and the national average (11.3%), but 
not the EU-27 average (7%) for 2008. 
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been a steady increase in wages per person employed in both the industrial and the 
service sectors.  
      In 2007, Cantabria’s GDP per capita represented 105.4% of the EU 27 average123 
(Eurostat, 2010g), the highest amongst all the third CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 
Regions. In terms of the service sector, transport, banks and insurance are experiencing 
significant growth and are much better represented than the national average. 
       The most important factor that led to progress and economic development in 
Cantabria was the presence of a skilled workforce thanks to significant industrial 
specialisation and high investment in education. Cantabria is characterised as “a region 
of knowledge” and its University is regarded as one of the best in Spain. The Cantabria 
International Campus project is one of the most important in Spain in the move towards 
regional economic development and knowledge transmission, as it is based on the 
commitment of 18 institutions (amongst which are two Universities). The regional 
administration of Cantabria closely cooperates with the University, mainly in the area of 
Research and Development (R&D). The Society for the Regional Development of 
Cantabria, the Science and Technology Park, the Centre for Technological Development 
in the University of Cantabria and the Technological Component Centre significantly 
promote knowledge. Cooperation between the University of Cantabria, the Society for 
the Regional Development of Cantabria and the Spanish government, particularly in the 
field of energy, has led to the establishment of important alliances with Siemens and 
IBM (Cantabria Campus Internacional, 2009). 
       Moreover, there is a close collaboration between the Marques de Valdecilla 
University Hospital, the Santander Bank and some of the most important universities 
                                                 
123 PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average. 
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worldwide, such as Harvard, Cornell and Wharton Business School (Cantabria Campus 
Internacional, 2009). This collaboration promotes knowledge in the fields of Economics, 
Medicine and Biotechnology (Cantabria Campus Internacional, 2009). Cantabria is an 
example of economic progress and development, which should be followed by the four 
remaining Spanish Convergence Objective Regions. It can be characterised as a semi-
peripheral region.  
 
4.3.4-SPANISH OBJECTIVE 1 REGIONS OF THE THIRD CSF CYCLE (2000-2006) IN TERMS 
OF GDP, UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
      Table 4.13 below shows the GDP expressed in euro per inhabitant in all the third 
CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 Regions plus Cantabria. 
Table 4.13  
GDP at current market prices at NUTS level 2 (Euro per inhabitant) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 27 15400 16200 17000 17800 19100 19800 20500 20700 21700 22500 23600 24900 
Spain 12400 12800 13500 14500 15700 16700 17700 18600 19700 20900 22300 23500 
Galicia 10000 10200 10700 11500 12200 13000 13800 14800 15800 17100 18500 19800 
Pr. de Asturias 10800 10800 11500 12000 13100 14100 15000 15900 17000 18500 20200 21700 
Cantabria 11400 11700 12500 13400 14600 15900 17000 18000 19200 20600 22100 23500 
Castilla y León 11800 11900 12400 13300 14200 15100 16200 17300 18500 19800 21200 22600 
Castilla-la 
Mancha 10200 10400 11000 11500 12300 13100 13900 14700 15400 16400 17400 18200 
Extremadura 7900 8000 8500 9200 10000 10700 11400 12200 13100 14200 15200 16200 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 11800 12300 13100 14000 15100 16200 16900 17600 18400 19300 20500 21300 
Andalucía 9300 9500 9900 10600 11500 12400 13200 14200 15200 16300 17300 18100 
Región de 
Murcia 10200 10700 11300 12000 13100 14000 14900 15800 16500 17700 18700 19400 
C.A. de Ceuta 10200 10500 11300 12300 13300 14100 15100 16500 17700 18900 20400 21700 
C.A. de Melilla 10700 10800 11600 12400 13200 13900 14700 15900 17200 18600 20200 21100 
Canarias 11900 12200 12900 14200 14800 15800 16500 17400 18100 19000 19900 20700 
Source: Eurostat, 2010e. 
 
       Table 4.13 reveals a steady increase in the GDP per inhabitant in all the Spanish 
regions presented. The fact that the Convergence Regions also experience this increase 
is a clear sign of regional development, relative to EU-27. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 below 
show the regional per capita GDP in PPS within the Spanish third CSF Cycle Objective 
1 Regions plus Cantabria. 
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Figure 4.11     
Regional GDP (PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average), by NUTS 2 regions 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010g. 
 
Figure 4.12  
Regional GDP (PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average), by NUTS 2 regions 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010g. 
 
       Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show that, contrary to the Italian Objective 1 Regions, 
between 1996 and 2007 there has been an evident increase in the GDP per capita in the 
Spanish regions, if we compare them with the EU average, with only a few exceptions, 
 126
such as Comunidad Valenciana in 2002 and 2006, Castilla-la Mancha in 2003 and 
Canarias in 1999 and 2003. This is indeed a sign of progress and development and 
shows an attempt at narrowing regional divergence. In 2007, the highest GDP per capita 
rate124 amongst the current Convergence Regions could be observed in Galicia, whereas 
the lowest one was in Extremadura. Nevertheless, the important fact is that in all the 
Spanish peripheral regions there has been an obvious GDP per capita increase, in 
comparison with the EU average. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 below show the real growth rate 
of regional GDP within the Spanish third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions plus 
Cantabria. 
Figure 4.13  
Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices at NUTS level 2- percentage  
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124 In % of the EU-27. 
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Figure 4.14  
Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices at NUTS level 2- percentage  
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
 
       Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the real growth rate of regional GDP. In 2006, Galicia, 
Cantabria and Región de Murcia experienced the highest real growth rate (4.1%), which 
was even higher than the national average (3.9%). Canarias experienced the lowest 
growth rate (3.3%). Figures 4.15-4.17 below show the real growth of the regional GVA 
in the Spanish Objective 1 Regions of the third CSF Cycle, including Cantabria. The 
Spanish and EU-27 rates are also included.  
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Figure 4.15  
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
Figure 4.16  
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
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Figure 4.17  
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
       From 2000 to 2007 (with the exceptions of Galicia in 2000, Canarias in 2000 and 
2006, and Principado de Asturias in 2004), the real growth rate of GVA of all the 
Spanish third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions (including Cantabria) and the national 
GVA growth rate of Spain were higher than the GVA growth rate of the EU-27. This is 
indeed a sign of significant regional economic convergence and development. Table 
4.14 below shows the economically active population within the third CSF Cycle 
Objective 1 Regions of Spain, plus Cantabria, within Spain and the EU-27. Both in 
1999 and 2008, Andalucía had the highest number of economically active people in the 
Spanish Objective 1 Regions and between 1999 and 2008 this number slightly increased.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130
Table 4.14 
Economically active population by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (1000)/Age: 15 years and over/Sex: 
Total  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 226375.1 228154.6 232038.5 234582 236615.6 239080.2 
Spain 17425.7 18012.2 18050.3 18785.5 19538.1 20184.4 20885.7 21584.8 22189.9 22848.2 
Galicia 1159.4 1189.3 1158.6 1178.6 1225.2 1254.2 1254.8 1272.1 1292 1314.8 
Asturias 414.4 423.6 395.1 412.3 433.3 435.6 451.4 467.1 473.5 493.2 
Cantabria 211 221.2 227 233.5 245 251.4 261.4 267.2 274.7 280.7 
Castilla y León 1016 1026.6 1003.8 1029.5 1053.8 1074.2 1120.5 1137.9 1156 1180.3 
Castilla-la Mancha 689.4 703.9 699.4 729.3 765 793 840.8 875.2 912.6 953.5 
Extremadura 426.2 440.3 401.5 430.2 438.3 448.1 458 460.2 474.5 482.6 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 1768.4 1845.4 1901.8 1985.3 2081 2178.2 2251.4 2348.9 2433.7 2533.4 
Andalucía 2946 3012.2 2966.8 3129.8 3227.1 3331.5 3435.2 3562.2 3690.3 3833.3 
Región de Murcia 478.2 508.9 516.8 547.4 576.6 607.2 619.3 648.5 684.6 718.4 
C.A. de Ceuta 28.3 32 25.5 25.2 27.6 27 32.4 29.5 29 31.5 
C.A. de Melilla 25.7 25.5 22.9 23.8 24.6 28.3 25.6 26.3 27.8 27.9 
Canarias 734.2 778.7 798.4 844.4 889.2 915.8 947.1 996.8 1022.1 1042.8 
Source: Eurostat, 2010c. 
 
Figure 4.18  
Economic activity rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/Age: 15 years and over 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010b. 
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Figure 4.19  
Economic activity rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/Age: 15 years and over 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010b. 
 
       According to Figures 4.18 and 4.19, in 2008, amongst the current Convergence 
Regions, Andalucía had the highest economic activity rate, whereas Extremadura the 
lowest one. Figures 4.20 and 4.21 below show the unemployment rates of all the third 
CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 Regions plus Cantabria.    
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Figure 4.20  
Unemployment rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010i. 
 
 
Figure 4.21  
Unemployment rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010i. 
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       Comparing the unemployment rates of the third CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 
Regions with the national average for 2008 (11.3%), it can be observed that Castilla y 
León (9.5%), Principado de Asturias (8.4%) and Galicia (8.7%) had a lower 
unemployment rate. This achievement becomes even more important taking into 
account that Galicia is still a Convergence Objective Region. In 2006, Región de 
Murcia and Castilla y León also had a lower unemployment rate compared to the EU 
average (8.2%), whereas in 2007, Castilla y León had the same percentage as the EU as 
a whole. These are clear signs of economic progress and show that regional economic 
divergence in terms of unemployment in Spain is lower than that of Italy125.  
Table 4.15 
Share of long-term unemployment (12 months and more), by NUTS 2 regions (Percentage of total 
unemployment) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Galicia 8.61 7.38 4.97 4.91 5.29 5.82 3.18 2.29 1.95 1.94 
Pr. de Asturias 10.47 9.67 3.35 4.58 4.92 4.44 4.07 2.94 2.59 2.32 
Cantabria 8.86 7.4 4.71 5 5.29 4.37 2.41 1.65 1.19 1.08 
Castilla y León 7.48 6.33 4.15 3.9 4.35 3.91 2.18 1.89 1.61 1.93 
Castilla-la Mancha 5.88 4.64 2.99 2.86 2.91 3.01 2.33 1.88 1.47 1.93 
Extremadura 8.72 7.57 4.07 5.84 4.66 4.93 4.42 3.35 3.28 3.52 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 5.38 4.01 2.78 2.56 2.69 2.40 1.98 1.43 1.41 1.74 
Andalucía 11.39 9.28 6.54 6.48 6.12 5.13 3.5 3 2.76 3.5 
Región de Murcia 5.17 3.9 2.72 2.99 2.75 2.51 1.47 1.32 1.09 1.7 
C.A de Ceuta 16.58 12.97 2.89 2.27 3.07 2.19 10.13 7.95 9.39 6.86 
C.A. de Melilla 12.25 13.14 1.3 2.25 4.3 9.83 5.13 5.46 7.3 9.27 
Canarias 5.86 5.37 3.39 3.55 3.61 3.39 3.06 2.52 2.28 3.42 
Source: Eurostat, 2010h. 
       Amongst the current Spanish Convergence Regions, in 2008, Castilla-la Mancha 
had the lowest share of long-term unemployment, according to Table 4.15, whereas 
Extremadura the highest. Figures 4.22 and 4.23 below show the regional employment 
rate of all the third CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 Regions plus Cantabria, compared to 
the national and EU average. 
 
 
                                                 
125 In 2008, there was no third CSF Cycle Italian Objective 1 Region with a lower unemployment rate 
than the national, or the EU average. 
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Figure 4.22  
Employment  rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over   
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010d. 
 
Figure 4.23  
Employment  rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over   
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010d. 
 
       According to Figures 4.22 and 4.23, up until 2007, there was a steady increase in the 
employment rate in all the third CSF Cycle Spanish Objective 1 Regions, with the 
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exception of Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta and Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla126. Amongst 
the current Convergence Regions, in 2008, Galicia and Castilla-la Mancha had the 
highest employment rates, whereas Extremadura had the lowest.  
 
4.3.5-CONCLUSION 
      The overall conclusion that can be drawn after examining the case of Spain is the 
fact that in terms of regional GDP per capita, there has been a steady increase127 in all 
the Objective 1 Regions, whereas in Italy the situation is totally the opposite. The 
economic development differences between core and peripheral Spanish regions are 
narrower than those of the Italian ones. In 2006, in three third CSF Cycle Spanish 
Objective 1 Regions (Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana and Región de Murcia), 
the unemployment rate was lower than the national average and in the cases of Castilla 
y León and Región de Murcia, it was even lower than the EU-27 average. Galicia, 
which is considered to be a peripheral Objective 1 Region, has managed to reduce its 
unemployment rate and in 2006 to reach the national average. This shows significant 
reduction of regional disparities and economic progress, despite the fact that that Galicia 
is still included in the Convergence Objective.  
       Cantabria, a semi-peripheral region, managed to exit Objective 1 before the end of 
the third CSF Cycle and that was a sign of regional development. On the other hand, in 
all of the Italian third CSF Cycle NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions, the unemployment rate 
was higher than both the national and the EU average. This means that in Spain the 
regional disparities during the third CSF Cycle were lower than those existing in Italy. 
Seven Spanish NUTS 2 regions which were included in Objective 1 during the third 
                                                 
126 If compared with both the national and the EU average. 
127 Relative to the EU average. 
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CSF Cycle128 have now exited the Convergence Objective, contrary to only two Italian 
regions129.       
       Another encouraging feature is the fact that in all the third CSF Cycle Spanish 
Objective 1 Regions, just like in Italy, from 1999 to 2004, there was a steady increase130 
in the employment rate. However, in the Spanish Objective 1 Regions there was an 
additional increase from 2004 to 2005, contrary to the Italian ones. This means that in 
all those regions there was a drop in unemployment and thus a positive start to regional 
development. It can be argued that during the third CSF Cycle, the Spanish Objective 1 
Regions were in a better economic situation than the Italian ones, due to the fact that 
there was an increase in both the GDP per capita and the employment rates. In Italy 
there was an increase in the employment rates, but also a decrease in the GDP per capita. 
Between 2000 and 2006, the unemployment rates in most of the third CSF Cycle 
Spanish Objective 1 Regions were lower than those of the Italian ones. Moreover, from 
2000 to 2007 131 , the real growth rate of GVA of all the Spanish third CSF Cycle 
Objective 1 Regions and the national GVA growth rate of Spain were higher than the 
GVA growth rate of the EU-27.        
       In Spain, regional economic development is more evident than in Italy and the 
target of economic convergence is closer and this is proved by the fact that seven NUTS 
2 regions that were part of Objective 1 have successfully managed to exit the 
Convergence Objective. The peripheral Spanish regions are approaching the core ones 
at a higher speed, compared to the Italian ones.  
 
                                                 
128 Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Principado de Asturias, Canarias, Región de Murcia, Ciudad 
Autónoma de Ceuta and Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla. 
129 Basilicata and Sardegna. 
130 Relative to the EU average. 
131 With very few exceptions. 
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4.4-CONCLUSIONS 
      The main conclusion we can draw is that the regional economic disparities still 
identified in Italy during the third CSF Cycle (2000-06) were more pronounced than in 
Spain and the economic differences between core and peripheral regions were much 
more evident. Dependency theory helps understand the regional economic convergence 
in both countries, where the NUTS 2 regions can be divided in core, semi-peripheral 
and peripheral.  
       Core regions are those which have never been part of Objective 1, or the 
Convergence Objective and are characterised by a) high GDP and employment rates 
compared to the other regions of the country, b) low unemployment rates132, c) lower 
agricultural dependency, d) a higher level of industrialisation, e) a more skilled labour 
force and f) higher industrial competitiveness. Semi-peripheral regions are those that 
used to be part of Objective 1 but have currently been excluded (either “Phasing-Out”, 
or “Phasing-In” Regions, although in the case of “Phasing-In” Regions, development is 
more evident). Peripheral regions are those still included in the Convergence Objective 
and are characterised by a) low levels of GDP and employment compared to the core 
and semi-peripheral regions, b) high levels of unemployment again compared to the 
core and semi-peripheral regions, c) high agricultural dependency, d) low 
competitiveness of their companies and e) distance from the core regions. 
       We can argue that dependency theory suits Italy better. In Italy there is still a clear 
distinction between core and periphery since the North is one of the best performing 
areas of the EU, whereas the Mezzogiorno is still one of the worst performing. However, 
the encouraging fact about Italy is that the semi-peripheral regions of Basilicata and 
Sardegna, despite the fact that were both included in Objective 1 during the third CSF 
                                                 
132 Again compared to the other regions of the country. 
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Cycle, are currently out of the Convergence Objective, even if Basilicata is a “Phasing-
Out” (Statistic Effect) Region, which means that it has exited the Convergence 
Objective because of the EU Enlargement.        
       In Spain it can be argued that regional development is more evident. Compared to 
Italy, we can argue that the developed “core” Spanish regions 133  are (still) less 
developed than most of those which form the Italian North134. This means that regional 
disparities are lower.  
       In terms of GDP per capita and employment rate, during the third CSF Cycle, there 
was a steady increase 135  in all the Spanish Objective 1 Regions. This proves that 
satisfactory regional economic development 136  has indeed taken place in Spain. 
Between 2003 and 2006, there was a decrease in the unemployment rate in both the 
Spanish and the Italian Objective 1 Regions137.  
       If we compare the real growth rate of GVA in Italy and Spain we can reach a very 
interesting conclusion about the different degree of regional economic development that 
exists in these two countries. In Italy, from 2003 to 2007, the real growth rate of GVA 
of almost all the Mezzogiorno regions and the national GVA growth rate were lower 
than the GVA growth rate of the EU-27. On the contrary, in Spain, between 2000 and 
2007, the real growth rate of GVA of almost all the Spanish third CSF Cycle Objective 
1 Regions and the national GVA growth rate were higher than the GVA growth rate of 
the EU-27. This means that so far in Spain regional divergence is decreasing at a faster 
pace than in Italy. 
                                                 
133 Comunidad de Madrid, Cataluña, País Vasco. 
134 Particularly Lombardia, Piemonte and Emilia-Romagna. 
135 Relative to the EU average. 
136 In terms of GDP per capita, employment and unemployment. 
137 With a few exceptions. 
 139
      To sum up, in both countries a) there is evident regional difference and b) there is a 
clear distinction between core and periphery, which makes the dependency theory 
perfectly applicable, leading to a “metropolis-satellite” relationship and making regional 
convergence difficult. Currently only four Italian 138  and four Spanish 139  NUTS 2 
regions are included in the Convergence Objective 140 . This shows that regional 
development has indeed taken place in both countries and regional disparities have 
clearly been reduced. 
       There is certain optimism that some of the current peripheral Convergence 
Objective Regions in Italy and Spain will be in position to exit this Objective by 2013, 
despite the financial crisis and the current recession, which inevitably has had a negative 
impact not only at a national, but also at a regional level, with a significant 
unemployment increase especially within the core NUTS 2 regions. An efficient 
regional policy can become an important “weapon” against the trickle down of the 
recession to regions. EU Regional Policy can facilitate the establishment of more 
efficient training and educational regimes, as a certain amount of SFs are destined 
exactly for this purpose. An efficiently qualified labour force means better quality in 
production and might be a solution to the gross problem of unemployment.  
       The next two chapters will present an analysis that draws on a research 
methodology to link EU SFs and economic performance. In particular, it will present a 
comparison between four NUTS 2 regions of Italy (Basilicata, Campania, Calabria and 
Puglia) and four NUTS 2 regions of Spain (Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, 
Andalucía and Extremadura).       
                                                 
138 Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicilia. 
139 Castilla-la Mancha, Galicia, Andalucía and Extremadura. 
140 Whilst during the third CSF Cycle 11 Spanish and six Italian NUTS 2 regions were included in 
Objective 1. 
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CHAPTER 5 
  
ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR ITALIAN REGIONS 
 
 
5.1-INTRODUCTION 
 
      In this chapter, there is an attempt to critically present the four Italian case studies in 
order to understand why some Italian NUTS 2 regions experience high degree of 
regional economic development, whilst some others do not. The case studies examined 
in this chapter are four Italian regions; Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia and Campania. The 
reason for choosing these four regions is that Basilicata has exited the Convergence 
Objective, even as a “Phasing-Out” Region, while the other three, despite the fact that 
they also received significant amounts of funds, are still included in the Convergence 
Objective. Sardegna, which is the only other Italian third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Region 
(besides Basilicata) to have exited the Convergence Objective has been excluded from 
further research, since its economy is mainly based on tourism, the impact of which is 
not clearly presented in the official statistics. Such comparison enables us to explore the 
main reasons behind their different trends, in view of better understanding the regional 
policy with the theoretical framework of MLG.  
       In addition to the main variables141 used, a critical observation of regional spending, 
administrative capacity and implementation problems is used. An attempt for the 
creation of an elaborate framework with a clear focus on institutional capacity building 
takes place not only in this chapter, but also in the following one in order to strengthen 
the comparative element in the presentation, analysis and critical examination of the 
case studies. 
                                                 
141 GDP per capita, employment and unemployment rates. 
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       This chapter on the four Italian regions, and the following one on the Spanish 
regions are framed in the theoretical set-up presented in Chapter 2. There is an attempt 
to link the Italian and Spanish case studies (in the context of EU Cohesion Policy) with 
the concepts of soft and new regionalism, to show they can indeed be used as analytical 
tools in order to explain the arguments of the thesis.  
       In terms of dependency theory, Basilicata can be regarded as a semi-peripheral 
region, despite the fact that it is a “Phasing-Out” Region, which means that it has exited 
the Convergence Objective due to the EU Enlargement. Basilicata is characterised as a 
semi-peripheral region due to the fact that a) its GDP per capita and employment are 
higher and b) its unemployment is lower than those of the peripheral Convergence 
regions. Calabria, Campania and Puglia are peripheral regions, according to dependency 
theory, and this distinction does not only take place due to their relatively low GDP per 
capita compared to the other Italian and EU regions, but also due to their high 
unemployment, low employment, distance from the core regions, the lack of 
competitiveness of their companies, and the lack of skill in their labour force. 
  
5.2-THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO ITALY 
 
5.2.1-REGIONAL POLICY FROM THE 1950s TO THE 1970s (CASMEZ IN ACTION) 
 
      According to Paci and Pigliaru (1998), between 1951 and 1960 there was limited 
economic convergence across Italian regions and divergence was rather more evident. 
Dependency theory can satisfactorily explain this situation, as the core-periphery 
structures created amongst northern and southern Italian regions revealed the increased 
dependency of the Mezzogiorno on the North. This dependency led to the current 
economic divergence, and was in part the result of the Second World War, which was 
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catastrophic for Italy and particularly for several underdeveloped peripheral southern 
regions142. 
      To address uneven development and regional divergence between North and South, 
the “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”, or “Cassa per opera straordinarie di pubblico 
interesse nell’Italia meridionale” (CASMEZ) (Leonardi, 2005:107) was established in 
1950. The CASMEZ establishment was an outcome of the thought that effective 
institutional capacity building would result in regional economic development. Its 
targets were to improve the infrastructure in the southern regions, to contribute to 
industrial development projects, to reduce dependency on agriculture and to create more 
employment opportunities within the Mezzogiorno (Leonardi, 2005).  
       In the 15 years that followed, the importance of CASMEZ became fundamental for 
the Mezzogiorno’s development, as it created significant infrastructure projects and 
offered incentives to the industrial sectors. It can be argued that the significantly 
positive results and the high growth rates of that era became a reality thanks to 
CASMEZ (interview with De Luca, Cuccu and Tagle, 2009).          
       The intervention policy of CASMEZ was meant to contribute to achieving the 
expected development objectives, by acting on transport infrastructures and by 
encouraging a process of industrialisation with direct interventions and incentives. 
However, coordination problems between central government and the local authorities, 
and a public administration lacking efficiency due to poor monitoring procedures 
concerning the spending of funds, hampered regional development (interview with De 
Luca, Cuccu and Tagle, 2009).  
                                                 
142 Such as Calabria, Basilicata and Puglia. 
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       CASMEZ followed a top-down, centralised approach, where central government 
decided on the financial interventions. The result was that the local ruling class in all the 
Mezzogiorno regions, who were acting as mediators with the decision-makers in Rome, 
soon became delegitimised as providers of public services. This was a serious obstacle 
to regional economic progress and development (Barca, 2001). The strategy was for the 
core North to design interventions and allocate assistance to southern regions, without 
consultation with local and regional authorities, with the inevitable backwash effects as 
a result.  
       Success was indeed limited, particularly in the 1960s, as both the GDP per capita 
and employment remained very low across the Mezzogiorno. During the second half of 
the 1960s more problems became evident. The lack of accountability created many 
difficulties in allocating resources efficiently. Also there were negative economic 
effects, for instance in relation to income transfers to compensate for the income gap; 
ex-post-compensatory transfers began to cause a diminishing propensity to save 
(interview with De Luca, Cuccu and Tagle, 2009; Barca, 2001). 
      According to Bianchi (1998), economic crises in the peripheral areas are linked with 
weak local administrations, which, instead of resolving regional problems themselves, 
almost always ask the national governments for support and solutions (Bianchi, 1998). 
The existence of weak regional administrations was the problem in the Mezzogiorno. 
Good prospects for regional development and lower regional divergence were linked to 
the establishment of stronger local administrations in order to encourage development to 
begin from “inside” the regions. CASMEZ expenditures were increased from 0.75% of 
Italian GDP in the mid-1950s to 1.14% in the mid-1970s. In the 1950s, fixed gross 
industrial investment paid by CASMEZ was meant to tackle problems of limited 
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production capacity and unemployment. More than 86% of this investment was made in 
the North, where industrial employment increased from 10% to 12%, whereas in the 
Mezzogiorno it remained at approximately 3.5%.       
       During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Italian government set up state-owned 
firms and insisted that they located 40% of their investment and 60% of their new plants 
in the Mezzogiorno. This generated a certain increase in employment in manufacturing, 
construction and services, accompanied by a contraction in agricultural employment 
(Acconcia and Del Monte, 2000; Boldrin and Canova, 2001). However, such policy 
provisions missed achieving the expected results since they should have been coupled 
with investment in education and training to upgrade the skill base of the labour force. 
For this reason, despite the top-down efforts from the central government, the 
Mezzogiorno remained significantly marginalised from the rest of Italy, which for 
instance caused a huge migration of young people to the North in search for better 
prospects (2.2 million people moved to the North from 1962 to 1974). Regional 
divergence was more than evident and a metropolis-satellite relationship143  became 
crystallised.    
      From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, there was a noteworthy convergence process, 
mainly based on the top-down approach, but for the following 20 years, there was 
significant economic divergence, with the exception of one short period in the mid-
1980s, when there was an attempt at sustained industrialisation in the Mezzogiorno 
(Paci and Saba, 1997).  
       The main reason for the failure to achieve economic convergence was the fact that 
infrastructural improvements in regions such as Sicilia, Puglia and Calabria amounted 
                                                 
143 One of the main characteristics of dependency theory. 
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to next to nothing. The Italian government was willing to invest huge amounts of money 
in order to trigger economic development in the South, but again it did not take into 
account that the most important factor was to activate forces inside the regions, rather 
than imposing initiatives from the outside. In addition to this, it was still difficult to 
monitor and control clearly how the national funds were being invested. Infrastructural 
problems and the lack of procedural transparency forced the Italian government to 
continue to adopt a top-down approach. During the 1970s, the oil-shocks hit the 
Mezzogiorno more harshly than the rest of the country, with industrial investment 
dropping by 15% per year together with per capita income. 
  
5.2.2-REGIONAL POLICY IN THE 1980s AND 1990s (AGENSUD FOR CASMEZ) 
 
      CASMEZ was closed in 1986 and in the same year the Agency for the South 
(Agensud) was established (Leonardi, 2003). Agensud clearly stated that regional 
development could only take place if there was adequate consultation with regional 
authorities and if these authorities could gain more power and responsibility in regional 
and local affairs. This corresponded to a drastic change of approach to regional policy 
and implied that MLG was not taking place correctly, as there was limited cooperation 
between the national and the regional level. The main problems Agensud had to address 
in the Mezzogiorno included: a) insufficient education and training standards coupled 
with an ageing and unskilled labour force; b) a continuous decline in industrial 
development and a failure to attract new dynamic industries; and c) a still strong 
agricultural dependence. However, despite initial intentions, it soon became clear that 
Agensud was also favouring a centralised top-down approach, which could not reduce 
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the significant dependency of the Mezzogiorno on the core North and included no 
provisions for exploiting regional potentials for endogenous development144.        
       In the early 1990s a new regional plan was developed to assist Italian peripheral 
regions. The result for the Mezzogiorno was a contraction of the public spending it 
received which led to slower economic growth. In many regions145, the high population 
growth rate also led to lower income per capita. The Mezzogiorno was again 
marginalised and the metropolis-satellite relation became more evident, even though 
some regions146 benefited from an increase in exports (Gerson and Rowland, 2004). In 
1992, the Agensud was unexpectedly closed down when the first Amato government 
decided to integrate all the national programmes for the Mezzogiorno economic 
development into the SF context. This meant that national intervention in terms of 
regional policy would actually be the co-finance of the SF actions and programmes 
(Leonardi, 2003). 
      Despite the initial allocation of 600 million euros for CASMEZ and 43 billion euros 
for Agensud147, the divergence between the southern and the northern regions remained 
the same. In 1950 GDP per capita in the northern regions was 3.81 times higher than in 
the southern ones. In the mid-1980s, it was 3.78 times higher. Neither CASMEZ nor 
Agensud succeeded in achieving regional convergence in Italy, mainly due to the lack of 
investment in human capital and infrastructure.  
       Neither CASMEZ, nor Agensud could be characterised as successful institutional 
capacity building examples, as they did not actually convince the Italian government to 
invest within the regions. There were limited attempts by the Italian government to 
                                                 
144 Or to identify each region’s specific problems. 
145 In particular Calabria, Puglia and Sicilia. 
146 For example Campania. 
147 Both allocations were worth an annual GDP increase of 3% for the South. 
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identify the specific areas and sectors within the regions that would result in regional 
development and then invest funds in more advanced education in order to create a 
knowledgeable labour force that would be capable of taking advantage of these sectors. 
Moreover, the Italian government did not offer any significant stimulus in order to keep 
the educated labour force within the peripheral regions (such as the creation of new 
working positions). Such an action would be beneficial to the peripheral regions, as the 
skilled labour force would be in a position to exploit all possibilities for regional 
development, improve regional administrative capacity, eliminate unwanted 
bureaucracy and attract private investors. The Italian government in the context of both 
CASMEZ and Agensud made few attempts to a) connect the universities of the 
peripheral regions with the labour market and b) discourage skilled labour force from 
migrating towards the core Northern regions. 
       Attempts to put in place a regional institutional capacity (creating MLG) did not 
realise in either the case of CASMEZ, or Agensud. In both cases there was a lack of 
cooperation between the national and the regional level, practically no cooperation 
between the regional and the EU level and problematic, as well as limited cooperation 
between the national and the EU level. 
       The shift in regional policy from a centralised (under CASMEZ and Agensud) top-
down approach to the EU bottom-up approach was problematic and it is dubious 
whether this change benefited the Mezzogiorno regions148 in the first CSF Cycle. The 
question is whether or not sufficient training programmes actually took place in order 
for the administrative personnel to familiarise with the EU Cohesion Policy rules and 
principles (Leonardi 2003). If such programmes had taken place and the personnel had 
                                                 
148 By the end of the third CSF Cycle, the dependency of the peripheral Mezzogiorno on the core North 
was decreased, but during the first two CSF Cycles this was not evident. 
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been well-qualified, then the shift from the former approach to the latter would have 
been successful. However, no systematic training programme took place in order to help 
personnel make the transition from the CASMEZ approach to EU Cohesion Policy 
during the first CSF Cycle. There was an evident need for such training in view of the 
second CSF Cycle, which led Italy to engage in a range of programmes149 aimed at 
training national, regional and local civil servants to participate in the EU SFs 
programmes. These programmes were, however, voluntary and no incentives were 
given by the funding authority150 to create interest, such an increase in pay, or career 
progression. Inefficient Italian bureaucracy was also an important reason behind the 
unsatisfactory preparation of administrators (at both national and regional level) to be 
familiarised with the new regulations of the EU Regional Policy (Leonardi, 2003).  
       The Intervento Straordinario per il Mezzogiorno151 and the CASMEZ both followed 
top-down policies, which could not be regarded as successful since the economic 
divergence between the North and the Mezzogiorno was steadily increasing.  
       Between 1984152 and 1988153, there was a transitional period, which would end the 
strict top-down regional policy. Several administrative, institutional and organisational 
changes took place and the new approach was a more bottom-up, multi-level one, 
according to which a) regional and local governments gained importance, b) they were 
formally identified as equal actors in terms of the new system and c) they became 
responsible for the planning and management of funds and resources (Milio, 2007).  
       Nevertheless, this shift was more problematic than expected, as CASMEZ had 
covered a lack of territorial institutional capacities. The result was a “consolidation of a 
                                                 
149 Such as the PASS or Sub-Programme for the Formation of Personnel of the Public Administration. 
150 Department for Public Administration of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 
151 Extraordinary Interventions for the Mezzogiorno, established in 1950. 
152 CASMEZ closure, though its true dismantling took place in 1992. 
153 Beginning of the SFs. 
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policy environment that can be defined as if the whole of the activities related to local 
development could be conceived and realised outside the administrations” (Milio, 
2007:433). Lack of regional administrative capacity means lack of regional 
development, regardless of the degree of centralisation of the approach followed. In 
order for this transformation to be successful, the winding down of the national regional 
policy and the implementation of the new EU Cohesion Policy required not only a shift 
in certain rules and procedures, but most importantly, a shift of administrative 
responsibilities from the national to the regional level. That shift did not take place 
successfully and as a result there was confusion in the operational programmes.  
       In the 1990s, a progressive decentralisation in terms of regional policy in Italy 
nevertheless took place. There was a significant transformation from a highly top-down 
approach to a combination of top-down and bottom-up ones. There was a 
decentralisation of competences in favour of lower governmental levels, which were 
considered to be the best positioned in order to mobilise and motivate regional and local 
actors. Multi-level governmental relations in regard to regional policies were 
characterised by competition and partnership. The main actors included; a) EU 
institutions, which set rules and objectives, b) central government, which adapted EU 
rules to the national context and monitored implementation, c) regional institutions, 
which received most of the funds and were in charge of designing and implementing 
projects and d) local administrations, which brought together local actors in the context 
of the projects (Barca, 2001). 
      Leonardi (2003) identifies five main differences between the two approaches in 
relation to Italy; a) EU Cohesion Policy was multi-level in both its inputs and 
management, whereas the national regional policy involved only the nation state; b) the 
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decisions on what to invest in were not a part of a comprehensive programme, but a 
result of “piecemeal” decisions by local authorities; c) until the first CSF cycle, regions 
did not play any part in regional development policies, since only national governments 
were in charge; d) policy evaluations were not part of the decision-making process, or 
of the implementation process, since all controls were internal to the national 
government; e) the interventions were “conceived as one-off or extraordinary actions 
rather than being part of a normal programme of interventions” (Leonardi, 2003:5). 
      The problem with regional policy in Italy was that it clashed with EU requirements 
for regional policy. The Italian national government (until the first CSF Cycle) was 
opposed to MLG and held a monopoly in the desicion-making context, without 
conceding any significant policy-making responsibility to regional or local authorities. 
We can argue that this centralised regional policy is in accordance with 
intergovernmentalism and totally opposed to the more supranational EU Cohesion 
Policy (Milio, 2010). The EU was mainly encouraging industrial investment support 
and infrastructure development in the disadvantaged regions and the creation of regional 
endogenous potentials, which involved the creation of a business environment that 
could have led to the success of the SMEs. The target of the ERDF was to support 
domestic regional policies and not to become a second pillar of regional aid 154 . 
However, the Agensud neither encouraged the creation of SMEs, nor moved towards the 
exploitation of regional potentials for endogenous growth.  
       This means that the regions were not encouraged to achieve regional economic 
development through internal processes, including an efficient management of human 
                                                 
154  Member States were supposed to add EU money to support existing national regional projects, 
according to the principles of subsidiarity, additionality and partnership. 
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capital and the establishment of updated forms of technology and production. Hence, 
regional development could not take place “inside” the regions.        
       Regional economic development is not only a matter of EU SFs and governmental 
funds, but is also linked to efficient management (Aiello and Pupo, 2008). The problem 
in Italy has been twofold: a) there have been several macro-territorial and economic 
differences between the core North and the peripheral Mezzogiorno and b) the Italian 
government has always treated the Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 regions as a single territory 
with similar problems and needs, without trying to search deeper for their specific 
regional needs (Milio, 2007). 
       Within the Mezzogiorno, several regions had never before been involved in 
European policies and were not aware of the requirements of a potential cooperation 
with EU institutions, and others did not even exist as geographical, administrative, or 
political entities (Bailey and De Propris, 2002). Therefore, there was a need for changes 
at both national and regional level (Allen, 2000). It was necessary for the institutions in 
charge of regional policy to establish a vertical and horizontal distribution of powers 
and responsibilities, in addition to sufficient strategic planning, organisation, 
programming, cooperation, coordination and monitoring capacities (Milio, 2007). 
       The Italian government, however, was incapable of delegating powers to regions in 
the South, mainly because of the lack of institutional capacity and experience within 
regional governments and the presence of a black economy that was gripping the 
Mezzogiorno. We can argue that the top-down approach adopted by the Italian 
government was an instrument to control the amounts of funds the Southern regions 
were receiving; however, it did not make any effort to involve regional stakeholders in 
the process of identifying needs and problems at the regional level.  
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       The change from a top-down to a more bottom-up regional development approach 
was forced on Italy and justified by the assumption that regional development can only 
be effective if it starts within the region and in consultancy with regional authorities155.  
 
5.2.3-REGIONAL POLICY DURING THE CSF CYCLES 
       Between 1992 and 2001, despite several institutional and policy-making changes 
that took place within the Mezzogiorno, there was still an unemployment rate of 
approximately 21%, a black economy of 1/3 of the total and a high degree of organised 
crime (Barca, 2001). At the beginning of the third CSF Cycle, the Cohesion Policy 
Department156 began stressing the importance of effective administrative capacity and 
clarified that the SFs can be efficient only if they are combined with a well-performing, 
modernised public administration (Milio, 2007).  
       The positive feature at the beginning of the CSF Cycles was the fact that the Italian 
government started realising that efficient institutional capacity building would be 
fundamental for regional development, as it would be the basis for efficient spending 
capacity. Indeed, the first serious attempts to put in place an effective MLG started 
taking place, as more powers and responsibilities were passed to the regional 
governments and there was a closer cooperation between national and regional 
governments with the aim of regional development taking place. Moreover, the EU 
participated actively in terms of Regional Policy and this led to a more intense 
coordination not only with the national government, but with the regional ones as well. 
Active cooperation at all three levels (EU, national and regional) was gradually 
                                                 
155 This shift can be regarded as positive, and evidence of this is the fact that since 1989, four NUTS 2 
Italian regions have already exited Objective 1/Convergence Objective.  
  
156 Established in 1988. 
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becoming a reality, despite the fact that there were still problems and disagreements 
about the amount of power and responsibilities that would be attributed to each level. 
       At this point we can link soft and new regionalism with the allocation of the SFs to 
Italy. Soft regionalism argues that regional development can become a reality only 
under the condition that there is adequate consultation with the regional and local 
authorities (Acharya, 1999; Hurrell, 1995; Ghica, 2008) and an effective understanding 
of the values of specific localities, as well as habitats (Strecker, 1994).  
       In the case of soft regionalism, central governments are indeed willing to offer 
power and authority to their regions, according to the principle of subsidiarity. This is 
exactly what the Italian government has started doing since the abolishment of the 
Agensud. Neither CASMEZ, nor Agensud were eager to offer much power to regional 
authorities who had better knowledge of the specific problems and needs of the 
peripheral Objective 1 Regions, in order for development to start inside these regions. 
New regionalism supports the increase of economic competitiveness not on a country-
by-country basis, but on a region-by-region basis and highlights the importance of the 
regions, and as a consequence the importance and necessity of regional development, 
based on processes such as visioning and strategic planning (Wallis, 2002). In other 
words, new regionalism favours the bottom-up approach of the EU Cohesion Policy. 
Thus, we can argue that till 1992 (closure of Agensud), regional policy in Italy was 
opposite to both soft and new regionalism. Since then, we can argue that regional policy 
in Italy has been conducted according to the principles of both soft and new regionalism.   
       According to Lizza (2009), there are four main reasons for the different spending 
capacity amongst the Italian NUTS 2 regions. Firstly, the internal organisation of the 
regions differs, as only some regions have established specialised structures for 
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satisfactory SF programming and spending. Secondly, regions and provinces have 
different institutional capacities in utilising the resources at their disposal in the best 
possible way. Thirdly, mistakes in the selection of the financial interventions can 
actually have a negative impact, or even cause problems (interview with Lizza, 2009). 
Finally, political pressure can lead to en excessive fragmentation of resources, too many 
interventions being pursued, and possible inappropriate spending and investment of SFs 
(interview with Lizza, 2009).  
       In Italy the top-down approach proved to be a failure. Within the Mezzogiorno, for 
many years, this centralised strategy had the practical effect of diminishing local 
energies, competences and potentials for endogenous growth. Development inside the 
Mezzogiorno regions was not possible, as decisions on development were taken without 
adequate consultation with regional authorities, resulting into a metropolis-satellite, 
dependence culture, which gave rise to the opposite results to its initial targets (Baccaro, 
2004).  
       Only in the early 1990s did the Italian government realise that, in order for the 
South to stop lagging behind, there was a need for area-based operational investment 
and spending programmes that would be based on the principle of partnership (Baccaro, 
2004). Issues such as cooperation, coordination and partnership were innovative for the 
Mezzogiorno (Gambaro, 2004). The development of the Mezzogiorno was necessary for 
the development of Italy and the EU as a whole and for that reason, the increase of 
territorial competitiveness was of vital significance (Barca, 2001).  
       The lack of an agency in Italy specifically in charge of the development of the 
South is due to the fact that in Italy the perception is that development policies should 
be conducted by ordinary institutions. This fact, on the one hand, has significantly 
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improved the capacity of the regional institutions in terms of the programming of 
development policies. On the other hand, in many cases, the additional funds are used in 
order to satisfy needs which are not covered by ordinary funds. This inevitably leads to 
difficulties concerning the economic balance. The Regional Operational Programmes 
(ROPs) have mainly contributed to the increase in the quality of regional programming, 
due to the fact that they introduce rules concerning operating procedures and processes 
to the regional organisations. Furthermore, another objective of these programmes is to 
sustain the innovation capacity of the businesses and firms and to create important 
infrastructure works. The SFs have significantly contributed to improving the regional 
administration, but there are still many delays caused by bureaucracy. Therefore, it 
would be necessary for further modernisation and updating of the administrative 
instruments to take place. Only recently has there been an increase in cooperation 
amongst the Mezzogiorno NUTS 2 regions. In the past, a competition regime was more 
evident, but it can be said that a degree of “conflict” still exists (interview with Moro, 
2009). 
       According to De Grandis (2009), there are three main factors that affect expenditure 
on SFs. SFs spending is mostly linked to a) infrastructures and b) state aids. The former 
is linked to national and regional sectoral planning, and may differ strongly from one 
region to another, due also to the plans of the implementing body157, as well as in the 
involvement of the private sector, for instance, in the environmental and transport field. 
It is important to mention that OPs often have a strong incentive in the implementation 
of projects, if they are well designed. The latter is linked to the potential intake of the 
productive sector and the habit of local SMEs to apply for grants in order to develop 
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projects. Administrative capacity, which can be regarded as a non-bureaucratic 
approach, is mainly based on the fact that the support given to potential beneficiaries 
comes from the central body, which can be a management authority, technical 
assistance, or other horizontal service of the Regional Administration. Administrative 
capacity plays a key role in developing programmes, notably on the implementation of 
horizontal aids, or integrated projects, which require an ex-ante involvement of 
stakeholders in order to be successful (interview with De Grandis, 2009). 
       Furthermore, efficient control mechanisms 158  are needed so as to deliver 
satisfactory levels of expenditure. Usually, a strong structure of departments, reporting 
directly to the President of the regional administration, with a clear political 
endorsement, are able to act pro-actively and to make the most efficient choices on the 
ground. Since 2000, the distributive dimension of public expenditure in Italy has been 
weak and ensured by the SFs (and the Fund for the Underperforming Areas (FAS)), 
whilst the ordinary expenditure has been biased towards the Centre-North. Annual 
public capital expenditure per capita was systematically lower in the Objective 1 
Regions (1.198 euros/year per head), than in the Objective 2 Regions (1.322 euros/year 
per head), over the period 2000-2005 (interview with De Grandis, 2009). 
       Notwithstanding the necessary caution when comparing public expenditure across 
countries, figures suggest that public investment policies were more distributive in 
Spain, where Objective 1 Regions were characterised by a higher public capital 
expenditure than the others. According to the latest national data159,  public capital 
expenditure in the Mezzogiorno160 has declined over the last 10 years (from 38.3% of 
the total in 1998 to 35.3% in 2007) representing now just about the demographic weight 
                                                 
158 Such as sample checks, quick cleaning of non-eligible expenditure and recovery. 
159 By SVIMEZ. 
160 Objective 1 + Abruzzo. 
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of the Mezzogiorno and well below the initial target of 45%161. The evolution of the 
resources devoted to the Cohesion Policy (national + EU, from 73.9% to 78.1%) just 
balanced out the decrease (from 28.4% to 21.4%) in ordinary public capital expenditure 
(interview with De Grandis, 2009). 
       In Italy, the responsibility for spending SFs is mainly carried by the Public 
Administrations. For the OPs of the Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective there is an OP for every NUTS 2 region. For the Convergence Objective OPs, 
besides the NUTS 2 regions, various territorial intervention programmes can be 
observed, which are carried out by the Ministries. The total amount of the financial 
resources allocated for each programme depends on the economic situation of each 
NUTS 2 region. Each administration has a specific political and management system for 
the realisation of each intervention, which results in different levels of efficiency 
between regions (interview with Piazzi, 2009). This difficulty that the Mezzogiorno 
regions faced in spending EU funds had already been identified for the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) in the period 1986-91 (Leonardi, 2005).  
       During the first two CSF Cycles, there were three SFs (ERDF, ESF and EAGGF). 
In the third CSF Cycle, the FIFG was added and in the current CSF Cycle the SFs are 
the ERDF and the ESF. The Funds’ intervention areas have been established according 
to EU rules and principles (interview with Piazzi, 2009). 
       In general, there is a high degree of integration amongst the policies of the ERDF 
and the ESF in the Convergence Objective Regions. In the fourth CSF Cycle, there is a 
process of stabilisation in terms of the elaboration of the “unified regional policy”162, in 
order to facilitate the efficient functioning of a system concerning all interventions in 
                                                 
161 Target in the context of Objective 1/CSF/2000-2006. 
162 Politica regionale unitaria. 
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the same region, which can be of EU, national, or regional nature. This way, the CSF 
contributes to the integration and the complementarity amongst the various Funds and 
not only between ERDF and ESF. Policies can be integrated thanks to the realisation of 
the unified regional policy (interview with Piazzi, 2009). According to De Luca, Cuccu 
and Tagle (2009), each of the Funds is managed by a different General Direction within 
the Commission. This factor partially explains the differences between their 
intervention policies (interview with De Luca, Cuccu and Tagle, 2009). So far, the first 
achievements obtained in Italy’s Objective 1 Regions 163  can be observed in the 
macroeconomic data on employment, water, waste and risk prevention and the creation 
of an information society164. Results from territorial actions165 and major infrastructures, 
such as transport, are likely to become visible at the end of this implementation period, 
or in the next couple of years due to a longer implementation period.        
       In Italy, most of the ESF interventions concentrate on educational activities. Whilst 
in the Convergence Objective context, the ERDF intervenes in order to create new jobs, 
and the ESF intervenes in coordination with the ERDF, in the Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective, the ESF is independent of the ERDF and intervenes for the 
“therapy” of the categories at risk166 in order to offer occupations to those who have 
prematurely abandoned their studies, continuing training of workers and employees and 
the financing of research scholarships. Even in cases within the Convergence Objective, 
the ESF has intervened with such actions, similar to those that can be observed and 
identified in the Competitiveness and Employment Objective context (interview with 
Piazzi, 2009). 
                                                 
163 In terms of results and not merely output. 
164 For example access to internet and broadband for enterprises, municipalities and households + e-
government. 
165 Integrated projects. 
166 For example people who have abandoned their studies, ex-prisoners, etc. 
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       Within the Convergence Objective, besides the ROPs, an Operational Programme 
(OP) managed by the Ministry of Public Education and Training will take place, 
including ESF interventions in order to improve the teaching in schools and academic 
institutions and ERDF interventions for laboratory modernisation and improvements in 
information technology for classes. Between 1988 and 1993, approximately 90% of the 
resources offered were invested. Between 1994 and 1999, the percentage was increased, 
reaching 94%. Between 2000 and 2006, there was a prolongation in terms of the 
realisation of the ROPs and multi-year integrated programmes until 30 June 2009, due 
to the economic crisis. By 30 June 2009 the majority of the programmes were carried 
out by means of the full utilisation of the available resources (interview with Piazzi, 
2009)167. 
       De Grandis (2009) argues that the NOPs, the ROPs and the training programmes 
have indeed contributed to the adequate implementation of the CSF at the national level 
in Italy. Training was important for ESF and the most successful NOP for the third CSF 
Cycle was the one on local development, which provided investments for local 
enterprises. In the second CSF Cycle, the most important NOP was the global grant for 
the Gioia Tauro port development, necessary in order to build up the most successful 
and strategic infrastructure possible for Southern Italy in terms of logistics. It is difficult 
to draw a single conclusion on the whole set of ROPs, as this is a specific subject for 
evaluation activities. However, certainly the ROPs have shown a strong coherence with 
the CSF, sharing the same priorities and a common set of indicators (interview with De 
Grandis, 2009). 
                                                 
167 The aim of Piazzi is to analyse in detail the complicated role of ERDF and ESF in combination with 
the role of the NOPs and ROPs in the context of Regional Policy in Italy and particularly in the 
problematic fields of education, training and job creation.  
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       Both during the third CSF Cycle and the current programming period, the level of 
responsibility for the management of SFs is based on the capacities and competence 
attributed to the State and the Regional Administrations by the Italian Constitution. In 
the Competitiveness and Employment Regions168, 100% of the resources is allocated to 
the regions, whilst in the Convergence Objective territory, approximately 70% of the 
resources are being managed by the Regional Administrations and 30% by the 
Ministries169. Once the resources are determined on a competence basis, the operational 
programmes are elaborated through an open process based on partnership. According to 
Piazzi (2009), the fact that the institutional and socio-economic partnership participates 
in the elaboration of the OPs makes us argue that the programmes follow a more 
bottom-up, decentralised regional development approach. Once the programmes are 
adopted by the Commission and the programme surveillance committees, decisions 
concerning the projects’ selections are taken by consensus. This method permits the 
following of the criteria of admission and evaluation, which are coherent with the needs 
of the civil society (interview with Piazzi, 2009).  
       De Grandis (2009) argues that a mix of bottom-up170 and top-down171 approaches 
has been ensured by integrated projects in the ROPs (interview with De Grandis, 2009). 
Lizza (2009) argues that the programming for regional development substantially 
follows the bottom-up approach, despite the fact that some politicians and authorities in 
charge of the development policy favour a return to the top-down approach172. The 
economic gap amongst the Italian NUTS 2 regions certainly continues to exist despite 
                                                 
168 ERDF and ESF intervention areas. 
169 Particularly those in charge of Transport, Internal Affairs, Research and University, Public Education 
and Training. 
170 Partnership/needs/specific projects. 
171 Regulatory framework/scoping. 
172 Where the national government would again play a significant role in the programming and 
management of funds. 
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the SF allocations. According to Lizza (2009), in order for the gap to close, it is 
necessary to create the right combination of help for the business sector 173  and 
territorial investments174 . During recent years the tendency of the policy makers has 
been to decrease assistance and increase investments (interview with Lizza, 2009)175. 
      Table 5.1 below measures the administrative capacity of Sicilia and Basilicata. This 
is defined by a) management176, b) programming177, c) monitoring178 and d) evaluation. 
Regional governments measure capacities in order to gain knowledge about the 
output179. As soon as the resources are implemented they must produce a result180 that 
can be measured in GDP growth terms181  (Milio, 2007). Administrative capacity is 
closely linked to both impact outcome and GDP growth. 
       Sicilia and Basilicata were chosen because Sicilia is an example of low fund 
implementation, whilst Basilicata is totally the opposite. Sicilia is a peripheral region, 
whereas Basilicata is a semi-peripheral one182. Data collection was based on document 
analysis, interview data and direct observation (Milio, 2007).      
Table 5.1 
Regional Administrative Capacity (2000-2006) 
Administrative capacity Sicilia Basilicata 
1. Management 1 3 
2. Programming 1 3 
3. Monitoring 1 2 
4. Evaluation 2 3 
Total Average 1.25 (Starting) 2.75 (Consolidated) 
Note: There are four identified progressive stages of administrative capacity (with their scoring band): a) 
Absent (0-0.5), b) Starting (0.6-1.5), c) Developing (1.6-2.5) and d) Consolidated (2.6-3).  
Source: Milio, 2007, p. 439. 
 
                                                 
173 Tax credit and occupation incentives. 
174 Public works, infrastructure, environment, research and innovation. 
175 Lizza, Piazzi and De Grandis refer to these details in order to link the role of the NOPs and ROPs with 
the target of the decentralisation of Regional Policy in Italy. 
176 According to the managing authority.  
177  According to the ROPs and the identification of priorities and measures for converting certain 
objectives into interventions in which to invest the available funds. 
178 According to a system of coherent and adequate information gathering. 
179 The quantitative implementation of resources measured by the expenditure rate. 
180 Institutional outcomes. 
181 This is the second relationship. 
182 According always to dependency theory and taking into account only economic variables. 
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        In Sicilia, management, programming183 and monitoring are still weak. A lack of 
funding requests created several difficulties in the definition and implementation of 
projects, which made the spending of resources very difficult. Evaluation is developing, 
but the ex-ante evaluation in Sicilia covers just a few intervention areas (Milio, 2007). 
By contrast, in Basilicata184 management, programming and evaluation are consolidated, 
whilst monitoring is developing. The establishment of the central coordination body in 
order to ensure more effective cooperation amongst the administrative departments, the 
absence of delays in programme approval and the fact that between 1994 and 1999, 
Basilicata was the only Mezzogiorno region to spend its entire SFs allocation justify its 
high level of development and administrative capacity (Milio, 2007). 
       The semi-peripheral regions of Abruzzo, Molise and Basilicata prove that the 
bottom–up approach can be successful, due to efficient three-level cooperation. 
Nevertheless, in peripheral regions such as Campania, Calabria and Puglia, the bottom-
up approach has also been put into practice with less encouraging results. The OPs in 
Italy are divided between those implemented by regions and those by the Italian 
government. During the first two CSF Cycles, the division between regional and 
national OPs was 50%-50%. In the third Cycle, 70% of funds were transferred to the 
regional level (Leonardi, 2003). This shift reveals the attempts at the decentralisation of 
the regional policies in Italy. 
       In Italy, the annual average impact of the 1994-1999185  support on growth was 
calculated as an additional 0.45%-1.69% for six Objective 1 Regions during 1999-2005, 
with an increasing impact of 3.96%-6.13% (Percoco, 2005). Increases in GDP of up to 
1.8% were calculated in the Mezzogiorno (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2007). The EU 
                                                 
183 Both programme design and programme approval. 
184 The first case study of the thesis. 
185 Second CSF Cycle. 
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Cohesion Policy has indeed had a positive impact, but without national and private 
contributions, regional economic development would have been impossible. 
       Introduced in early 2000, Territorial Employment Pacts (TEPs) were a step forward 
towards regional economic convergence and development in the Mezzogiorno. These 
were selected and monitored by the Commission, according to a standard set of rules. 
They were good examples of development programmes based on the principle of 
partnership and favoured a less centralised, bottom-up approach. Their target was the 
reduction of unemployment and the increase of employment (Milio and Simoni, 2004). 
The TEPs were the EU-funded version of the Patti Territoriali (early 1990s), which 
were local partnerships between private and public actors that took place in peripheral 
areas of the Mezzogiorno and were funded by the central government (Baccaro, 2004:V). 
       Furthermore, the introduction of the TEPs facilitated EU Regional Policy for two 
more reasons; firstly, the Commission provided significant resources and valuable 
technical support in order for the TEPs rules and regulations to be followed easily and 
efficiently; and secondly, financial resources for TEPs “were set aside in bulk, thus each 
TEP only had to follow the set procedural rules” (Gambaro, 2004:21) in order to 
receive funds. The TEPs procedure was efficient mainly due to its transparency in both 
rules and funding.    
      There were nine TEPs186 concerning the Objective 1 Regions187. In their study, 
Milio and Simoni (2004) interviewed national actors, such as trade unions and 
employers’ organisations officials and they all argued that the TEPs were indeed 
successful. Table 5.2 below shows the TEPs in Italy for Objective 1 Regions. The 
                                                 
186 They took place in the regions of Campania, Sicilia, Sardegna, Puglia, Abruzzo and Molise. 
187 There was one more for an Objective 2 Region.  
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unemployment rate in all the areas with the exception of Sangro Aventino is higher than 
18%. 
Table 5.2: Territorial employment pacts in Italy (Objective 1) 
Descriptive Data and Unemployment Rates 
Pact Inhabitants No. Municipalities Unemployment Rate 
Napoli Nord Est (Campania) 274,330 9 28.85% 
Agro Nocerino Sarnese 
(Campania) 252,084 11 40% 
Alto Belice Corleonese (Sicily) 121,855 20 19% 
Calatino Sud Simeto (Sicily) 151,971 15 38.83% 
Catania Sud (Sicily) 333,075 1 33.50% 
Matese (Molise) 137,829 57 20% 
Nord Barese Ofantino (Puglia) 358,427 9 25.80% 
Oristano (Sardegna) 158,043 78 26.91% 
Sangro Aventino (Obj.1 and 2) 
(Abruzzo)188 133,000 59 9.40% 
Sources: Gambaro, 2004, p. 40. 
 
       Table 5.3 below is very important in order to explain regional institutional and 
administrative capacity problems in Italy. Regional institutional and administrative 
capacities are closely linked with the ability to spend the SFs allocated. Inability to 
spend SFs means lack of regional institutional capacity. Table 5.3 reveals the percentage 
of SFs expenditure in the Objective 1 context as expenditure/total allocation and we can 
observe that during the first CSF Cycle the percentage of the Italian Objective 1 
Regions was extremely low (73%) and in the second CSF Cycle it was even lower 
(67%). The situation became worse during the third CSF Cycle (60% until December 
2006) (Milio, 2010). This information makes us argue that administrative capacity in 
the Italian Objective 1 Regions has been ineffective and has remained incomplete, as 
Italian regions suffered important implementation difficulties in the CSF context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 Sangro Aventino was not co-financed by EU funds because, at that time, Abruzzo had exited Objective 
1. Nevertheless, it benefited from EU technical assistance. 
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Table 5.3 
Percentage of SF Expenditure (% of expenditure is calculated  
as expenditure/total allocation)-EU Objective 1 
First CSF Cycle (1989-1993) 
 
 
Member states % 
Ireland 95 
Portugal 91 
Spain 87 
Greece 84 
France 84 
UK 83 
Italy  73 
Second CSF Cycle (1994-1999) 
 
 
Member states % 
Portugal 89 
Ireland 87 
Spain  82 
Denmark 81 
Austria 77 
Greece 73 
Belgium 72 
France 67 
Netherlands 67 
UK 67 
Italy  67 
Third CSF Cycle (2000-2006) (until December 2006) 
 
 
Member states % 
Ireland 82 
Sweden 79 
Germany 77 
Spain 75 
Portugal 75 
Austria 74 
Finland 72 
Netherlands 72 
Belgium 66 
UK 66 
France 64 
Italy 60 
Greece 53 
Source: Milio, 2010, p. 27. 
 
       Table 5.4 below provides information on the SF expenditures within the 
Mezzogiorno. Sicilia received the highest amount during all three CSF Cycles, but is 
still included in the Convergence Objective. 
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Table 5.4 
Total SFs in the Italian Objective 1 Regions (in millions of euros) 
Region First CSF Cycle   
(1989-93) 
Second CSF Cycle 
(1994-99) 
Third CSF Cycle  
(2000-06) 
Molise 344 616 618 
Abruzzo 593 - - 
Campania 1,617 3,091 9,247 
Puglia 1,027 2,645 6,695 
Basilicata 768 1,272 1,614 
Calabria 1,156 1,911 5,302 
Sardegna 1,087 1,816 4,671 
Sicilia 1,687 3,194 10,279 
Source: Leonardi, 2005, pp. 131-132. 
 
       Table 5.5 below summarises the spending capacity of the Italian Objective 1 
Regions. Basilicata had the highest expenditure rate during the first two CSF Cycles and 
reached 100% during the second one. Abruzzo also reached 100% during the second 
Cycle. Basilicata is currently a “Phasing-Out” Region, whilst Abruzzo officially exited 
Objective 1 in the end of 1996. However, during the third CSF Cycle, the percentage of 
SFs expenditure was lower for all Italian Objective 1 Regions, compared to the previous 
Cycles, and this shows difficulties in the implementation of the CSF framework, which 
reveals institutional capacity problems of the regional administrations. 
Table 5.5 
Percentage of SFs Expenditure-Italian Objective 1 Regions (in %) 
First CSF Cycle (1989-93) Second CSF Cycle (1994-99)  Third CSF Cycle (2000-06) until 
December 2006  
Basilicata                                  92 Basilicata                                100 Basilicata                                  64 
Abruzzo                                    80 Abruzzo                                  100 Abruzzo                                      - 
Molise                                      77 Molise                                      99 Molise                                      73 
Sardegna                                  77 Sardegna                                  92 Sardegna                                  63 
Calabria                                    80 Calabria                                    84 Calabria                                    64 
Campania                                 62 Campania                                 80 Campania                                 51 
Puglia                                       64 Puglia                                       77 Puglia                                       55 
Sicilia                                       57 Sicilia                                       75 Sicilia                                       46 
Note: Abruzzo exited Objective 1 at the end of 1996 and Molise at the end of 2003. 
Source: Milio, 2010, p. 28. 
 
       The evidence above shows that the Italian regions under spent the SFs they had 
been allocated with the exception of Basilicata and Sardegna in the second Cycle. In 
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terms of the first Cycle 189 , the Commission prolonged the period allocated for 
expenditure, firstly to 1996, then to the end of 1996 and then to 31st December 1997.            
       One of the most important actions for regional economic development was the OP 
for Education and Training “La scuola per lo sviluppo” that took place in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno during the third CSF Cycle. The Commission co-financed this 
multiregional programme for education and training. Two thirds of the amount was 
covered by the EU and the remaining third by the Italian public sector. The ERDF and 
the ESF were in charge of funding (Inforegio Europa, 2009i). 
      The OP for Education and Training concentrated on seven sub-areas; a) the 
adaptation of the education system (ESF), b) new technologies in order to aid teaching 
methods (ERDF), c) measures in order to reduce the number of pupils leaving school 
early and to rehabilitate those who had already abandoned school (ESF), d) 
infrastructure in support of educational and social inclusion (ERDF), e) higher level 
training (ESF), f) life-long learning (ESF), g) the support and promotion of educational 
and training choices in order to facilitate the access of females into the labour market 
(ESF) (Inforegio Europa, 2009i). 
Table 5.6   
Breakdown of Finances by Priority Area and Funds in the Mezzogiorno (2000-2006) 
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
Improving the quality of 
education and development 
of the knowledge-based, 
information society 
812,214,384 524,623,969 
Technical assistance 17,800,187 12,460,031 
Total 830,014,571 
537,084,000 [ERDF 
contribution 109,816,000 
(20.45%) and ESF 
contribution 427,268,000 
(79.55%)] 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009i. 
 
       In the following sections there is a critical analysis a) of the economic profile of 
each of the four regions and b) of the regional plans and projects that have so far taken 
                                                 
189 1989-1993. 
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place, with comments on their efficiency. According to dependency theory and based 
only on economic variables, we can argue that Basilicata is a semi-peripheral region, 
whilst the other three are peripheral ones. The question is whether EU Regional Policy 
has so far had a positive impact in the economies of such regions. The answer is that the 
SFs have indeed had a positive impact on all four regions, but it was not possible for all 
the 2000-2006 Objective 1 Regions to be excluded from the Convergence Objective. 
This progress may be evident by the end of the current Cycle (2007-13), when the 
remaining peripheral Convergence Regions190 may exit the Convergence Objective. 
   
5.3-REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
5.3.1-BASILICATA (Part of Objective 1 till 2006. “Phasing-Out” Region for the 2007-2013 Cycle) 
 
       The fact that Basilicata is a “Phasing-Out” Region means that it has exited the 
Convergence Objective due to the statistic effects of the EU Enlargement and not 
necessarily due to its significant economic development. However, we can argue that in 
terms of spending capacity and economic performance according to GDP, employment 
and unemployment rates, it is in a better position compared to the current Italian 
Convergence Objective Regions. Therefore we will characterise Basilicata as a semi-
peripheral region. In 2009, the population of Basilicata was 588,879 people (ISTAT, 
2011).  
       In order to justify that the state of “regions in balance” offers opportunities, we 
assume a medium-term prospective: during the 1990s in fact, the macro-economic 
profile of Basilicata shows that there was a significant reduction in its dependency on 
external transfers and consuming incidence in terms of the GDP. At the same time, 
there was a steady increase in its capacity to create internal reserves and capital 
                                                 
190 Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicilia. 
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accumulation. Everything took place in a wider context of relations with the external 
markets, characterised by a substantial closure of international investments 191 . This 
economic strategy was also combined with strong exports, mainly in the automotive 
sector192 (interview with Lavieri, 2009).  
       The economic development improvements of the 1990s were followed by a relative 
decrease, mainly due to the negative economic situation at both national and global 
levels. At the regional level, there was a significant slow down in the manufacturing 
sector193 and an unsatisfactory diversification and in some cases a contraction of the 
tertiary sector, in particular new professions and advanced technology. This slowing 
down of economic growth in the 2000s was caused by: a) the interruption of the process 
of convergence in terms of per capita GDP and b) the insufficient dynamics of the 
labour market. The GDP increase, in association with a population decrease, led to a 
sustainable GDP increase during the 1990s. This evolution undoubtedly underlined a 
positive economic aspect, which was visible in the improvements in the quality of life 
of the inhabitants of Basilicata. Nevertheless, this evolution resulted in an 
impoverishment of human resources, due to the outward flow of the labour force from 
Basilicata towards other core regions (interview with Lavieri, 2009). 
       Labour market dynamics in Basilicata are not sufficiently vibrant; of particular 
concern is the women’s rate. There has been a very slow increase in the employment 
rate. Within the “grey” universe of unemployment and part-time employment, the 
situation is worse for the older groups within the labour force, which are considered to 
be the tough base of long-term unemployment. The recourse towards atypical 
                                                 
191 Basilicata is an attractive region for international investments. 
192 Automotive districts. 
193  Processes of significant de-industrialisation and closure of the productive installations after the 
earthquake and numerous difficulties in the departments in charge of the production of cars. 
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employment remains stable, but incidences of “illegal” employment are still increasing. 
In the end, this situation confirms the fact that the economic system of Basilicata is 
going through a rather difficult phase in terms of absorbing the qualified and 
“professionalised” labour supply, which is provided every year 194  by the regional 
system of education (interview with Lavieri, 2009).        
          
-Regional economic statistics 
       The activity rate in 2008 was 43.5% (Eurostat, 2010b). The male activity rate was 
57.3% in 2002, the lowest in Italy, whereas the female activity rate was almost the 
lowest, slightly higher than that of Puglia and Campania (Europa, 2004d). The 
employment rate was also one of the lowest in Italy (38.7% in 2008) and (35.8% in 
1999), but the second highest after Sardegna amongst the third CSF Cycle Italian 
Objective 1 Regions. It was also much lower than both the national (45.9%) and the EU 
average (53.7%). The 2.9% increase between 1999 and 2008, though, shows 
development (Eurostat, 2010d).  
       During the last decade there has been a significant decrease in employment in the 
agricultural sector. In 2002, employment in the agricultural sector was 10.4%, still 
much higher than the national average (5%) and this showed that Basilicata was still 
highly dependent on agriculture. At the same year, the employment rate in the industry 
sector was 33.5%, higher than the national average (31.8%). One third of this 
percentage was employed in the building sector (national average 16.6%). In the same 
year, the employment rate in the service sector was 56.5%, lower than the national 
average (63.2%) and the sector included 104,000 jobs (Europa, 2004d).          
                                                 
194 To the labour market. 
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       The unemployment rate in 2008 was 11.1%, (17.1% in 1999), higher than both the 
national (6.7%) and the EU average (7%). However unemployment dropped by 6 
percentage points between 1999 and 2008, which is a sign of development (Eurostat, 
2010i). In 2008, the regional GDP per capita of Basilicata represented 75% of the EU 
27 average (81.9% in 1996) (Eurostat, 2010g).  
       In 2000, Basilicata’s contribution to Italy’s GVA was below 1%. In the same year, 
the share of GVA generated by agriculture195 was indeed the highest in the country 
(6.8%) and this shows again the importance of this sector for the regional economy. In 
2000, the share of GVA generated by industry was 27.1% (Europa, 2004c).  
      The manufacturing sector contributes to the secondary sector GVA with 
approximately 64% of the total, whereas the building sector contributes 24%. The main 
activities of the service sector (GVA) include business activities, distributive trade, 
education and public administration. In recent years, new sectors, such as manufacture, 
transport equipment, furnishing and oil extraction have been developed. Basilicata has 
many natural attractions, but tourism is underdeveloped mainly due to poor transport 
facilities (Europa, 2004c). 
       In Basilicata, agricultural processing196 has created more jobs than the industrial or 
service sectors. The local manufacturing system includes large companies with a core of 
SMEs, mainly focused on agro-food, furniture and automotive (Inforegio Europa, 2009c; 
Inforegio Europa, 2009k).             
       During 2005, the economy of Basilicata was characterised by a slow growth of 
domestic demand, mainly because of a decrease in its households’ consumption 
capacity. There was an increase in agricultural output and a slight increase in 
                                                 
195 Sowables and particularly wheat represent 46% of the total land. Potatoes, maize, olives and wines are 
the most important agricultural products of the region. 
196 Fruit, vegetables and zoo-technical products. 
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manufacturing input. Exports of cars and furniture, which are the main industries of 
Basilicata abroad, were reduced. The construction sector, and more specifically the 
branch in charge of public works suffered difficulties. The services sector performance 
could be characterised as positive, retail sales were decreased, but tourism was 
increased. Employment fell, mainly because of a decrease in self-employed workers and 
the unemployment rate decreased, even though it remained above the national average 
(Bank of Italy/Basilicata 2005, 2010).  
       In 2006, regional economic activity increased compared to 2005 due to the 
domestic demand recovery in terms of consumer expenditure and investments in 
building. The region’s exports also increased after three years as a result of an upturn in 
the transport equipment industry. Industrial input was similar to that of 2005, but the 
construction industry was characterised by significant performance in the property 
market and the recovery of public works. Retail sales increased, but tourism fell. 
Agriculture value added also dropped and there was a 2.3 percentage points incease in 
employment due to the service sector and building industry. Unemployment contracted 
due to migration to the Central and Northern areas (Bank of Italy/Basilicata 2006, 2010).               
       The Commission co-financed the 2000-2006 ROP for Basilicata through the ERDF 
(mainly), the ESF and the EAGGF (Inforegio Europa, 2009c). 
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Table 5.7 
ROP for Basilicata (2000/06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Basilicata 
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID 
(EC AND 
OTHERS) (in 
euros) 
Natural resources 297,028,000 148,514,000 297,028,000 
Cultural resources 68,170,000 34,085,000 68,170,000 
Human resources 481,490,000 240,745,000 481,490,000 
Local development 
systems 560,850,000 280,425,000 560,850,000 
Cities 86,368,000 43,184,000 86,368,000 
Networks and service 
hubs 186,518,000 93,259,000 186,518,000 
Technical Assistance 15,646,000 7,823,000 15,646,000 
Total 1,696,070,000 
848,035,000 [ERDF 
contribution 433,885,000 
(51.16%), ESF contribution 
220,900,000 (26.05%) and 
EAGGF contribution 
193,250,000 (22.79%)] 
1,696,070,000 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009c. 
       The highest total cost (560,850,000 euros) can be observed in the context of local 
development systems (promotion in specific areas and districts to new companies and 
enterprises, and support for the demand for qualified services). The second highest 
(481,490,000 euros) can be seen in terms of human resources (Inforegio Europa, 2009c). 
       On 7/12/07, the Commission adopted the operational programme for Community 
assistance (2007-2013) (ERDF) as a transitional support for the Convergence Objective 
for Basilicata, with a total cost of 752.18 million euros (EU contribution 300.87 million 
euros) (Inforegio Europa, 2009k). 
Table 5.8 
Community assistance from the ERDF under the Convergence Objective/OP Basilicata (2007/13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
Accessibility 46,400,000 69,600,000 116,000,000 
Knowledge society 35,200,000 52,800,000 88,000,000 
Competitiveness of 
production 31,800,000 47,700,000 79,500,000 
Exploitation of cultural and 
natural assets 32,800,000 49,200,000 82,000,000 
Urban systems 29,800,000 44,700,000 74,500,000 
Social inclusion 39,200,000 58,800,000 98,000,000 
Energy and sustainable 
development 74,400,000 111,600,000 186,000,000 
Governance and technical 
assistance 11,274,549 16,911,824 28,186,373 
Total 300,874,549 451,311,824 752,186,373 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009k. 
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       Around 57% of the funding for this Programme will be in line with the objectives of 
the Lisbon Strategy. The programme aims to improve research, technology transfer197, 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Special attention will be given to manufacturing and 
agri-foods. Relations between SMEs and the banking system are expected to be 
improved and tourism should be supported. The estimated impact of the Programme is 
the creation of 8,000 jobs, an increase in expenditure by public and private enterprises 
in the R&D sector (from 0.20% to 0.35% of the Local Industrial Product) and an 
increase in the number of patents registered with the European Patent Office (from 9.3 
to 38 per million inhabitants). The exact number of enterprises with broadband access is 
expected to increase from 50 to 85 and the proportion of electricity consumption from 
renewable energy sources to increase from 15.9% to 18% (Inforegio Europa, 2009k). In 
Basilicata, one of the main agents for economic development is the establishment of a 
central coordination body in charge of optimising collaboration between different 
departments and clarifying certain individual roles. This creation is part of the regional 
administration policy and facilitated the implementation of the EU SFs guidelines 
(Milio, 2007).  
 
-Institutional capacity 
       The regional administration of Basilicata is divided into seven main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Presidency, b) Health and Security, c) Infrastructure and 
Public Works, d) Training and Employment, e) Productive Activity, f) Environment and 
g) Agriculture and Rural Development (Regione Basilicata, 2011a). The department of 
Presidency is mainly responsible for the coordination and management of the EU 
policies (Regione Basilicata, 2011b). Also, the department of Training and Employment 
                                                 
197 Particularly between university public research centres and enterprises. 
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is in charge of the cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean area (Regione 
Basilicata, 2011c). 
       The spending capacity of Basilicata (in percentage of SFs expenditure) was 92% 
during the first CSF Cycle, 100% during the second CSF Cycle, but only 64% during 
the third CSF Cycle (until December 2006) (Milio, 2010). Basilicata had the highest 
spending capacity amongst all the Italian Objective 1 Regions during the first two CSF 
Cycles (matched only by Abruzzo during the second Cycle), but its low spending 
capacity during the third CSF Cycle, compared to the previous two CSF Cycles, shows 
that there were regional institutional capacity problems regarding the CSF 
implementation (Milio, 2010).  
       The fact that between 1994 and 1999 the expenditure rate was 100% is evidence of 
Basilicata’s indeed had a satisfactory institutional capacity building. Institutional 
capacity is closely linked with spending (or absorption) capacity due to the fact that the 
latter is an instrument for measuring the degree of implementation of the CSF by the 
regions. So we can argue that a high spending capacity, expressed in a high percentage 
of SF expenditure, is an indicator of satisfactory regional institutional capacity. 
       The regional administration of Basilicata has established significant competencies 
in the areas of professional and vocational training, education, life-long training, labour 
policies, cultural activities and services and the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The 
regional administration of Basilicata is a partner of the National Employment Services 
and has created Regional Employment Centres within the region. It has also 
successfully implemented numerous ESF projects towards the updating and 
improvement of employment services. The Employment Information Network (Basil-
Basilicata Lavoro) of the Regional Employment Centres contributes to research 
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activities in terms of education in the area of linguistics. The effective implementation 
of regional policies in the context of linguistic training is important, due to the fact that 
linguistics can be linked with important labour fields for the regional economy of 
Basilicata, such as tourism (Lilama Network, 2011).       
       During the third CSF Cycle, it can be said that in terms of sustainable development, 
the institutional and programming objectives, particularly concerning water, refuse and 
protected areas, have in general been followed. The human capital evaluation policies 
can be regarded as very successful, but the active labour policies have not generated 
new occupational opportunities (interview with Lavieri, 2009).           
       The national policies for the Mezzogiorno before the reform of the SFs can be 
categorised into two main sub-periods. The first was the period before the institution of 
the regional administrations. It essentially concentrated on investments in public 
infrastructures, planned and implemented by an ad-hoc body, CASMEZ, which was 
supposed to be in charge not only of the strategic planning functions and the additional 
resources, but also of the adequate technical and practical competence. The second 
period was the one that began after the institution of the regional administrations. 
Problems and difficulties soon appeared mainly due to two reasons; a) there were 
several difficulties concerning industrial and infrastructure policies and b) there was a 
fundamental problem in terms of cooperation and coordination amongst regional 
administrations and CASMEZ. The beginning of the multifunded ROPs temporarily 
coincided with the “Phasing-Out” of the ad-hoc intervention in the Mezzogiorno 
undertaken by CASMEZ (interview with Lavieri, 2009). 
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       The financial dimension of the mobility of resources, the plurality of the productive 
and economic sectors where intervention took place, the long 198  nature and 
implementation of the programme, and the need to introduce innovations in 
management and operations and a dedicated administrative system, are all factors, 
which during the years have contributed to increase the significance and incidence of 
the programmes which were co-financed by EU resources in the context of regional 
development policies. Within the SFs, Basilicata has carried out significant a) sectorial 
programmes199, b) sectorial integrated projects200 and c) territorial integrated projects201. 
The SFs have acted as a significant assistance in various intervention cases, such as 
information society, research and innovation and local development (interview with 
Lavieri, 2009). 
       During recent years and due to the negative economic situation, Basilicata, just like 
the other Mezzogiorno regions, is reviewing its migration trends towards the more 
advanced regions. The innovative characteristic of this migratory tendency, in 
comparison with that of the 1950s and the 1960s is that the labour force migrating from 
Basilicata is young and qualified (interview with Lavieri, 2009)202.    
       In order to contest this process of decreasing regional human capital, the regional 
administration of Basilicata, during recent years has established an ambitious project, 
which includes a variety of actions, such as training, occupational and experience 
opportunities. The aim of this project is to keep the new generations in the region. The 
                                                 
198 In a time context. 
199 Programmes covering the areas of productive competitiveness, water integration cycle, urban refuse 
elimination, rural development, forestation, occupation training, research and building of schools. 
200  In the areas of internationalisation and information society. 
201 Local development and urban systems. 
202 This outflow is causing a loss of precious human capital, both of a professional nature (better work and 
training prospects) and concerning life style. It is not surprising that young people who are registered in 
Universities in more attractive cities wish to stay in environments that offer more job prospects.    
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efficiency of the administrative organisations is in direct relation to the implementation 
policies. A good example is the SFs. There have been several complications in terms of 
passing from multi to mono-funding, and it has also been difficult to simplify the 
management of the community programmes, since this would lead to an increase in 
negative externalities, such as administrative, organisational, procedural and realisation 
costs. An efficient ad-hoc monitoring and controlling system and satisfactory 
management of both internal and external governance are necessary in order for 
programmes co-financed by EU resources to take place without problems (interview 
with Lavieri, 2009).    
       The monitoring procedure is an important instrument of policy evaluation. The 
necessary condition for it to work is the establishment and diffusion of an evaluation 
culture, which has to take into account not only the traditional issues of monitoring203, 
but also issues related to strategic and programming monitoring, such as the monitoring 
of objectives. The evaluation process should function in a repetitive and periodical 
manner in order to guide the programme efficiently towards achieving the programmed 
results (interview with Lavieri, 2009).  
       Monitoring activity204 is in close relation with the evaluation activity. Both ex-
ante/itinere and ex-post evaluation is very important in the surveillance system of a 
programme. In the final course of the ROP 2000-2006, there was confusion in the 
monitoring process, due to insufficient evaluation procedures. This confusion led to the 
establishment of a complex grading system for the originally formulated programme 
and resulted in the elimination of many intervention measures, the introduction of other 
                                                 
203 Such as financial, physical and procedural monitoring. 
204 Both ordinary and strategic. 
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measures and the alteration and re-establishment of others (interview with Lavieri, 
2009). 
       All that was required for years was action to reinforce the administrative capacity of 
the public sector. This strategy should be concentrated on the following objectives; a) 
inclusion of the institutional capacity of regional entities in activities concerning the 
programming and strategies of the unified regional policy within the EU, national and 
regional components, b) reinforcement of the administrative capacity of the regional 
entities in management and implementation of the policies benefited by the SFs, 
including increasing the professional competences of the personnel involved, c) increase 
of the institutional and administrative capacity of the territorial and functional 
autonomies, including extension to details of the technical and professional 
competences205, d) activation of evolutional forms of public-public and public-private 
partnership, by promoting and accompanying the partnership management of projects 
and interventions, and e) evaluation of the bringing of private operators into the design 
and realisation of a unified regional policy206 (interview with Lavieri, 2009).  
       In Basilicata, administrative capacity has become a strategic resource by which a 
great deal of the activation and realisation of the EU programme is based. For that 
reason, the more recent OPs have included interventions of technical assistance for the 
administration systems (interview with Lavieri, 2009).  
       We have to be cautious and critical when assessing the opinions of Lavieri 
regarding both the economic situation and the future prospects of Basilicata. It is 
acceptable that several attempts for regional economic development have indeed taken 
                                                 
205 In the context of EU resources management. 
206 This application is based on the principle of horizontal subsidiarity through processes of responsibility 
taking by the private operators and the promotion of innovative forms of auto-organisation of 
consumers/receivers. 
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place and Basilicata has exited the Convergence Objective, but we should not forget that 
this exclusion was a statistic effect result. Basilicata exited the Convergence Objective 
as a “Phasing-Out” Region, meaning this happened because of the EU Enlargement and 
not necessarily due to its significant regional economic development. We have to admit 
that Lavieri is more descriptive than over-optimistic about the economic situation in 
Basilicata, and we have to acknowledge that in terms of spending capacity Basilicata is 
in a much better position compared to the other three Italian case studies of our thesis 
(Calabria, Puglia and Campania). 
      Between 1994 and 1999, Basilicata was the only region to spend its entire allocation 
and this success can also be attributed to the efficiency of the monitoring system which 
has offered important data that have enabled the regional administration to keep 
expenditure under control and correct any problems through intervention (Milio, 2007). 
The semi-peripheral region of Basilicata is familiar with the practice of evaluation and 
the regional administration of Basilicata bases many of its actions on the evaluation 
results (Milio, 2007). Administrative capacity in Basilicata is satisfactory, unlike in 
peripheral Calabria, Campania, or Puglia. 
     The conclusion is that Basilicata, despite exiting the Convergence Objective as a 
“Phasing-Out” Region, has the potential to become one of the most prosperous NUTS 2 
regions in the Mezzogiorno due to its efficient local manufacturing system, the 
satisfactory operation of the SMEs and its opening up to the outside world, alongside 
the effective practice of the ROPs.  
 
5.3.2-CALABRIA (Convergence Objective Region for the 2007-2013 Cycle) 
       Calabria can be regarded as a peripheral region. It has indeed received a significant 
amount of funds from both the EU (SFs) and the Italian government (interview with 
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D’Orio, 2009). In 2009, the population of Calabria was 2,009,330 people (ISTAT, 
2011). Between 2006 and 2007, Calabria was the poorest NUTS 2 region in Italy and it 
is worth mentioning that the income of an inhabitant of the richest region (Valley 
D’Aosta) was on average 2.6 times higher than that of an inhabitant of Calabria 
(interview with Pupo, 2010). 
 
-Regional economic statistics 
       In 2008, the activity rate of Calabria was 39.7%, the lowest in the Mezzogiorno 
(Eurostat, 2010b). The male activity rate (2002) was 58.6%, whilst the female one was 
32.3% (Europa, 2004f). The employment rate in 2008 was 34.9%, (31.7% in 1999), the 
lowest in Italy and much lower than both the national (45.9%) and the EU average 
(53.7%), however its 3.2% increase between 1999 and 2008 shows development 
(Eurostat, 2010d).  
       The female employment rate (2002) was approximately 12% lower than the 
national average (20.8% in Calabria, whilst the national average was 44.4%). In 2002, 
the share of employment in agriculture was 12.3%, twice the national average. This 
shows that Calabria is highly dependent on agriculture. Calabria is the region with the 
highest number of employees in agriculture in Italy, despite the fact that the share has 
dropped (by 5.3%), from 105,000 persons in 1993 to 71,000 persons in 2002. In 
Calabria there has been a shift from agriculture to the industrial and service sectors, but 
still the share of employees in agriculture is very high. In 2002, the industrial sector 
share was the lowest in Italy (19.9%). In the service sector, the share in 2002 was 67.7%, 
higher than the national average (63.2%) (Europa, 2004f). 
      In 2008, the unemployment rate of Calabria was 12.1%, (28% in 1999), higher than 
both the national (6.7%) and the EU 27 average (7%), but the 15.9% drop that occurred 
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between 1999 and 2008 shows development (Eurostat, 2010i). In 2002, youth 
unemployment (below 29 years) was the highest in Italy (48.4%). The same year, the 
male unemployment rate was 18.1%, higher than the national average (7%) and the 
female unemployment rate was 35.7%, again much higher than the national average 
(12.2%), and the highest in Italy. In 2002, approximately 61.8% of unemployed persons 
were in long-term unemployment207 and almost 50% of the young people currently 
searching for a job had only a secondary school education level. In 2002, fixed term 
employment in Calabria accounted for 522,000 persons, whereas part-time employment 
accounted 49,000 persons. The fixed term and part-time employment share in Calabria 
was similar to the national average (91.4% and 8.6% respectively in 2002) (Europa, 
2004f). 
      In 2007, Calabria’s regional GDP per capita represented 65.8% of the EU 27 
average (72.3% in 1996) (Eurostat, 2010g). In 2001, Calabria’s contribution to the GVA 
of Italy was approximately 2.2% of the national total. In 2001, the GVA share generated 
by agriculture208 was 5.8%, by industry 16.4% and by the service sector 77.8%. The 
main characteristic of Calabria is the high fragmentation of the farm structure. In 2000, 
holdings of less than two hectares amounted to 69% of the total. In 2001, the GVA 
contribution of the manufacturing209 sector reached approximately 7.2%. The building 
sector GVA contribution (2001) was approximately 6.3%. The service sector GVA 
contribution (2001) was 28.8%. Education and public administration are this sector’s 
main activities. In 2001, tourism210 contributed 3.3% to the GVA. Between 1995 and 
                                                 
207 More than 12 consecutive months. 
208 Olives and seed crops (wheat/citrus fruit) are Calabria’s most important agricultural products. 
209 The most important branches of the manufacturing sector are foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco. 
210 Tourism is a potential resource for development in Calabria, but Calabria’s economy is not heavily 
based on tourism. 
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2001, there was a 40.6% increase in the tourism sector GVA and the tourist structure 
has been developing (Europa, 2004e).        
       The regional administration of Calabria pursues a policy of encouraging Calabrian 
emigrants living abroad to either return and stay permanently in the region, or to make 
investments in the region. Business activities in Calabria are mostly small-scale industry 
or firms. Large firms are limited and industrial development is mainly stimulated by 
governmental intervention. The main economic strength of Calabria is in the agro-food 
industry potential, the development of IT activities, particularly during the last 10-12 
years, the creation of a container port in Gioia Tauro, and tourism 211  (IRE 
Network/Calabria, 2010). 
       Calabria’s economy is characterised by a high level of unemployment and a cultural 
heritage in need of improvement (Inforegio Europa, 2009d). Calabria is considered to 
have great economic and manufacturing development potential, but its high 
unemployment and its decrease in gross production, particularly between 2003 and 
2004, are the main obstacles to regional economic development and convergence. It can 
be argued that “as a whole, innovation remains scarce since the regional system is 
characterised by marginal and specialised enterprises, typical of a predominantly local 
market economy” (IRE Network/Calabria, 2010:1). 
       Between 2005 and 2007, the construction industry gave a significant boost to the 
economy of Calabria due to an increase in public works (Bank of Italy/Calabria 2007, 
2010) and more specifically the Salerno-Reggio Calabria motorway (Bank of 
Italy/Calabria 2005, 2010), but between 2008 and 2009, this sector suffered heavily 
from a decrease in public works. The manufacturing sector was characterised by an 
                                                 
211 800 kms of coastline and beaches. 
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output decrease in 2005, there was an increase in 2006, but between 2007 and 2009 
there was again a decrease. Utilisation of plant capacity was significantly reduced and 
there was also a decrease in investment. As far as the labour force is concerned, in 2005 
there was a reduction due to a decrease of the number of job-seekers and persons in 
work (Bank of Italy/Calabria 2005, 2010). In 2006, the labour force increased (Bank of 
Italy/Calabria 2006, 2010) and in 2008 there was an increase in the number of job-
seekers with previous work experience and a decrease in first-job seekers (Bank of 
Italy/Calabria 2008, 2010).  
       In 2008, the decrease in the number of workers was focused on payroll employment 
(Bank of Italy/Calabria 2008, 2010) and in 2009, there was a decrease in the number of 
job-seekers, accompanied though with an increase in the rate of exit from the labour 
market. We must emphasise that there is a significantly negative gap between Calabria 
and the Italian average in terms of labour market participation for people aged from 25 
to 34 and women and also that Calabria is the region with the highest proportion of 
undeclared work in Italy (Bank of Italy/Calabria 2009, 2010).        
       The Commission part-financed the ROP/Objective 1 Programme for Calabria for 
2000-2006 through the ERDF (mainly), the ESF, the EAGGF and the FIFG (Inforegio 
Europa, 2009d). 
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Table 5.9 
ROP for Calabria (2000-06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Calabria 
PRIORITY AREAS TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID (EC AND 
OTHERS) (in euros) 
Natural resources 1,081,230,000 540,615,000 1,081,230,000 
Cultural resources 128,290,000 64,145,000 128,290,000 
Human resources 671,318,000 457,054,000 671,318,000 
Local development systems 1,405,372,002 694,135,000 1,388,269,000 
Towns and cities 314,052,000 157,026,000 314,052,000 
Service networks and hubs 396,252,000 198,126,000 396,252,000 
Technical Assistance 39,884,000 19,942,000 39,884,000 
Total 4,036,398,002 
2,131,043,000 [ERDF 
contribution 1,258,742,000 
(59.07%), ESF contribution 
424,883,000 (19.94%), 
EAGGF contribution 
426,458,000 (20.01%) and 
FIFG contribution 
20,960,000 (0.98%)] 
4,019,295,000 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009d. 
   
       The highest total cost (1,405,372,002 euros) can be observed in the context of local 
development systems (promoting industrial districts, export systems, new businesses 
and tourism), whereas the second highest (1,081,230,000 euros) can be seen in terms of 
natural resources with an emphasis on renewable energy sources and distribution 
networks (Inforegio Europa, 2009d). On 7/12/07 the Commission approved the Calabria 
ROP (2007-2013), under the Convergence Objective, with a total budget of 
approximately 3 billion euros. The aid provided by the EU (ERDF) amounts to some 
1.5 billion euros212. This figure represents 5.2% of the EU’s total investment in Italy for 
the 2007-2013 period (Inforegio Europa, 2009l). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212 Half of the entire Programme.  
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Table 5.10 
Programme under the Convergence Objective co-funded by the ERDF/OP Calabria (2007-13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
R&D, innovation and 
information society (10% of 
total funding) 
149,912,003 149,912,003 299,824,006 
Energy (7% of total funding) 104,938,402 104,938,402 209,876,804 
Environment (12% of total 
funding) 179,894,403 179,894,403 359,788,806 
Quality of life and social 
inclusion (9% of total 
funding) 
134,920,802 134,920,802 269,841,604 
Natural and cultural 
resources and sustainable 
tourism (12% of total 
funding) 
179,894,404 179,894,404 359,788,808 
Networks for mobility (16% 
of total funding) 239,859,204 239,859,204 479,718,408 
Productive systems (14% of 
total funding) 209,876,804 209,876,804 419,753,608 
Cities, urban areas and 
territorial systems (17% of 
total funding) 
254,850,404 254,850,404 509,700,808 
Technical assistance  and 
interregional cooperation 
(3% of total funding) 
44,973,600 44,973,600 89,947,200 
Total 1,499,120,026 1,499,120,026 2,998,240,052 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009l. 
       More than 58% of the Programme funding is destined to be used for investments 
concerning sustainable growth and jobs according to the Lisbon and Gothenburg 
Agendas213 . The expected impact of the Programme is an additional regional GDP 
annual increase of 1.6% till 2015, as well as an additional annual increase of 0.3% in 
employment growth. By 2015, 43,500 new jobs are supposed to be created and female 
employment rates are expected to increase to 40.2% (35% in 2005). 16,500 jobs for 
women are expected to be created (Inforegio Europa, 2009l). 
        
-Institutional capacity  
       The regional administration of Calabria is divided into 13 main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Presidency, b) National and EU Programming (mainly 
responsible for the management of EU policies), c) Budget, d) Productive Activity, e) 
Agriculture and Forests, f) Organisation and Personnel, g) Urban Development and 
                                                 
213 R&D and innovation projects, information society, renewable, education and entrepreneurship. 
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Territorial Governance, h) Infrastructure, Public Works and Water, i) Employment, 
Policies for Families, Professional Education and Cooperation, j) Culture, Education, 
Universities, Research and Information Technology, k) Tourism, Cultural Heritage, 
Policies for Young People and Sports, l) Health and m) Environment (Regione Calabria, 
2011). 
       The spending capacity of Calabria (in percentage of SF expenditure) was 80% 
during the first CSF Cycle, 84% during the second CSF Cycle and 64% during the third 
CSF Cycle (until December 2006) (Milio, 2010). Calabria’s spending capacity during 
the third CSF Cycle was much lower compared to that of the previous CSF Cycles and 
this reveals institutional capacity problems regarding the CSF framework 
implementation (Milio, 2010). Calabria had the fourth lowest spending capacity 
amongst all the Italian Objective 1 Regions during the first two CSF Cycles and the 
second highest (alongside Basilicata) compared to the other Objective 1 Regions during 
the third CSF Cycle.    
       Calabria has participated in three innovation projects; the Regional Innovation 
Strategy (RIS), the RIS+ and the SCONE (IRE Network/Calabria, 2010). According to 
the RIS report, other problems that hamper regional economic development and 
increase divergence within the region include: a) lack of efficient cooperation between 
firms, b) lack of entrepreneurial spirit, c) low export performance, which is linked to a 
lack of ambition or culture of growth and d) poor links between SMEs and the R&D 
and the higher education system of the region. There is also a need for improvement in 
terms of regional infrastructure, whilst another discouraging fact is the illiteracy rate of 
the population, which is as high as 25% (IRE Network/Calabria, 2010). 
 188
       The main targets of the RIS Calabria were three; a) to enable the most 
disadvantaged sectors to organise and conduct collaborative behaviour, b) to identify the 
innovation potential in the universities and R&D centres of Calabria that could lead to 
new technology based business and c) to create a culture of risk and innovation within 
the region. The Steering Committee gave priority to the agro-food and tourism sectors. 
In the agro-food sector, two main working groups were established214. The first deals 
with sector development in Piana di Sibari, which is the largest regional agro-food area 
and covers 15 small companies, cooperatives and their consortia. The second deals with 
marketing and internationalisation and includes the leading companies in the regional 
agro-food sector, which have already created a consortium for the joint promotion of 
their products. In both cases, the main planning tool is a Goal Oriented Project Planning 
(GOPP) procedure, specifically designed for the problems and needs of the region (RIS 
Calabria, 2010). 
       During the last ten years, many attempts at bottom-up regional development have 
taken place in Calabria. The Local Action Groups were promoted all over Calabria, the 
LEADER programme for rural areas was put into practice, new national and European 
programmes for employment and local development, such as PIC Adapt, PIC 
Occupazione, Patti Territoriali, Contratti D’Area were introduced, and local actors, 
such as SMEs and local administrations and governments supported and organised these 
attempts (RIS Calabria, 2010).       
       The Calabrian university system includes the University of Calabria in Rende, the 
University of Reggio Calabria and the Faculty of Medicine in Catanzaro. Furthermore, 
the Science and Technology Park of Calabria215 hosts approximately 60 organisations. 
                                                 
214 Joint work with an Adapt project. 
215 Calpark SpA. 
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Several research centres exist, mainly promoted by the National Research Council and 
the universities, the scientific Informatics-Telematics pool, the Network of Chambers of 
Commerce, the BIC Calabria and the InnovaReggio consortium (IRE Network/Calabria, 
2010).  
      Calabria is a region where the bottom-up approach was not effectively put into 
practice, or at least not as effectively as in the cases of Basilicata, Sardegna, Abruzzo 
and Molise. Several bottom-up actions took place, such as the Local Action Groups, the 
LEADER Programme, the ITENET Observatory and the Regional Innovation Strategy. 
The aim of these policies was to trigger economic development from within the region, 
rather than imposed from the outside. A certain degree of regional economic 
development took place, but much less than expected.  
      The inefficient cooperation between regional and national authorities was evident. 
Bottom-up policies in general are highly unlikely to lead to regional economic 
development unless there is a) adequate infrastructure in the region, b) an identification 
of the exact problems, c) effective training regimes and d) an amount of skilled workers 
motivated to remain in the region. In Calabria, skilled workers are steadily migrating 
out towards Northern regions and the infrastructure and training regimes are still 
insufficient. Therefore, the bottom-up policies have not yet had the expected results. 
The development of a vertical and horizontal differentiated distribution of powers and 
responsibilities is still problematic and there are also many implementation problems, 
which do not seem likely to be resolved soon.  
      The conclusion is that Calabria is one of the worst performing Convergence Regions 
in terms of regional economic development. Its very high unemployment, its decrease in 
gross production and the reluctance of the regional economic players to pursue a 
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sufficient network development strategy, leaving aside all forms of entrepreneurial 
individualism, make regional economic development very difficult. Furthermore the 
infrastructure problems alongside the inability of the region to enter foreign markets and 
to attract investment create more difficulties. The agro-food sector, if managed correctly, 
has great potential for regional economic development.  
 
  5.3.3-PUGLIA (Convergence Objective Region for the 2007-2013 Cycle) 
       Puglia can be regarded as a peripheral region. In 2009, the population of Puglia was 
4,084,035 people (ISTAT, 2011). Its synthetic indicator of regional development was 
2.16 in 1994, which is 30% higher than Mezzogiorno (1.67) and 50% lower than 
Central-Northern Italy. The economy of Puglia is mainly based on cost/price-related, 
and not on innovation-related, competitiveness. In Puglia, the percentage of innovative 
companies is 18.5%, lower than both that of the Mezzogiorno (21.7%) and that of 
Central-Northern Italy (33.8%) (RIS Puglia, 2009). 
      R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Puglia is 0.46%, lower than both that 
of the Mezzogiorno (0.87%) and that of Central-Northern Italy (1.1%). SMEs in Puglia 
are more interested in fixed investment in technology (84%) than in R&D design and 
marketing (16%). In the Mezzogiorno, the percentage of fixed investment in technology 
reaches 77%, whereas that of R&D design and marketing is 23%. In Central-Northern 
Italy, the percentage of fixed investment in technology is 42%, whilst that of R&D 
design and marketing is 58% (RIS Puglia, 2009). In Puglia a number of sectors, such as 
basic engineering, construction, steel, chemicals and textiles, are experiencing problems. 
The provinces mainly affected by industrial decline are Taranto, Brindisi and Foggia. 
Bari and Lecce suffer less, although this decline has had a certain negative impact on 
them as well. 
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       In Puglia, there is a need for improvement in the procedures around programming 
and evaluation. Also, one of the main problems of Puglia has been the continuous 
emigration of the qualified labour force from the region. The internal departments in the 
regional administration of Puglia have decreased. Also, the systematic monitoring of 
data is fundamental. Until recently, there was an evaluation report within Puglia in the 
regional network of the public administrations216. This specific report gave a revision 
and examination of the policies of television services in the following programming 
cycle. It is still too early to conclude whether Puglia will be in position to exit the 
Convergence Objective by 2013 (interview with Moro, 2009).  
       We have to be cautious when assessing the opinions of Moro regarding both the 
economic situation and the future prospects of Puglia. It is acceptable that several 
attempts for regional economic development have indeed taken place, but Puglia, 
despite receiving SFs for more than 20 years is still included in the Convergence 
Objective and it is still unclear whether or not it will be excluded in 2013. The current 
economic situation in Puglia is not particularly encouraging and we must admit that 
Moro is not over-optimistic. Certainly, since the beginning of the CSF Cycles, Puglia 
has been less dependent in agriculture and more industrialised, but only its exit from the 
Convergence Objective in 2013 will prove that regional economic development has 
indeed taken place.  
  
-Regional economic statistics   
       In 2008, the activity rate of Puglia was 42.2%, much lower than the national 
average (49.3%) (Eurostat, 2010b). In 2001, the male activity rate was 60.1%, whereas 
the female rate was 27%, the lowest in Italy. The young people’s activity rate (under the 
                                                 
216 RUPAR. 
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age of 25) was 32.6% (national average 36.3%), whilst in 1990, it was 49.6% (Europa, 
2004l). In 2008, the employment rate was 37.3%, (35.3% in 1999), lower than the 
national (45.9%) and the EU-27 average (53.7%), but the 2% increase between 1999-
2008 shows development (Eurostat, 2010d). The unemployment rate in 2008 was 11.6%, 
(19% in 1999), higher than both the national (6.7%) and the EU 27 average (7%), but 
the 7.4% drop between 1999 and 2008 shows development (Eurostat, 2010i). There has 
also been a significant decrease in agricultural employment and a growth in the 
industrial sector. In 2001, the agricultural sector share was 11.7%, higher than the 
national average (5.2%), but in 1995, it had reached 24.7%. Despite this drop, Puglia 
still remains highly dependent on agriculture (Europa, 2004l). 
      In 2001, the industrial sector employment share was 26.1%, lower than the national 
average (31.8%). The employment level in industry in 1990 was the same as in 1951, 
but in 1951 employment was characteristically in traditional small-scale craft industries, 
whereas in 1990, it was in high-tech engineering and electronics. In the service sector, 
the employment share in 2001 was 62.2%, similar to the national average. Also, in 2001, 
54% of unemployed people were searching for their first job (Europa, 2004l). 
       Between 2003 and 2005, industry had declined considerably, but in 2006, a 
significant output growth was observed in all industrial sectors with the exception of 
construction, due to a) higher domestic demand for intermediate and capital goods and b) 
a rise in sales of traditional Italian products. A great number of firms tried to innovate 
the range of their products in order to respond to competition and gain market power, 
whilst a limited number of firms located production abroad. However at the end of 2006 
this positive trend in demand and industrial production was terminated. The profitability 
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of the regional industrial firms has been decreasing during the last decade and in general, 
industry in Puglia suffers structural problems (Bank of Italy/Puglia 2006, 2010).  
       In 2008, “industrial activity fell by 4 per cent in real terms after stagnating in 
2007” (Bank of Italy/Puglia 2008, 2010:1). There was practically no expansion in 
investment and a drop in both the fashion and the auto-industry supply sectors (Bank of 
Italy/Puglia 2008, 2010). In early 2009, there was a further production decline, firms 
started to cut costs, particularly for staff, decreased profit margins and put off planned 
investments (Bank of Italy/Puglia 2008, 2010). In 2009, industrial investment fell by 
more than one third, as there was a decrease in demand and firms had significant 
problems regarding self-financing (Bank of Italy/Puglia 2009, 2010).  
       Disposable income is much higher than earned income because of the high level of 
income transfers that account for 10% of earned income. Also, household consumption 
accounts for a greater share of disposable income than investment. The expenditure of 
disposable income in Puglia can be characterised by a greater share of household 
consumption and a share of investment compared to the majority of the Italian regions 
(Europa, 2004l). 
      In 2007, the regional GDP per capita of Puglia represented 66.8% of the EU 27 
average (78.3% in 1996) (Eurostat, 2010g). In 2000, Puglia’s contribution to Italy’s 
GVA was 4.6%. Within the last 20 years, besides highly capital-intensive large scale 
plants, like ILVA (steel-making) in Taranto and Enichem (petrochemicals) in Brindisi 
and Manfredonia, many small and medium-sized firms have also been developed in the 
region. Almost all these firms are being financed by local capital and provide 
approximately 70% of the jobs within the region. Such industrial development has led 
to the development of highly specialised areas, of both domestic and international 
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significance. The most important areas are a) food processing and vehicles in Foggia, b) 
footwear, textiles, wood and furniture in Barletta, c) wood and furniture in Murge, d) 
engineering, rubber, wood, furniture and computer software in Bari, e) textiles and 
clothing in Monopoli-Putignano and f) footwear and textiles in Casarano (Europa, 
2004k). 
       Several important research and development centres have been created, the most 
important of which are the Tecnopolis-CSATA and the new software development 
centres near Bari, as well as the “Citadella Della Ricerca” in Brindisi (Europa, 2004k). 
The university system of Puglia includes the University of Bari, the University of Lecce 
and the Polytechnic of Bari (IRE Network/Puglia, 2009).        
       The economy of Puglia is mainly based on agriculture and services. Industry has 
played an important role in income generation, but services have increased growth in 
jobs. In 2000, the GVA share generated by the agricultural and service sectors was 
above the national average, whilst the industrial sector share was below average. Labour 
productivity is generally lower in agriculture and higher in the service sector (Europa, 
2004k). Productivity in the manufacturing sector is 20% below the national average and 
at the service sectors 13% below the national average. Furthermore, the manufacturing 
sector is characterised by small firms’ size, as approximately 95% of the firms within 
the region have fewer than 20 employees (IRE Network/Puglia, 2009). 
       The positive features of the productive system of Puglia are a) the relatively high 
productivity of the agriculture sector, b) the relatively high productivity of sectors such 
as agro-food, sofas, chemicals and non-metallic minerals, c) the important role of the 
private sector, as approximately 97% of firms are privately owned and d) tourism. The 
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negative economic features are the weak business services, and a lack of development in 
terms of intermediate industries and exporting firms (IRE Network/Puglia, 2009). 
       The Commission part-financed the ROP/Objective 1 Programme for the 2000-2006 
period, co-financed by the ERDF (mainly), the ESF, the EAGGF and the FIFG 
(Inforegio Europa, 2009b). 
Table 5.11 
ROP for Puglia (2000/06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Puglia   
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID (EC AND 
OTHERS) (in euros) 
Natural resources 1,239,697,000 672,500,000 1,239,697,000 
Cultural resources 254,327,000 138,350,000 254,327,000 
Human resources 799,385,000 511,950,000 799,385,000 
Local development systems 2,060,322,000 1,146,891,000 2,037,680,000 
Towns and cities 366,784,000 188,238,000 366,784,000 
Service networks and hubs 538,046,000 277,100,000 538,046,000 
Technical Assistance 22,976,000 11,488,000 22,976,000 
Total 5,281,537,000 
2,946,517,000 [ERDF 
contribution 1,721,827,000 
(58.44%), ESF contribution 
604,090,000 (20.50%), 
EAGGF contribution 
587,600,000 (19.94%) and 
FIFG contribution 
33,000,000 (1.12%)] 
5,258,895,000 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009b. 
       The highest total cost (2,060,322,000 euros) can be observed in the context of local 
development systems (promoting industrial districts, export systems, new businesses 
and tourism), whilst the second highest (1,239,697,000 euros) can be seen in terms of 
energy management and renewable sources (Inforegio Europa, 2009b). On 20/11/07, the 
Commission approved an OP for Puglia (for the 2007-13 Cycle), under the 
Convergence Objective framework, with a total budget of around 5.2 billion euros. EU 
assistance (ERDF) amounted to approximately 2.6 billion euros (Inforegio Europa, 
2009p). 
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Table 5.12 
Programme under the Convergence Objective co-funded by the ERDF/OP Puglia (2007-13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in 
euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in 
euros) 
Promotion and 
dissemination of 
research and innovation 
for competitiveness 
290,500,000 290,500,000 581,000,000 
Sustainable and efficient 
use of environmental 
and energy resources for 
development 
454,000,000 454,000,000 908,000,000 
Social inclusion and 
services to enhance the 
quality of life and the 
attractiveness of the 
region 
285,000,000 285,000,000 570,000,000 
Promoting the potential 
of natural and cultural 
resources to improve the 
attractiveness and 
development of the 
region 
196,000,000 196,000,000 392,000,000 
Networks and mobility 
links 525,000,000 525,000,000 1,050,000,000 
Competitiveness of 
productive systems and 
employment 
551,000,000 551,000,000 1,102,000,000 
Competitiveness and 
attractiveness of cities 
and urban systems 
260,000,000 260,000,000 520,000,000 
Governance, 
institutional capacity 
and competitive and 
efficient markets 
57,521,978 57,521,978 115,043,956 
Total 2,619,021,978 2,619,021,978 5,238,043,956 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009p. 
       The OP’s main targets are sustainable development, equal opportunities, 
development of the knowledge economy, promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship 
and an increase in renewable energy production. The expected impact of the Programme 
is a growth rate between 2.4% and 3.1%, a growth rate in employment between 48.6% 
and 50% and a decrease of greenhouse gases of approximately 6.5%, due to new and 
improved public transport and the use of renewable energy (Inforegio Europa, 2009p). 
 
-Institutional capacity 
       The regional administration of Puglia is divided into 15 main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Presidency, Legislative Policies, Strategic Control, 
Management Control of Internal Affairs, Internal Auditing, International Politics, b) 
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Economic Development, Research and Competitiveness, Economic Activity, Industry, 
Energy, Infrastructure for Development and Cooperation, c) Public Works and Civil 
Protection, Natural Resources and Water, d) Territorial Quality, Protected Areas, 
Cultural Goods, Urban Areas, Libraries and Museums, e) Human Resources, 
Administrative Simplification, Organisation and Personnel, Sports, f) South and 
Federalism, Policies for the Mezzogiorno, Cooperation with the EU, Inter-institutional 
Conferences’ Systems, Local Entities, General Affairs, g) Health, Programming for 
Territorial Assistance and Prevention, h) Policies for Young People and Innovation, 
Policies for Immigrants, Transparency and Institutional Communication, i) Welfare, 
Occupation, Policies of Social Well-Being, Equal Opportunities, Social Programming 
and Integration, Puglian People Across the World j) Mediterranean Issues, Culture, 
Tourism and International Relations, k) Strategic Infrastructure and Mobility, 
Transports and Communication, l) Environment, Ecology, Energy Policies, Refuse, 
Maritime Issues and Forests, m) Finance, Budget, Fiscal Issues and Federalism, SFs 
agenda 2007-13 (mainly responsible for the EU Cohesion Policy), FAS Funds, n) 
Education, Schools, Universities and Research, Professional Education and o) Agro-
Food Resources, Agriculture, Animal Hunting and Fishing (Regione Puglia, 2011). 
       The spending capacity of Puglia (in percentage of SFs expenditure) was 64% 
during the first CSF Cycle, 77% during the second CSF Cycle and 55% during the third 
CSF Cycle (until December 2006) (Milio, 2010). Puglia’s spending capacity during the 
third CSF Cycle was much lower compared to that of the previous CSF Cycles and this 
reveals institutional capacity problems regarding the CSF framework implementation. 
Puglia had the second lowest spending capacity amongst all the Italian Objective 1 
Regions during the first two CSF Cycles and the third lowest compared to the other 
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Objective 1 Regions until September 2003 (Milio, 2010). The institutional capacity of 
Puglia during the first two Cycles has been more efficient only compared to that of 
Sicilia and more efficient than those of both Campania and Sicilia during the third CSF 
Cycle (Milio, 2010).   
       One of the programmes aimed at helping regional economic development to take 
place in Puglia, was the Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS), which would be based on 
“the economic fabric represented by its sub-regional and sectoral specificities” (RIS 
Puglia, 2009:1217). At the same time, the technology-adoption-dominated innovation 
process should be focused on a) applied and industrial research, b) technology transfer 
and c) innovation services. The target of the RIS partnership was a) to improve the 
regional innovation infrastructure through better involvement of business in 
management 218 , through an increased focus on industrial districts, specialised local 
manufacturing systems and public support to local sectoral Technology Centres219, and 
through close monitoring; b) to support the demand/supply match of Innovation services 
and c) to support North-South and Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships. 
      The Regional Innovation Partnership (RIP) was created upon a) already existing 
partnerships in the regional innovation infrastructure, such as Tecnopolis-Finpuglia-
PASTIS Science Park-CISI220 Puglia and b) sub-regional Territorial Pacts for Brindisi, 
Lecce, Nord Barese Ofantino. The RIS Puglia INNOVA was the strategic plan, 
according to which new jobs would be created within the region. It would be based on 
the strategic partnership of the aforementioned actors. This plan was supposed to be 
                                                 
217 When downloaded, page 1 of the article corresponds to page 62. 
 
218 Private participation to Technology Centres, Science Parks, and Local Innovation Agencies. 
219 Managed by SMEs. 
220 Centre for Innovation and Enterprise Development. 
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complementary to the Territorial Pacts, as it was the only initiative ensuring a region-
wide coordination of local initiatives (RIS Puglia, 2009). 
      Puglia has participated in the previous article ten ERDF Innovative Actions, since a 
pre-pilot programme called REPORTING was implemented during 1995 and 1996. 
That project, just like the RIS initiative, was co-funded, organised and supervised by the 
regional authorities of Puglia and was managed by Tecnopolis and the IRIDE 
Innovation Relay Centre. According to that strategy, there would be a close cooperation 
and coordination between a) associations, b) local partnerships, such as Territorial Pacts 
and consortia and c) sectoral leaders. The RIS process included representatives of the 
Regional Government and local authorities who were chosen according to their role in 
their Steering Committee. Their target would be to promote local partnerships and 
indeed they succeeded. These attempts revealed a shift from a top-down to a more 
bottom-up approach. The regional and local governments and authorities have played a 
central role in all these attempts and initiatives (RIS Puglia, 2009). 
       According to the pre-pilot project REPORTING there was an attempt to encourage 
technology transfer to modernise industry in less developed areas. There was a 
methodology test in order for EU research results to be transferred to the SMEs. Seven 
local SMEs were chosen 221  with know-how concerning innovation in products and 
processes. The results were positive; eight jobs were directly created and 33 were 
induced at a cost of 12,200 ECU per new employee (RIS Puglia, 2009).   
      Puglia, just like Calabria, is a region where new bottom-up policies222 did not have 
the expected results, due again to poor infrastructure, interregional migration of skilled 
workers and inefficient training regimes. The main problems that hamper regional 
                                                 
221  In the fields of biotech diagnostics, software production, electro-mechanical equipment, railway 
diagnostics, publishing, knitwear and clothing. 
222 Such as RIS Puglia INNOVA, ITENET and REPORTING projects. 
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convergence are inefficient spending and problematic administrative capacity. The 
differences in the structure and functioning of local governance are many, despite 
several attempts to eliminate them, and this makes regional economic development 
difficult. Moreover, many parts of Puglia 223  had never before been involved in 
European policies and therefore had never developed cooperation with European 
institutions. Also some of these parts did not even exist as geographical, administrative 
and political entities. The development of a vertical and horizontal differentiated 
distribution of powers and responsibilities is still problematic and there are also many 
implementation problems, which do not seem likely to be resolved soon, although 
several bottom-up projects that have recently taken place can be characterised as quite 
region’s strategy towards both economic and cultural 
ternationalisation.  
                                                
successful. 
      The conclusion is that Puglia is still a long way from efficient regional economic 
development, but several attempts, in the form of regional plans and projects, are being 
made. Regional economic development in Puglia is mainly based on the sectors of 
textiles, clothing, footwear, building construction, food, agriculture, metal and 
mechanical work. Furthermore, the so far efficient implementation of innovative 
policies, alongside with the attempts at the internationalisation of local and regional 
production systems are important steps towards regional development. Several 
programmes for the education of the labour force are currently taking place, due to the 
fact that knowledge and research are key drivers of development. Lastly, the role of the 
Puglia’s emigrants abroad is fundamental in both the improvement of the regional 
economy and the 
in
 
223 Just like Calabria. 
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5.3.4-CAMPANIA (Convergence Objective Region for the 2007-2013 Cycle) 
       Campania can be regarded as a peripheral region. In 2009, the population of 
Campania was 5,824,662 people (ISTAT, 2011). One of the most important reasons for 
the lack of economic development in Campania is the crisis in heavy industry, which 
remained the same even after several new investments took place within the region. The 
building sector also faced a serious crisis after the end of the special reconstruction 
assistance. The public sector still has a disproportionate impact on the production 
structure of Campania. The tourism sector remains underdeveloped, despite the natural 
beauty of the region. The profitability of agriculture declined in the 1990s, despite the 
ajority of the Mezzogiorno areas and at a national level it had increased. 
 small size of farms224 (Inforegio Europa, 2009e).  
(23.7% in 1999), lower than both the national (6.7%) 
                                                
fact that in the m
Such decline had its roots in the
 
-Regional economic statistics           
       In 2008, the activity rate of Campania was 39.9%, one of the lowest in the 
Mezzogiorno (Eurostat, 2010b). In 2002, the male activity rate was similar to the 
national average (36.2%), whereas the female one (28.8%) was below it (Europa, 
2004h). In 2008, the employment rate was 34.9% (33.6% in 1999), the lowest in Italy 
and lower than both the national (45.9%) and the EU 27 average (53.7%), but the 1.3% 
increase between 1999 and 2008 shows development (Eurostat, 2010d). In 2008, the 
unemployment rate was 12.6% 
and the EU 27 (7%) average, but the 11.1% drop between 1999 and 2008 shows 
development (Eurostat, 2010i).  
 
224 50% less than one hectare and 90% less than five hectares. 
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       The female employment rate is extremely low. In 2002, it reached 24.1%, whereas 
the national average was 40.9%. In 2002, the employment share in the agricultural 
sector was 6.4% (national average 5.2%), in the industrial sector 24.4% (national 
average 31.8%) and in the service sector 69.2% (national average 63%). In 2002, part-
time and temporary jobs accounted for 13.2% of total jobs 225 . In 2002, female 
unemployment was extremely high (30.6%) (national average 12.9%). Also, in 2002, 
youth unemployment rate was 59.6%, much higher than the national average (27.2%). 
In the same year, 73.3% of the unemployed suffered long term unemployment, although 
there had been a slight decrease since 2001, when the share reached 76.8%. In 2002, the 
regional administration invested approximately 100 million euros in projects to increase 
the employment level. In 2001, the total income from salaries in the agricultural sector 
was 751 million euros, in the industrial sector 5.6 billion euros and in the service sector 
26.3 billion euros. In 2002, household expenditure was broken down as follows: 24.3% 
on food and drink, 1.3% on tobacco, 7.9% on clothing and footwear, 20.7% on housing, 
8% on furniture, 2.9% on health, 13.1% on transport and 1.5% on education. The rest 
was spent on other goods and services. Campania is one of the lowest regions in Italy in 
                                                
terms of wage levels. In 2001, the average salary was 10% lower than the national 
average (Europa, 2004h). 
       Between 2002 and 2005 the annual growth in output was never higher than 0.5 
percentage points and in 2005 output levels were very low in all the main regional 
economic sectors (Bank of Italy/Campania 2005, 2010). However, between 2000 and 
2005, there was a significant growth in terms of the economic size of farms and this led 
to a certain productivity improvement. Between 2006 and the first months of 2007, 
 
225 A small decrease since 2001. 
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output increased in all the regional economic sectors and during 2006, there was a rise 
in household consumption and investment (Bank of Italy/Campania 2006, 2010). In 
2008, value added increased only in the agriculture sector, but decreased by 5 
percentage points in industry and 1 percentage point in services. In the same year, the 
construction sector suffered from a significant drop in terms of public investment (Bank 
of Italy/Campania 2008, 2010). The local government debt of Campania increased from 
 
ncreasing. In 2002, the value of exports was decreased by 6.5%, mainly due to 
                                                
12.1 billion euros at the end of 2008 to 13.1 billion euros at the end of 2009 (Bank of 
Italy/Campania 2009, 2010). 
      In 2007, Campania’s regional GDP per capita represented 65.9% of the EU 27
average (73.4% in 1996) (Eurostat, 2010g). In 2001, Campania created 6.4% of the 
Italian GDP and the service sector makes up approximately 78% of the region’s GDP.  
       The most important industrial sector is the agro-food industry and its main products 
are fruit, vegetables226, nuts227 and greenhouse flowers. The agriculture sector GVA 
accounted for approximately 6.5% of the total regional VA (213.7 billion euros in 2002). 
Animal breeding is also important (70,278 farms in 2000); mozzarella cheese is a 
typical regional product, whilst olive trees cover more than 74,604 hectares of land and, 
alongside fruit production, add more than 620.6 billion euros to the agricultural VA. A 
problem, nevertheless, is the small size of farms (3.53 hectares on average). In terms of 
trade, the retail trade is pivotal in the service sector and the number of supermarkets is 
steadily i
the fall in exports in a) the car sector and b) the textile and clothing sectors (Europa, 
2004g). 
 
226 Especially tomatoes, 1.5 million tonnes a year. 
227 More than 50% of the total production of Italy. 
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       According to Rinaldi (2009), the framework that emerges through the ISTAT 
analysis data, creates an image of Italy characterised by significant economic and social 
differences amongst the different territorial areas. The Convergence Objective 2007-
2013 is being represented by an increase in both economic and occupational terms. In 
terms of socio-economic differences, according to the latest available data, it can be 
argued that Campania is currently in a situation of significant delay with respect to the 
main parameters agreed at the European Councils of Lisbon and Goteborg, as well as 
the main development indicators. Between 1988 and 1998, the GDP per capita, 
according to the ROP 2000-2006 for Campania, dropped significantly from 66.8% to 
61.5%, with respect to the national average. Between 2000 and 2003, according to the 
data of the ROP ESF 2007-2013 for Campania, there was a media average increase at a 
much higher level compared to the other Mezzogiorno regions. However, this increase 
still remained inferior compared to both the Convergence Regions and the national level. 
The GDP per capita drop in Campania can probably be related to the state of emergency 
concerning refuse and the economic and financial crisis, which affected the whole of 
strategy. The situation of Campania, on the basis of the statistical 
                                                
Europe. These situations resulted in a negative impact on the production system, as well 
as a significant reduction in the speed of the economic cycle (interview with Rinaldi, 
2009). 
       Campania used to be one of the ten European regions with the highest 
unemployment levels228. This substantially marginalised the region, with respect to the 
targets of the Lisbon 
indicators, shows employment and unemployment levels to be out of line with national 
 
228 26.1% in 1998, according to the ROP/ESF 2007/2013. 
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levels and the objectives of the European Councils of Lisbon and Goteborg (interview 
with Rinaldi, 2009).  
       In comparison with the reported data in the diverse OPs 2007-2013 of the 
Convergence Objective, it emerges that Sicilia is amongst the regions that presented the 
highest unemployment level in 2005 (16.2%), followed by Campania (14.9%). Calabria 
is amongst the NUTS 2 regions that were praised in 2005, as it had a higher rate of 
employment (44.5%) and a lower rate of unemployment (14.4%). In contrast, in 2005, 
Sicilia had the lowest employment rate (44%) and the highest unemployment rate 
(16.2%) with respect to the other Convergence Regions. Structural policies can offer a 
very important opportunity to Campania, in order to activate territorial development and 
thermore, the structural 
ive Campania the chance to be more efficiently protected from negative 
w with Rinal
      The ROP for Campania (2000-2006) was co nced by t  ERDF mainly, 
the GGF an ) (Inforegi  2009e)
Table 
R  (2000-0
B nces by a in Campan
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) E  
P  
OTHERS) (in 
euros) 
help the region express its appropriate endogenous potential and benefit significantly 
from the challenges of the enlargement of world markets. Fur
policies g
effects caused by local, or general crises (intervie di, 2009). 
he EU (the-fina
 ESF, the EA d the FIFG o Europa, . 
5.13 
OP fo pania
reakdown of Fina
r Cam 6) 
 priority are ia 
U CONTRIBUTION (in
euros) 
UBLIC AID
(EC AND 
Natural resources 1,999,025,989 1,998,378,851 1,089,314,210 
Cultur urces al reso 656,596,337 331,920,695 655,690,923 
Human resources 1,357,994,078 1,345,769,543 857,675,572 
Local development 
systems 2,154,614,832 2,103,348,843 1,199,469,365 
Cities 436,668,945 221,439,288 436,668,945 
Networks and service 
hubs 1,076,300,599 547,255,870 1,071,748,102 
Technical Assistance 66,972,000 33,486,000 66,972,000 
Total 7,748,172,780 
4,280,561,000 [ERDF 
contribution 2,775,703,660 
(64.84%), ESF contribution 
702,462,340 (16.41%), 
EAGGF contribution 
764,146,000 (17.85%) and 
FIFG contribution 38,249,000 
7,678,577,207 
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(0.89%)] 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009e. 
 
      The highest total cost (2,154,614,832 euros) can be observed in the context of local 
development systems (promoting industrial districts, export systems, new businesses 
and tourism), whereas the second highest (1,999,025,989 euros) can be seen in terms of 
natural and water resources and energy management. On 11/09/07 the Commission 
a 
illion eu he financ  E d 
to  euros, representing about 11.8% of Community aid to Italy as part of 
2007-2 regio Europa  
T
d by the er the Conver ctive/OP Cam 13) 
EU CONTRIBUTION (in NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTR  euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTR  euros) 
approved an OP for Campania for 2007-2013, under the Convergence Objective, with 
total budget of 6.9 b
 some 3.4 billion
ros. T ing provided by the U (ERDF) amounte
Cohesion Policy for 013 (Info , 2009m).
able 
Programme co-finance
5.14 
 ERDF und gence Obje pania (2007-
PRIORITY  AXIS euros) IBUTION (in IBUTION (in
E  nvironmental sustainability
and cultural and tourism 
appeal (29.5% of total 
investment) 
1,012,500,000 1,012,500,000 2,025,000,000 
Competitiveness of the 
egion’s productive economy
 of t vestm
r  
(17.7% ent) otal in
607,500,000 607,500,000 1,215,000,000 
Energy (4.4% of total 
investment) 150,000,000 150,000,000 300,000,000 
Accessibility and transport 
(17.5% of total investment) 600,000,000 600,000,000 1,200,000,000 
Information society (5.8% of 
total investment) 197,500,000 197,500,000 395,000,000 
Urban development and 
quality of life (2.2% of total 
investment) 
752,500,000 752,500,000 1,505,000,000 
Technical assistance and 
cooperation (3.3% of total 
investme
112,397,599 112,397,599 224,795,198 
nt) 
Total 3,432,397,599 3,432,397,599 6,864,795,198 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009m. 
t
of
innovation. More than 52.55% of ERDF funds are destined for the Lisbon priorities. 
       The main aim of the Programme is to increase employmen  and regional 
competitiveness in the national, European and Mediterranean context. 54%  
expenditure will target the Lisbon Strategy with emphasis on R&D and technology 
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The expected impact of the Programme is the creation of 105,000 jobs229, the cutting of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2.8 tonnes of CO2 230 , an urban waste proportion 231  
crease from 10% to 18%, a broadband coverage increase from 89% to 99%, a 
Sources (RES) share increase 232  from 3.3% to 20% and the 
ation with Provinces and Municipalities, k) Urban 
in
Renewable Energy 
construction of 22 km of regional light railway (Inforegio Europa, 2009m). 
 
-Institutional capacity  
       The regional government of Campania is divided into 13 main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Health, International Relations of the Regional 
Administration of Campania, Relations between the Regional Administration of 
Campania and the EU (mainly responsible for the management of EU policies), 
Relations between the Regional Administration of Campania and the National 
Government and with the instruments of coordination between State and Regions, b) 
Development, Tourism, Cultural Heritage and Marketing Research, c) Agriculture, 
Rural Development, Forestry, Animal Hunting and Fisheries, d) Public Works and 
Territorial Protection, e) Budget, Treasury and Finance, f) Education, Cultural 
Promotion, Museums and Libraries, g) Employment, Emigration and Immigration 
Policies, h) Ecology, Environment, Refuse and Water, i) Social Activities and Social 
Assistance, j) General Affairs, Management and Education of Personnel and Relations 
of the Regional Administr
Development, Territorial Governance and Constructions, l) Transports and Productive 
                                                 
229 69,000 for males and 36,000 for females. 
230 2.3 tonnes per inhabitant. 
231 Sorted for collection. 
232 Electric power generation. 
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Activity and m) Universities, Scientific Research, Statistics and Information Systems 
(Regione Campania, 2011a). 
       The spending capacity of Campania (in percentage of SFs expenditure) was 62% 
during the first CSF Cycle, 80% during the second CSF Cycle and 51% during the third 
CSF Cycle (until December 2006) (Milio, 2010). Campania’s spending capacity during 
the third CSF Cycle was much lower compared to that of the previous CSF Cycles and 
this reveals institutional capacity problems regarding the CSF framework 
implementation. Campania had the third lowest spending capacity amongst all the 
Italian Objective 1 Regions during the first two CSF Cycles and the second lowest 
compared to the other Objective 1 Regions during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). 
Hence, we can argue that, measuring the spending capacity, the institutional capacity of 
Campania during the first two Cycles has been more efficient only compared to those of 
Puglia and Sicilia and more efficient than only that of Sicilia during the third CSF Cycle. 
       During the last 15 years, Campania has set the bases for regional development in a 
clear way in the context of setting priority areas for intervention. Amongst these, 
tourism, transport, 
       
research and innovation are the most important. The first two CSF 
 ROPs’ contribution has been fundamental, due to the fact that their resources 
have replaced national interventions. The funds for research, innovation and transport, 
Cycles have de-provincialised the region and put it in a position to confront Europe in 
both programming and organisation. The third CSF Cycle was actually the most 
articulate, since a) the first positive results of the previous programming periods became 
evident and b) significant problems of management, administration, conservation and 
sustainability were set in the context and procedure of interventions (interview with 
Mazzocca, 2009). 
       The
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rather than being additional and complementary to the national funds for development, 
have actually replaced the latter. This issue inevitably led to a reduction in a) the 
capacity concerning the projects for sustainability and b) the continuation of actions 
concerning regional development that had already started233 (interview with Mazzocca, 
2009). 
       A significant managerial and administrative capacity has to be developed around a 
vision and programming capacity. The actual administrative organisation, despite its 
improvements, has difficulty in moving forward towards efficient regional economic 
progress and development. This problem of public administration has been combined 
with an inefficient system concerning the evaluation of competences. The EU Regional 
Policy period has taught Campania that a managerial/administrative class, regardless of 
the age of its members, has to be culturally young and ready to receive, adopt and 
govern change. In order to have such a class, it is necessary to establish training 
programmes and territorial and intersectorial mobility. Furthermore, there is a need to 
rethink the recruitment system, which has little background of having complex 
knowledge about management (interview with Mazzocca, 2009). 
       The increase of managerial capacity is directly combined with the capacity of 
professional improvement and motivation increase, which require a normative and 
procedural simplification. A normative fragmentation can be observed in the procedures 
regarding regional development, which inevitably complicates the life of not only the 
consumers, but also the administrators. Therefore, it is important to learn how to use the 
new information technology effectively, since it can lead to a cultural revolution, which 
will a) reform organisation and procedures, b) introduce elements of efficient evaluation 
                                                 
233 These interruptions created significant problems in Campania, the most important of which were the 
blocking of shipyards and the closure of advanced research centres and structures. 
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and c) establish a fair evaluation, which will be as objective as possible. It would be 
necessary to introduce sabbatical years, or semesters, for Public Administrators, in order 
nia, despite receiving SFs for more than 20 years is still included in the 
onvergence Objective and it is still unclear whether or not it will be excluded in 2013. 
ation in Campania is not particularly encouraging. Certainly, 
represents four times the level of the third CSF Cycle in research and innovation. There 
are nine strategic areas for priority intervention; three basic sectors (New Technologies; 
Information and Communication Technology; and Advanced Biology), three territorial 
for them to work within an EU administration. In fact this would be the best training 
programme for them, as they would familiarise themselves with the EU rules and best 
practices concerning administration. For all these reasons, the emerging of an 
Administration autonomous from political guidance is necessary. Such a separation is 
likely to give both national and regional authorities the potential to increase their 
capacity, authority, efficacy and credibility (interview with Mazzocca, 2009).  
       We have to be cautious when assessing the opinions of the interviewees regarding 
both the economic situation and the future prospects of Campania. It is acceptable that 
several attempts for regional economic development have indeed taken place, but 
Campa
C
The current economic situ
since the beginning of the CSF Cycles Campania has been less dependent on agriculture, 
more de-provincialised and more industrialised, but only its exit from the Convergence 
Objective in 2013 will prove that regional economic development has indeed taken 
place. 
  
-Policies towards innovation  
       In terms of the fourth CSF Cycle, Campania is the Italian NUTS 2 region with the 
highest amount of public resources, in absolute value 1,349 million euros, which 
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sectors (Health and Agriculture; Tourism and Culture; and Territorial Security and 
Observation) and three industrial sectors (Energy; Aerospace; and Automotive, 
Transport and Logistics) (Regione Campania, 2011b; Mazzocca, 2008). 
       The Regional Centres of Competence 234 , which have aggregated the principal 
entities of Scientific Research in Campania, such as the University, Laboratories, 
Research Centres, Scientific and Technological Parks, have been financed with 
approximately 230 million euros, which is the value of the resources of the 2000-2006 
ERDF ROP for Campania. The mission of these centres is to identify and put in practice 
the conditions for technology-based development in the business system in every 
strategic area of intervention. The CRdCs establish an autonomous model which 
systemises the competence of the participants, due to the fact that they act as a bridge 
between the offers of research applied in seven strategic areas235 (Mazzocca, 2008). The 
                                                
main target of the regional administration of Campania has been the improvement of its 
capacities for scientific research and innovations in technology (Regione Campania, 
2011b).  
       During the first two years of the CRdCs, 80 new projects of research 236  were 
presented. The total value of these programmes was approximately 50 million euros. 
Around 60% of these projects have already been approved for a total value of 
approximately 22 million euros. The financing originates as following: 6% from the EU 
and extra-EU programmes, 37% from national and extra-Campania resources and 
approximately 57% from the regional administration of Campania in addition to its 
provinces and communities. The priorities of the projects include the Advanced Biology 
 
234 Centri Regionali di Competenza (CRdC). 
235 New Technologies for Productive Activity, Information and Communication Technology, Advanced 
Biology, Analysis and Monitoring of Environmental Risk, Conservation, Development and Use of the 
Cultural and Environmental Goods, Agricultural Production and Transportation. 
236 Financed by EU, national and regional programmes. 
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sector (34%), the Information and Communication Technology sector (27%) and the 
Cultural and Environmental Goods sector (26%). If we want to estimate the results of 
the CRdCs in their first two years of activity, we can argue that in total approximately 
30 new patents have been registered, four new industries have been established237, 36 
, higher than that 
regional, national and EU authorities. Just like in Calabria and Puglia several bottom-up 
new innovative market products have been created and approximately 70 projects of 
cooperation between Italian and foreign industries and Public Administration238 have 
been realised239 (Mazzocca, 2008). 
       Research and Innovation are the principal competitive assets of Campania towards 
the target of regional economic progress and development. The number of graduates in 
scientific and technological education fields240 has been increased by approximately 1.5 
times, from 4.2 to 10.2 between 2000 and 2006. In terms of expenditures on R&D241 in 
2005, the percentage of Campania was 1.12%, the highest amongst all the Italian 
Objective 1 Regions and the seventh highest in Italy. In terms of expenditure in R&D in 
the industrial sector242 in 2005, the percentage of Campania was 0.42%
of all the third CSF Cycle Italian Objective 1 Regions. Finally, in terms of employees in 
R&D 243 in 2005, the percentage of Campania was 6.6%, the highest of all Italian 
Objective 1 Regions and the sixth highest in Italy (Mazzocca, 2008).  
       The conclusion is that Campania is another example of the fact that regional 
bottom-up policies cannot be effective unless there is an efficient cooperation between 
                                                 
237 Two of them from spin-off. 
238 Of approximately 11 million euros value. 
239 Other significant applications of the CRdCs include: a) Innovative packaging based on food grade gel, 
cation, c) a laboratory for earthquake detection, d) advanced technology in 
mistry and medicine and e) bio-sensors used in animal experiments. 
s. 
. 
b) bio-systems of water purifi
terms of visual reality, che
240 Per thousand inhabitant
241 In percentage of GDP. 
242 In percentage of GDP. 
243 As a percentage of total employees
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projects took place244. Despite these projects and despite the importance of the region245 
for the entire Mezzogiorno, the results concerning regional economic development are 
d its natural environment. The main 
offer a more comparative view in the examination of our four 
e studies. Table 5.15 below summarises the main industrial types and sectors 
 case study. 
.15 
comparative table of the f
M  
not very encouraging. Unsatisfactory fund management made it impossible for the 
bottom-up approach to have the desired effects.   
      The main obstacles towards regional economic convergence and development in 
Campania are similar to those in Puglia and Calabria: namely inefficient spending 
capacity and poor administrative capacity. Again, there are several differences in the 
structure and functioning of local governance and this makes regional economic 
development difficult. The most important advantages for the economic development of 
Campania are its strategic geopolitical position an
problems of the region are the delay in internationalisation, the decrease in consumption 
and investments and the inadequate infrastructure. 
       The following tables 
Italian cas
of each
Table 5
First 
Region 
our Italian case studies 
Type of Industries ain Sectors of Specialisation of Industry
Basilicata Mainly SMEs Agro-food, Furniture, Automotive 
Calabria Mainly SMEs Agro-food, Information Technology, 
Tourism 
Puglia Mainly SMEs; some large 
firms (e.g. ILVA and 
Enichem) R  
Food Processing, Vehicles, Footwear, 
Textiles, Wood, Furniture, Engineering, 
ubber, Computer Software, Clothing
C
ry, Medicine, 
Visual Reality, Aerospace, Energy, 
ampania Mainly SMEs Advanced Biology, Information and 
Communication Technology, Earthquake 
Detection Systems, Chemist
Automotive, Logistics 
Source: Europa, 2004c; Europa, 2004f; Europa, 2004e; Europa, 2004l; Europa, 2004k; Europa, 2004h; 
Europa, 2004g; Mazzocca, 2008; Inforegio Europa, 2009c; Inforegio Europa, 2009k.             
 
 
                                                 
4 Particularly the Observatory and the ROPs. 
5 Mainly due to the City of Naples. 
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       Tables 5.16 and 5.17 below summarise the funds our four Italian case studies have 
ved d h u yc ed pul
 
omparative table of the four Italian case studies  
for ROP 
2000-2006  
for ROP 
2000-2006  
st 
recei uring the t ird and fo rth CSF C les compar  to their po ation. 
 
 
Table 5.16 
Second c
Region Population  
2000 
Population 
2006 
EU 
Contribution 
(in euros) 
Total Public 
Contribution 
(in euros) 
Priority
with the 
Highest EU 
Contribution 
os) 
 Area 
(in eur
Priority
with the Highe
Public 
Contribution 
os) 
 Area 
(in eur
Basilicata 
e 1(Objectiv
between 
) 
 
2000-2006
599,404 591,338 848,035,000 1,696,070,000 Local 
Development 
Systems  
25,000) (280,4
Local 
Development 
Systems 
50,000) (560,8
Calabria 
(Objective 1 
 between 
2000-2006) (694,135,000) (1,388,269,000) 
2,018,722 1,998,052 2,131,043,000 4,019,295,000 Local 
Development 
Systems 
Local 
Development 
Systems 
Pu
(O
 between 
2000-2006) 
Development 
Systems 
(1,146,891,000) 
Development 
Systems 
(2,037,680,000) 
glia 
bjective 1 
4,026,054 4,069,869 2,946,517,000 5,258,895,000 Local Local 
C
(O
 
 2000-2006) 
5,708,137 5,790,187 4,280,561,000 7,678,577,207 Local 
Development 
9
Local 
Development 
,843) 
ampania 
bjective 1 
between Systems 
(1,199,46 ,365) 
Systems 
(2,103,348
Source: Infore 0 egio Europa,  Inforegio Europa, 
2009e; ISTAT, 2011. 
 
ative table of the four Italian case studies 
in 
test 
data available for ROP 
2007-2013 (in 
euros) 
for ROP 
2007-2013 (in 
euros) 
n (in n (in 
gio Europa, 20 9c; Inforegio Europa, 2009d; Infor  2009b;
 
Table 5.17 
Third compar
Region Population 
2009 (la
EU 
Contribution 
Total Public 
Contribution 
Priority Area 
with the Highest 
EU 
Contributio
euros) 
Priority Area 
with the Highest 
Public 
Contributio
euros) 
Basilicat
(Phasing-Out 
between 2007
2013) 
a 
-
588,879 300,874,549 752,186,373 Energy and 
Sustainable 
Development 
(74,400,000) 
Energy and 
Sustainable 
Development 
(186,000,000) 
Calabria 
(Convergen
Objective 
between 2007
2013) 
ce 
-
2,009,330 1,499,120,026 2,998,240,052 n 
  
Cities, Urba
Areas and
Territorial 
Systems 
(254,850,404) 
Cities, Urban 
Areas and
Territorial 
Systems 
(509,700,808) 
Puglia 
(Convergence 
bjective 
tween 2007-
of Productive 
Systems and 
of Productive 
Systems and O
be
2013) 
4,084,035 2,619,021,978 5,238,043,956 
Employment 
(551,000,000) 
Employment 
(1,102,000,000) 
Competitiveness Competitiveness 
Campania 
(Convergence 
Objective 
between 2007-
2013) 
5,824,662 3,432,397,599 6,864,795,198 Environmental 
Sustainability 
and Cultural and 
Tourism Appeal 
(1,012,500,000) 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
and Cultural and 
Tourism Appeal 
(2,025,000,000) 
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Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009k; Inforegio Europa, 2009l; Inforegio Europa, 2009p; Inforegio Europa, 
2009m; ISTAT, 2011. 
heral 
ions, according to the principle of subsidiarity. New regionalism is 
both the EU and the national governments to encourage regional economic development 
to begin. In all four regions, there are traces of regional development, but some of them 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4-CONCLUSIONS 
      The main conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that in some NUTS 2 
regions in Italy, efficient regional economic development has indeed taken place and in 
some others it has not. According to dependency theory, Basilicata can be regarded as a 
semi-peripheral region, whereas the other three case studies can be regarded as 
peripheral. Metropolis-satellite relations still exist between the core and perip
regions. We argue that both the MLG and the theories of soft and new regionalism can 
be used as analytical tools in order to describe and critically examine regional policy in 
Italy. The MLG framework is used to critically understand the cooperation amongst the 
three levels (EU, national and regional) in the context of the EU Cohesion Policy.  
       Soft regionalism is used as it is based on the fact that regional development can 
become a reality only under the condition that there is adequate consultation with the 
regional and local authorities and if central governments are willing to offer power and 
authority to their reg
used as it supports the increase of economic competitiveness on a region-by-region 
basis and highlights the importance of the regions, and as a consequence the importance 
and necessity of regional development, based on processes such as visioning and 
strategic planning.  
       In all four regions examined in this chapter, there has been significant funding from 
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show greater economic progress than others. This can be explained by the fact that in 
some regions the problems of inefficient spending and administrative-institutional 
 gain market power, particularly in the fashion and auto-
ould not be 
capacity, accompanied by implementation difficulties, infrastructure problems, low 
industrial competitiveness and limited investments are more evident than in others. 
       A comparison between the four case studies in terms of industrial development and 
labour market shows that in all four Italian case studies, the main reasons for limited 
development were structural problems, competition with other countries and a 
slowdown in lending by the banks, as a result of the international financial crisis and the 
recession. Calabria experienced a certain degree of development in the construction 
industry due to an increase in public works, but this was practically terminated in 2008, 
simply because no more public works could take place, mainly due to the economic 
crisis. Puglia made several attempts to change business strategies in order to face 
external competition and
industry supply chain, but unfortunately development was limited, as there was a drop 
in sales in these sectors.  
       In Puglia, also, in 2006 there was a significant output growth in industry, which 
was a result of higher domestic demand for intermediate and capital goods and a rise in 
sales of traditional Italian products. However, such growth started declining from the 
following year. The lack of competitiveness in all four case studies sh
attributed to high labour costs, but to structural, internal organisational problems, 
competition with external markets and the economic crisis and recession.   
       One of the most important problems that hamper regional economic development is 
the inefficient spending capacity of some of the regions, in our case Calabria, Campania 
and Puglia. According to EU Cohesion Policy Guidelines, it is the responsibility of the 
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member countries to spend their allocated EU funds. If these funds are not spent within 
the CSF Cycle deadlines, then during the following Cycle, these regions will receive 
fewer or no funds for regional development. A satisfactory spending capacity is a 
condition according to which the EU offers SFs to the current Convergence regions. as 
the regions are actually not in position to adequately implement the CSF. Basilicata, 
U institutions were concerned. In Basilicata, more or less, this target has 
was the only region of our four case studies that managed to spend its entire allocation 
during the second CSF Cycle. 
      Problems with spending capacity are closely linked with a problematic 
administrative and institutional capacity. Differences in the structure and functioning of 
local governance in some Convergence Regions (in our case Calabria, Campania and 
Puglia), in addition to confusion over the administrative roles dealing with regional 
economic development, are the root of the problem. Some regions had never before 
been involved in European policies and this means that they did not have the chance to 
adapt their administrative systems to the basic guidelines of EU Cohesion Policy. There 
was confusion in the cooperation of the regional governments with the EU institutions 
and in some cases regions did not even exist as geographical, administrative and 
political entities. The establishment of a vertical and horizontal differentiated 
distribution of powers and responsibilities, in addition to effective planning, 
programming, coordination and monitoring capacities was a fundamental responsibility 
as far as the E
become a reality. In the other three regions examined in this chapter, the results are less 
encouraging. 
       Problems in spending and administrative capacity unavoidably lead to problems in 
implementation as the regions are actually not in position to adequately implement the 
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CSF. In 1989, the SFs started financing the ROPs. The question was whether the 
implementation would take place according to the basic guidelines and principles of EU 
Regional Policy 246 . Two kinds of implementation existed, the quantitative and the 
qualitative. In order for implementation problems to be resolved the Commission 
stopped placing both the decision-making and implementation decisions exclusively 
within the responsibility of the national authorities. This shift of regional policy made 
regional institutions become important policy actors and increased their significance in 
the attempts for regional economic convergence and development. This shift was 
followed by another, from the exclusive top-down regional policies to a combination of 
top-down and bottom-up, and in some cases purely bottom-up, approaches. The 
ve taken place in the four Italian case studies of this 
                                                
implementation of the CSF at a national level became a reality through the NOPs and at 
a regional level through the ROPs.  
       We have to remain critical when assessing the opinions of the interviewees. In 
some cases they are just describing the regional economic situation and in others they 
present the methods and processes, by which regional economic development can take 
place within their particular regions. However, in some cases they are being over-
optimistic not only regarding future prospects, but also regarding the current impact of 
regional policies since the beginning of the CSF Cycles. We must bear in mind that 
three out of our four Italian case studies (Calabria, Puglia and Campania) are still 
included in the Convergence Objective despite receiving SFs for more than 20 years and 
Basilicata has been excluded due to the statistic effect of the EU Enlargement. Indeed, 
several attempts for development ha
 
246 Additionality, subsidiarity, partnership and strategic planning. 
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thesis, but the results so far do not allow a great degree of optimism either for the 
current situation, or for the future.   
      The question in every case of regional economic development is whether or not the 
traditional top-down, or the contemporary bottom-up, approach is more effective. The 
answer is not simple. Since the beginning of the SFs, there has been a shift from 
exclusively top-down regional policies to a combination of top-down with bottom-up 
ones and in some cases the bottom-up approach is dominant. The bottom-up approach 
seems to be more efficient due to the fact that it is concentrated on individual regions 
and localities. However, in order for this approach to lead to regional economic 
evelopment there is a need for a more sufficient cooperation between the regional, 
national and EU authorities.  
 
d
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
6.1-INTRODUCTION 
ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR SPANISH REGIONS 
 
 
      In this chapter we analyse the four Spanish case studies, in order to explain why and 
how some Spanish NUTS 2 regions experienced a high degree of regional economic 
development, whilst others did not. In Spain, just like in Italy, there is a clear distinction 
between core, semi-periphery and periphery amongst NUTS 2 regions. The case studies 
examined in this chapter are Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura and 
Andalucía. The reason for choosing these regions is twofold: a) to critically present the 
regional economic divergence that still exists in Spain by means of dependency theory 
and b) to underline that, despite the huge amounts of funds they have received from 
both the EU and the national governments, Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana 
have already exited the Convergence Objective (“Phasing-In” Regions), whilst 
Andalucía and Extremadura are still included in the Convergence Objective.  
       As in the case of Italy, there is an attempt to use the MLG framework, soft and new 
regionalism as analytical tools for a critical presentation of EU Regional Policy in the 
context of Spain. There is also a clear focus on institutional capacity. According to 
dependency theory, Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana can be regarded as 
semi-peripheral regions, as they are both out of the Convergence Objective and at a 
“Phasing-In” stage, which means that they have exited due to significant regional 
economic development and not because of the EU Enlargement. Andalucía and 
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Extremadura are peripheral regions, due to the fact that despite receiving SFs for more 
than 20 years, they still have not managed to exit the Convergence Objective.   
       Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana have managed to reduce their economic 
disparities and exited the Convergence Objective, while Andalucía and Extremadura 
y León and Comunidad Valenciana can be regarded as semi-peripheral regions, 
ereas Andalucía and Extremadura are peripheral ones, according to dependency 
ocess took place, but with limited success. 
                                                
have not experienced similar convergence. A comparison between the four regions will 
reveal the main reasons for this pattern. 
       The main variables that determined our choice are the GDP per capita, and the 
unemployment and employment rates, in addition to a critical observation of the 
regional spending and administrative capacity, as well as implementation problems. 
Castilla 
wh
theory. 
   
6.2-THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO SPAIN 
6.2.1-REGIONAL POLICY IN THE 1980s AND 1990s  
      In practice, regional policy in Spain started in the early 1960s, when the “Planes de 
Desarollo”247 was established. According to Garcia-Mila and Marimon (1999), until the 
mid-1960s a clear convergence pr
Productivity, average wages and income differentials were and still are the main reasons 
for regional divergence across Spain. 
      In the 1980s, the “Comunidades Autónomas” were set up as autonomous regional 
governments enjoying devolved political powers from Madrid to the regional and local 
authorities. The “Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial” (FCI) was established in 
 
247 This was a regional development strategy. 
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1978, according to the 1978 Constitution of Spain (article 158.2) and its main target was 
the decrease of regional disparities across the entire Spanish territory (Rodriguez, 1987). 
       Both initiatives marked a first major step towards a bottom-up approach because, 
until then, Spanish regional policy was mostly based on a top-down/centre-down 
approach, which meant that decisions were taken from Madrid, without consultation 
with local and regional authorities (Stohr, 1981). Until 1975, Spain was under the 
military regime of Franco and this made the offer of power and responsibilities to 
regional authorities even more difficult. The top-down approach adopted in Spain was 
stricter than the one in Italy. This meant that, while in Italy there was at least a small 
degree of consultation with regional authorities, in Spain there was no consultation at all 
and decisions were taken only by Madrid. During that period, the over-concentration of 
monopoly in the 
                                                
industrial development in the core Madrid-Basque Country-Catalan triangle occurred 
(Rodenas Calatayud, 1994).    
      This led to a highly centralised policy which practically eliminated any attempt to 
put in place a bottom-up approach (Harrop, 1996; Pinder, 1983; Rodenas Calatayud, 
1994). This highly centralised regional policy was totally contrary to MLG, because 
there was limited, or no cooperation, or coordination between the national and the 
regional level. The Spanish national government (before 1980) held a 
desicion-making context (Rodenas Calatayud, 1994), acting in an intergovernmentalist 
way, which is opposed to the more supranational EU Cohesion Policy. 
      Also, according to Lamo (2000), interregional migration from the peripheral to the 
core Spanish regions played a certain part in the convergence process, especially during 
the period 1955 to 1984248, but it was not the most important factor determining income 
 
248 Particularly in Andalucía and Extremadura. 
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dynamics. During the 1980s and particularly after 1986, when Spain joined the EEC, 
there was already a better understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, namely, the 
decentralisation of regional policies to regional actors. However, the principle of 
additionality was not correctly followed as discussed by Garcia-Mila and McGuire 
(2001). In their view, the amount of EU economic assistance to the Spanish regions was 
much larger than that of the Spanish Government. This meant that EU funding was not 
nality was not followed and the question remains 
additional to governmental spending, but greatly expanded initiatives for the low 
performing regions of Spain. 
      Between 1986 and 1991, the top recipients of the FCI were Extremadura (2.55%), 
Castilla-la Mancha (1.22%) and Galicia (1.16%). On the other hand, the top recipients 
of ERDF funds during the same period were Castilla-la Mancha (0.89%), Extremadura 
(0.83%) and Andalucía (0.72%). The ESF funds’ top recipients were Extremadura 
(0.33%), Castilla y León (0.20%) and Castilla-la Mancha (0.18%). In total, Castilla-la 
Mancha received 4.32% (only 1.22% from the Spanish government), Extremadura 
6.64% (only 2.55% from the Spanish government), Andalucía 3.53% (only 1.26% from 
the Spanish government), Castilla y León 2.91% (only 0.90% from the Spanish 
government) and Asturias 1.64% (only 0.52% from the Spanish government). As we 
can see, the principle of additio
whether these grants really helped those peripheral regions (Gerson and Rowland, 2004; 
Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2001). 
      Within these peripheral regions of Spain and particularly in Extremadura and 
Castilla-la Mancha, there were (just like in the Mezzogiorno) problems of industrial 
location, failure to attract new dynamic industries, as well as an unskilled and aging 
labour force (Harrop, 1996). Nevertheless, in some other regions, such as Andalucía, a 
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number of new industries have started appearing and this is encouraging for the future 
as a sign of a desirable regional convergence. Youth unemployment in Spanish 
peripheral regions249 dropped from 48% in 1985 to 32% in 1990, with the highest drop 
omparison with the 1980s, when it was noted that, at 
at time, Spanish regions suffered significant economic disparities in terms of per 
t Spain has failed to fit EU SFs into its existing national regional 
                                                
in Andalucía (45.8%), Principado de Asturias (45.5%) and Extremadura (43.3%) (Tondl, 
1998). 
      Despite the aforementioned failures in the low performing regions of Spain, the 
growth measured as income per head between joining the EU in 1986 and 1990 was 
much greater than that of the Mezzogiorno. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, 
Spanish growth was again greater than the Mezzogiorno’s, so the gap narrowed and 
divergence tended to be smaller. This proves that there was indeed some progress in the 
regional development in Spain in c
th
capita income (IMF/Spain, 2005). 
 
6.2.2-REGIONAL POLICY DURING THE CSF CYCLES 
      The evolution of Spanish regional policy has indeed been influenced by the 
development of EU Regional Policy. The Spanish government’s regional policy 
gradually became more decentralised, but the main problem was the identification of the 
regional endogenous potentials not being aligned with the ERDF pre-requisites. The 
ERDF’s target was the establishment of a business environment that could help the 
creation of new SMEs and support their growth and economic performance. Another 
problem was tha
 
249 Such as Galicia, Castilla y León, Extremadura, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, Región de Murcia and 
Canarias. 
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scheme; indeed the ERDF was supposed to top up domestic regional funding rather than 
substitute them. 
       The gradual decentralisation of regional policy in Spain and the cooperation with 
the EU in terms of the Cohesion Policy was synonymous with the MLG, as there was 
clear coordination between the regional, national and EU levels. Furthermore, Regional 
Policy in Spain during the CSF Cycles has been conducted (just like in Italy) in 
accordance with the principles of soft and new regionalism. According to soft 
regionalism, regional development takes place only if there is adequate consultation 
with the regional and local authorities (Acharya, 1999; Hurrell, 1995; Ghica, 2008) and 
an effective understanding of the values of specific localities and habitats and only if 
central governments are willing to follow subsidiarity (Strecker, 1994). In Spain this 
rted about 15 years earlier than in 
Italy. In Spain decentralisation started taking place in 1978 (FCI establishment), but in 
Italy it started in 1992, after the closure of Agensud. 
started taking place slowly with the establishment of the Comunidades Autónomas and 
the FCI, but became more evident with the beginning of the CSF Cycles.  
       New regionalism, which supports the increase of economic competitiveness on a 
region-by-region basis and highlights the importance of the regions, and as a 
consequence the importance and necessity of regional development, based on processes 
such as visioning and strategic planning (Wallis, 2002) could also be adapted in the case 
of Spain since the establishment of the Comunidades Autónomas and the FCI, but was 
followed more intensely with the beginning of the CSF Cycles, when a more bottom-up 
approach towards regional development was adopted. We can argue that 
decentralisation in the regional policies in Spain sta
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       According to Conzelmann (1998), all southern EU Member States250 have “often 
found it difficult to accommodate the growing resources of the Structural Funds within 
the relatively narrow realm of traditional regional policy” (Conzelmann, 1998:3).  
       Just like in Italy, several Spanish regions had never been involved in EU policies 
before the 1990s and thus had never functioned under an EU framework, whilst others 
did not exist as administrative, geographical, or even political entities (Bailey and De 
Propris, 2002). Also, regional institutions in charge of regional policy had to establish 
vertical and horizontal powers and distribution of responsibilities, as well as effective 
and considerable organising, planning, programming, cooperation, coordination, 
evaluation and monitoring capacities (Milio, 2007).  
       That is why a new more flexible ERDF approach was introduced in order to 
facilitate the release of all the available financial resources from Brussels. Nevertheless, 
in some cases the bottom-up policies of the ERDF led to disagreements with member 
states on the degree of autonomy of the regional and local authorities in the context of 
regional policy (Conzelmann, 1998).  
       The Spanish Convergence Regions can be characterised by significant territorial 
extension, mainly agricultural, and their population is dispersed in scattered nuclei. 
Traditionally in these regions, agriculture has been very important and the employment 
is concentrated on the aforementioned agricultural sector, which has a seasonal 
character, in tourism, particularly in the cases of Andalucía and Galicia and in industry, 
particularly in the case of Galicia, even if this region has experienced significant 
transformation processes during these years. Between 2000 and 2008, an important 
increase in income and employment took place in these regions, mainly due to the 
                                                 
250 Including Spain and Italy. 
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development of the building and construction sector (interview with Kaiser Moreiras, 
2009).  
       The role of the SFs in the development of the Spanish regions since 1989 has been 
more than obvious. The EU transfers resulted in a great volume in relation to the 
national GDP. Generally, there has been cooperation and complementarity in the 
policies of the ERDF, the EAGGF and the Cohesion Fund. The ESF actions were 
mainly directed towards labour formation, education and training. The OPs framed the 
implementation of the CSF in Spain. That is why their contribution can be characterised 
as absolute and tautological. The management capacity of the autonomous 
administrations has significantly increased in the context of economic planning and the 
programming of interventions (interview with Kaiser Moreiras, 2009). 
       The regional development approach that has been taking place in Spain in recent 
years has stopped being strictly top-down. The fact that the regional administrations are 
gaining importance in decision-making leads to the conclusion that there is a shift from 
a strict top-down approach to a combination of top-down and bottom-up (interview with 
Kaiser Moreiras, 2009). Spain has implemented a less centralised domestic regional 
policy in comparison with Italy. 
       The level of decentralisation in Spain is very high and there is a certain degree of 
competitiveness between Autonomous Communities. Traditionally in Spain the 
geographical mobility of the labour force has been low. The exceptions are movements 
towards Comunidad de Madrid251  and Barcelona252 . Such movements became very 
difficult, mainly due to three reasons: a) difficult access to the rented house market, b) 
                                                 
251 Due to the fact  that besides being the capital city of Spain, Madrid is also the location of numerous 
multinational companies and industries. 
252 Capital city of Cataluña - one of the most developed NUTS 2 regions within the entire EU - and the 
second economic centre of Spain.  
 228
different legislation in different Spanish NUTS 2 regions and c) Spanish family roots. 
Regions welcoming an increased labour force are those with higher chances of finding 
jobs, and as a result they are the wealthiest in purely economic terms. On the other hand, 
regions exporting their labour force suffer a decapitalisation process of their human 
resources. This inevitably worsens their potential possibilities for economic progress 
and development (interview with Kaiser Moreiras, 2009). 
       In the context of systematically available dates and monitoring systems, FONDOS 
2000 is the most important operational instrument. The central database of this system 
supposes basic support for the management, administration and monitoring of the 
interventions. It is the source of formal documentation for the European Commission 
concerning the physical and economic situation and its role increased significantly 
during the third CSF Cycle. The successor to FONDOS 2000, for the current CSF Cycle, 
is the FONDOS 2007 system, which is characterised by even more capabilities and 
capacities, such as digital signatures on documents. The main target of FONDOS 2007 
is the establishment and management of an “administration without paperwork” type 
system. Evaluation reports are indeed necessary, but certainly not enough to achieve 
significant improvement in the management of plans and studies and even more so in 
the case of more complicated interventions, such as the OPs, unless they are followed 
by other measures in a wider context of regional policy (interview with Kaiser Moreiras, 
2009). 
      An efficient regional economic performance depends not only on the regional 
development approach followed, but also on regional administrative capacity. The latter 
can be regarded as one of the main factors determining economic differences across 
regional performances (Milio, 2007). Cantabria, Castilla y León and Comunidad 
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Valenciana prove that the bottom–up approach was successful, due to efficient three-
level cooperation. Nevertheless, in Extremadura and Andalucía a bottom-up approach 
has also been put into practice, but with less encouraging results. 
       Spain is one of the EU Member States that have most benefited from the EU 
Regional Policy, including the SFs and the CSFs. SFs have contributed to a satisfactory 
increase of economic growth, as well as job and wealth creation. The investment 
programmes that took place between 1989 and 2006 resulted in an average gain of 
approximately 0.56 points in the context of growth rates of the regions benefited by 
these programmes, compared with the situation that would have existed without this aid. 
This gain would lead to an average raise of approximately 425 euros (1999 prices) in 
terms of income per capita (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005). 
      This is a clear sign of how much the EU Cohesion Policy has contributed to the 
regional economic convergence and economic development in the Objective 1 and 
Convergence Objective Regions; however, without national contribution, regional 
development would have been unattainable. However, the increase of per capita income 
is not the only benefit in the case of Spain. Sosvilla-Rivero (2005) estimated that 
between 1989 and 2006, the CSF total effects would result in an employment increase 
of 1.46 percentage points accompanied by an unemployment decrease of 0.74 
percentage points, compared to the situation that would have prevailed without the aid.       
       In Spain, SFs during the second CSF Cycle added approximately 1% per year to 
output growth and 0.4% per year in employment growth. Nevertheless, due to the fact 
that not all the Spanish Objective 1 Regions had the same level of development, this 
additional effect took place with “wide regional variation” (Bachtler and Gorzelak, 
2007:314). During the 2007-2013 period, Spain is receiving less aid in the form of SFs 
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than in the past (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005). Between 2000 and 2006, Spain received 54,000 
million euros, whereas between 2007 and 2013, it will receive only 27,300 million 
euros; almost half of the amount (Gomez et al., 2005). This reduction in the allocation 
of funds takes place not because the Spanish Convergence Regions show poor spending 
capacity, but because many of them have managed to achieve significant regional 
development. Spain will receive fewer funds because it does not actually need them any 
more.  
       Table 6.1 below, as in the case of Italy explains regional institutional and 
administrative capacity in Spain, which is closely linked to the ability to spend the SFs 
allocated. Inability to spend SFs indicates lack of regional institutional capacity. Table 
6.1 reveals the percentage of SFs expenditure in the Objective 1 context as 
expenditure/total allocation and we can observe that during the first CSF Cycle the 
percentage of the Spanish Objective 1 Regions was satisfactory (87%). In the second 
CSF Cycle it a bit lower (82%), whereas in the third it was 75% until December 2006 
(Milio, 2010). This information makes us argue that administrative capacity in the 
Spanish Objective 1 Regions has been more sufficient than in the Italian Objective 1 
Regions. Spanish regions experience fewer implementation difficulties in terms of the 
CSF, as during the first three CSF Cycles, they had the third highest implementation 
rates253. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
253 Payments compared to commitments. 
 231
Table 6.1 
Percentage of SF Expenditure (% of expenditure is calculated  
as expenditure/total allocation)-EU Objective 1 
First CSF Cycle (1989-1993) 
 
 
Member states % 
Ireland 95 
Portugal 91 
Spain 87 
Greece 84 
France 84 
UK 83 
Italy  73 
Second CSF Cycle (1994-1999) 
 
 
Member states % 
Portugal 89 
Ireland 87 
Spain  82 
Denmark 81 
Austria 77 
Greece 73 
Belgium 72 
France 67 
Netherlands 67 
UK 67 
Italy  67 
Third CSF Cycle (2000-2006) (until December 2006) 
 
 
Member states % 
Ireland 82 
Sweden 79 
Germany 77 
Spain 75 
Portugal 75 
Austria 74 
Finland 72 
Netherlands 72 
Belgium 66 
UK 66 
France 64 
Italy 60 
Greece 53 
Source: Milio, 2010, p. 27.  
 
       Table 6.2 below presents the SF allocation 254 within the Spanish Objective 1 
Regions. During all three Cycles, Andalucia received the highest amounts, but is still 
included in the Convergence Objective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
254 In millions of euros. 
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Table 6.2 
Total SFs in the Spanish Objective 1 Regions (in millions of euros) 
Region First CSF Cycle 
(1989-93)255 
Second CSF Cycle 
(1994-99)256 
Third CSF Cycle 
(2000-2006) 
Andalucía 1816.45 4204.54 12470 
Principado de Asturias 398.75 851.88 1921 
Canarias 531.03 1334.28 2862 
Cantabria 92 499.65 - 
Castilla y León 906.15 2164.68 4906 
Castilla-la Mancha 741.61 1481.24 3271 
Comunidad Valenciana 575.72 1766.09 4579 
Extremadura 525.35 1124.91 3230 
Galicia 805.07 2745.39 5642 
Región de Murcia 221.43 706.36 1758 
Source: Pardo Garcia, 2003, pp. 6-7 and Cancelo de la Torre, Faina and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2005, p. 5. 
       Table 6.3 below summarises the spending capacity of the Spanish Objective 1 
Regions. During the first CSF Cycle, Región de Murcia had the highest spending 
capacity. Castilla y León was first during the second Cycle, whilst Cantabria boasted the 
highest spending capacity between 2000 and 2006. The high percentages of SF 
expenditure in the majority of the Spanish Objective 1 Regions during all three CSF 
Cycles (with the exceptions of Extremadura and Principado de Asturias during the 
second CSF Cycle and Canarias and Comunidad Valenciana during the third CSF Cycle) 
reveal a satisfactory institutional capacity in terms of implementation of the CSF 
framework. 
Table 6.3 
Percentage of SFs Expenditure-Spanish Objective 1 Regions (in %) 
First CSF Cycle (1989-93) Second CSF Cycle (1994-99) Third CSF Cycle (2000-06) 
Andalucía                                       94 Andalucía                                  82.69 Andalucía                                  77.68 
Principado de Asturias              106.5 Principado de Asturias              71.77 Principado de Asturias              90.01 
Canarias                                    102.6 Canarias                                    87.26 Canarias                                    76.45 
Cantabria                                          - Cantabria                                   78.95 Cantabria                                 112.01 
Castilla-la Mancha                    101.7 Castilla-la Mancha                    89.16 Castilla-la Mancha                    93.62 
Castilla y León                          110.3 Castilla y León                          92.18 Castilla y León                        102.67 
Extremadura                                 100 Extremadura                              61.54 Extremadura                              87.70 
Galicia                                       107.2 Galicia                                       91.84 Galicia                                       82.20 
Región de Murcia                     110.4 Región de Murcia                     83.03 Región de Murcia                     77.81 
Comunidad Valenciana             102.9 Comunidad Valenciana             85.69 Comunidad Valenciana             74.98 
Note: During the first CSF Cycle, Cantabria was an Objective 2 Region. 
Source:  Milio, 2010, p. 28. 
                                                 
255 Funding by the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF. 
256 Funding by the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF. 
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       In the following sub-sections there is an analysis of a) the economic profile of each 
of the four regions and b) the regional plans and projects that have so far taken place, 
with comments on their efficiency. Whilst Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana 
are chosen for further study because of their significant development, Extremadura and 
Andalucia are chosen due to their very low growth rates, their poor spending and 
administrative capacity and their implementation problems. The issue addressed here is 
to understand how and why EU Regional Policy has so far had a positive impact on the 
economies of some regions, and the exact role of the regional institutional framework. 
 
6.3-REGIONAL ANALYSIS  
 
6.3.1-CASTILLA Y LEÓN (Part of Objective 1 till 2006. “Phasing-In” Region for the 2007-2013 
Cycle) 
 
      Castilla y León can be characterised as a semi-peripheral region due to the fact that 
it is a “Phasing-In” Region, which means it has exited the Convergence Objective 
because of its significant economic development and not because of the EU 
Enlargement. It is the largest NUTS 2 region in Spain and the third largest in Europe. 
However, it is characterised by low population density, since its urban areas are 
geographically scattered. On 1st January 2010, the population of Castilla y León was 
2,559,515 people (INE, 2011d). Low population density adds a great deal to the cost of 
investment in basic infrastructure (EURES/Castilla y León, 2009; Inforegio Europa, 
2009f). More specifically in Castilla y León, there are 2,248 towns; approximately 98% 
of them have a population of fewer than 5,000 inhabitants and 71% of fewer than 300 
(Inforegio Europa, 2009f). Castilla y León has been losing population for a century in 
favour of other regions. Since 2001, there has been a slight increase in population, 
mainly thanks to the contribution of foreign immigrants. The still relatively high 
unemployment rate hampers development and social welfare. There is also a need to 
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improve social services, especially in rural areas (Inforegio Europa, 2009f). The main 
problems of Castilla y León are related to infrastructure, and the population dispersion. 
Furthermore, there is a certain degree of lagging behind in innovation, research, labour 
force qualification, education and training, in addition to a significant ageing of the 
population (interview with Valverde Gomez, 2009).        
       The enlargement of the EU-15 to the EU-27 resulted into a drop in the EU average 
used to normalise regional GDP per head, and many NUTS 2 regions included in 
Objective 1 became eligible to exit Objective 1 due to a simple statistic effect. However, 
this was not the case for Castilla y León, which managed to exit Objective 1 because of 
the specific development policies that took place over the last few years. Significant 
development has been taking place in Castilla y León since 1986. Castilla y León has 
managed to reach the average EU income from having 66% in 1986 to 94.5% in 2004. 
Provinces of Castilla y León, such as Burgos, Segovia, Soria and Valladolid have GDP 
per head above Spain’s average (100.7%). Between 2000 and 2004, all the region’s 
provinces experienced development clearly above the national average (interview with 
Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009). 
       In order for the FCI actions to be successful, there is a need to accompany such 
measures with a pro-active national government. Without the cooperation and assistance 
of the central government, both the FCI and EU funds are significantly less effective. 
The provision of public services is far more difficult in the NUTS 2 regions that are 
characterised by dispersed or ageing population. The EU tries to prioritise 
environmental sustainability across its policies; however, the environmental protection 
cost in some regions is not sufficiently evaluated. The convergence level of Castilla y 
León during recent years is very encouraging. The NUTS 2 regions are in charge of the 
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management of health, education, social services and active employment policies 
(interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009).  
       Castilla y León has been an Autonomous Community since the approval of its 
autonomy enactment in 1983. Significant training courses for civil servants in the 
regional public administration have taken place, including some focused on SFs 
management; this guarantees the rotation of fund managers within the region.  Regional 
employees’ capacity in the context of EU issues has improved since 1989 (interview 
with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009). 
       A problematic issue for civil servants is the language and terminology used in EU 
documents. The utilisation of phrases “made in the EU”, complicates the 
comprehension of the documents. Some examples are the terms “partnership” and 
“subsidiarity”. Such terms, despite the fact that they are very common in the context of 
EU institutions, are not common in Spain; their use in the Commission’s documents 
makes their comprehension somewhat difficult (interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and 
Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009).   
       In relation to the distribution of resources, the Spanish Constitution guarantees 
solidarity amongst the territories and the current model of financing regulates the 
existence of funds and compensatory mechanisms, thus monitoring the realisation of the 
solidarity principle. Regarding competitiveness amongst territories, it is necessary to 
argue that the autonomy of Spanish regions is still very young, as it has been in place 
for only 30 years. During this time the aspiration of each region has been to reclaim 
competencies from the Spanish government together with the related budget to manage 
them (interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009). 
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       The most nationalistic regions and territories continue requesting competencies, but 
there are discussions concerning the need to enforce the coordinational and cohesional 
role of the State. Until now, cooperation amongst the Spanish NUTS 2 regions has been 
important. The priority of the regions has been to take charge of the competencies 
anticipated by the Commission and the respective Autonomy Statutes, and to deal with 
them effectively (interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009). 
       The improvement of education is one of the fundamental pillars on which regional 
development should be based. The education provided within Castilla y León is of a 
high level. According to the results of the most recent Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) report conducted by the OECD, Castilla Leon is the best 
performing NUTS 2 Spanish region in terms of results concerning science and maths. It 
is also one of the first regions in text comprehension. The quality of education in 
Castilla y León is significantly above the national average. Nevertheless, these results 
are not enough to boost regional development; there is in fact a problem retaining 
skilled young labour. After students finish their studies, they look for job opportunities 
and these mainly occur in Madrid, which is the destination of the largest portion of the 
students of Castilla y León. The high level of the universities of Castilla y León indeed 
attracts students from outside the region; young people therefore enter the universities 
of Castilla y León, but leave the region after they finish their studies. It is obvious that 
regional authorities would welcome the labour force from other regions to move to 
Castilla y León to support per capita income increases. That is why it is necessary for 
the regional authorities to put in place initiatives aimed at retaining the students 
educated within Castilla y León (interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la 
Cuesta, 2009). 
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       EU policies have contributed positively to sustaining employment in Spain. 
According to Eurostat data, during the third CSF Cycle, the GDP per head in Castilla y 
León rose from 88.1% to 99.2%. It was the fourth Spanish NUTS 2 region in terms of 
convergence (4.3 points above the national average). Other NUTS 2 Spanish regions, 
which used to be in a much better economic situation, have shown slight or no progress 
in terms of the convergence level. According to the Funcas institute (2007), Castilla y 
León was the first amongst all the Spanish NUTS 2 regions in terms of convergence 
with the EU, showing during the 2000-2007 period an increase of 15 points, six more 
than the Spanish average. Comparing the “Statistic Effect” Regions with Castilla y León, 
it emerges that, in terms of convergence level, the former have not shown any 
development over the past nine years. On the contrary, according to the 2007 Funcas 
data, Castilla y León’s income has been converging to the EU-27 average, so that it 
qualifies for the ESF as a “Plain Competitiveness” Region (103.03%). Employment 
growth is one of the main objectives of Castilla y León, and during the last decade, its 
unemployment rate trends257 have fallen when compared to the national average. In the 
following years, the target of Castilla y León will be to continue increasing its 
convergence with the EU in line with the Lisbon Strategy, focusing on competitiveness, 
productivity, stronger innovation and human capital (interview with Barrios Garcia, 
2009).  
       Despite its economic development, Castilla y León258 requested to be included in 
the Convergence priority, rather than the Competitiveness and Employment priority. 
When a NUTS 2 region is eligible to exit the Convergence Objective259, this does not 
mean that its convergence trend is adequate to immediately enter the Competitiveness 
                                                 
257 For all categories of employment. 
258 Already a “Natural Effect” Region. 
259 In this case being a “Phasing-In” Region. 
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and Employment Objective. The distance between the “Phasing-In” period and the 
Competitiveness and Employment Objective is quite long and in some cases there is a 
difference of approximately 5% in terms of employment-unemployment levels, or GDP 
per capita levels between the two (interview with Valverde Gomez, 2009). Therefore, 
Castilla y León has practically asked for development guidelines, measures and 
interventions as if it still was part of the Convergence Objective. In this way, when 
exiting the Convergence Objective, it hopes to be much more competitive and to have a 
smoother inclusion into the Competitiveness and Employment Objective with a shorter 
transitional period.  
  
-Regional economic statistics 
       Castilla y León is the region with the highest capital equity level in Spain 
(interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009). In Castilla y León, 
the activity rate in 2001 was lower than both the EU and the Spanish average. The main 
characteristic of this region is the huge out-migration to other regions, especially 
Comunidad de Madrid, Cataluña and País Vasco. The employment rate in 2008 was 
48.9% (40.5% in 1999), lower than both the national (52.4%) and the EU-27 average 
(53.7%). Castilla y León has the highest percentage of self-employed labour (interview 
with Barrios Garcia, 2009).  Between 1999 and 2008, the employment rate increased by 
8.4% and this can be read as a sign of development (Eurostat, 2010d). In 2008, 19.5% 
were employed in the industrial sector, 10.2% in construction, 65% in the service sector 
and 5.3% in the agricultural sector (EURES/ Castilla y León, 2009).  
      The unemployment rate of Castilla y León was 9.5% in 2008 (15.3% in 1999), 
lower than the national average (11.3%), but higher than the EU-27 average (7%). This 
is an encouraging fact for regional economic development. Between 1999 and 2008, the 
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unemployment rate fell by 5.8%, the sign of a small economic progress (Eurostat, 
2010i). Approximately one million inhabitants in Castilla y León are employed and 
approximately 63.8% of males and 45.8% of females are economically active (EURES/ 
Castilla y León, 2009).  
       Using macro-economic models based on the HERMIN model, Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2005) argues that the income per capita of Castilla y León (PPP) in 1993 was 73 (EU-
15=100) with CSF, but it would have been 72 (EU-15=100) without CSF. Likewise, in 
1999, the income per capita was 76 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been 72 
(EU-15=100) without it. In 2002, the income per capita was 80 (EU-15=100) with CSF, 
but would have been just 67 (EU-15=100) without CSF. The convergence between 1993 
and 1999 was 3% with CSF, but would have been 0 without CSF. The convergence 
between 1993 and 2002 was 7% with CSF, but would have been -5% without CSF 
(Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005). In 2007, the regional GDP per capita of Castilla y León 
represented 101.4% of the EU-27 (87.5% in 1996). The 13.9% increase between 1996 
and 2007 shows economic development and thereby convergence (Eurostat, 2010g).  
       The main industries in Castilla y León include automotive, energy, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, agro-food and recently aeronautics and biotechnology (IRE Network/ 
Castilla y León, 2009). The companies having more than 1,000 employees are Renault 
Espana, G. Antolin, Michelin, Nissa M. Iberica, Iveco and Bridgestone H. (automotive 
and components), Ebro Puleva, Campofrio, Pascual and Siro (agri-food), G. Norte, 
Viajes Halcon (tourism), El Arbol (distribution) and G.Anton (cleaning), Begar and 
MRS (construction), Antibioticos and Europac (chemicals) and G. Indal (metal). In 
2008, all activity sectors in Castilla y León were negatively affected by the world 
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financial crisis, most importantly the sectors of industry and construction. In the same 
year, net employment in the region dropped by 3.5% (EURES/ Castilla y León, 2009). 
       In 2008, 700,000 work contracts were signed in Castilla y León and this percentage 
is 9% lower than in 2007. 75% of these were in the service sector260. 9% of these 
contracts were in the industrial sector and more specifically in agri-food industries and 
the metal and motor vehicle manufacturing sector. 11.2% of the contracts were in the 
construction sector261 and finally 4.8% of the contracts were in agriculture262 (EURES/ 
Castilla y León, 2009).  
      The Commission co-financed the 2000-2006 ROP/Objective 1 Programme for 
Castilla y León, which was co-financed by the ERDF (mainly), the ESF and the 
EAGGF (Inforegio Europa, 2009f). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
260 General services, health, and hotels and restaurants. 
261 Bricklayers, electricians, cement workers and labourers. 
262 Labourers, livestock raisers, or forestry workers. 
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Table 6.4 
Objective 1 Programme for Castilla y León (2000-06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Castilla y León 
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID (EC AND 
OTHERS) (in euros) 
Improved competitiveness 
and developing the 
productive fabric 
395,712,000 286,278,344 395,712,000 
Knowledge-based society 133,587,842 93,511,489 133,587,842 
Environment, nature and 
water resources 836,836,566 565,759,857 836,836,566 
Education infrastructure and 
reinforcement of 
professional, technical 
education and training 
421,572,963 266,987,447 421,572,963 
Integrating and bringing the 
unemployed back into the 
workforce 
94,091,352 61,159,377 94,091,352 
Reinforcement of stability in 
employment and adaptability 71,098,842 49,769,190 71,098,842 
Insertion of people with 
particular difficulties in the 
labour market 
65,562,781 45,893,947 65,562,781 
Participation of women in the 
labour market 22,618,436 16,963,829 22,618,436 
Local and urban development 394,141,688 258,406,259 394,141,688 
Transport and energy 
networks 2,043,022,621 1,267,483,460 2,043,022,621 
Agriculture and rural 
development 536,355,355 369,050,392 536,355,355 
Technical Assistance 17,859,097 13,394,323 17,859,097 
Total 5,032,459,553 
3,294,657,914 [ERDF 
contribution 2,301,773,395 
(69.86%), ESF contribution 
322,368,866 (9.78%) and 
EAGGF contribution 
670,515,653 (20.35%)] 
5,032,459,553 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009f. 
      The highest total cost (2,043,022,621 euros) can be observed in the context of 
transport and energy networks with an emphasis on gas and electricity generation and 
distribution infrastructure. The second highest (836,836,566 euros) can be seen in terms 
of environment, nature and water resources with an emphasis on the improvement of the 
public water supply to homes and industry (Inforegio Europa, 2009f).  
       On 28/11/07, the Commission approved the ERDF OP for Castilla y León under the 
Competitiveness Objective for the 2007-2013 Cycle, with a budget of about 1.2 billion 
euros, including EU investment from the ERDF (around 818 million euros), which 
corresponds to approximately 3.5% of the ERDF that would be invested in Spain during 
the 2007-2013 Cycle (Inforegio Europa, 2009n). 
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Table 6.5 
Programme under the Competitiveness Objective, co-funded by the ERDF/OP Castilla y León (2007-13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
Development of the 
Knowledge Economy 
(Information Society and 
ITCs) (9.6% of total funding) 
90,247,232 22,561,813 112,809,045 
Entrepreneurial Development 
and Innovation (26.6% of 
total funding) 
218,968,294 93,843,555 312,811,849 
Environment, Natural 
Surroundings, Water 
Resources and Risk 
Prevention (22.8% of total 
funding) 
187,354,760 80,294,898 267,649,658 
Transport and Energy (30.4% 
of total funding) 233,696,267 123,429,312 357,125,579 
Local and Urban Sustainable 
Development (10.1% of total 
funding) 
82,797,064 35,484,458 118,281,522 
Technical Assistance and 
Reinforcement of 
Institutional Capacity (0.5% 
of total funding) 
5,130,820 1,282,705 6,413,525 
Total 818,194,437 356,896,741 1,175,091,178 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009n.  
      The main aim of the OP, in line with the Lisbon Strategy, is to improve regional 
competitiveness, to create new jobs, to enhance innovation in businesses, to support 
SMEs, R&D investment and improvements in the technology and education 
infrastructure. The target is for the region to be presented as an ideal location for 
business. According to the Programme, technology-based new enterprises will be 
supported, the use of Renewable Energy Sources will be encouraged and approximately 
7,000 jobs will be created. More than two billion euros of private investment is 
expected to be stimulated, as well as the co-finance of projects linking science and 
business (Inforegio Europa, 2009n).  
       The Objective 1 funding for Castilla y León for the 2000-2006 period was 4.6 
billion euros, which represents 12.1% of the entire Objective 1 funding for Spain. In 
2004, Castilla y León received from the FCI 70.06 million euros, which amounts to 
7.04% of the entire FCI funds for regional economic development in Spain (Salmon, 
2004).  
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         Between 1989 and 2006, 50% of the average percentage CSF distribution 
according to investment categories was invested in infrastructure, 18% as a business aid 
and 32% in human capital. These figures clearly show the important role that the CSFs 
placed on the move towards regional economic convergence (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005).  
 
-Institutional capacity 
       The regional government of Castilla y León is divided into 12 main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Presidency, b) Autonomous Administration, c) Internal 
Affairs and Justice, d) Finance/Treasury (Hacienda), e) Economy and Employment, f) 
Development, g) Agriculture and Livestock, h) Environment, i) Health, j) Family and 
Equal Opportunities, k) Education and l) Culture and Tourism (Junta de Castilla y Leon, 
2011a). The department of Finance/Treasury (Hacienda) is mainly in charge of the 
management of the EU policies and funds, in particular through the Directorate General 
for Budget and European Community Funds (Junta de Castilla y León, 2011b). The 
department of Economy and Employment also plays an important role in terms of the 
management of the EU policies, through the Directorate General for Economy, 
Financial Policy and European Issues (Junta de Castilla y León, 2011c). 
       The spending capacity of Castilla y León (in percentage of SFs expenditure) was 
110.3% during the first CSF Cycle, 92.18% during the second CSF Cycle and 102.67% 
during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). Castilla y León had the second highest 
spending capacity of all the Spanish Objective 1 Regions during the first CSF Cycle, the 
highest during the second CSF Cycle and the second highest during the third CSF Cycle, 
when Cantabria which was a “Phasing-Out” Region was on top of the list (Milio, 2010). 
High absorption capacity means high implementation capacity and is a crucial factor 
that makes us argue that Castilla y León experiences an effective institutional capacity. 
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The regional administration of Castilla y León shows (through the high level of 
absorption capacity) that it has few problems in implementing the CSF.          
       In Castilla y León, bottom-up projects, such as the RTP, the RIS+ and the TRIP, 
can be argued to have been successful. Crucial for innovation across the manufacturing 
sector was the set up of a technology park near Valladolid, which focused on 
telecommunications and housed the R&D divisions of Spain’s Telefonica, Vodafone 
and other international telecoms firms. This technology park was created in the early 
1990s by the regional administration of Castilla y León in order to stimulate innovation 
in technology within the following years. The presence of Spain’s Telefonica and 
Vodafone, with their updated technology and skilled labour force, encouraged advanced 
telecommunications’ research and design. It can be argued that this park was the main 
reason behind the progress in the R&D context in Castilla y León. In 1997, these 
attempts were further stimulated by the 1997-2000 Regional Technology Plan (RTP), 
the aim of which was the development of technology and innovation within Castilla y 
Leon (Cordis/ITT, 2002). 
       The RTP of Castilla y León was co-financed by the EU, more specifically, the 
ERDF. Its total budget was 600,000 ECU and the ERDF contribution was 200,000 ECU. 
The RTP concentrated on the identification of strategic action plans in the context of 
regional innovation. The targets of the RTP were a) the reorganisation of technological 
supply, b) the clarification of business problems and needs, c) the establishment of more 
efficient cooperation and collaboration at all levels, d) the better utilisation and 
management of human resources, e) the promotion of innovation and updating of 
technology and f) a better evaluation system (RIS/ Castilla y León, 2010). The action 
lines of the RTP concentrated on five main programmes: infrastructure, innovation, 
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vocational training, awareness raising and structuring of the business demand. The first 
positive results became evident in 1997, when many actions were implemented through 
a call for plans and projects by the Agencia de Desarrollo Economico (ADE) 
(RIS/Castilla y León, 2010). 
      The RTP gained credibility and fulfilled the expected outcomes, so much so that 
more funding was made available, including a) the ERDF, b) the ESF, c) a Global Grant 
ERDF-ADE, d) a cooperation agreement between ADE and the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, e) several private sources and f) the RTD Framework Programme. Around 
447 million ECU was pledged for the first four years of implementation (1997-2000) 
and the targets were twofold: a) to increase the technological effort (R&D expenditure 
over GDP at factor costs) to reach 1% by 2001 (in 1997, it was 0.8%), and b) to increase 
business R&D expenditure to reach 50% of total expenditure (in 1997, it was 40%). 
Both targets were achieved (RIS/Castilla y León, 2010). 
      In order to put the RTP strategy into practice, a Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS+) 
project was also launched from 1999 to 2001 in three of the region’s nine provinces263. 
This project included 12 actions, the most important being the technology audits of 20 
SMEs in the machinery, textiles, metal-working and stone sectors. SMEs were 
introduced to the technology equipment and facilities located in regional universities. 20 
companies received training on information technologies and several others on 
marketing, and the management of research and innovation. The Transregional 
Innovation (TRIP) project Autochain, which linked the car industry of Castilla y León 
with those of Aragon and Wales also took place (Cordis/ITT, 2002). This project led to 
the creation of a Regional Automotive Forum in Castilla y León.  
                                                 
263 Avila, Salamanca and Zamora. 
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      In October 1997, the Regional Government of Castilla y León and the Federation of 
Savings Banks agreed to set up an investment company, which was to gather funds from 
local banks (80% of their own funds). The target of the Regional Government was to 
make funding available to facilitate the development of strategic economic sectors for 
the region of Castilla y León and to generate employment in a region with a long 
tradition of emigration. An important objective of that programme was to promote the 
food industry, sugar production and transport network. The agreement was based on a 
consensus between the Regional Government and the savings banks. Rural savings 
banks would take part only in the investments of the agriculture and the agri-business 
sector and a joint commission was established to define the strategic sectors and 
determine the amounts that should be invested. This programme indeed helped the 
agriculture sector in Castilla y León (Artiles, 1997).        
       Besides the regional universities, there are many research centres covering almost 
the entire complex of industrial activities, such as the Centre for R&D in the 
Automotive Sector, the Centre for Automation and Robotics and the Centre for 
Biotechnology. The Agency of Investments and Services of Castilla y León is 
responsible for most of the public funding for innovation and technology development 
(IRE Network/ Castilla y León, 2009).  
       The existence of an increased number of internal departments in the regional 
administration tends to lead to a fragmentation of the management of interrelated areas. 
This would inevitably lead to an inefficient assignment of resources. Despite its 
significant territorial extension, the number of departments in the region in currently 12, 
much lower than other NUTS 2 regions with a lower territorial extension. A deep 
knowledge of the region is necessary in order for adequate planning to become a reality. 
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That is why the existence of databases and statistics which evaluate public policies and 
allow comparisons of the results of the different Spanish NUTS 2 regions is necessary 
for the development of the regions (interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la 
Cuesta, 2009). 
       Predictions for the future of the Castilla y León economy mainly depend on the 
depth and length of the current economic crisis. According to the most recent facts on 
HISPALINK, there was going to be a growth rate increase of 0.4 percentage points for 
2009, whereas the increase for Spain was supposed to be 0.7 percentage points. For 
2010264 the expected growth rate increase for Castilla y León will reach 0.6 percentage 
points, whereas the national average is supposed to increase by 0.2 percentage points 
(interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez de la Cuesta, 2009). 
       Despite the fact that all the Spanish Objective 1 Regions have received significant 
amounts of SFs, they have not achieved similar results to Castilla y León. This proves 
that EU funds on their own cannot increase a regional economy’s competitiveness level. 
Other factors should contribute, such as additional funds, satisfactory management of 
funds, a clear policy leading to competitiveness, an emphasis on productive activities, 
R&D investment, enforcement of exports and the updating of agricultural exploitation. 
It is necessary for the regional governments 265  to ensure that interventions are 
efficiently combined with regional policies. They must also be complementary to the 
other financial instruments of the region 266 . The priorities of the EU Funds are 
significantly different, but efficient programming amongst them allows positive 
coooperations, which benefit regional economic development, even when some issues 
                                                 
264 When the economic crisis will be less intense. 
265 Receiving SFs. 
266 According to the article nine of the EC Rule 1083/2006 of the general dispositions for this new 
programming period. 
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are not being covered by the SFs. Nevertheless, in order for the different funds to 
achieve their targets, it is necessary for the regions to play an important role in deciding 
key priorities and actions for their region (interview with Lopez de la Cuesta and Lopez 
de la Cuesta, 2009).  
       Again we have to be cautious and critical when assessing the opinions of the 
interviewees regarding both the economic situation and the future prospects of Castilla 
y León, but in this case a certain degree of optimism is justified due to the fact that 
Castilla y León is a “Phasing-In”, “Natural Effect” Region. This means that, unlike 
Basilicata, it has exited the Convergence Objective only due to its significant economic 
development and not due to the EU Enlargement. Several attempts at regional economic 
development have indeed taken place and most of them have been successful. We can 
argue that the current economic situation in Castilla y León can be regarded as 
encouraging. 
       The conclusion is that Castilla y León is indeed on the way to effective regional 
development. The fact that it has already exited the Convergence Objective shows the 
high degree of economic progress and development that has already taken place. In our 
view, the case of Castilla y León shows that a bottom-up regional development 
approach can indeed positively impact on regional economic convergence. 
      
6.3.2-COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA (Part of Objective 1 till 2006. “Phasing-In” Region for the 
2007-2013 Cycle) 
 
      Comunidad Valenciana can be characterised as a semi-peripheral region, due to the 
fact that (just like Castilla y León) it is a “Phasing-In” Region, which means it has 
exited the Convergence Objective because of its significant economic development and 
not because of the EU Enlargement. However, the main problem that still hampers 
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regional economic development is that, despite the fact that employment is increasing, 
productivity growth remains low 267 , mainly due to the regional economy’s 
specialisation in traditional, and low-value added activities. On 1st January 2010, the 
population of Comunidad Valenciana was 5,111,706 people (INE, 2011d).   
       Comunidad Valenciana268 is a “Natural” and not a “Statistic Effect” Region, which 
means that it has exited the Convergence Objective because of its actual economic 
development and not because of the EU Enlargement. Comunidad Valenciana, like 
Castilla y León, also requested support measures in line with the fact that it finds itself 
between the “Phasing-In” and the Competitiveness Objective status. Indeed, the 
economic growth and competitiveness improvements that are taking place in the 
“Natural Effect” Regions are still vulnerable and uncertain. There is an actual danger for 
the “Natural Effect” Regions to step back even to levels below 75% of the EU-15 GDP 
average, unless the EU takes specific measures concerning convergence. The main 
problem is the fact that Communidad Valenciana 269  still has structural and 
infrastructural problems, such as industrial restructuring, and is lagging behind in 
economic performance in the mountain zones, islands, periphery and frontier areas. The 
main problems of “Natural Effect” Regions include weak innovation, low activity in 
R&D, industrial delocalisation, low productivity, weak transport infrastructure, 
excessive barriers to entering the labour market, population ageing and lack of 
qualifications of labour force. Besides improving its basic infrastructure, Comunidad 
Valenciana has to improve its social infrastructure (interview with Revuelta, 2009). 
       The financing of the “Phasing-In” and “Phasing-Out” Regions could be conducted 
more efficiently if the EU mechanisms more clearly identified the exact needs of these 
                                                 
267 Lower than both the national and the EU average. 
268 Like Castilla y León. 
269 Alongside the other “Natural Effect” Regions. 
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regions. There is a need for a more bottom-up approach to be adopted. “Phasing-In” 
Regions remain within the Convergence Objective since this division will require a 
more simple adjustment of the indicative funding percentages offered to each Objective. 
Approximately 78% of the EU funds are being offered to the Convergence Objective 
and only 18% to the Competitiveness and Employment Objective. In Comunidad 
Valenciana, the initial level of gradual decrease of financing should be estimated to take 
into account the funds the region received between 2004 and 2006 (when the region was 
included in Objective 1) (interview with Revuelta, 2009). 
       Whichever fund has not been “used” as a consequence of the application of the 
absorption limits, should remain at the disposal of the region to be used when needed. 
The “Phasing-In” Regions should also benefit from a completely separate fund, which 
would improve their competitiveness and increase their convergence levels. A certain 
transformation in the financing context of regions receiving such transitional assistance 
should take place in order for these regions to be sooner and more efficiently included 
in the Competitiveness and Employment Objective (interview with Revuelta, 2009). 
       As in the case of Castilla y León, we have to be critical when assessing the opinions 
of Revuelta regarding the economic situation of Comunidad Valenciana, but again we 
have to admit that a certain degree of optimism is justified due to the fact that 
Comunidad Valenciana is a “Phasing-In”, “Natural Effect” Region. This means that it 
has exited the Convergence Objective only due to its significant economic development 
and not due to the EU Enlargement. Revuelta is being more descriptive than over-
optimistic, but in any case we can argue that the current economic situation in 
Comunidad Valenciana can be regarded as encouraging. 
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-Regional economic statistics 
       The regional employment rate of Comunidad Valenciana in 2008 was 53.1% 
(45.5% in 1999), higher than the national average (52.4%), but just lower than the EU-
27 one (53.7%). Between 1999 and 2008, the employment rate increased by 7.6%, a 
sign of economic development (Eurostat, 2010d). 62% of the territory of Comunidad 
Valenciana is covered by rural areas. In 1996, the population density was 172 
inhabitants per square km, whereas by 2006, it had increased to 206 inhabitants per 
square km. There is higher population density along the coastline and lower in the 
majority of the rural areas inside the region. In 2006, the regional GDP per capita was 
18,977 euros, accounting for 90.8% of the Spanish average (Europa Press Releases, 
2008). 
      The 1959 stabilisation plan and the simultaneous move towards liberalisation led to 
a huge cross-regional migration of labour force from the other Spanish Objective 1 
Regions to Comunidad Valenciana and in particular Valencia (Jerez, 1992; Tascon 
2001).  
      In 2008, the unemployment rate of Comunidad Valenciana was 12.1% (13.8% in 
1999), higher than both the national (11.3%) and the EU-27 average (7%). Between 
1999 and 2008, the unemployment rate dropped by 1.7% (Eurostat, 2010i). In 1995, the 
unemployment rate reached 22.43% (Europa Press Releases, 2008). During the last four 
months of 2008, there was an increase in employment of 61,000 employees compared to 
the same period in 2007. By the end of 2008, the employed active population of 
Comunidad Valenciana was 2,188,100, of whom approximately 57% were males. In 
2008, the service sector accounted for approximately 68% of the regional GDP, 
focusing mainly on real estate and business services, trade and repairs, hotels and 
restaurants, transport, communication, health and veterinary activities. Industry is 
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mainly based on non-metal mineral products, tobacco, food and beverage, footwear, 
textiles, leather, metallurgy, metal products manufacturing, and other manufacturing 
industries (EURES/Comunidad Valenciana, 2009). 
       SMEs tend to characterise the region’s manufacturing sector and they mainly 
specialise in footwear, furniture, textiles and toys. Large firms, such as IBM and Ford 
are present and export-oriented. One of the main problems in the region is the water 
resourses’ scarcity (Atlas/Spain, 2004).        
       In the construction sector, the most important occupations are those requiring 
specialisation, like electricians, plumbers, bricklayers, plasterers and painters. In the 
service sector context, the most important occupations are in the retail and wholesale 
trade, hotels, restaurants, health, culture and land transport (EURES/Comunidad 
Valenciana, 2009).  
      Using macro-economic models based on the HERMIN model, Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2005) argues that the the income per capita of Comunidad Valenciana (PPP), in 1993 
was 75 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would be 72 (EU-15=100) without CSF. In 1999, it 
was 79 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been 75 (EU-15=100) without CSF. 
Likewise, in 2002, it was 82 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been just 71 (EU-
15=100) without CSF. The convergence between 1993 and 1999 was 4% with CSF, but 
would have been 3% without CSF. The convergence between 1993 and 2002 was 7% 
with CSF, but would have been only -1% without CSF (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005). In 2006, 
the GDP per capita of Comunidad Valenciana represented 95.4% of the EU average 
(96.2% in 2002). In Comunidad Valenciana, during the first three CSF Cycles (1989-
2006), 39% of the SFs were invested in infrastructure, 20% as business aid and 41% in 
human capital (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005).  
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       In the last decade, Comunidad Valenciana has taken advantage of its potential as a 
tourist destination to attract private investment. Tourism has been unevenly developed 
and this creates pressure on the infrastructure of some municipalities. Nevertheless, due 
to a rise in public provision, there has been an improvement in the transport network. 
During the last decade, there has been a focus on improved sewage treatment (Inforegio 
Europa, 2009h).     
       The Commission co-financed the ROP for Comunidad Valenciana for 2000-2006. 
This programme was co-financed by the ERDF (mainly), the ESF and the EAGGF 
(Inforegio Europa, 2009h).  
Table 6.6 
Objective 1 Programme for Comunidad Valenciana (2000-06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Comunidad Valenciana 
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID (EC AND 
OTHERS) (in euros) 
Imrovement of 
competitiveness and 
development of productive 
base 
374,600,557 256,154,610 374,600,557 
Knowledge society 421,852,844 295,296,992 421,852,844 
Environment, natural 
surroundings and water 
resources 
1,344,040,822 826,989,130 1,344,040,822 
Education infrastructure and 
reinforcement of 
professional, technical 
education and training 
359,270,600 225,954,467 359,270,600 
Insertion and professional 
reinsertion of unemployed 
people 
181,497,032 117,973,072 181,497,032 
Support for job stability and 
adaptability 158,919,761 111,243,833 158,919,761 
Integration in the labour 
market of people with special 
difficulties 
56,565,963 39,596,173 56,565,963 
Participation of women in the 
labour market 30,429,185 22,821,888 30,429,185 
Local and urban development 267,856,513 183,796,821 267,856,513 
Transport and energy 
networks 1,183,423,303 688,722,412 1,183,423,303 
Agriculture and rural 
development 141,604,331 87,166,811 141,604,331 
Technical Assistance 13,007,744 9,755,808 13,007,744 
Total 4,533,068,655 
2,865,472,017 [ERDF 
contribution 2,145,792,712 
(74.88%), ESF contribution 
497,504,245 (17.36%) and 
EAGGF contribution 
222,175,060 (7.75%)] 
4,533,068,655 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009h.  
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      The highest total cost (1,344,040,822 euros) can be observed in the context of 
environment, natural surroundings and water resources with an emphasis on a) the 
rational use of water, b) sewage treatment and purification, c) waste minimisation and d) 
conservation of natural spaces and coastal areas, whilst the second highest 
(1,183,423,303 euros) can be seen in terms of transport and energy networks with an 
emphasis on railways and the natural gas network, extended to provinces and counties 
that lacked it (Inforegio Europa, 2009h). On 29/11/07, the Commission approved an OP 
for Comunidad Valenciana (2007-2013), under the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective (2.2 billion euros budget). The financing provided by the EU 
(ERDF) was approximately 1.3 billion euros, representing 3.8% of total EU 
contributions to Spain between 2007 and 2013 (Inforegio Europa, 2009q).  
Table 6.7 
Programme under the “Regional Competitiveness and Employment” Objective, co-financed by the 
ERDF/Operational Programme Comunidad Valenciana (2007-13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
Development of the 
knowledge-based economy 
(R&D&i, information society 
and ICT) (17% of total 
investment) 
190, 248,850 190,248,850 380,497,700 
Business development and 
innovation (24% of total 
investment) 
305,315,929 232,493,011 537,808,940 
Environment, water 
resources and risk prevention 
(27% of total investment) 
391,902,925 211,824,140 603,727,065 
Transport and energy (22% 
of total investment) 297,957,693 199,686,453 497,644,146 
Sustainable local and urban 
development (8.5% of total 
investment) 
116,543,900 72,942,472 189,486,372 
Technical assistance (1.5% of 
total investment) 24,371,250 6,092,814 30,464,064 
Total 1,326,340,547 913,287,740 2,239,628,287 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009q.  
      The aim of the Programme is the improvement of regional competitiveness, 
integration, environmental protection and the increase of productivity and 
diversification of production structures according to the EU strategic guidelines and the 
national strategic framework. Special attention will be given to issues such as 
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emigration, infrastructure needs and the promotion of sustainable development in both 
urban and mountainous areas of the region. The expected impact of the Programme is 
the creation of approximately 22,865 jobs, a 264% increase in R&D expenditure/GDP 
(from 0.99% to 2.61% in 2013), four billion euros of private investment and a 160% 
increase in businesses benefiting from environmentally friendly systems of management 
(from 442 to 711 in 2013) (Inforegio Europa, 2009q). The Objective 1 funding for 
Comunidad Valenciana for the 2000-2006 period was four billion euros, which 
represents 10.5% of the entire Objective 1 funding for Spain. Also, in 2004, Comunidad 
Valenciana received from the FCI 61.99 million euros, which represents 6.23% of the 
entire FCI funds for regional economic development in Spain (Salmon, 2004).  
 
-Institutional capacity  
       The regional government of Comunidad Valenciana is divided into 13 main 
administrative departments in charge of a) Industry, Commerce and Innovation, b) 
Economy, Finance/Treasury (Hacienda) and Employment, c) Environment, Water, 
Urban Development and Housing, d) Infrastructure and Transport, e) Education, f) 
Culture and Sports, g) Health, h) Agriculture, Fishing and Food, i) Social Welfare, j) 
Justice and Public Administration, k) Government, l) Tourism and m) Immigration, 
Solidarity and Citizenship (Generalitat Valenciana, 2011a). The department of 
Economy, Finance/Treasury (Hacienda) and Employment is mainly in charge of the 
management of the EU policies and funds, through a specific unit responsible for EU 
funds and the EU Regional Cohesion Policy (Generalitat Valenciana, 2011b).  
       The spending capacity of Comunidad Valenciana (in percentage of SFs expenditure) 
was 102.9% during the first CSF Cycle, 85.69% during the second CSF Cycle and 
74.98% during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). Comunidad Valenciana had the fifth 
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highest absorption capacity of all the Spanish Objective 1 Regions during the first and 
the second CSF Cycles and the lowest during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). This 
means that in terms of absorption and implementation capacities, the relatively low 
percentages compared to the other Spanish Objective 1 Regions show that Comunidad 
Valenciana suffered some problems regarding the CSF implementation. This makes us 
argue that the regional institutional capacity of Comunidad Valenciana was less 
effective than that of Castilla y León, our previous case study.       
       The Regional Plan on Scientific Research, Technological Development and 
Innovation (PVIDI) 2001-2006 gave a boost to the regional economic development of 
the region. It was focused on two main areas: a) the improvement of scientific 
knowledge and technological innovation and b) the improvement of the competitive 
capacity of the economic sectors (CORDIS/Valencia, 2002). The target of the PVIDI 
was to link science and society and to combine research and innovation activities with 
the specific needs of Comunidad Valenciana (European Commission/CORDIS, 2009) 
      The main objectives of the plan were to increase the competitiveness of the 
Valencian Science-Technology-Enterprise system, increase public and private global 
resources, which would be used in research and development and innovation in the 
region towards reaching 2% of regional GDP by 2006, improve vertical integration and 
collaboration between all agents of the Science, Technological Development and 
Innovation System270, help increase the participation and contribution of the private 
sector in innovation activities as a main actor in Valencian enterprises and as a key 
factor of research and technological development, establish a more efficient mechanism 
                                                 
270 University institutes and departments, research and technology centres, and enterprises. 
 257
in the context of transferring research results and stimulating scientific development 
within Comunidad Valenciana (European Commission/CORDIS, 2009).  
       This plan shaped actions able to create new jobs, to increase competitiveness and to 
underline the importance of the private sector in promoting regional economic 
development (European Commission/CORDIS, 2009). Furthermore, the System of 
Science-Technology-Enterprise of the region is being significantly developed. In 2002, 
it included six Universities271 , 32 University Institutes, 16 Technology Centres and 
seven regional Research Centres (CORDIS/Valencia, 2002). 
       Comunidad Valenciana has been taking part in two INTERREG 3 B cross-border 
cooperation and collaboration projects. The first is the “South West Europe”272 and 
“Western Mediterranean”273 and the second is the “South” zone of the INTERREG 3 C 
interregional cooperation programme. These programmes focus on issues such as 
competitiveness, knowledge society, environment, energy, local and urban development 
(Atlas/Spain, 2004). Another important project is the expansion of the port of 
Valencia274, which requires a new infrastructure able to accommodate the increasing 
number of containers going through it. The aim of this project is to underline the 
importance of Valencia as an inter-oceanic port and to maintain “the supply of services 
at a time when the Spanish economy and thus maritime trade was undergoing major 
expansion” (Atlas/Spain, 2004:2). 
       In Comunidad Valenciana an effective collaboration between national and regional 
authorities made it the most developed Spanish third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Region. 
                                                 
271 51 Faculties, 7,000 professors, and 143,000 students. 
272 With the participation of Spain, Portugal, France and Great Britain. 
273 With the participation of Spain, Italy, Portugal, France and Great Britain. 
274 The project, which is mainly concentrated in the southern area of the port includes the construction of 
a dam 3km long and a 1,500 metre long quay with a depth of 16 metres. This plan offers the opportunity 
to regional and local enterprises a) to come closer to international markets and b) to strengthen their 
economic competitiveness by decreasing the transport costs of exported and imported goods and products. 
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Bottom-up regional projects, such as PVIDI and INTERREG 3 B can be regarded as 
successful, and regional economic divergence is steadily decreasing. The conclusion is 
that Comunidad Valenciana has actually achieved efficient regional economic 
development and the result is that it has exited the Convergence Objective. 
      
6.3.3-ANDALUCÍA (Convergence Objective Region for the 2007-2013 Cycle) 
       Andalucía can be characterised as a peripheral region. On 1st January 2010, the 
population of Andalucía was 8,370,975 people (INE, 2011d). Its main problems are 
inefficient spending capacity275 and poor administrative capacity. The differences in the 
structure and functioning of local governance are several and this makes progress in 
regional economic development difficult. Moreover, many parts of Andalucía had never 
before been involved in European policies and therefore had never developed 
cooperation with European institutions276. Concerns in relation to the economic context 
include high unemployment, low GDP per capita, desertification issues and lack of 
modernisation and openness in the regional manufacturing sector. 
       Ever since the beginning of its State of Autonomy, and in particular since Spain 
joined the EU, a process of structural reform has taken place in numerous parts of the 
socio-economic system of Andalucía. Due to these reforms, there has been a significant 
correction and improvement in economic, demographic and social inequalities within 
the region. These reforms are reflected in three features: a) the productive structure is 
more balanced and efficient, b) there have been improvements in the infrastructure and 
c) there has been a higher degree of internationalisation in the economy (interview with 
Lavezzi, 2009). 
                                                 
275 One of the lowest in Spain, alongside Extremadura. 
276 Some of these parts did not even exist as geographical, administrative, or political entities. 
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       In Andalucía, the SFs have not only created financial support and multi-annual 
basis, but have also created a potential effect of resource mobility in both the public and 
private sector, which has been actually translated into pursuing continuous increases to 
surpass the average growth of both Spain and EU. The SFs’ impact in Andalucía can be 
seen in the planning and programming capacity, in terms of infrastructure, human 
capital, environment, R&D, industries and rural development. Besides their quantitative 
importance, which has been a feature of all the programming periods, EU funds have 
contributed to the adoption and maintenance of important compromises between distinct 
governmental sectors277 , which promoted partnership amongst them (interview with 
officials at the General Direction of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). 
 
-Regional economic statistics 
       Officials at the General Direction of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía 
(2009) commented on the process of Andalucia’s convergence with respect to Spain and 
the EU in terms of GDP growth, employment and productivity. In relation to the 
temporal framework, the analysis refers to the comparative development of Andalucía 
since Spain joined the EU in 1986, and specifically evaluates the situation and details of 
the contribution in the last financial year, 2006. In 2006, the GDP at market prices for 
Andalucía grew by 3.9% in real terms, according to the Quarterly Accounts for 
Andalucía published by the AIS, an equal percentage to the Spanish economy, and 
higher than both the EU-15 (2.9%), and the EU-25 (2.9%). In production terms, this 
result represents an advance in the process of real convergence in relation to the 
reference economies for Andalucía, as the growth in the GDP was 1 and 0.9 points 
higher respectively for the EU-15 and EU-25, according to Eurostat. Also, it means that 
                                                 
277 Central government, regional administration of Andalucía and city halls. 
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for the thirteenth consecutive year, the Andalucian economy continued along a growth 
cycle that began in 1994, allowing it to experience a process of real convergence with 
the EU. The results obtained by the Andalucian economy in 2006 are even more 
relevant if we consider their effect on employment, where the available indicators reveal 
that on the one hand, the process of creating employment recorded since the 1990s has 
continued, and on the other, this process is more intense in Andalucía than in Spain as a 
whole, and particularly, than in Europe (interview with officials at the General Direction 
of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). 
       Since 1986 and according to the latest official information available, up to 2006, 
the population has grown by 16.8%, 2.5 points more than Spain, and twice that of the 
EU-15 (8.7%). According to the Active Population Survey of the Spanish National 
Institute of Statistics (NIS), employment in 2006 rose to 3,110,400, representing an 
increase of 5.1% and 150,800 more jobs than the previous financial year. This 
considerable advance in employment represents an important contribution to the process 
of creating employment for Spain and the EU. Andalucía contributed to 19.5% of the 
total increase in employment in Spain in 2006, 4.9% of the EU-15, and 3.9% of the EU-
25. These figures demonstrate the strong employment dynamic in Andalucía, which 
according to the NIS is one point higher than for the Spanish economy as a whole 
(4.1%), and according to the European Workforce Survey, three points higher than that 
for the EU-15 and EU-25 (1.8% and 2% respectively) (interview with officials at the 
General Direction of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). 
       This real convergence process is making it possible for the level of employment 
and wealth per person in the region to draw progressively closer to average EU levels. 
In 2006, considering the GDP per capita, this stood at 71.5% of the level for the EU-15 
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(with Spain at 90.5%). According to the NIS, in 2005 Andalucía’s GDP per capita in 
relation to the EU-25 stood at 76% (Spain at 98%). In terms of the employment rate, in 
2006 this stood at 90.4% of the EU-15 (Spain at 102.2%), and 91.4% of the rate for the 
EU-25 (with Spain at 103.3%). In terms of productivity, this represents 79.1% of the 
average for the EU-15 (with Spain at 88.5%), and 84.4% of the EU-25 (Spain: 94.4%). 
The results achieved by the Andalucian economy in 2006 demonstrate the trajectory of 
convergence that Andalucía and Spain have undergone, with similar intensity, since 
joining the EU. Since then, there has been a notable advance in real and nominal 
convergence with the EU, with visible economic growth and job creation (interview 
with officials at the General Direction of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 
2009). 
       Again since 1986 and according to the latest official information available, up to 
2006: a) the growth of the real accumulated GDP of the Andalucian economy was 
116.9%, 54.3 points more than the EU-15 (62.6%) and 17 points more than Spain 
(99.9%), b) growth in the nominal PPS GDP per capita was 210.55% in Andalucía, 64.5 
points higher than the EU-15 (146%) and 8.8 points higher than Spain (201.7%) and c) 
employment has grown in Andalucía by 104.8%, representing an advance of 82.3 
percentage points in relation to the growth registered for the EU-15 (22.5%) and 25.3 
points with respect to Spain (79.5%). It may be seen from these results that Andalucía’s 
economy has continued to advance towards the average levels of wealth per inhabitant 
of the EU-15. Real convergence, according to the GDP PPS per capita in relation to the 
EU-15, increased by 14.9 points over the period 1986-2006. The Andalucian economy 
has experienced a growth in GDP per capita based on a strategy focused on employment. 
For each point of economic growth, employment has grown in Andalucía by 0.9 points, 
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compared to the 0.36 points of the EU-15 (interview with officials at the General 
Direction of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). 
       In relative terms, the SFs’ contribution in terms of the Andalucian GDP increase 
has been important. On average, there has been a 1.3% increase in terms of the GDP 
over the 16 years. This is indeed an important volume in terms of income through 
transfers. In order to explain the rapid process and increase in terms of income and 
employment levels that have taken place in Andalucía, we must say that it has taken 
place, not only thanks to the funds received, but also due to important decisions and 
actions that have been taken by the regional authorities of Andalucía. The increase in 
gross savings which has been taking place in Andalucía has been ten times higher than 
the expected increase of European funds. The financial autonomy of Andalucía has 
increased with this intensity during the last years (interview with officials at the General 
Direction of European Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). 
       Since 2006, Andalucía has received more than 54,000 million euros and for the 
period 2007-2013, it will also receive more than 25,000 million. Of these 79,000 million, 
almost 45,000 million of euros are being managed by the regional administration of 
Andalucía. The percentage is 56.7%. The other 34,000 million correspond to the 
General Administration of State, and the percentage is 43.3% of the total. More than 
40,000 million (51.2%) correspond to structural actions, whilst almost 39,000 million 
(48.8%) correspond to the EAGGF-Guarantee and for that reason the balance between 
the Cohesion Policy and the CAP can be characterised as equilibrated in the context of 
Andalucía. This balance has been observed in Andalucía over the entire period of 
Spanish membership (interview with officials at the General Direction of European 
Funds and Planning of Andalucía, 2009). 
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       In relation to the regional productive structure, the balance and efficiency of the 
economy is manifested in: a) a lower dependency on the primary sector; in 2007278, 
employment in Andalucía in the primary sector was 7.8%, against 23% in 1981, b) a 
manufacturing more oriented towards higher technological content sectors; between 
1987 and 2006, investment in R&D grew by 11.4% against a national growth of 8.5%, c) 
a significant improvement of the tertiary sector of the economy, with a services sector 
much more balanced in the context of its internal composition; in 2007279 66.8% of the 
occupied population was working in services. This percentage is approximately 18 
points higher than that of 1981 (49.1%). In addition to important activities, such as 
commerce and tourism (hotels and restaurants), there is a strong emphasis on business 
and knowledge-intensive sectors, such as education, health, recreation, culture and sport 
activities. In the context of the business sector, within Andalucía, more than half a 
million businesses (511,728) existed as of 1st January 2007. This number means that 
Andalucía is the second NUTS 2 region in terms of business sector development in 
Spain after Cataluña (interview with Lavezzi, 2009). 
       Speaking about infrastructural improvement and occupation in the infrastructure 
sector, the number of kilometres of highway within the region of Andalucía actually 
multiplied by 12.2% between 1981 and 2006, more than double the national average 
(5.7%)280 (interview with Lavezzi, 2009). 
       As far as the internationalisation of the economy is concerned, the degree of the 
Andalucian economy’s openness, in the relation between external commerce and GDP, 
                                                 
278 Average January-September. 
279 Average January-September. 
280 Highways were significantly improved in order to serve the region better internally, and to connect the 
region with external areas. The High Velocity highway that connects Sevilla, Cordoba and Malaga with 
Madrid and the recently terminated highway of the Plata can be regarded as emblematic. In this sector, 
EU support to Andalucía has been more than obvious. 
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which was 13.5% in 1981, was actually 27% between January and September 2007. 
This means that in 26 years, this has practically doubled. In addition to that, a higher 
dynamic in business initiatives can be observed. This is manifested by the fact that the 
creation of “mercantile societies” has been more than ten times higher than that of 1981, 
placing the business capacity of the Andalucian population at a similar level to the 
national average 281 . As far as international economic relations are concerned, the 
economy of Andalucía keeps winning in terms of competitiveness and this fact reflects 
an increase of exports by 40.4% between 2004 and 2007. This percentage is almost 
double the Spanish average (23%). The result was an increase of the region’s market 
share in global trade, which has been evident during the last 10 years. During this period, 
Andalucía’s increased by 158.3%, much more than the global average (133.6%), the 
German average (112.5%), the EU average (77.4%) and the Japanese average (46%) 
(interview with Lavezzi, 2009). 
       Here, the socio-economic impact of the different and numerous subsidies has been 
significant. These subsidies were financed by the ERDF and resulted in a strategy 
around SMEs (PYMES) in Andalucía. Andalucía used to be a region people migrated 
from, whilst nowadays, it is a region that welcomes emigrants from other regions. 
Between 1981 and 2007, the Andalucian population increased to 1,598,414 inhabitants, 
coinciding with a 24.8% increase, five points higher than the national average and more 
than three times higher than the increase of the EU 27 population (7.8%). Lastly, from a 
social perspective, structural reforms have also resulted in the incorporation of women 
into the labour market and a significant increase in the level of qualifications of the 
labour force. The female activity rate in 2007282 was 44.3%, more than double than in 
                                                 
281 30 and 33 societies created for every 10,000 inhabitants respectively in 2006. 
282 January-September. 
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1981 (19.6%). The qualified active population with secondary or university studies was 
36.5% in 1981, whilst in 2007283 it reached 80.3% (interview with Lavezzi, 2009). 
       All these structural economic, demographic and social changes have permitted 
Andalucía to have a demographic dimension of eight million people with a GDP of 
150,000 million euros. This superior performance has so far led the Andalucian GDP to 
surpass 75% of the average of the EU-25 and the 80% of the EU-27. According to 
Eurostat, in 2006, Andalucia was situated at an 80.8% GDP per inhabitant compared to 
the EU-27. Thus, despite the fact that Andalucía is currently included in the 
Convergence Regions, technically it stops being a region eligible for the Convergence 
Objective, surpassing for the third consecutive year the lowest level of 75% of GDP per 
capita with respect not only to EU-25, but also to EU-27. That is why it is necessary for 
Andalucía to design policies in line with the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective (interview with Lavezzi, 2009).  
       The notable development of the Andalucian economy between 2004 and 2007 was 
accompanied by strong “employment generation”. 591,500 new jobs were created and 
Andalucía actually became the NUTS 2 region with the highest amount of job creation 
in absolute terms in Spain. This process of employment creation was based on equity 
terms, as more than half of the new jobs created corresponded to women284. Andalucía 
became the NUTS 2 region with the highest female employment in absolute and relative 
terms in Spain (interview with Lavezzi, 2009).  
      In 2008, the regional employment rate was 46.6% (36.9% in 1999), the fourth 
lowest in Spain after Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, Extremadura and Ciudad Autónoma 
de Melilla. It was lower than both the national (52.4%) and the EU average (53.7%). 
                                                 
283 Average January-September. 
284 305,700 female new jobs created between 2004 and 2007. 
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Between 1999 and 2008, the employment rate was increased by 9.7 percentage points 
(Eurostat, 2010d). 
      In 2008, the unemployment rate of Andalucía was 17.8% (26.5% in 1999), much 
higher than both the national (11.3%) and the EU-27 average (7%). Between 1999 and 
2008, unemployment rate dropped by 8.7% (Eurostat, 2010i).  
       In the agricultural sector, there are several problems, mainly concerning the 
processing and marketing of the products. It can be said that the agricultural sector is 
clearly orientated towards exportation and it must be mentioned that Andalucía is the 
top world producer in olive oil and has a tradition as an important exporter of fruit and 
vegetables, particularly in the European market. Many rural areas within the region have 
not yet adopted contemporary farming technologies. As a result, these areas have fallen 
behind and there is a need of economic diversification (Inforegio Europa, 2009a).  
       Andalucía can mainly be characterised as an agricultural area, but during recent 
years there has been an increase in the importance of the service sector and most 
importantly tourism, transport and retail. The recession of 2008 led to a decline in the 
construction and industrial sectors and it can also be argued that in Andalucía the 
industrial sector is less developed compared to the other regions. The service sector is 
the most important in Andalucía, in terms of recruitment levels (EURES/Andalucía, 
2009).  
       The Andalucian aerospace industry is also of significant importance and it is worth 
mentioning that the regional administration of Andalucía is interested in developing this 
industrial sector by introducing training courses. In October 2002, a Masters degree 
course in the technology and management of the aeronautic industry commenced at the 
University of Sevilla and also several forums, talks and trade fairs on the aerospace 
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sector have been organised. In 2004, the regional government of Andalucía put into 
practice the “Plan Director del Sector Aeronautico” in order to develop the aerospace 
industry (Andalucía.com, 2011).       
       The most important agriculture companies in Andalucía are located in the province 
of Almeria. Other important economic activities include construction, hotels, restaurants, 
retail trade, health and veterinary activities, education, public administration and 
wholesale trade. It can be argued that the labour force in Andalucía lacks skill, and, 
therefore, the majority of jobs in the regions can be characterised as low-skilled. 
Another important fact is that in Andalucía 88.8% of enterprises employ between one 
and ten people and just 0.1% have more than 500 employees. These enterprises are 
mainly situated in Cadiz, Seville and Malaga. During the last few years, a high number 
of foreign workers have been integrated into the labour market of Andalucia, mainly 
arriving from Romania, Poland, Morocco, Ecuador and Colombia (EURES/Andalucía, 
2009).  
       Using macro-economic models based on the HERMIN model, Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2005) argues that the the income per capita of Andalucía (PPP) in 1993 was 58 (EU-
15=100) with CSF, but would have been 57 (EU-15=100) without CSF. Likewise, in 
1999, it was 61 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been 58 (EU-15=100) without 
CSF. In 2002, it was 65 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been just 57 (EU-
15=100) without CSF. The convergence between 1993 and 1999 was 3% with CSF, but 
would have been 1% without CSF. The convergence between 1993 and 2002 was 7% 
with CSF, but would have been just 0 without CSF (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005).  
        Many new businesses tend to be set up, but they are short lived, due to two reasons: 
a) their initial capitalisation is too small and b) there is an evident lack of cooperation, 
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innovation and efficient management systems. The manufacturing sector still remains 
marginalised and the tourist sector lacks development (Inforegio Europa, 2009a). 
       The ROP 2000-2006 for Andalucía was co-financed by the Commission and part-
financed by the ERDF (mainly), the ESF and the EAGGF (Inforegio Europa, 2009a).  
Table 6.8 
Objective 1 Programme for Andalucía (2000-06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Andalucía  
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID (EC 
AND OTHERS) (in 
euros) 
Improvement of 
competitiveness and 
employment, and development 
of production structures 
1,279,308,890 947,223,424 1,279,308,890 
Knowledge-based society 358,016,703 268,512,527 358,016,703 
Environment, natutal habitats 
and water resources 3,244,714,329 2,183,708,781 3,244,714,329 
Educational infrastructures and 
strengthening of technical and 
vocational teaching 
807,818,420 545,548,529 807,818,420 
Vocational insertion and 
reinsertion of the unemployed 306,098,935 214,269,256 306,098,935 
Stabilisation of jobs and 
adaptability 150,890,809 113,168,109 150,890,809 
Insertion of people with 
particular difficulties in the 
labour market 
80,920,035 60,690,027 80,920,035 
Participation of women on the 
labour market 122,673,892 98,139,108 122,673,892 
Local and urban development 623,978,470 454,006,833 623,978,470 
Transport and energy networks 4,647,801,235 2,938,311,691 4,647,801,235 
Farming and rural development 438,051,084 318,415,168 438,051,084 
Technical Assistance 55,035,076 44,028,056 55,035,076 
Total 12,115,307,878 
8,186,021,509 [ERDF 
contribution 6,427,411,070 
(78.52%), ESF contribution 
971,354,167 (11.87%) and 
EAGGF contribution 787,256,272 
(9.62%) 
12,115,307,878 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009a.  
      The highest total cost (4,647,801,235 euros) can be observed in the context of 
transport and energy networks, with an emphasis on the improvement of energy 
distribution networks and forms of renewable energy, whilst the second highest 
(3,244,714,329 euros) can be seen in terms of the environment, natural habitats and 
water resources, with an emphasis on fire protection, urban waste, coastal ecosystems, 
reforestation and water cycle management (Inforegio Europa, 2009a). On 3/12/07, the 
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Commission approved an OP for Andalucía (2007-2013), under the Convergence 
Objective (Inforegio Europa, 2009j). 
Table 6.9 
Programme under the Convergence Objective, co-financed by the ERDF/OP Andalucía (2007-13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
Knowledge economy (R+D, 
information society, ICT) 
(4.6% of total investment) 
361,778,076 90,444,530 452,222,606 
Entrepreneurial development 
and innovation (19% of total 
investment) 
1,312,835,531 562,643,798 1,875,479,329 
Environment, natural 
surroundings, water 
resources and risk prevention 
(29.7% of total investment) 
2,047,767,906 877,614,820 2,925,382,726 
Transport and energy (31% 
of total investment) 1,985,878,770 300,347,995 2,286,226,765 
Local and urban sustainable 
development (10.1% of total 
investment) 
388,190,972 97,047,745 485,238,717 
Social infrastructure (5% of 
total investment) 388,190,972 97,047,745 485,238,717 
Technical assistance (0.6% of 
total investment) 46,666,107 11,666,530 58,332,637 
Total 6,531,308,334 2,036,813,163 8,568,121,497 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009j. 
 
      The target of the Programme is to increase regional GDP per capita, regional 
productivity and activity/employment rates, particularly for females. Around 71.29% of 
funds allocated to the Programme and 92% of the funds allocated to all ERDF and ESF 
operational programmes are oriented towards the Lisbon strategy (Inforegio Europa, 
2009j). 
      According to the Programme, between 2007 and 2013, the real regional GDP will be 
increased by 2.4%, 53,000 jobs will be created and the investment generated will be 12 
billion euros. 165 research, development and information centres should benefit; 695 
research projects and 1703 information society projects should take place. Expenditure 
on R&D will increase from 0.84% to 2% of regional GDP. Female employment should 
be increased from 34% to 43% and the percentage of the population and businesses 
connected to the internet should be increased from 43% to 75% and from 87% to 93% 
respectively. 92,000 companies should benefit from entrepreneurial development, the 
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innovation intensity rate should be increased from 0.59% to 1.15% and the rate of new 
business creation will also increase (from 4.85% to 5.15%) (Inforegio Europa, 2009j). 
       Environmental activities should affect 118 waste-processing projects, 480 km of 
water supply network (access for 3.3 million inhabitants), 124 km of waste-water 
network (access for 1.5 million inhabitants) and 445 projects over 71 square km in 
NATURA 2000 zones. Transport initiatives should benefit from 128 km of the Trans-
European Rail Freight Network and 14 km of road network. Renewable Energy Sources 
should increase their input to power outputs from 7.45% to 21% of the total with about 
60,000 projects. Lastly, more than 942 regeneration projects and 3,000 tourism/culture 
projects should be carried out (Inforegio Europa, 2009j). 
       The Objective 1 funding for Andalucía for the 2000-2006 period was 11.3 billion 
euros, again the highest in Spain, which represents 30% of the entire Objective 1 
funding for Spain. Also, in 2004, Andalucía received from the FCI 398.82 million 
euros 285 , which means 40.06% of the entire FCI funds for regional economic 
development in Spain. Almost half of the FCI funds for regional economic development 
in Spain were offered to Andalucía (Salmon, 2004).  
       Speaking about the average percentage distribution according to investment 
categories in Andalucía (CSFs 1989-2006), 45% was invested in infrastructure, 19% as 
a business aid and 36% in human capital (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005).  
 
-Institutional capacity 
       The regional administration of Andalucía is divided into 13 main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Presidency, b) Governance and Justice, c) Finance/Treasury 
(Hacienda) and Public Administration, d) Education, e) Economy, Innovation and 
                                                 
285 Again the highest in Spain. 
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Science, f) Public Works and Housing, g) Employment, h) Health, i) Agriculture and 
Fisheries, j) Tourism, Commerce and Sports, k) Equality and Social Welfare, l) Culture 
and m) Environment (Junta de Andalucía, 2011a). The department of Economy, 
Innovation and Science is mainly in charge of the management of EU policies and funds 
through its specific unit for EU funds (Junta de Andalucía, 2011b). 
       The spending capacity of Andalucía (in percentage of SFs expenditure) was 94% 
during the first CSF Cycle, 82.69% during the second CSF Cycle and 77.68% during 
the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). Andalucía had the lowest spending capacity of all 
the Spanish Objective 1 Regions during the first CSF Cycle, the fourth lowest during 
the second CSF Cycle and the third lowest during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). 
This means that in terms of absorption and implementation capacities, the relatively low 
percentages compared to the other Spanish Objective 1 Regions show that Andalucía 
suffered some problems regarding CSF implementation. This makes us argue that the 
regional institutional capacity of Andalucía was one of the least effective amongst the 
Spanish Objective 1 Regions between 1989 and 2006.        
       One of the most important agencies for regional development in Andalucía is the 
Agencia de Innovación y Desarrollo de Andalucía (IDEA), which is the Regional 
Development Agency responsible for the implementation of economic and social 
development. Its aim is the promotion of innovation, entrepreneurship, technological 
cooperation, competitiveness and business activity in Andalucía (IDEA, 2005).        
       The international economic crisis has affected Andalucía, but thanks to the 
evolution and development of the region, especially during the previous years, and 
thanks to EU support, the impact of the crisis is gradually becoming less intense. EU 
Regional Policy in terms of the fourth CSF Cycle will continue playing an important 
 272
part in Andalucía, with an assignment of 14,024.22 million euros, in order for 
Andalucian productivity and competitiveness to be increased. Towards that target, 
77.95% of the resources have been assigned to the priorities recognised by the Lisbon 
Strategy and this connection of the intervention instruments with the objectives of the 
Lisbon Strategy has been extended to Andalucía as a general economic policy plan for 
the following years, and included in the General Plan “Strategy for the Competitiveness 
of Andalucía 2007-2013”. Also, Andalucía has been developing financing instruments, 
such as JEREMIE and JESSICA for the more effective use of the SFs. The majority of 
the 54,000 million euros invested by the EU to Andalucía from 1986 to 2006286 have 
contributed to the production of a radical transformation of Andalucía, bringing the 
region day by day up to the European standards with which the region wishes to 
converge (interview with Lavezzi, 2009).  
       We have to be critical when assessing the views of the interviewees regarding both 
the economic situation and the future prospects of Andalucía. It is acceptable that 
several attempts for regional economic development have indeed taken place, but 
Andalucía, despite receiving SFs for more than 20 years is still included in the 
Convergence Objective and it is still unclear whether or not it will be excluded in 2013. 
The current economic situation in Andalucía is not particularly encouraging and we 
would argue that over-optimism in some crucial issues, such as the catching-up of 
Andalucía with the core Spanish, or EU regions in terms of economic growth cannot so 
far be completely justified. As a conclusion, we can argue that it is not yet clear whether 
Andalucía will be in a position to exit the Convergence Objective by 2013, but certain 
economic progress towards convergence has indeed been achieved. 
                                                 
286 Taking into account the Structural Actions and the PAC. 
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 6.3.4-EXTREMADURA (Convergence Objective Region for the 2007-2013 Cycle) 
       Extremadura is characterised as a peripheral region that is still included in the 
Convergence Objective. On 1st January 2010, the population of Extremadura was 
1,107,220 people (INE, 2011d). Extremadura has a very low population density and the 
manufacturing sector accounts for only 10.6% of employment287. Innovation activity is 
limited despite the fact that over the last ten years, several sector technological centres 
have been created. 
       One of the characteristics of Extremadura that explains the limited economic 
development is its sparse population, which amounts to approximately 26 inhabitants 
per sq. km, one third of the average for Spain and one fifth of the European average. 
The population is spread around the region in small agglomerations and a real regional 
capital does not exist. Also, there is a very low birth rate and the population is ageing. 
This means that internal demand is not sufficient to stimulate production activities. A 
lack of production activities inevitably means slow economic development. Moreover, 
farming productivity is weak due to a) the small size of the farms, b) the low level of the 
farmers’ training and c) the very high level of indebtedness amongst the farming 
population. Also, energy and water represent 60% of the industrial sector, which is 
neither developed, nor oriented towards new technologies (Inforegio Europa, 2009g). 
        When referring to the GDP per capita, during the current CSF Cycle, according to 
Cruz (2009), Extremadura will surpass 75% of the average EU income. Towards the 
end of the third CSF Cycle, the income of Extremadura was approximately 70%. This 
means that within Extremadura regional development indeed took place during the third 
CSF Cycle, but the target of 75% was narrowly missed and that is why Extremadura is 
                                                 
287 Including mainly small, family businesses. 
 274
still included in the Convergence Objective. Some of the economic facts mainly 
published by the Spanish FUNCAS Foundation make a special reference to the region’s 
income increases; in fact since 2000, it has reduced its distance from the EU average by 
approximately 20%. When Spain entered the EU (in 1986), Extremadura’s income 
represented approximately 35% of the EU average. During the current CSF Cycle, 
Extremadura will receive 3.400 million euros through different social programmes288. 
Cruz (2009) argues that in the context of R&D, Extremadura has been so far greatly 
benefited from the SFs (interview with Cruz, 2009). 
       The allocation and management of the SFs has allowed the balanced development 
of the region with its related income convergence. There are several other factors 
besides the SFs that have helped and the most important is the fact that within Spain 
there is a certain system of cooperation and solidarity in both economic and social terms 
amongst the NUTS 2 regions (interview with Cruz, 2009). 
       According to Sabido Martin (2009), the economic development of Extremadura 
during recent years has undoubtedly been much higher than the national average as well 
as that of the EU. This regional development was mainly based on an optimal 
management of EU funds (interview with Sabido Martin, 2009). In Extremadura, the 
use of FIFG funds is minimal, since there are no shores of beaches in the region; 
nevertheless, the management of these funds helped in the development of agriculture 
within the region. On the other hand, the ERDF helped strengthen the competitiveness 
of Extremadura businesses, mainly by focusing on investments in R&D and innovation, 
and by supporting their internationalisation. Moreover, thanks to the ESF, 
Extremadura’s labour market managed to improve its performance significantly. The 
                                                 
288 ERDF, ESF, Cooperación Transfronteriza, EAFRD and FEP. 
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employment, unemployment and activity rates have all improved across all sectors of 
the labour market through training programmes, up-skilling and professional 
development (interview with Sabido Martin, 2009). 
       In Extremadura the primary sector accounts for more than 7% of the GDP. For that 
reason, the EAGGF has played a very important role and will continue to play one in 
the future in terms of regional progress and development. Finally, thanks to the 
Cohesion Fund, there has been an evident development in the infrastructure plans of 
Extremadura. This development has been crucial for the region to a) continue increasing 
its economic power, b) attract investments and c) improve its inhabitants’ quality of life. 
Socio-economic convergence for Extremadura could not have been a reality without the 
help of the SFs. In terms of the FCI, Sabido Martin (2009) argues that it can provide a 
lower level of funds, compared to EU funds, and more specifically less than 1/10. That 
is why the FCI impact on the regional economy has been much lower than that of the 
EU funds. The management of the FCI funds by the regional administration of 
Extremadura289 is being conducted according to specific EU guidelines (interview with 
Sabido Martin, 2009). 
       The Spanish Constitution guarantees the principle of solidarity, in terms of fiscal 
transfer, in the financing of the NUTS 2 regions and for this reason, it is compulsory for 
the more developed core regions to offer adequate resources in order for the less 
developed periphery ones to enter the road of economic progress. This is why the 
autonomous Spanish economic system is based on the principle of cooperation and not 
that of competition, where the regions offer their resources in order for national 
development to become a reality. Since the 1990s, Extremadura has been a region of 
                                                 
289 Always according to the specific regional needs in a more bottom-up approach. 
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emigrants. With the offering of the different competences from the Central 
Administration to Regional Administration, including the University, this situation has 
significantly changed. The labour market of Extremadura suffers an important lack of 
education and training. A noteworthy increase in textile production is gradually taking 
place in the region. The satisfactory management of the EU funds has helped in the 
creation of new jobs and has decreased the number of youngsters who are forced to 
emigrate from Extremadura in order to find occupation in other regions (interview with 
Sabido Martin, 2009).  
 
-Regional economic statistics 
       In the context of the economic structure of Extremadura, agriculture accounts for 
18.4%, industry for 23.2% and services for 58.2%. This means that Extremadura is still 
highly dependent on agriculture (Zanetti, 2008). The most important industrial sectors 
are food industries, construction materials and the wood, cork and furniture industries. 
The most important services are those linked with education and health. It can be argued 
that within Extremadura there is an extremely low level of efficiency and 
competitiveness. There is a significant technological backwardness that hampers 
regional economic development. This can be seen by the very low level of investment in 
R&D amongst the region’s firms. In general, technology and innovation activities can 
be regarded as not being efficient, due to the fact that commercial and financial 
structures are relatively poor. However, there is progress and development in terms of 
mining and hydroelectric resources and a significant tourism potential. Energy is also 
important for the regional development of Extremadura and many hydroelectric and 
nuclear energy plants can be observed in the region, despite the fact that “there is no 
real industrial fabric in these fields” (IRE Network/Extremadura, 2009:1).    
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       In 2008, the unemployment rate of Extremadura was 15.2% (25.1% in 1999). It was 
higher than both the national (11.3%) and the EU-27 average (7%). However, between 
1999 and 2008, the unemployment rate decreased by 9.9 percentage points (Eurostat, 
2010i). From mid-2008, till 2009, there was a steady increase of unemployment, which 
mainly affected the construction sector and another interesting feature is that the number 
of employees registered with the Social Security in Extremadura is steadily decreasing. 
The amount of foreigners officially registered with Social Security in Extremadura by 
the end of the third quarter of 2009 was 3.36% (EURES/Extremadura, 2009). 
       According to the Active Population Survey of the National Statistics Office, during 
the first quarter of 2009, 382,400 people were employed, whereas 106,300 were 
unemployed. Moreover, Extremadura’s activity rate was 54.07%, much lower than the 
Spanish average (60.15%). Male activity rates accounted for 64.64%, female for 
43.77%. The unemployment rate was 21.75%, higher than the national average 
(17.36%). The male unemployment rate was 19.84% (Spanish average 16.86%) and the 
female one 25.02% (Spanish average 18.01%) (EURES/Extremadura, 2009).  
       During the end of the first quarter of 2009, 108,664 unemployed persons were 
registered with the Extremadura Public employment Service and this reveals a 38.06% 
increase compared to the first quarter of 2008. At the same time, 3,323 foreigners were 
out of work and 52.78% of them originated from the EU. 53.82% of the total 
unemployed were males and 46.18% females. 5,170 unemployed people were occupied 
in agriculture (amongst whom 179 were from the EU), 9,690 in industry (116 from the 
EU), 20,694 in construction (275 from the EU) and 60,294 in services (517 from the 
EU). 12,916 people from the entire number (517 from the EU) had not been previously 
employed. Also, there was a significant decrease in the number of both temporary and 
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permanent contracts signed in all the economic sectors, but the encouraging feature was 
that in some a) industrial branches and in particular textiles, tobacco, metal products 
manufacturing, recycling and energy production and b) services branches and mainly 
auxiliary activities, financial intermediation, information technology, R&D, public 
health, sport, cultural and recreational activities, there was an increase in hiring in 2008 
(EURES/Extremadura, 2009).  
       In 2008, the regional employment rate was 44.7% (36.8% in 1999), the second 
lowest in Spain, after Melilla. It was much lower than both the national (52.4%) and the 
EU average (53.7%). Nevertheless, between 1999 and 2008, the employment rate 
increased by 7.9%, which is a sign of regional economic development (Eurostat, 2010d). 
Extremadura mainly comprises small enterprises and most of them are in the services 
sector and in particular in trade, construction, hotels and restaurants. In Extremadura, 
the iron, steel and metallurgy sectors are also of great importance (EURES/Extremadura, 
2009).        
       During the recent 25 years, the GDP of Extremadura has increased by 690%, which 
represents 15 points above the increase at the national level (interview with Sabido 
Martin, 2009).  
       Using macro-economic models based on the HERMIN model, Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2005) argues that the the income per capita of Extremadura (PPP) in 1993 was 56 (EU-
15=100) with CSF, but would have been 52 (EU-15=100) without CSF. In 1999, it was 
53 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been just 48 (EU-15=100) without CSF. In 
2002, it was 56 (EU-15=100) with CSF, but would have been just 44 (EU-15=100) 
without CSF. The convergence between 1993 and 1999 was -3% with CSF, but would 
have been -4% without CSF. The convergence between 1993 and 2002 was 0 with CSF, 
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but it would have been -8% without CSF (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005). Speaking about the 
average percentage distribution according to investment categories in Extremadura 
(CSFs 1989-2006), 42% was invested in infrastructure, 19% as an aid to business and 
39% in human capital (Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005). These figures prove again the 
importance of the CSFs for the regional economic convergence and the regional 
economic development. 
       In terms of GDP per capita, Extremadura was positioned at 59% of the EU-27 and in 
2008, it was expected to surpass 75% of the EU average (interview with Sabido Martin, 
2009). In 2007, the GDP per capita of Extremadura represented 72.4% of the EU 27 
average (58.9% in 1996) and was the lowest in Spain, but this 13.5% increase shows 
development (Eurostat, 2010g). The Regional Administration of Extremadura has 
recently been convinced that after the “Irish miracle” and then the “Spanish miracle”, 
the following years will witness the “Extremadura miracle” (interview with Sabido 
Martin, 2009).  
       From a critical understanding of the economic situation and the future prospects of 
Extremadura, it seems reasonable to accept that several attempts for regional economic 
development have indeed taken place. Despite receiving SFs for more than 20 years, 
Extremadura is still included in the Convergence Objective and it is still unclear 
whether or not it will be excluded in 2013. The current economic situation in 
Extremadura is not particularly encouraging.  
      The ROP 2000-2006 for Extremadura was co-financed by the Commission and part-
financed by the ERDF (mainly), the ESF and the EAGGF (Inforegio Europa, 2009g).  
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Table 6.10 
Objective 1 Programme for Extremadura (2000-06) 
Breakdown of Finances by priority area in Extremadura                             
PRIORITY AREA TOTAL COST (in euros) EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
PUBLIC AID (EC AND 
OTHERS) (in euros) 
Improvement of 
competitiveness and 
development of the 
production structures 
330,142,475 244,361,395 330,142,475 
Knowledge-based society 139,166,113 95,351,204 139,166,113 
Environment, natural habitats 
and water resources 688,116,815 501,325,647 688,116,815 
Education infrastructure and 
reinforcement of 
professional, technical 
education and training 
297,432,790 199,123,687 297,432,790 
Insertion and professional 
reinsertion of unemployed 
people 
124,540,146 87,178,102 124,540,146 
Stabilisation of employment 
and adaptability 47,931,899 35,948,925 47,931,899 
Integration on to the labour 
market of people with 
specific difficulties 
24,941,517 18,706,138 24,941,517 
Participation of women in the 
labour market 7,940,573 6,352,457 7,940,573 
Local and urban development 268,733,583 195,212,758 268,733,583 
Transport and energy 
networks 1,045,318,644 690,976,212 1,045,318,644 
Farming and rural 
development 206,710,315 144,971,137 206,710,315 
Technical Assistance 7,087,011 5,669,605 7,087,011 
Total 3,188,061,881 
2,225,177,267 [ERDF 
contribution 1,579,118,955 
(70.97%), ESF contribution 
363,573,000 (16.34%) and 
EAGGF contribution 
282,485,312 (12.69%)] 
3,188,061,881 
    Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009g. 
 
       The highest total cost (1,045,318,644 euros) can be observed in the context of 
transport and energy networks with an emphasis on multiple transport systems, 
transport centres and energy distribution networks, whereas the second highest 
(688,116,815 euros) can be seen in terms of environmental protection, with an emphasis 
on forestry (Inforegio Europa, 2009g). On 28/11/07, the Commission approved a ROP 
for Extremadura (2007-13 cycle), within the Convergence Objective framework (around 
2.3 billion euros budget). EU assistance (ERDF) amounted to approximately 1.6 billion 
euros, around 4.5% of the total EU investment for Spain for the 2007-13 Cycle 
(Inforegio Europa, 2009o). 
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Table 6.11 
Programme under the Convergence Objective, co-funded by the ERDF/OP Extremadura (2007-13) 
PRIORITY AXIS EU CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
TOTAL PUBLIC 
CONTRIBUTION (in euros) 
Development of the 
Knowledge Economy 
(Information Society and 
ICTs) (5.4% of total funding) 
97,758,537 24,439,645 122,198,182 
Entrepreneurial Development 
and Innovation (18.1% of 
total funding) 
286,583,659 122,821,564 409,405,223 
Environment, Natural 
Surroundings, Water 
Resources and Risk 
Prevention (26.7% of total 
funding) 
423,856,251 181,652,677 605,508,928 
Transport and Energy (30.5% 
of total funding) 450,211,311 240,561,588 690,772,899 
Local and Urban Sustainable 
Development (11.7% of total 
funding) 
185,156,279 79,352,692 264,508,971 
Social Infrastructures (7.5% 
of total funding) 135,346,434 33,836,610 169,183,044 
Technical Assistance (0.1% 
of total funding) 1,275,438 318,860 1,594,298 
Total 1,580,187,909 682,983,636 2,263,171,545 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009o. 
 
      According to the Programme, several investments in research and development are 
due to take place. Furthermore, the use of information and communication technology 
will be encouraged. Transport infrastructure and territorial accessibility will be 
improved, the environment will be protected (in particular ecosystem and environmental 
diversity) and the management of water resources and waste treatment will be enforced. 
By the end of the current CSF Cycle (2007-13), GNP is expected to increase to 84.5% 
of the EU-27 average and productivity by one-third. An important aim of this 
Programme is the creation of approximately 15,700 jobs, a 0.3% unemployment rate 
decrease and a mobilisation of about 1.7 billion euros of private investments. It is 
believed that the Programme will result in a Gross Regional Product increase of about 
0.4% (Inforegio Europa, 2009o). 
       The Objective 1 funding for Extremadura between 2000 and 2006 was 3.1 billion 
euros, which represents 8.1% of the entire Objective 1 funding for Spain. Also, in 2004, 
Extremadura received from the FCI 81.27 million euros, which represents 8.16% of the 
entire FCI funds for regional economic development in Spain (Salmon, 2004). 
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-Institutional capacity  
      The regional administration of Extremadura is divided into 10 main administrative 
departments in charge of a) Economy, Commerce and Innovation, b) Public 
Administration and Finance/Treasury (Hacienda), c) Development, d) Industry, Energy 
and Environment, e) Agriculture and Rural Development, f) Equality and Employment, 
g) Education, h) Health, i) Culture and Tourism and j) Young People and Sports (Junta 
de Extremadura, 2011a). The department of Public Administration and 
Finance/Treasury (Hacienda) is mainly responsible for the management of the EU 
policies and funds, through the Directorate General of Autonomous Financing and EU 
funds (Junta de Extremadura, 2011b). 
       The spending capacity of Extremadura (in percentage of SFs expenditure) was 
100% during the first CSF Cycle, 61.54% during the second CSF Cycle and 87.70% 
during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 2010). Extremadura reached 100% in terms of its 
spending capacity during the first CSF Cycle, but had the lowest spending capacity 
during the second CSF Cycle and the fifth lowest during the third CSF Cycle (Milio, 
2010). This means that in terms of absorption and implementation capacities, the 
relatively low percentages compared to the other Spanish Objective 1 Regions show 
that Extremadura suffered some problems regarding CSF implementation. This makes 
us argue that the regional institutional capacity of Extremadura was one of the least 
effective amongst the Spanish Objective 1 Regions between 1989 and 2006.        
       Between 1994 and 1999, there were attempts to a) improve communications within 
the region by modernising transport, b) improve telecommunications and energy 
networks and c) resolve environmental problems, such as reforestation and waste 
management. Between 2000 and 2006, Extremadura received approximately 2.1 billion 
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euros from the EU290, which were invested in two main targets: a) the building up of the 
economic base and b) the unemployment rate decrease.        
       An urgent need for innovation was felt, in order for Extremadura to reduce 
unemployment. Therefore, a RIS was set up with the target to create more employment 
mainly in industry. The objectives of the RIS project were three; a) to improve the 
ability of regional actors to develop policies according to the business sector needs and 
the capabilities of Extremadura in innovation and R&D, b) to encourage and support 
innovation within the regional industries and c) to create an adequate framework for 
policy decisions in the context of innovation and investements in order for regional 
economic development to take place in Extremadura. Also, the RIS project intended to 
focus on the identification of the innovation needs of the major industrial sectors in 
Extremadura so as to adapt the regional technology supply and innovation infrastructure 
to demand. The target of the project was to establish a higher degree of participation of 
regional technology centres in the creation and development of projects for business 
innovation (RIS Extremadura, 2010). 
      The Extremadura RIS project created new forms of cooperation amongst the main 
regional actors in innovation. Working groups formed by firms covering six different 
strategic sectors291 were established. The main results were two: a) there was a clear 
identification of the role of those sectors and their potential for the regional economic 
development of Extremadura and b) there was a clear plan which determined how these 
sectors could cooperate in order for regional economic divergence to be decreased 
within the region. In 1997, the “Extremadura IT” project was launched. It focused on 
the IT and telecommunications sectors (NICT) and the target was to eliminate the 
                                                 
290 In the form of SFs. 
291 Agro-food, metal-mechanical, cork-wood-vegetal coal, textile, ornamental stones-building materials, 
and cross-sectoral. 
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disadvantages inherent in the peripheral location of Extremadura. The aims of that 
project were four: a) to modernise the manufacturing base, b) to improve regional and 
local services, c) to decrease inequalities between rural and urban areas and d) to lead to 
further integration between Spain and Portugal (Extremadura IT/Docgener, 2010). 
      The project began with the establishment of Infodex, an organization financed 
equally by both the regional government and the EU SFs under RISI292. The aim of 
Infodex was to examine the situation and provide a framework on which the IT strategy 
would be created. The target of the project was the establishment of the “Extremadura 
intranet”, “a regional network with which secondary networks can be bundled and 
which will eventually provide access for end-users via a total of 1478 terminals across 
the entire region” (Extremadura IT/Docgener, 2010:2). 
       The most important structures working towards regional innovation (IRE 
Network/Extremadura, 2009) in Extremadura are the industrial promotion services of 
the regional administration, such as the Technological Centre ICMC for Cork, Wood 
and Vegetal Carbon, the Department of Agro-alimentary Technology for Food Industry 
Firms (INTAEX) and the Technological Centre INTROMAC for Ornamental Minerals 
and Construction Materials. Moreover, the Minimally Invasive Surgery Centre (CCMI) 
is very important for the supply of surgical and medical specialists from all around the 
world. Other important institutes are the Office for Research Results Transfer from the 
University of Extremadura, the FUNDECYT (FUNDECYT, 2008), which encourages 
cooperation and coordination amongst universities, firms and public administration, 
SODIEX for industrial development, SOFIEX for industrial support and CEX for the 
establishment of new firms (IRE Network/Extremadura, 2009).  
                                                 
292 Which is the regional IT initiative. 
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       The regional administration of Extremadura wishes to further develop the 
Information Society in the region and had developed several important projects, such as 
a Centre for the Promotion of New Initiatives, (which is in charge of the Free Software 
Project GNU/LinEx and of the Extremadura Regional Programme of Innovative 
Actions, eExtremadura), the Vivernet which comprises Business Centres for the New 
Era and the Educational Technological Network 293 . In Extremadura there are 11 
university faculties, including electronics, chemistry, biotechnology and construction 
engineering, and numerous university institutes. Extremadura has also benefited from 
an URBAN II programme, the INTERREG Initiative and several Cohesion Fund 
Projects (IRE Network/Extremadura, 2009). 
       The conclusion is that Extremadura is still far from significant regional economic 
development, despite the fact that some regional authorities are optimistic about the 
future. However, it is fair to argue that certain economic progress has indeed taken place. 
The main problems are the high unemployment rate, the low employment rate and the 
low GDP per capita294, compared always to the other Spanish NUTS 2 regions. The 
high dependency on agriculture and the sparse population are two more obstacles 
hampering convergence. It is not yet clear whether Extremadura will be in position to 
exit the Convergence Objective by 2013.  
       The following tables offer a more comparative view in the examination of our four 
Spanish case studies. Table 6.12 below summarises the main industrial types and 
sectors of each case study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
293 Red Tecnológica Educativa. 
294 The lowest in Spain in 2003. 
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Table 6.12 
First comparative table of the four Spanish case studies 
Region Type of Industries Main Sectors of Specialisation of 
Industry 
Castilla y León Mainly SMEs but also large ones such as Renault, 
Michelin, Bridgestone H., El Arbol, Iveco, Nissa M., 
Iberica, Ebro Puleva, Campofrio, Pascual and Siro, G. 
Norte, Viajes Halcon, G. Anton, Begar and MRS, 
Antibioticos and Europac, G. Indal 
Automotive, Energy, Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals, Agro-Food, 
Aeronautics, Biotechnology 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
Mainly SMEs but also large ones such as IBM and 
Ford 
Computer Software, Automotive, 
Non-metal Mineral Products, 
Tobacco, Food and Beverage, 
Footwear, Textiles, Leather, 
Metallurgy, Metal Products 
Manufacturing 
Andalucía Mainly SMEs but also an Aerospace Industry Textiles, Tobacco, Aerospace 
Technology 
Extremadura Mainly SMEs Textiles, Tobacco, Metal Products 
Manufacturing, Energy Production, 
Information Technology 
Source: EURES/Castilla y León, 2009; EURES/Comunidad Valenciana, 2009; Atlas/Spain, 2004 ; 
Inforegio Europa, 2009a; EURES/Andalucía, 2009; Andalucía.com, 2011; IRE Network/Extremadura, 
2009; EURES/Extremadura, 2009. 
 
       Tables 6.13 and 6.14 below summarise the funds our four Spanish case studies have 
received during the third and fourth CSF Cycles compared to their population.  
Table 6.13 
Second comparative table of the four Spanish case studies 
Region Population 
on 
1/1/2000 
Population 
on 
1/1/2006 
EU 
Contribution 
for ROP 
2000-2006 (in 
euros) 
Total Public 
Contribution 
for ROP 2000-
2006 (in euros) 
Priority Area 
with the 
Highest EU 
Contribution 
(in euros) 
Priority Area 
with the 
Highest Public 
Contribution 
(in euros) 
Castilla y León 
(Objective 1 
between 2000-
2006) 
2,479,118 2,523,020 3,294,657,914 5,032,459,553 Transport and 
Energy 
(1,267,483,460) 
Transport and 
Energy 
(2,043,022,621) 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
(Objective 1 
between 2000-
2006) 
4,120,729 4,806,908 2,865,472,017 4,533,068,655 Environment, 
Nature and 
Water 
(826,989,130) 
Environment, 
Nature and 
Water 
(1,344,040,822) 
Andalucía 
(Objective 1 
between 2000-
2006) 
7,340,052 7,975,672 8,186,021,509 12,115,307,878 Transport and 
Energy 
(2,938,311,691) 
Transport and 
Energy 
(4,647,801,235) 
Extremadura 
(Objective 1 
between 2000-
2006) 
1,069,420 1,086,373 2,225,177,267 3,188,061,881 Transport and 
Energy 
(690,976,212) 
Transport and 
Energy 
(1,045,318,644) 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009f; Inforegio Europa, 2009h; Inforegio Europa, 2009a; Inforegio Europa, 
2009g; INE, 2011a; INE, 2011b. 
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Table 6.14 
Third comparative table of the four Spanish case studies 
Region Population on 
1/1/2010 
(latest data 
available) 
EU 
Contribution 
for ROP 
2007-2013 (in 
euros) 
Total Public 
Contribution 
for ROP 
2007-2013 (in 
euros) 
Priority Area 
with the 
Highest EU 
Contribution 
(in euros) 
Priority Area 
with the 
Highest Public 
Contribution 
(in euros) 
Castilla y León 
(Phasing-In 
between 2007-
2013) 
2,559,515 818,194,437 1,175,091,178 Transport and 
Energy 
(233,696,267) 
Transport and 
Energy 
(357,125,579) 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
(Phasing-In 
between 2007-
2013) 
5,111,706 1,326,340,547 2,239,628,287 Environment, 
Water 
Resources and 
Risk Prevention 
(391,902,925) 
Environment, 
Water 
Resources and 
Risk Prevention 
(603,727,065) 
Andalucía 
(Convergence 
Objective 
between 2007-
2013) 
8,370,975 6,531,308,334 8,568,121,497 Environment, 
Natural 
Surroundings, 
Water 
Resources and 
Risk Prevention 
(2,047,767,906) 
Environment, 
Natural 
Surroundings, 
Water 
Resources and 
Risk Prevention 
(2,925,382,726) 
Extremadura 
(Convergence 
Objective 
between 2007-
2013) 
1,107,220 1,580,187,909 2,263,171,545 Transport and 
Energy 
(450,211,311) 
Transport and 
Energy 
(690,772,899) 
Source: Inforegio Europa, 2009n; Inforegio Europa, 2009q; Inforegio Europa, 2009j; Inforegio Europa, 
2009o; INE, 2011d. 
 
6.4-CONCLUSIONS 
      The main conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that in some Spanish 
NUTS 2 regions, efficient regional economic development has indeed taken place and 
in some others has not. According to dependency theory, Castilla y León and 
Comunidad Valenciana can be regarded as semi-peripheral regions, whereas Andalucía 
and Extremadura can be regarded as peripheral. Just like in Italy, metropolis-satellite 
relations still exist between the core and peripheral regions.  
       As in Italy, we again argue that both the MLG and the theories of soft and new 
regionalism can be used as analytical tools in order to describe and critically examine 
regional policy in Spain. MLG is used in order to critically present the cooperation 
amongst the three levels (EU, national and regional) in the context of the EU Cohesion 
Policy. Soft regionalism helps understand that regional development can become a 
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reality only under the condition that there is adequate consultation with the regional and 
local authorities and if central governments are willing to offer power and authority to 
their regions, according to the principle of subsidiarity. New regionalism explains the 
increase of economic competitiveness on a region-by-region basis and highlights the 
importance of the regions, and as a consequence the importance and necessity of 
regional development, based on processes such as visioning and strategic planning.  
       In all four NUTS 2 regions examined in this chapter, there was adequate funding 
from both the EU and the national governments in order for regional economic 
development to begin. In all four regions there are traces of regional development, but 
some of them show much better economic progress than others. This can be explained 
by the fact that in some regions, socio-economic problems, such as high unemployment, 
lack of education and poor infrastructure could not have been better resolved by the SFs.       
       One of the most important problems that hamper regional economic development is 
the inefficient spending capacity of some of the peripheral regions, in our case 
Extremadura and Andalucía. According to the EU Cohesion Policy Guidelines, all the 
allocation funds (in the form of SFs) must be spent and invested in order for regional 
economic convergence to become a reality. It is the responsibility of the member 
countries to spend their allocated funds according to their specific needs and problems. 
If these funds are not spent within the deadlines of the specific CSF Cycle, then during 
the next Cycle, these regions will receive fewer or no funds for regional development. 
In our case, the semi-peripheral regions of Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana 
have already exited the Convergence Objective, partly due to their satisfactory 295  
spending capacity. Spending (or absorption) capacity is closely linked with institutional 
                                                 
295 Compared to the other third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions. 
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capacity, so we can argue that inefficient spending capacity is proof of inefficient 
institutional capacity. 
      Also, in terms of institutional capacity, noticeable differences between the structure 
and functioning of local governance in some NUTS 2 Convergence Objective Regions -
in our case the peripheral Extremadura and Andalucía- in addition to confusion around 
the administrative roles dealing with regional economic development are at the root of 
the problem. Some regions had never before been involved in European policies and 
this means that they did not have the chance to adapt their administrative systems to the 
guidelines of the EU Cohesion Policy. There was confusion in the cooperation of the 
regional governments with EU institutions and in some cases regions did not even 
initially exist as geographical, administrative and political entities.  
      Problems in spending and administrative capacities, unavoidably lead to problems 
with implementation, as regions find difficulties in implementing the CSF. In 1989, the 
SFs started financing the ROPs. The question was whether implementation would take 
place according to the basic guidelines and principles of EU Regional Policy. In order to 
resolve implementation problems, the Commission stopped placing both the decision-
making and implementation decisions exclusively within the responsibility of the 
national authorities. This shift in regional policy made regional institutions become 
important policy actors and increased their significance in the attempts at regional 
economic convergence and development. This shift was followed by another, from the 
exclusive top-down regional policies to a combination of top-down and bottom-up ones, 
and in some cases purely bottom-up ones. The implementation of the CSF at a national 
level became a reality through the NOPs and at a regional level through the ROPs. In 
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Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana, this shift was successful. In the other two 
regions examined in this study it was problematic.  
       As in the case of Italy, we have to remain critical when assessing the opinions of 
the interviewees regarding the four Spanish case studies of the thesis. Sometimes they 
are just describing the regional economic situation and in others they present the 
methods and processes by which regional economic development can take place within 
their particular regions. However, in some cases they are being over-optimistic not only 
regarding future prospects, but also regarding the current impact of the regional policies 
since the beginning of the CSF Cycles, particularly in the cases of Andalucía and 
Extremadura. We must bear in mind that whilst Castilla y León and Comunidad 
Valenciana have exited the Convergence Objective as “Phasing-In” Regions (which 
means they have been excluded as “Natural Effect” Regions due to their significant 
regional development and not due to the EU Enlargement), Andalucía and Extremadura, 
despite receiving SFs for more than 20 years are still included in the Convergence 
Objective.  
       In the cases of Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana, a certain amount of 
optimism is justified, but when speaking about Andalucía and Extremadura we can 
argue that so far there is no room for over-optimism. Indeed, several attempts at 
development have taken place in both regions, but the results so far are not particularly 
encouraging either for the current situation, or for the future.   
       The question in every case of regional economic development is whether the 
traditional top-down, or bottom-up approach is more effective. Since the beginning of 
the SFs, there has been a shift from exclusively top-down regional policies to a 
combination of top-down with bottom-up ones and in some cases the bottom-up 
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approach is the dominant. The bottom-up approach296 seems to be more efficient due to 
the fact that it is concentrated on individual regions and localities. However, in order for 
this approach to lead to regional economic development there is a need for sufficient 
cooperation between regional, national and EU authorities. In Spain, the semi-peripheral 
regions of Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana are the most prosperous of the 
third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions, whereas peripheral Andalucía and Extremadura 
are totally the opposite, still suffering from high unemployment, low employment, low 
GDP per capita and other infrastructure, environmental and education problems. 
Regional development indeed takes place in Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana, 
but in the other two regions it is not sufficient.  
       We can also argue that the Comunidades Autónomas and the FCI have indeed 
helped decentralisation to take place 297  and development to begin inside the less 
advantaged regions and not outside them.                
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
296 Which can be linked to the horizontal/territorial one. 
297 Use of the bottom-up approach. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
       This research has produced two sets of academic findings. One the one hand, with 
respect to the current theories, three main conclusions can be drawn: a) the evident 
regional divergence (clear distinction between core and periphery) that exists in Italy 
and Spain can be effectively analysed and explained by the use of dependency theory, 
which emerges from structuralism, b) the terms new and soft regionalism, as well as 
MLG can be effectively adapted to the case of the EU Regional Policy and c) the less-
centralised, “bottom-up” approach seems to be more effective than the “top-down” one, 
in order for regional development to take place. This can be mainly observed at the 
former Objective 1 Regions of Italy (namely Abruzzo, Molise, Sardegna and Basilicata) 
and Spain (such as Cantabria, Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana), which have 
managed to exit either Objective 1, or the Convergence Objective. 
       On the other hand, the evidence gathered in our empirical research on the eight EU 
regions shows that the main reasons for the persistent regional economic divergence can 
be traced back to the historical centralisation of national regional policies, inadequate 
cooperation between EU, national and regional authorities, and the violation of the 
additionality, subsidiarity and partnership principles, and that the bottom-up approach is 
more likely to result in regional development.  
      Since 1989, EU Regional Policy has been orientated towards socio-economic 
cohesion, but for this to become a reality, economic regional convergence is essential, 
i.e. the convergence of regional economic indicators like GDP per capita towards the 
EU average. Core-periphery structures and regional disparities hamper cohesion. 
Certain optimism can be observed regarding the fact that regional disparities have 
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indeed narrowed and that regional economic development is progressing, but at the 
same time there are still doubts about whether or not domestic regional policies are 
being conducted according to the basic EU guidelines and principles.  
      In both Italy and Spain, evident regional economic progress, which can indeed lead 
to the reduction of regional disparities in the near future, can be observed. Since 1989, 
four Italian and eight Spanish NUTS 2 regions have exited Objective 1. Comparing the 
results of the EU Regional Policy before and after 1989, it can be argued that, after 1989, 
regional economic divergence has been narrower. The target of convergence is 
gradually becoming a reality, even though core-periphery economic structures still exist. 
In both countries, until 2000, there was a high degree of centralisation within domestic 
regional development policies, accompanied by problems around cooperation between 
the ERDF and the national authorities, particularly in terms of the exploitation of 
regional potential for endogenous growth.  
       However, since the beginning of the third CSF Cycle, regional policies have 
become more decentralised and regional economic development in both Spain and Italy 
(through the practice of bottom-up policies) has become more evident. Currently only 
four Italian and four Spanish NUTS 2 regions are included in the Convergence 
Objective. This shows that regional development has indeed taken place in both 
countries and regional disparities have been significantly reduced.  
       In Italy, the region of Basilicata is more prosperous compared to the other third 
CSF Cycle Objective 1 regions (with the exception of Sardegna). Basilicata is a 
“Phasing-Out” Region, which means it exited the Convergence Objective due to the EU 
Enlargement, whereas Sardegna is a “Phasing-In” Region, meaning that it has exited the 
Convergence Objective because of significant economic development. The regions of 
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Campania, Puglia and more evidently Calabria suffer from high unemployment, low 
employment, low GDP per capita, lack of basic infrastructure and many more economic 
and environmental problems.  
       In Spain, the regions of Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana are the most 
prosperous of the third CSF Cycle Objective 1 Regions (both “Phasing-In”), whereas 
Andalucía and Extremadura are still suffering from high unemployment, low 
employment, low GDP per capita and other infrastructure, environmental and education 
problems. 
       The regional economic divergence identified in Italy during the third CSF Cycle 
was more pronounced than in Spain. In Italy there is still a clear distinction between 
core and periphery, since the North is one of the best performing areas of the EU, 
whereas the Mezzogiorno is still one of the worst performing, except for Abruzzo and 
Molise. However, the encouraging feature about Italy is that the regions of Basilicata 
and Sardegna, despite the fact that were both included in Objective 1 during the third 
CSF Cycle, are currently out of the Convergence Objective.  
       In Italy, the central government, at least until the beginning of the third CSF Cycle, 
seemed not eager to offer power and responsibilities to regional and local authorities, 
again with the exceptions of Abruzzo and Molise, where the bottom-up approach (even 
as a combination with the top-down approach) took place. Nevertheless, during the third 
CSF Cycle, bottom-up policies were used more often and the successful development of 
Basilicata and Sardegna is mainly a result of the correct practice of this approach. 
      In Spain, it can be argued that regional development is more evident. Compared to 
Italy, there are two main differences. The first is the fact that the developed “core” 
regions of Spain (namely Comunidad de Madrid, Cataluña and País Vasco) are (still) 
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less developed than some of those which form the Italian North (and particularly 
Lombardia, Piemonte and Emilia-Romagna). This means that the overall regional 
divergence is narrower.  
      The second difference is the fact that in Spain the principle of subsidiarity is being 
followed in a more appropriate way, compared to Italy, despite the fact that in both 
countries (and perhaps more significantly in Spain), the principle of additionality has 
been violated several times. Regions such as Castilla-la Mancha, Extremadura, Castilla 
y León, Andalucía and Principado de Asturias have indeed received higher amounts of 
funding from the EU than from the Spanish government.  
       Spain and Spanish regions have also received respectable amounts in the form of 
Cohesion Funds, whilst Italy has not. We have to mention that Cohesion Funds have 
been distributed at a national level. This means that their absorption has not suffered 
from regional spending capacity problems, widely observed in the context of SFs, 
particularly in the current Convergence Objective Regions. Lack of difficulties in 
spending capacity, in terms of Cohesion Funds, means more effective absorption and 
better regional economic development prospects. In that sense, Spain has benefited 
more than Italy. 
       GDP per capita and the employment rate (again during the third CSF Cycle), 
steadily increased (relative to the EU average) in all the Spanish Objective 1 Regions, 
without a single exception. This is very encouraging and proves that satisfactory 
regional economic development (at least in terms of these variables) has indeed taken 
place in Spain. There was a decrease in the unemployment rate in both the Spanish and 
the Italian Objective 1 Regions, but in Spain the regional unemployment rates in the 
majority of the Objective 1 Regions were much lower. The fact that in the third CSF 
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Cycle, as many as seven previous Objective 1 Regions have managed to exit the 
Convergence Objective (namely Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Principado de 
Asturias, Canarias, Región de Murcia, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta and Ciudad 
Autónoma de Melilla), contrary to only two regions in Italy (Basilicata and Sardegna) is 
a clear sign that regional development in Spain has been more successful than in Italy. 
      Another positive feature in the case of Spain is the fact that the “Comunidades 
Autónomas” and the FCI have positively contributed to a real process of 
decentralisation taking place (use of the bottom-up approach) and for development to 
begin inside the peripheral regions and not outside them.       
       In all eight Italian and Spanish case studies, there was adequate funding from both 
the EU and the national governments, earmarked for regional economic development. In 
all regions, there are traces of regional development, but some of them show further 
economic progress than others. This can be explained by the fact that in some regions 
the problems of poor spending and administrative capacity, implementation difficulties, 
insufficient education and infrastructure, lack of cooperation between economic players 
and regional authorities and lack of investments are more evident than in others. 
       Another obstacle comes in the form of problems with administrative and 
institutional capacities. Several differences in the structure and functioning of local 
governance in some Convergence Regions (in our case Calabria, Campania, Puglia, 
Extremadura and Andalucía), in addition to a confusion within the administrative roles 
dealing with regional economic development, are the root of the problem. Some regions 
had never before been involved in European policies and this means that they did not 
have the chance to adapt their administrative systems to the basic guidelines of EU 
Cohesion Policy. There was confusion in the cooperation of the regional governments 
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with the EU institutions and in some cases regions did not even already exist as 
geographical, administrative and political entities.  
      The establishment of a vertical and horizontal differentiated distribution of powers 
and responsibilities, in addition to effective planning, programming, coordination and 
monitoring capacities, was seen as a fundamental responsibility by the EU institutions. 
In Basilicata, Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana this target has, more or less 
become a reality. In the other case studies the results are not very encouraging. 
       Administrative and institutional capacity problems are linked with spending 
capacity problems, hence we can argue that the inefficient spending capacity of some of 
the regions (in our case Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Extremadura and Andalucía) has 
created difficulties that hamper regional economic development. According to EU 
Cohesion Policy Guidelines (Leonardi, 2003 and 2005; Milio, 2010), all of the 
allocation of SFs must be spent and invested in order for regional economic 
convergence to become a reality. It is the responsibility of the member states to spend 
their allocated funds according to their specific needs and problems. If these funds are 
not spent within the deadlines of the specific CSF Cycle, then these regions will receive 
fewer or no funds for regional development during the following and future Cycles. In 
the case of Italy, Basilicata (which managed to spend its entire allocation during the 
second CSF Cycle), has been excluded from the Convergence Objective, even as a 
“Phasing-Out” Region, partly due to its efficient (compared to the other third CSF 
Cycle Objective 1 Regions) spending capacity. More significant progress has taken 
place in the Spanish regions of Castilla y León and Comunidad Valenciana, which have 
exited the Convergence Objective as “Phasing-In” Regions. 
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       If we compare the percentages of SFs expenditure of the Italian and Spanish 
Objective 1 Regions during the third CSF Cycle, we find that in all Spanish regions, 
percentages are higher compared to those of Italian regions. Also, the percentages of 
Italian Objective 1 Regions during the third CSF Cycle are much lower compared to 
those of the first and second CSF Cycles. This leads us to two conclusions: a) the 
spending and institutional capacity of the Spanish Objective 1 Regions during the third 
CSF Cycle has been much more efficient compared to those of the Italian Objective 1 
Regions and b) disappointedly, the spending capacity of the Italian Objective 1 Regions 
during the third CSF Cycle has been less efficient compared to that of the previous two 
CSF Cycles and this reveals problems and difficulties regarding the implementation of 
the CSF framework. The institutional capacity of the Italian Objective 1 Regions during 
the third CSF Cycle was less efficient compared to the previous two CSF Cycles. 
       If we also compare the spending capacity between Italy and Spain in their Objective 
1 Regions, we can argue that during all three CSF Cycles Spain had higher percentages 
of SFs expenditure compared to total allocation. This means that Spain could actually 
implement the CSF framework much more efficiently than Italy. 
       Problems in spending and administrative capacity have unavoidably led to 
implementation problems. In 1989, SFs started financing the ROPs. The question was 
whether or not the implementation would take place according to the basic principles of 
the EU Regional Policy298. Two kinds of implementation exist: the quantitative and the 
qualitative. In order for implementation problems to be resolved, the Commission 
stopped placing both the decision-making and implementation decisions exclusively 
within the responsibility of the national authorities. This shift of regional policy enabled 
                                                 
298 Additionality, subsidiarity, partnership and programming. 
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regional institutions to become important policy actors and empowered them to shape 
and implement initiatives aimed at regional economic convergence and development. 
This shift was followed by another, from the exclusive top-down regional policies to a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up, and in some cases purely bottom-up, ones. 
The implementation of the CSF at a national level became a reality through the NOPs 
and at a regional level through the ROPs. In Basilicata, Castilla y León and Comunidad 
Valenciana, this shift was successful. In the other case studies, it was more problematic. 
       The less successful features of cohesion policy (mainly observed in the 
Convergence Regions) are that a) the principle of strategic planning is not being 
correctly followed, b) implementation problems have appeared in terms of the desirable 
place-based territorial approach, c) there have been problems in differentiating between 
efficiency and social inclusion, d) there have been difficulties in the context of 
contractual arrangements and in their attempt to influence both the Commission and the 
Member States so as to establish institutional alterations according to specific problems 
and needs, and e) there is insufficient policy debate concerning the results at a regional 
and EU level, as both the regions and the EU are mainly concentrated on issues such as 
financial absorption and irregularities (Barca, 2009a).   
       The question in every case of regional economic development is whether or not the 
traditional top-down, or the contemporary bottom-up approach is more effective. The 
answer is not simple. Since the beginning, EU Cohesion Policy has experienced a shift 
from exclusively top-down regional policies to a combination of top-down with bottom-
up ones, and in some cases the bottom-up approach is the dominant. The bottom-up 
approach299 is argued to be more effective, due to the fact that it is concentrated on 
                                                 
299 Which is linked to a horizontal and territorial approach. 
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individual regions and localities. However, a condition for this approach to lead to 
regional economic development, is that sufficient cooperation between the regional, 
national and EU authorities needs to take place. Without national contributions and 
efficient three-level cooperation, it is unlikely to achieve the desired objectives.  
       The economic convergence of the EU-27 has been further undermined by the recent 
global economic recession that has hit EU regions. This global financial crisis had a 
certain impact on both Italy and Spain. Italy is currently suffering its tenth economic 
set-back in the last 50 years. In Italy, the latest recession (meaning in general a period of 
sustained GDP contraction) began during the second quarter of 2008 and lasted for 
about one year. It is considered to be as severe as that of the 1930s. GDP fell because of 
a sharp reduction in industrial activity, combined with a simultaneous reduction in the 
service sector activity (Credit-Agricole, 2009).  
       Italy was the first euro-zone member to experience negative growth in 2008. The 
economic crisis firstly hit the northern regions, which are more exposed to international 
trade and further specialised in investment goods. In 2009, Convergence Regions 
experienced a GDP contraction of 5.2%, whilst Competitiveness and Employment a 
drop of 5.3%. The degree of the impact of the crisis on the various regions depended on 
their product specialisation and their degree of openness to international trade. 
According to estimations, the core Italian Competitiveness and Employment Regions 
were expected to exit the crisis before the Convergence ones because of two reasons: a) 
they have a greater amount of resources to mobilise to exit the economic crisis, 
including the appropriate use of SFs and b) they actually own the major source of 
financing for recovery measures (regional discretionary resources). Indeed, from the 
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summer of 2009, the first signs of recovery in the core Northern regions were evident 
(Fabbris and Michelin, 2010).       
       Busillo (2010) carefully notes that the Italian economy was hit by the international 
financial crisis with a drop of approximately five percentage points at the GDP level, 
but certain factors hampering economic development, especially in the Mezzogiorno 
were pre-existent; these include high labour costs, low productivity growth (3 
percentage points between 1998 and 2008), low employment rates compared to the EU 
average, lack of development in terms of human capital and difficulties in keeping the 
public debt under control (Busillo, 2010). The financial crisis worsened an already 
difficult economic situation and led to a slower and more problematic economic 
recovery than expected (Credit-Agricole, 2009).    
       Between 2000 and 2007, productivity in Italy declined and this led to an increase in 
unit labour costs. The crisis worsened Italy’s loss of competitiveness on global markets 
and its trade balance began steadily deteriorating. In the short term, limited or no 
improvement is expected on the labour market and according to analysts, it is highly 
unlikely for Italy to reach the level of its previous cyclical peak300 before the end of 
2011 (Credit-Agricole, 2009).  
       Also, Spain entered the recession during the second quarter of 2008, after a slow 
growth in 2007. Between 2007 and December 2009, unemployment increased by more 
than 11 percentage points (from 8% to more than 19%, the highest in the EU in 2009) 
and its fiscal deficit increased by 4.1 percentage points between 2008 and 2009 (in 2008 
it was 3.8% of GDP and in 2009 it reached 7.9% of GDP), which is practically double 
the EMU limit. The crisis had a significant impact on the economy from the 
                                                 
300 A phase when activity reaches a high point. 
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construction’s sector decline, to the oversupply of housing, to a decrease in consumer 
spending and to reduction of exports. The main actions of the Spanish government to 
compensate for the economic contraction were mainly focused on unemployment 
benefits and loan guarantees (CIA Factbook/Spain, 2010b). 
       In Spain, banks were exposed to the collapsed domestic construction sector and the 
real estate market dangers. That explains why the government’s intervention to rescue 
the banking sector was necessary (CIA Factbook/Spain, 2010b). The economic crisis 
caused a huge drop in labour demand, as key labour-intensive sectors shrunk. 
According to experts, economic recovery should create approximately 2% to 2.5% per 
year new jobs to stimulate growth. However, the high budget deficit, the still negative 
GDP growth, high unemployment rates, and higher financing costs for industries and 
companies make it very difficult for the economy to embark on a recovery path. 
Particularly, in the case of savings’ banks faced several problems due to the fact that 
their loans could actually not be repaid because of high unemployment (Wharton 
Universia, 2010). 
       In this context, the Commission is also exploring ways to review Regional Policy 
beyond 2014. The findings of this work shed light on some of the crucial concerns of 
the Commission, namely the sustained underperformance of some of the old EU-15 less 
favoured regions. In the current debate, Commissioner Danuta Hubner (2009) argues 
that Cohesion Policy can be regarded as one of the main impetuses towards the target of 
European Integration and Fabrizio Barca (2009) mentions that there is a need for a 
socio-economic policy tailored to the exact problems and needs of the regions, 
according always with efficient multilevel governance. Barca favours the bottom-up 
approach. Moreover, the principle of additionality should be strengthened by the 
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Commission, in order to be ensured that national expenditure is not substituted with EU 
expenditure. Hence, a direct link with the Stability and Growth Pact should be 
established. The “territorial” development approach, despite difficulties, is still going to 
be followed until 2013 (Barca, 2009a). Cohesion Policy has undoubtedly contributed 
positively towards the establishment of a common strategic approach regarding regional 
policy across the EU, but in some cases, the implementation of parallel EU and national 
policies has been problematic, resulting in an “inadequate internal policy coherence 
between cohesion policy and domestic regional development policies/strategies and 
limited exploitation of the scope for strategic synergies” (Barca 2009a:92). 
       From our research, it can be argued that in order for Cohesion Policy to become 
more efficient in Italy and Spain, there is a need for a) the concentration of resources on 
three or maximum four core priorities, b) a clearer and more coherent identification of 
objectives, c) the establishment of an annual reporting system regarding results and 
indicators, d) more efficient training regimes to be introduced, particularly in order for 
civil servants to become better informed on how to adapt the CSF framework to 
domestic regional policies towards regional economic convergence, e) strengthening of 
role of the Commission, in particular the Directorates-General 301  and f) the active 
participation of both the European Parliament and the Council on implementation issues, 
so as to evaluate the actions of both the EU Member States and the Commission (Barca, 
2009a). An efficient EU Regional Policy can become an important tool to overcome the 
crisis and the recession, since it can contribute to the creation of new jobs and the 
establishment of more efficient training and educational regimes.  
                                                 
301 Which are considered to be the headquarters of the EU Regional Policy and have the power to set 
Regional Policy guidelines and monitor implementation issues in order to make sure that the EU Regional 
Policy is efficiently being conducted according to basic principles, such as additionality, subsidiarity and 
partnership and towards the economic development of the regions lagging behind. 
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       In both Italy and Spain, regional and local employment rates and efficiency can be 
increased, and the effective transferring of knowledge can be established and updated, if 
sufficient links amongst local suppliers and foreign companies and firms take place. 
Educational and training regimes must be improved in all the case studies and 
particularly the Convergence ones, in order for higher productivity growth to be 
established through new ideas and practices. “Phasing-In” and “Phasing-Out” Regions 
must modernise and improve their business environments and also carry out more 
investment in education, training, R&D and creative skills in order for regional 
development to actually take place. It is true that they have significantly reduced the 
economic distance from the Competitiveness and Employment Regions, but in order to 
enter this Objective, both “Phasing-In” and “Phasing-Out” Regions should increase 
productivity and employment, with special attention to R&D, patents and human capital 
(Sixth Progress Report, 2009).        
       The question of whether or not the EU should continue following a bottom-up 
regional policy is an issue synonymous with the implementation of subsidiarity. The 
bottom-up approach has significantly helped some regions in Italy and Spain to achieve 
important regional development and exit the Convergence Objective. However, four 
Italian and four Spanish NUTS 2 regions are still included in the Convergence 
Objective and it is still unclear whether or not they will exit by 2013. Their prospects of 
convergence need to be considered in the context of the Convergence Regions also 
including the 12 new Member States. 
       The current discussion of what EU Cohesion Policy will look like after 2013 will 
actually depend on the decision on whether to continue or abandon the bottom-up 
approach. From our work, it can be suggested that there should be a rethinking of 
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whether EU Cohesion Policy should return to a combination of top-down and bottom-
up approaches, or, in other words, to a more centralised regional policy model. Such a 
model will probably offer regional authorities less freedom in their decision-making 
process, but will definitely strengthen the role of the Commission and the national 
governments. This shift of power and responsibility from regional to national and EU 
authorities could well be the solution of the problems of the underperforming regions, 
as perhaps the regional administrations in the Convergence Regions are not yet 
sufficiently experienced, or organised, to bear the heavy burden of responsibility 
regarding their regional policy decision-making. 
       Another important fact worth mentioning is that the new Member States had to 
prepare before joining by building their institutional capacity, especially in relation to 
policy design and implementation, as part of the conditions to membership. This means 
that by the time of their actual entry into the EU, these countries had already established 
an adequate regime in order for the CSF to be adapted without significant problems. 
This was not the case for Italy and Spain, where there was actually limited, or no 
preparation when the Reform of SFs took place in 1989 to allow EU guidelines and 
regulations to be absorbed and followed in a more satisfactory way in order to move 
towards economic convergence.  
       A crucial issue that will definitely play an important part in the context of EU 
Regional Policy in the following years is whether the EU can actually afford to continue 
funding regions such as the four Convergence Italian and Spanish ones, which, despite 
receiving funds for 20 years, are still included in the Convergence Objective. It is 
almost certain that, due to budgetary constraints that will appear mainly because of the 
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enlargement, the funds that will be received by underperforming regions in the near 
future will be far lower compared to current funding.      
       The latest enlargement poses new challenges to the EU, and, without an efficient 
Cohesion Policy mechanism, convergence may be troublesome. Ever since the 
beginning of the enlargement process, there have been concerns as how the EU would 
manage fundings both for the new Member States’ NUTS 2 regions and for the old 
Convergence ones. The fact that the old Convergence Regions started receiving far 
fewer SFs than in the past, due to the enlargement, raised a question on how the old 
Convergence Regions would actually be in position to exit the Objective 1, or the 
Convergence Objective while receiving limited SFs. If the current Convergence 
Regions of the EU-15 do not manage to exit the Convergence Objective by 2013, then 
this will indeed be a serious problem for the EU Cohesion Policy and an important 
obstacle to regional economic convergence in the EU.  
      The key finding of this work is further confirmation that in order for regional 
economic convergence to become a reality, a key condition should be an effective 
institutional capacity building, in order for the CSF to be adapted and properly followed 
according to the specific regional problems and needs and according to the EU Regional 
Policy guidelines and principles. An adequate institutional capacity will lead to an 
effective spending capacity and as a result to a positive economic impact of the SFs. 
This impact is highly likely to result in a significant regional economic performance, 
which is the key to regional economic convergence. The causality across these factors 
has to be born in mind when EU institutions review Cohesion Policy for the 2014 round. 
Indeed such findings are reference points for the future of an EU Cohesion Policy still 
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characterised by bottom-up regional development, not only for Italy and Spain, but for 
the EU as a whole. 
      The findings from this research also highlight areas and issues for which further 
research would be valuable. Drawing on our research, an area that merits further 
investigation is to further study how EU Cohesion Policy will look like after 2013; how 
the new Member States will be able to efficiently adapt to that; and how the old 
Convergence Regions will also adapt to that. The debate on whether or not a less-
centralised, bottom-up, EU Cohesion Policy can produce effective results for the EU-15 
underperforming regions is still open and is clearly linked with inevitable budgetary 
constraints posed by a concurrence of factors, including the euro, the current financial 
crisis and the more severe need of the new Member States. 
       Further research on the possibility of a new more centralised EU Regional Policy 
after 2013 might be valuable, as, for instance, by comparing the impact of Cohesion 
Funds and SFs on regional economic growth. The funding to the new Member States 
after 2013 will depend on whether the current EU-15 Convergence Objective Regions 
will exit the Convergence Objective by 2013. If not, a new design of the EU Cohesion 
Policy will have to take place and further investigation would be valuable in order to 
find out a) how the SFs will be divided between old and new member states and b) if 
these funds will actually be enough in order to result in regional economic development 
for the old and new Member States. 
       Finally, further research would be worthwhile, in order to discover whether or not 
the pre-accession aids and strategies, imposed on the new Member States in order to 
facilitate their entrance in the EU by helping them learn how to effectively implement 
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the CSF, could be efficiently adapted to the current EU-15 underperforming 
Convergence Regions, in order for the latter to improve their spending capacity.  
       Unlike the 12 new EU Member States, the EU-15 ones did not receive either 
lessons, or aids before their entrance in the EU, in order to gain further knowledge on 
how to effectively absorb the SFs. This lack of knowledge could be a reason behind 
their current regional economic underperformance, so it would be interesting to 
investigate if the pre-accession strategies applied to the new EU Member States can 
actually have a positive impact on the EU-15 Convergence Regions. Improvement of 
spending capacity means better institutional capacity and increases the possibilities for 
regional economic convergence. Further research on the impact of such strategies on the 
underperforming Convergence Regions can lead to interesting conclusions about the 
future of the EU Regional “Cohesion” Policy towards the convergence target in an 
already significantly enlarged EU.    
 
        
 
       
        
        
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRES  
 
 
      The following questionnaires were administered to officials and representatives of a) 
national government in Italy and Spain (civil servants), b) regional authorities within the 
Italian and Spanish NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions and c) EU authorities in charge of EU 
Regional Policy within the NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions of Italy and Spain. 
Interviewees responded to the questionnaires in writing through e-mails. In some cases, 
the answers emerged from a team effort. The interviewees at a regional, national and 
EU level were carefully chosen according to their knowledge, experience and specific 
positions they hold. The interviewees at a regional level are regional ministers, regional 
presidents, directors, managers, administrative members and Professors in charge of 
Regional Policy. The interviewees at a national level are general directors, sub-
directors, economic analysts, members of evaluation units at the Italian and Spanish 
Ministries in charge of regional policies. The interviewees at an EU level are 
programme managers in charge of EU Regional Policy in Italy and Spain, working for 
the European Commission in Brussels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 310
 EU COMMISSION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
      The first questionnaire was designed for officials of the EU Commission. It 
comprises eight questions: 
  
1. After 15 years of receiving SFs, why do some NUTS 2 Italian and Spanish regions 
spend more of their allocated resources than others? In other words why is the regional 
response level, in terms of spending the available resources, significantly different 
between some current Italian (e.g. Basilicata and Calabria) (or) Spanish (e.g. 
Comunidad Valenciana and Extremadura) NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions? What reasons 
would you give for the different take-up in different regions?   
 
2. Despite the fact that there are evident signs of regional economic progress within 
Italy and Spain, some of the Italian and Spanish NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions have a 
lower GDP per capita level, higher level of unemployment and lower level of 
employment compared to other Italian and Spanish NUTS 2 regions, as well as 
compared to other EU NUTS 2 regions. In your opinion, why is convergence in Italian 
and Spanish NUTS 2 regions proceeding at different speeds? Could you please identify 
the main reasons for this, focusing mainly on GDP per capita, employment and 
unemployment rates? Do you think that within the next five and ten years divergence 
across Italian and Spanish regions is likely to increase, or decrease? On what evidence 
do you base your answer?   
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3. In your opinion, what is the relative importance of the ERDF, the ESF, the FIFG and 
the EAGGF towards meeting the objective of regional convergence and regional 
development in Italy and Spain? Do these funds have different approaches towards the 
objective of regional development?   
 
4. Can we argue that, despite some implementation difficulties, EU Structural Policy 
(through its aforementioned funds) has so far had beneficial effects towards the target of 
economic and social cohesion in Italy and Spain? 
 
5. In your opinion, are there any significant differences in terms of a) economic policies 
and b) economic performance (in terms of GDP per capita, employment and 
unemployment) between the NUTS 2 regions within Italy and Spain? If so, what are 
those differences?  
   
6. In your opinion, how have the National Operational Programmes so far contributed to 
the adequate implementation of the Community Support Framework at the national 
level in Italy and Spain, and which are the most important training programmes that 
have taken place within the Objective 1 Regions of Italy and Spain since 1989? 
 
7. In your opinion, how have the Regional Operational Programmes and the multi-year 
integrated programmes (particularly since 1989) so far contributed to the adequate 
implementation of the Community Support Framework at the regional level in Italy and 
Spain and to regional development (within the Italian and Spanish Objective 1 
Regions)?   
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 8. Would you say that in Italy and Spain, policies of regional development have been 
transformed from exclusively “top-down” (highly centralised) to a combination of “top-
down” and “bottom-up” (more decentralised) ones? According to many 
authors/economists/political scientists, a top-down approach takes place when decisions 
regarding regional policy are taken from the central government without consultation 
with regional-local authorities. Thus, regional development begins “outside” the region. 
In terms of the bottom-up approach, there is efficient cooperation between national and 
regional authorities in order for regional development to start “inside” the region. Do 
you agree with this definition/meaning of the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches, 
or do you define them in another way? Can we argue that this transformation has mainly 
taken place during the current (2007-2013) and the previous (2000-2006) CSF Cycle? 
Are there any cases where a pure “bottom-up” approach has taken place?     
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ITALY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
       A second questionnaire was administered to Italian national and regional officials. 
It comprises 12 questions to national government officials (eight main and four 
supplementary ones) and 11 to regional government officials (six main and five 
supplementary ones).  
 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
MAIN QUESTIONS  
1. After 15 years of receiving SFs, why do some NUTS 2 Italian regions spend more of 
their allocated resources than others? In other words why is the regional response level, 
in terms of spending the available resources, significantly different between some 
current Italian (e.g. Basilicata and Calabria) NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions? What 
reasons would you give for the different take-up in different regions?   
 
2. Despite the fact that there are evident signs of regional economic progress within 
Italy, some of the Italian NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions have a lower GDP per capita 
level, higher level of unemployment and lower level of employment compared to other 
Italian NUTS 2 regions, as well as compared to other EU NUTS 2 regions. In your 
opinion, why is convergence in Italian NUTS 2 regions proceeding at different speeds? 
Could you please identify the main reasons for this, focusing mainly on GDP per capita, 
employment and unemployment rates? Do you think that within the next five and ten 
years divergence across Italian regions is likely to increase, or decrease?  
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3. In your opinion, what is the relative importance of the ERDF, the ESF, the FIFG and 
the EAGGF towards meeting the objective of regional convergence and regional 
development in Italy? Do these funds have different approaches towards the objective of 
regional development?   
 
4. Can we argue that, despite some implementation difficulties, EU Structural Policy 
(through its aforementioned funds) has so far had beneficial effects towards the target of 
economic and social cohesion in Italy? 
  
5. In your opinion, are there any significant differences in terms of a) economic policies 
and b) economic performance (in terms of GDP per capita, employment and 
unemployment) between the NUTS 2 regions within Italy? If so, what are those 
differences? 
  
6. How have the CASMEZ, the Department for the Mezzogiorno and the Agensud 
contributed to regional development in the regions of Basilicata, Campania, Calabria 
and Puglia? Do you believe that they have contributed in a positive way towards the 
target of regional economic convergence in these regions? Would you suggest that they 
have pursued policies that are consistent with those of the EU, national government and 
regional authorities, or do you think that the EU policies and principles (additionality, 
subsidiarity, partnership, strategic planning) have been bypassed? 
 
7. How have the National Operational Programmes so far contributed to the adequate 
implementation of the Community Support Framework at a national level in Italy, and 
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which are the most important training programmes (in your opinion) that have taken 
place within the Objective 1 Regions of Italy since 1989? 
  
8. Would you say that in Italy, policies of regional development have been transformed 
from exclusively “top-down” (highly centralised) to a combination of “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” (more decentralised) ones? According to many 
authors/economists/political scientists, a top-down approach takes place when decisions 
regarding regional policy are taken from the central government without consultation 
with regional-local authorities. Thus, regional development begins “outside” the region. 
In terms of the bottom-up approach, there is an efficient cooperation between national 
and regional authorities in order for regional development to start “inside” the region. 
Do you agree with this definition/meaning of the “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
approaches, or do you define them in another way? Can we argue that this 
transformation has mainly taken place during the current (2007-2013) and the previous 
(2000-2006) CSF Cycle? Are there any cases where a pure “bottom-up” approach has 
taken place in Italy? 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS  
1. Within the Mezzogiorno, two NUTS 2 regions (Abruzzo and Molise) have already 
exited Objective 1, two others (Basilicata and Sardegna) are highly likely to exit 
Objective 1 by 2013 (according to the EU), whereas the remaining regions, despite the 
fact that they have made obvious progress, are not likely to exit Objective 1 by 2013. In 
your opinion, and taking into account the differences in terms of regional development, 
would you suggest that the Mezzogiorno regions are cooperative, or competitive? 
Would you argue that the more “advanced” regions (those with higher GDP per capita 
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and lower unemployment) offer a substantial degree of assistance to pursue regional 
economic convergence within Italy? 
 
2. How has inter-regional migration so far affected regional development within the 
NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions of Italy? Would you say that if an educated and 
experienced labour force leaves a specific region, then this slows down or hampers 
progress and development within this region? Would you say that the region that 
welcomes an educated and experienced labour force is highly likely to experience 
development (in the form of GDP per capita increase, creation of new jobs, 
technological progress, new knowledge and updating/modernisation of production and 
administration systems)? On what evidence do you base your answer? 
     
3. In your opinion, how important is an advanced monitoring system (with 
systematically available data) for regional development within the NUTS 2 Objective 1 
Regions of Italy?      
 
4. How have the ex-ante, itinere or ex-post evaluation reports helped in the promotion 
of regional development in the NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions of Italy? Could you 
possibly give me some specific examples where such reports have led to policy 
improvement (and/or regional development)? 
  
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
MAIN QUESTIONS  
1. Please comment on the progress (in terms of regional convergence and development, 
focusing mainly on variables such as GDP per capita, employment-unemployment 
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rates) in your region that has so far taken place during the last three CSF Cycles as well 
as the current one. How would you rate the progress of your region compared to that of 
the other Italian regions and how do you think your region is going to perform in the 
next five and ten years compared to the other NUTS 2 regions in Italy?  
    
2. In your opinion, what is the relative importance of the ERDF, the ESF, the FIFG and 
the EAGGF towards meeting the objective of regional convergence and regional 
development in your region? Do these funds have different approaches towards the 
objective of regional development?   
  
3. Can we argue that, despite some implementation difficulties, EU Structural Policy 
(through its aforementioned funds) has so far had beneficial effects towards the target of 
economic and social cohesion in your region? 
     
4. How have the CASMEZ, the Department for the Mezzogiorno and the Agensud 
contributed to regional development in your region? Do you believe that they have 
contributed in a positive way? Would you suggest that they have pursued policies that 
are consistent with those of the EU, national government and regional authorities, or do 
you think that the EU policies and principles (additionality, subsidiarity, partnership, 
strategic planning) have been bypassed?  
 
5. How have the Regional Operational Programmes and the multi-year integrated 
programmes (particularly since 1989) so far contributed to the adequate implementation 
of the Community Support Framework at a regional level in Italy and to regional 
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development (within the Objective 1 Regions)? Please also refer to the impact of these 
programmes on your region.  
 
6. In terms of regional policy, implementation difficulties are strongly related to the 
degree of regional administrative capacity. According to many 
authors/economists/political scientists, regional administrative capacity includes the 
degree of the ability of regional authorities and employees to successfully deal with 
regional policies and effectively carry out plans for regional economic development. 
This ability is necessary for the sufficient implementation of funds, according to 
existing rules and regulations and according to the basic EU Regional Policy principles 
(subsidiarity, additionality, partnership, strategic planning). How do you define the term 
“administrative capacity” and how do you assess administrative capacity in your region, 
particularly since 1989? What measures are needed (if any) to a) increase the 
effectiveness of administrative capacity building and b) to complement EU Regional 
Policy, or to contribute to EU Regional Policy efficiently? 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS  
1. Within the Mezzogiorno, two NUTS 2 regions (Abruzzo and Molise) have already 
exited Objective 1, two others (Basilicata and Sardegna) are highly likely to exit 
Objective 1 by 2013 (according to the EU), whereas the remaining regions, despite the 
fact that they have made obvious progress, are not likely to exit Objective 1 by 2013. In 
your opinion, and taking into account the differences in terms of regional development, 
would you suggest that the Mezzogiorno regions are cooperative, or competitive? 
Would you argue that the more “advanced” regions (those with higher GDP per capita 
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and lower unemployment) offer a substantial degree of assistance to the others to pursue 
regional economic convergence? 
 
2. How has inter-regional migration so far affected regional development within your 
region? Would you say that if an educated and experienced labour force leaves a 
specific region, then this slows down, or hampers progress and development within this 
region? Would you say that the region that welcomes an educated and experienced 
labour force is highly likely to experience development (in the form of GDP per capita 
increase, creation of new jobs, technological progress, new knowledge and 
updating/modernisation of production and administration systems)? On what evidence 
do you base your answer? 
     
3. This question is about the administrative personnel within your region in the context 
of the Cohesion Policy. In your opinion, can a small or a large number of internal 
departments lead to a more effective coordination of actions and to an increased overall 
efficiency? On what evidence do you base your answer? 
   
4. In your opinion, how important is an advanced monitoring system (with 
systematically available data) for regional development within your region?      
 
5. How have the ex-ante, itinere or ex-post evaluation reports helped in the promotion 
of regional development in your region? Could you possibly give me some specific 
examples where such reports have led to policy improvement (and/or regional 
development)? 
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SPAIN QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
      A third questionnaire was administered to Spanish national and regional officials. 
It comprises 12 questions to national government officials (eight main and four 
supplementary) and 11 to regional government officials (six main and five 
supplementary).  
 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT  
MAIN QUESTIONS  
1. After 15 years of receiving SFs, why do some NUTS 2 Spanish regions spend more 
of their allocated resources than others? In other words why is the regional response 
level, in terms of spending the available resources, significantly different between some 
current Spanish (e.g. Comunidad Valenciana and Extremadura) NUTS 2 Objective 1 
Regions? What reasons would you give for the different take-up in different regions?   
 
2. Despite the fact that there are evident signs of regional economic progress within 
Spain, some of the Spanish NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions have a lower GDP per capita 
level, higher level of unemployment and lower level of employment compared to other 
Spanish NUTS 2 regions, as well as compared to other EU NUTS 2 regions. In your 
opinion, why is convergence in Spanish NUTS 2 regions proceeding at different 
speeds? Could you please identify the main reasons for this, focusing mainly on GDP 
per capita, employment and unemployment rates? Do you think that within the next five 
and ten years divergence across Spanish regions is likely to increase, or decrease?   
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3. In your opinion, what is the relative importance of the ERDF, the ESF, the FIFG and 
the EAGGF towards meeting the objective of regional convergence and regional 
development in Spain? Do these funds have different approaches towards the objective 
of regional development?   
 
4. Can we argue that, despite some implementation difficulties, EU Structural Policy 
(through its aforementioned funds) has so far had beneficial effects towards the target of 
economic and social cohesion in Spain? 
  
5. In your opinion, are there any significant differences in terms of a) economic policies 
and b) economic performance (in terms of GDP per capita, employment and 
unemployment) between the NUTS 2 regions within Spain? If so, what are those 
differences? 
  
6. How has the FCI contributed to regional development in the regions of Castilla y 
León, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía and Extremadura? Do you believe that it has 
contributed in a positive way towards the target of regional economic convergence in 
your region? Would you suggest that it has pursued policies that are consistent with 
those of the EU, national government and regional authorities, or do you think that the 
EU policies and principles (additionality, subsidiarity, partnership, strategic planning) 
have been bypassed?    
 
7. How have the National Operational Programmes so far contributed to the adequate 
implementation of the Community Support Framework at a national level in Spain, and 
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which are the most important training programmes (in your opinion) that have taken 
place within the Objective 1 Regions of Spain since 1989? 
  
8. Would you say that in Spain, policies of regional development have been transformed 
from exclusively “top-down” (highly centralised) to a combination of “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” (more decentralised) ones? According to many 
authors/economists/political scientists, a top-down approach takes place when decisions 
regarding regional policy are taken from the central government without consultation 
with regional-local authorities. Thus, regional development begins “outside” the region. 
In terms of the bottom-up approach, there is an efficient cooperation between national 
and regional authorities in order for regional development to start “inside” the region. 
Do you agree with this definition/meaning of the “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
approaches, or do you define them in another way? Can we argue that this 
transformation has mainly taken place during the current (2007-2013) and the previous 
(2000-2006) CSF Cycle? Are there any cases where a pure “bottom-up” approach has 
taken place in Spain? 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
1. Within Spain, one NUTS 2 region that used to be part of the Objective 1 (Cantabria), 
has already exited, five others (Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Asturias, 
Canarias and Murcia) are highly likely to exit Objective 1 by 2013 (according to the 
EU), whereas the remaining regions, despite the fact that they have made obvious 
progress, are not likely to exit Objective 1 by 2013. In your opinion, and taking into 
account the differences in terms of regional economic development, would you suggest 
that the Spanish NUTS 2 regions are cooperative, or competitive? Would you argue that 
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the more “advanced” regions (those with higher GDP per capita and lower 
unemployment) offer a substantial degree of assistance to pursue regional economic 
convergence within Spain?   
 
2. How has inter-regional migration so far affected regional development within the 
NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions of Spain? Would you say that if an educated and 
experienced labour force leaves a specific region, then this slows down, or hampers 
progress and development within this region? Would you say that the region that 
welcomes an educated and experienced labour force is highly likely to experience 
development (in the form of GDP per capita increase, creation of new jobs, 
technological progress, new knowledge and updating/modernisation of production and 
administration systems)? On what evidence do you base your answer? 
   
3. In your opinion, how important is an advanced monitoring system (with 
systematically available data) for regional development within the NUTS 2 Objective 1 
Regions of Spain?      
 
4. How have the ex-ante, itinere or ex-post evaluation reports helped in the promotion 
of regional development in the NUTS 2 Objective 1 Regions of Spain? Could you 
possibly give me some specific examples where such reports have led to policy 
improvement (and/or regional development)? 
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REGIONAL GOVERNMENT  
MAIN QUESTIONS 
1. Please comment on the progress (in terms of regional convergence and development, 
focusing mainly on variables such as GDP per capita, employment-unemployment 
rates) in your region that has so far taken place during the last three CSF Cycles as well 
as the current one. How would you rate the progress of your region compared to that of 
the other Spanish regions and how do you think your region is going to do in the next 
five and ten years compared to the other NUTS 2 regions in Spain?  
    
2. In your opinion, what is the relative importance of the ERDF, the ESF, the FIFG and 
the EAGGF towards meeting the objective of regional convergence and regional 
development in your region? Do these funds have different approaches towards the 
objective of regional development?   
    
3. Can we argue that, despite some implementation difficulties, EU Structural Policy 
(through its aforementioned funds) has so far had beneficial effects towards the target of 
economic and social cohesion in your region?   
 
4. How has the FCI contributed to regional development in your region? Do you believe 
that it has contributed in a positive way? Would you suggest that it has pursued policies 
that are consistent with those of the EU, national government and regional authorities, 
or do you think that the EU policies and principles (additionality, subsidiarity, 
partnership, strategic planning) have been bypassed? 
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5. How have the Regional Operational Programmes and the multi-year integrated 
programmes (particularly since 1989) so far contributed to the adequate implementation 
of the Community Support Framework at a regional level in Spain and to regional 
development (within the Objective 1 Regions)? Please also refer to the impact of these 
programmes on your region. 
  
6. In terms of regional policy, implementation difficulties are strongly related to the 
degree of regional administrative capacity. According to many 
authors/economists/political scientists, regional administrative capacity includes the 
degree of the ability of regional authorities and employees to successfully deal with 
regional policies and effectively carry out plans for regional economic development. 
This ability is necessary for the sufficient implementation of funds, according to 
existing rules and regulations and according to the basic EU Regional Policy principles 
(subsidiarity, additionality, partnership, strategic planning). How do you define the term 
“administrative capacity” and how do you assess administrative capacity in your region, 
particularly since 1989? What measures are needed (if any) in order a) to increase 
effectiveness of administrative capacity building and b) to complement EU Regional 
Policy, or to contribute to EU Regional Policy efficiently? 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
1. Within Spain, one NUTS 2 region that used to be part of the Objective 1 (Cantabria), 
has already exited, five others (Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Asturias, 
Canarias and Murcia) are highly likely to exit Objective 1 by 2013 (according to the 
EU), whereas the remaining regions, despite the fact that they have made obvious 
progress, are not likely to exit Objective 1 by 2013. In your opinion, and taking into 
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account the differences in terms of regional economic development, would you suggest 
that the Spanish NUTS 2 regions are cooperative, or competitive? Would you argue that 
the more “advanced” regions (those with higher GDP per capita and lower 
unemployment) offer a substantial degree of assistance to the others in order to pursue 
regional economic convergence?   
 
2. How has inter-regional migration so far affected regional development within your 
region? Would you say that if an educated and experienced labour force leaves a 
specific region, then this slows down, or hampers progress and development within this 
region? Would you say that the region that welcomes an educated and experienced 
labour force is highly likely to experience development (in the form of GDP per capita 
increase, creation of new jobs, technological progress, new knowledge and 
updating/modernisation of production and administration systems)? On what evidence 
do you base your answer? 
     
3. This question is about the administrative personnel within your region in the context 
of the Cohesion Policy. In your opinion, can a small or a large number of internal 
departments lead to a more effective coordination of actions and to an increased overall 
efficiency? On what evidence do you base your answer? 
   
4. In your opinion, how important is an advanced monitoring system (with 
systematically available data) for regional development within your region?     
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5. How have the ex-ante, itinere or ex-post evaluation reports helped in the promotion 
of regional development in your region? Could you possibly give me some specific 
examples where such reports have led to policy improvement (and/or regional 
development)? 
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RESEARCH ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES EMERGING FROM THE 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
 
      The next step is the creation of a synthesising table, which can be used as a guide to 
point out how the research questions lead us to conclusions on Regional Policy 
objectives. Also the table summarises the issues that are included in the questionnaires 
in order to a) ensure that the majority of important issues regarding regional policy have 
indeed been covered, and b) clearly distinguish which issues are covered at each of the 
three levels: EU, national and regional. 
A1: POLICY-History and changes over time 
A2: POLICY-Actual policy (general direction) 
A3: POLICY-Actual policy (specific issues) 
A4: POLICY-Compatibility with policies at other levels (EU-national-regional) 
A5: POLICY-Comparison with policies at other levels (EU-national-regional) 
A6: POLICY-Comparison with policies in other NUTS 2 regions of the same country  
A7: POLICY-Comparison with policies in the other country of the study 
A8: POLICY-Comparison with policies in other EU Member States 
A9: POLICY-Governance/institutional issues 
B1: OUTCOMES-Evaluation/assessment/conclusions regarding past policy 
B2: OUTCOMES-Evaluation/assessment/conclusions regarding current policy 
B3: OUTCOMES-Possible alterations required in order to improve outcomes/future policy towards 
efficient regional development 
B4: OUTCOMES-Comparison with outcomes in other NUTS 2 regions of the same country 
B5: OUTCOMES-Comparison with outcomes in the other country of the study 
B6: OUTCOMES-Comparison with outcomes in other EU Member States 
C1: OTHER ISSUES-Migration 
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SYNTHESISING TABLE  
 EU level National level Regional level 
A1 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 I.M.1, I.M.2, I.M.4, 
I.M.6, I.M.7, I.M.8, 
I.S.1, S.M.1, S.M.2. 
S.M.4, S.M.6, S.M.7, 
S.M.8, S.S.1 
I.M.1, I.M.3, I.M.4, 
I.M.5, I.M.6, I.S.1, 
S.M.1, S.M.3, S.M.4, 
S.M.5, S.M.6, S.S.1 
A2 5 I.M.5, S.M.5  
A3 3, 6, 7, 8 I.M.3, I.M.6, I.M.7, 
I.M.8, S.M.3, S.M.6, 
S.M.7, S.M.8 
I.M.2, I.M.4, I.M.5, 
I.M.6, I.S.1, S.M.2, 
S.M.4, S.M.5, S.M.6, 
S.S.1 
A4 3, 6, 7 I.M.3, I.M.6, I.M.7, 
S.M.3, S.M.6, S.M.7 
I.M.2, I.M.4, S.M.2, 
S.M.4  
A5 4, 5, 8 I.M.4, I.M.5, I.M.8, 
S.M.4, S.M.5, S.M.8 
I.M.2, I.M.4, S.M.2, 
S.M.4 
A6 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 I.M.3, I.M.4, I.M.5, 
I.M.6, I.M.7, I.M.8, 
I.S.1, S.M.3, S.M.4, 
S.M.5, S.M.6, S.M.7, 
S.M.8, S.S.1 
I.M.5, I.M.6, I.S.1, 
S.M.5, S.M.6, S.S.1 
A7 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8   
A8 4   
A9 3, 6, 7, 8 I.M.3, I.M.6, I.M.7, 
I.M.8, I.S.3, I.S.4, 
S.M.3, S.M.6, S.M.7, 
S.M.8, S.S.3, S.S.4 
I.M.2, I.M.4, I.M.5, 
I.M.6, I.S.3, I.S.4, 
I.S.5, S.M.2, S.M.4, 
S.M.5, S.M.6, S.S.3, 
S.S.4, S.S.5 
B1 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 I.M.1, I.M.2, I.M.4, 
I.M.5, I.M.6, I.M.7, 
I.M.8, S.M.1, S.M.2, 
S.M.4, S.M.5, S.M.6, 
S.M.7, S.M.8 
I.M.1, I.M.3, I.M.4, 
I.M.5, I.M.6, S.M.1, 
S.M.3, S.M.4, S.M.5, 
S.M.6 
B2 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 I.M.3, I.M.5, I.M.7, 
I.M.8, I.S.1, S.M.3, 
S.M.5, S.M.7, S.M.8, 
S.S.1 
I.M.1, I.M.3, I.M.5, 
I.M.6, I.S.1, S.M.1, 
S.M.3, S.M.5, S.M.6, 
S.S.1 
B3 8 I.M.8, S.M.8 I.M.6, S.M.6 
B4 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 I.M.1, I.M.2, I.M.3, 
I.M.4, I.M.5, I.M.6, 
I.M.7, I.S.1, S.M.1, 
S.M.2, S.M.3, S.M.4, 
S.M.5, S.M.6, S.M.7, 
S.S.1 
I.M.1, I.M.5, I.M.6, 
I.S.1, S.M.1, S.M.5, 
S.M.6, S.S.1 
B5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7  I.M.2, S.M.2  
B6 2 I.M.2, S.M.2  
C1  I.S.2, S.S.2 I.S.2, S.S.2 
 
Note: I.M.: Italian questionnaire main questions, I.S.: Italian questionnaire supplementary questions, 
S.M.: Spanish questionnaire main questions, S.S.: Spanish questionnaire supplementary questions 
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INTERVIEWEES 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
 
[Not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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ITALY 
 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 
[Not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 
[Not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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SPAIN 
 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
[Not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
[Not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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APPENDIX 2 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF INTERVIEWS WITH KEY 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
 
 
       This is a summary of interviews with Regional Policy makers. Interviews have 
been conducted with regional, national and EU authorities, in a) all the Italian 
(Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata) and Spanish NUTS 2 regions (Castilla y León, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía, Extremadura) included in the thesis, b) the 
Ministries of Economics and Development of Italy and Spain and c) the European 
Commission.  
       As already mentioned in the main part of the thesis, the reason for choosing the 
aforementioned regions is the fact that they are representative of different levels of 
economic development, according to the three main variables (GDP, employment and 
unemployment levels) on which the thesis is based. The findings concerning these 
regions are indicative of those I would gather about the regions that were not chosen 
and, therefore, it will be possible to generalise my results for the Italian and Spanish 
NUTS 2 regions for the whole of Italy and Spain respectively  
       The interviews conducted with National and EU authorities are also indicative of 
my attempt to offer a more “complete” result regarding the current economic situation. 
The findings originate from all three levels of government (EU, national and regional), 
not only from the regional level. The interviewees were specifically chosen due to their 
knowledge of the subject. This knowledge can be observed by the details they have 
provided me with, in the context of regional policy, at all three aforementioned levels.  
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       The process of finding these interviewees was troublesome. There were two main 
difficulties; the first was the unsatisfactory guidance provided by the regions’ websites, 
which actually did not provide adequate information, either on the qualifications of the 
potential interviewees, or their contact details. The second was the language problem. 
       Personally, I speak English, French and a little Italian. However, it was difficult to 
communicate in either English or French, even with some of the interviewees working 
in the European Commission. This is why I relied on two translators (one Spanish and 
one Italian), teacher of Spanish Marian Hernandez and teacher of Italian Maria Lucia 
Donati, and their help was priceless. The interviews were conducted by phone and by e-
mail. After several difficulties and delays the interviews were successfully conducted. 
My objective (through the interviews) is to estimate the degree of economic divergence 
that currently exists in Italy and Spain and to search for the deeper reasons behind this 
regional divergence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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APPENDIX 3 
ECONOMIC TABLES CORRESPONDING TO CHAPTER 4 
 
 
       Appendix 3 includes all the economic tables that correspond to the figures 
presented on chapter 4. The reason for placing the tables on this appendix is to avoid 
duplication of data. 
Table 1 corresponding to Figure 4.1  
Dispersion of regional GDP per inhabitant in Spain and Italy (in % of the national GDP per 
inhabitant)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Spain 19.1 19.5 19.9 20.2 20.6 20.5 20.2 20.4 19.8 19.4 19.1 19 
Italy 24.9 24.8 24.5 24.5 24.3 NA 26 25.6 25.5 25.5 24.8 24.6 
Source: Eurostat, 2010a. 
 
 
-Tables referring to Italy 
 
Table 2 corresponding to Figure 4.3 
Regional GDP (PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average), by NUTS 2 regions 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Abruzzo 103.4 101 100 98.1 99.7 100.9 95.1 92.1 84.8 85.4 85.6 85.3 
Molise 86.9 89 88.7 86 85.2 86.4 81.6 79.5 76.9 75.9 77.8 77.9 
Campania 73.4 74 74.7 73.2 72.8 74.2 72 70.8 68.1 67 66.5 65.9 
Puglia 78.3 76.6 77.6 77.7 76.9 77.4 73.4 72.3 69.3 67.6 68 66.8 
Basilicata 81.9 82.4 84.1 85.4 83.5 82.7 78.4 77.1 75.4 73.3 75.2 75 
Calabria 72.3 72.6 73 73.2 72.1 73.7 69.8 69.8 68.3 67.3 67 65.8 
Sicilia 76.7 75.7 76 73.6 73.4 74.6 70.7 70.4 67.1 67.6 67.2 66 
Sardegna 87.8 88.9 89.1 88 87.1 89.2 83.2 83.4 81.1 79.7 79.6 78.4 
Source: Eurostat, 2010g. 
 
Table 3 corresponding to Figures 4.4-4.5 
Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices at NUTS level 2- percentage  
change on previous year  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Italy 1.8 0.3 0 1.2 0.1 1.9 
Abruzzo 1 0.1 -1.2 -2.4 1.5 1.6 
Molise 1.2 0.7 -1.6 1.2 0.7 1.4 
Campania 3.3 2 -0.6 0.4 -1.1 1.4 
Puglia 1.6 -0.5 -1 1.1 -0.4 1.4 
Basilicata -0.3 0.7 -1.1 1.3 -0.2 2.1 
Calabria 3 -0.3 1.4 2.1 -2.4 1.1 
Sicilia 2.7 0 -0.1 0.1 1.3 1 
Sardegna 1.8 -0.4 2.1 0.4 0 1.3 
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
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Table 4 corresponding to Figures 4.6-4.7 
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 27 4 2 1.3 1.3 2.6 2 3.2 3.1 
Italy 3.7 1.8 0.6 -0.3 1.7 0.7 2 1.7 
Abruzzo 6.1 2.4 0.2 -2.1 -2.3 2.6 2.5 1.8 
Molise 2.9 2.1 0.9 -2.1 1.6 0.2 2.7 1.3 
Campania 3.8 2.6 2.6 -1 0.4 -0.3 1.1 1 
Puglia 2.9 1.2 -0.1 -1.9 1.4 -0.2 2.5 0.2 
Basilicata 2.1 -0.3 -0.1 -1.7 2.3 -1.4 3.8 1 
Calabria 1.7 3.4 -0.5 0.5 2.8 -1.7 1.3 0 
Sicilia 3.2 3.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 2.7 0.9 0.1 
Sardegna 2 1.7 -0.5 0.8 1.5 0.1 1.1 1.6 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
 
Table 5 corresponding to Figure 4.8 
Economic activity rates at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/Age: 15 years and over  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 56.5 56.6 57.1 57.6 57.5 57.7 
Italy 48.1 48.3 48.6 48.8 49.2 49.5 49.1 49.2 48.9 49.3 
Abruzzo 45 44.8 45.8 46 46.3 47.2 47.8 47.3 47.2 48.4 
Molise 45.5 45.3 46.1 45.5 44.7 44.8 43 44 44.1 45.2 
Campania 44.1 44.2 44.2 44.7 44.5 44.5 42.9 41.7 40.5 39.9 
Puglia 43.6 43.7 43.2 43.5 43 43.5 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.2 
Basilicata 43.2 44.1 43.4 43.3 43.3 44.2 43.8 43.7 42.7 43.5 
Calabria 44 43.6 44.8 45.1 44.9 43.1 41.7 41.7 40 39.7 
Sicilia 42.7 43.1 43 42.7 42.6 42.1 42.1 41.5 40.7 40.6 
Sardegna 47 46.6 47.2 47.6 47.1 48.8 48.1 47.4 47.1 48 
Source: Eurostat, 2010b. 
 
 
Table 6 corresponding to Figure 4.9 
Unemployment rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over                            
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 9.1 9.2 8.9 8.2 7.2 7 
Italy 11.4 10.6 9.5 9 8.6 8 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.7 
Campania 23.7 23.7 22.5 21.1 20.2 15.6 14.9 12.9 11.2 12.6 
Puglia 19 17.1 14.7 14 13.8 15.5 14.6 12.8 11.2 11.6 
Basilicata 17.1 16.2 16.5 15.3 16.1 12.8 12.3 10.5 9.5 11.1 
Calabria 28 26 25.7 24.6 23.4 14.3 14.4 12.9 11.2 12.1 
Sicilia 24.5 24 21.5 20.1 20.1 17.2 16.2 13.5 13 13.8 
Sardegna 21 20.6 18.7 18.5 16.9 13.9 12.9 10.8 9.9 12.2 
Abruzzo 10.1 7.8 5.7 6.2 5.4 7.9 7.9 6.5 6.2 6.6 
Molise 16.2 13.9 13.7 12.6 12.3 11.3 10.1 10 8.1 9.1 
Source: Eurostat, 2010i. 
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Table 7 corresponding to Figure 4.10 
Employment  rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 51.4 51.4 52 52.9 53.3 53.7 
Italy 42.6 43.2 43.9 44.4 44.9 45.5 45.3 45.8 45.9 45.9 
Abruzzo 40.4 41.3 43.2 43.2 43.8 43.5 44 44.2 44.3 45.2 
Molise 38.1 38.9 39.8 39.8 39.2 39.8 38.7 39.6 40.6 41 
Campania 33.6 33.7 34.3 35.3 35.5 37.5 36.5 36.3 35.9 34.9 
Puglia 35.3 36.2 36.8 37.4 37.1 36.8 36 36.7 37.4 37.3 
Basilicata 35.8 36.9 36.2 36.6 36.4 38.6 38.4 39.1 38.6 38.7 
Calabria 31.7 32.3 33.3 34.1 34.4 37 35.7 36.3 35.5 34.9 
Sicilia 32.3 32.7 33.8 34.1 34 34.8 35.3 35.9 35.4 35 
Sardegna 37.1 37 38.4 38.8 39.1 42 41.9 42.3 42.5 42.1 
 Source: Eurostat, 2010d. 
 
-Tables referring to Spain 
Table 8 corresponding to Figures 4.11-4.12 
Regional GDP (PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU-27 average), by NUTS 2 regions 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Galicia 74.4 74.7 75.6 75.9 75.6 76.1 78.7 80 81.2 83.4 86.7 88.8 
Pr. de Asturias 79.9 79 81.1 79.2 81.4 82.7 85.3 86.1 87.1 90.1 94.6 96.9 
Cantabria 84.7 85.2 87.8 89.1 91 93.3 97 97.3 98.2 100.5 103.4 105.4 
Castilla y León 87.5 86.8 87.3 87.8 88.1 88.9 92.2 93.8 94.9 96.6 99.5 101.4 
Castilla-la Mancha 75.7 75.7 77.3 76.4 76.5 77.1 78.8 79.7 78.9 79.7 81.3 81.5 
Extremadura 58.9 58.8 59.9 61 62 62.6 65 66.2 67.1 69.3 71 72.4 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 87.7 89.8 92.4 93 93.9 94.8 96.1 95.2 94.2 94.1 95.9 95.3 
Andalucía 68.6 69.3 70.1 70.3 71.8 72.6 75.2 76.9 77.8 79.2 81.1 81.2 
Región de Murcia 75.9 78 79.8 79.8 81.7 82.2 84.6 85.4 84.8 86.1 87.4 86.9 
C.A. de Ceuta 75.6 76.6 80 81.7 83 82.6 86 89.2 90.6 92.1 95.3 97.3 
C.A. de Melilla 79 79 81.6 82.1 82.2 81.4 83.6 86.1 88 90.6 94.5 94.5 
Canarias 88.1 88.8 91.2 93.9 92.3 92.5 94.2 94.4 92.9 92.5 93.3 92.8 
Source: Eurostat, 2010g. 
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Table 9 corresponding to Figures 4.13-4.14 
Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices at NUTS level 2- percentage  
change on previous year  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Spain 5 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9 
Galicia 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.6 3.5 3.2 4.1 
Pr. de 
Asturias 5.2 3.5 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.9 3.8 
Cantabria 5.2 4.8 3.5 2.1 2.9 3.5 4.1 
Castilla y 
León 3.6 2.5 3.3 3.2 3 3.2 3.5 
Castilla-la 
Mancha 5.1 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.1 3.9 
Extremadura 5 3 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.5 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 5.6 4.6 2.8 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.9 
Andalucía 6.3 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.6 3.7 3.9 
Región de 
Murcia 6.1 4.4 3.9 4 3.2 4.4 4.1 
C.A. de 
Ceuta 6.7 2.9 2.8 4.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 
C.A. de 
Melilla 5.8 2.7 2 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 
Canarias 3.7 4.9 2.8 3.8 2.4 3 3.3 
Source: Eurostat 2009. 
 
 
 
Table 10 corresponding to Figures 4.15-4.17 
Real growth of regional gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS 2 level-percentage 
change on previous year 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 27 4 2 1.3 1.3 2.6 2 3.2 3.1 
Spain 5.1 3.7 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.3 4.1 3.9 
Galicia 2.7 2.8 2.2 2.3 3.4 3.1 4.3 4.3 
Pr. de 
Asturias 5.2 3.5 2 2.1 2.1 2.9 4.4 3.7 
Cantabria 5.2 4.8 3.3 1.7 2.8 3.5 4 3.9 
Castilla y 
León 3.6 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.9 3 3.9 3.9 
Castilla-la 
Mancha 5.1 3.2 3.5 3.1 3 3 4.5 4.4 
Extremadura 5 3 3.7 3.2 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.1 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 5.6 4.6 2.6 2.2 3 3.2 4 3.7 
Andalucía 6.3 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.8 
Región de 
Murcia 6.1 4.4 3.7 3.7 3 4 4.3 4.2 
C.A. de Ceuta 6.7 2.9 2.6 4.5 2.8 2.6 2.7 4.1 
C.A. de 
Melilla 5.8 2.8 1.9 4.1 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.9 
Canarias 3.7 4.9 2.7 3.4 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.8 
Source: Eurostat, 2010f. 
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Table 11 corresponding to Figures 4.18-4.19 
Economic activity rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/Age: 15 years and over
  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 56.5 56.6 57.1 57.6 57.5 57.7 
Spain 51.9 53 52.3 53.6 54.8 55.7 56.7 57.6 58.2 59.1 
Galicia 49.8 50.7 49.2 49.8 51.6 52.6 52.6 53.1 53.7 54.6 
Pr. de Asturias 44.1 45 41.7 43.5 45.8 46 47.7 49.4 50.1 52.2 
Cantabria 46.2 48 49 49.9 51.8 52.6 54.1 54.7 55.7 56.4 
Castilla y León 47.8 48.4 47.1 48.2 49.2 50 52 52.6 53.1 54 
Castilla-la Mancha 48.5 49 48 49.2 50.6 51.4 53.3 54.3 55.3 56.3 
Extremadura 49.2 50.5 45.7 48.7 49.3 50 50.8 50.9 52.2 52.8 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 52.7 54 54.5 55.4 56.5 57.6 58 58.9 59.4 60.5 
Andalucía 50.2 50.8 49.3 51.3 52 52.9 53.5 54.5 55.5 56.7 
Región de Murcia 51.7 53.8 53.2 54.9 56.1 57.5 57.1 58.2 59.7 60.9 
C.A. de Ceuta 51.3 56.8 45.2 44.4 48.7 48 57.5 51.9 50.6 54.4 
C.A. de Melilla 52.5 51.4 45.1 47.1 48.5 55 50.3 51.3 53 52.4 
Canarias 54 55.3 54.9 56.3 57.8 58 58.5 60.2 60.1 60.1 
Source: Eurostat, 2010b. 
 
 
Table 12 corresponding to Figures 4.20-4.21 
Unemployment rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 9.1 9.2 8.9 8.2 7.2 7 
Spain 15.7 13.9 10.5 11.5 11.5 11 9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 
Galicia 16.2 14.9 11 12.2 12.7 13.6 9.9 8.5 7.6 8.7 
Pr. de Asturias 17.9 17 7.7 9.7 11.1 10.4 10.2 9.3 8.5 8.4 
Castilla y León 15.3 13.8 10.1 10.5 11.1 10.7 8.7 8.1 7.2 9.5 
Castilla-la Mancha 15 12.6 9.5 9.5 10.1 9.5 9.2 8.8 7.6 11.6 
Extremadura 25.1 23.6 14.5 19.2 17.4 17.2 15.8 13.4 13.1 15.2 
Comunidad Valenciana 13.8 11.6 9.4 10.8 11.2 10.4 8.8 8.4 8.8 12.1 
Andalucía 26.5 24.1 18.7 19.7 18.6 17.1 13.8 12.7 12.8 17.8 
Región de Murcia 13.9 12.7 10.7 11.4 10.7 10.7 8 7.9 7.6 12.6 
C.A. de Ceuta 27.2 24.6 NA NA 9.5 10.7 19.7 21 20.3 17.3 
C.A. de Melilla 21 21.4 NA NA 8.9 17 14 13.4 18.2 20.7 
Canarias 14.2 13.4 10.8 11.1 11.4 12 11.7 11.7 10.4 17.4 
Cantabria 15.4 13.4 8.7 10.1 10.5 10.5 8.5 6.6 5.9 7.2 
Source: Eurostat, 2010i. 
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Table 13 corresponding to Figures 4.22-4.23 
Employment  rates by sex and age, at NUTS level 2 (%)/Sex: Total/ Age 15 years and over   
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU 27 NA NA NA NA 51.4 51.4 52 52.9 53.3 53.7 
Spain 43.8 45.6 46.8 47.4 48.5 49.6 51.5 52.7 53.4 52.4 
Galicia 41.7 43.2 43.8 43.8 45 45.5 47.3 48.6 49.6 49.8 
Pr. de Asturias 36.2 37.3 38.5 39.2 40.7 41.2 42.8 44.8 45.9 47.8 
Cantabria 39.1 41.6 44.7 44.9 46.3 47.1 49.5 51.1 52.4 52.4 
Castilla y León 40.5 41.7 42.4 43.2 43.7 44.6 47.4 48.3 49.3 48.9 
Castilla-la Mancha 41.2 42.8 43.5 44.6 45.5 46.5 48.4 49.5 51.1 49.8 
Extremadura 36.8 38.6 39.1 39.4 40.8 41.4 42.8 44.1 45.4 44.7 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 45.5 47.7 49.3 49.4 50.1 51.6 52.9 54 54.2 53.1 
Andalucía 36.9 38.5 40.1 41.2 42.4 43.8 46.1 47.6 48.4 46.6 
Región de Murcia 44.5 47 47.5 48.6 50.1 51.3 52.5 53.7 55.2 53.2 
C.A. de Ceuta 37.3 42.7 42 41.4 44.1 42.8 46.2 41 40.3 45 
C.A. de Melilla 41.5 40.3 43.7 45.1 44.2 45.6 43.2 44.4 43.3 41.6 
Canarias 46.3 47.9 49 50.1 51.2 51.1 51.6 53.2 53.8 49.6 
Source: Eurostat, 2010d. 
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